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PREFACE
In early June, 1989, the Communist Party of China and its
government used force to suppress the growing student democracy
movement in Beijing. Hundreds of tanks and thousands of troops
were deployed on the streets and around the city's central square,
Tiananmen. It was the "people's army" against the people. When the
smoke cleared, hundreds of students and others lay dead.
This book, consisting of previously published and unpublished articles, offers a comprehensive account of China's recent pro-democracy movement, its prelude, unfolding of events, brutal suppression
and aftermath, and analyses of political, economic, and diplomatic setbacks suffered by China following the massacre. The articles, authored by prominent journalists and eminent scholars, offer not only
eyewitness accounts of the events in China in the April-June period of
1989 by the Beijing correspondents of Time, Newsweek, and The New
York Times, but also critical analyses of the democracy movement by
China experts. Even though several books on Tiananmen have been
published, ours remains the first and only one that provides both eyewitness accounts and scholarly analyses. A definitive work on the
events leading up to the brutal killings in Beijing in early June, 1989,
this book offers an insightful look at why it happened, how the world
has responded, and what the future holds for China, the world's most
populous nation.
Obviously, a book of this magnitude could not have been published without the assistance and cooperation of many institutions and
individuals. We are grateful to all the contributors who either prepared original articles, granted us permission to use their published
essays, or revised and updated their previously published articles for
this book. Thanks are also due to Time, Newsweek, The New York
Times, the University of Maryland, Seton Hall University, and the
Council on Foreign Relations for their generous support and cooperation. In particular, we wish to thank Jill F. O'Connell, Judy Pearlman, Stephanie A. Terry, Joanne A. Pello, John Brewer, Peter
Hutberg, and Tracy Jaros. Thanks are also due to Erik Gartzke, Margaret Chiang, Louisa Perimenis, and Dawn Dall for their efficient typing, editing, and proofreading. Last but not least, we wish to express
our profound gratitude to Professor Hungdah Chiu, without whose
assistance this book could not have been prepared or published.
The Tiananmen tragedy has changed the history of China. Even
(ix)
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though the incident is now part of the history of mankind, China's
democracy movement is not yet dead; it cannot be suppressed forever.
Those who perished during China's struggle for democracy did not die
in vain; their efforts have now been carried on by millions of others in
China and other parts of the world. The democracy movement is continuing. To all those who sacrificed their lives for this historic movement, this book is humbly dedicated on the first anniversary of
Tiananmen.
Winston L. Y. Yang
Marsha L. Wagner
June 4, 1990

INTRODUCI'ION
Winston L. Y. Yang

Since the return of Deng Xiaoping to power in 1977 following the
death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China has made, despite occasional
setbacks, steady progress in its economic reforms. 1 Although little
political liberalization has been achieved, the economic life of the Chinese, especially those in rural areas, has greatly improved. Economic
advances, however, have failed to meet the growing demands of Chinese students and intellectuals for political reforms. The Communist
Party of China (CPC) and the Communist government of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) have adamantly refused to respond to such
demands.
Thus, an ever-growing democracy movement began to emerge in
the mid-1980s and reached its peak in April-June of 1989 following
the death of ousted CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang on April15.
Thousands of Chinese college students demonstrated by occupying
Tiananmen Square, a symbol of China's political power, for well over
one month to dramatically demonstrate their demands for democracy
and freedom. Instead of engaging in a genuine dialogue with the
students and instituting fundamental political reforms, the Beijing
government imposed martial law on May 20 and used troops and
tanks to suppress the movement on June 4. As a result, hundreds of
students and others died and thousands were injured. A great historic
tragedy had taken place.
Following the bloody June 4th Beijing massacre, many countries,
including the United States and Japan, adopted economic and diplomatic sanctions against China. Almost overnight China suffered unprecedented diplomatic setbacks. At home, the Communist
authorities intensified their suppression of the democracy movement
by arresting, sentencing, or executing a very large but unknown
number of those involved in the movement. A new leadership headed
l. Numerous studies of China's post-Mao Zedong economic reforms have been published. Among the earlier books is Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough, eds., Modernizing
China: Post-Mao Reform and Development, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.
More recent books on the subject include Stephen Feuchtwang, ed., Transforming China's
Economy in the Eighties, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 2 vols.; Peter P.
Cheng, Marxism and Capitalism in the People's Republic of China, Lanham, Md.: Univ.
Press of America, 1989; and David Wen-Wei Chang, China Under Deng Xiaoping, New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
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by Jiang Zemin replaced the purged leader Zhao Ziyang as CPC General Secretary on June 24.2
China's political, economic and other problems have not been resolved, however, by the new leadership and its crackdown policy. A
great majority of the Chinese people have lost confidence in the CPC
and the PRC government. Under tight government control and suppression, Chinese students, intellectuals, and others have carried on a
passive resistance movement at home and formed various organizations, including the Federation for a Democratic China (FDC) with its
headquarters in Paris, to continue the pro-democracy movement.
The PRC government is obviously confronted with massive
problems and difficulties both at home and abroad. China is indeed
facing a crisis.
The June 4th massacre in Beijing was undoubtedly a great tragedy of historic dimensions. Until today, however, many aspects of the
massacre remain unknown. While Chinese official announcements
and statements that characterize the democracy movement as "turmoil" or "counter-revolutionary rebellion" 3 are biased and cannot be
relied on, reports and accounts by Western and Chinese correspondents from Hong Kong and Taiwan are often incomplete, contradictory, and filled with serious gaps. The decision process of the Chinese
leadership in dealing with the student democracy movement remains a
mystery. 4 Very few in-depth scholarly studies and analyses of the
Tiananmen incident, its prelude and aftermath have been published.
It will probably take years for a fully documented picture of the various aspects of the Tiananmen tragedy to emerge. The incident is too
recent for scholars or historians to view in perspective.
In order to help interested readers around the world develop a
better understanding of the incident, we have invited several highly
experienced correspondents stationed in Beijing in April-June, 1989 to
offer first-hand eyewitness accounts and a few prominent China experts to prepare scholarly, in-depth analyses of the Tiananmen incident, its prelude, aftermath, and impact. They have either written
2. "Communique of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee," Beijing Review, Vol. 32, No. 27 (July 3-9, 1989), pp. 13-14.
3. Ibid., p. 13.
4. Nicholas D. Kristof's article, "China Update: How the Hardliners Won," The
New York Times Magazine, Nov. 12, 1989, pp. 39-41, 66-71, explains China's decision process with considerable, though not fully documented, detail. Up to the present, Kristof's
article remains probably the most thorough source on this subject even though much remains unknown.
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original articles, revised their previously published reports, or gr~ted
us permission to reprint their articles that require little or no revtston.
It is a well known fact that China's democracy movement began
long before the 1989 student demonstrations. In December, 1978, Wei
Jingsheng, an electrician at the Beijing Zoo, launched an underground
publication, Exploration (Tan-shuo), and posted it on Xidan Wall, also
known as "Democracy Wall," to advocate democratization and fundamental political change. Three months later, he was arrested and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment by a Beijing court for his alleged
crimes of providing a foreigner with Chinese military intelligence and
carrying out "counterrevolutionary agitation.'' 5 His pioneer democracy movement was thus brought to an abrupt end. 6 Professor
Hungdah Chiu of the University of Maryland provides, in his article,
the basic facts of the Wei Jingsheng case and an analysis of the trial
and the sentence. The author has reached the conclusion that the Wei
case is clearly a political one, in which the substance of the alleged
criminal acts and the applicable law cannot meet the minimum standard of administration of criminal justice for civilized nations. The
purpose of the conviction and sentence by the Beijing authorities was
apparently to halt Wei's pioneer pro-democracy movement.
After Wei Jingsheng, Fang Lizhi, a noted Chinese scientist, became a leading advocate of democracy and freedom in China in the
mid-1980s. Orville Schell's article on Fang is included here to help the
reader develop a better understanding of Fang's crusade following the
destruction of Wei Jingsheng's democracy campaign.
In his "Prelude to the Tiananmen Incident," Nicholas D. Kristof,
the New York Times Beijing Bureau Chief, provides an account of the
events that led to the 1989 student uprising. He offers a considerable
number of reasons why China erupted in mid-1989. It is obvious from
Mr. Kristof's account that the Communist Party's power had been
eroding long before the 1989 uprising, which marked a turning point
in China's post-Mao political developments.
5. See Fox Butterfield, "Imprisoned Chinese Dissident Leader, Wei Jingsheng," The
New York Times, October 20, 1979, p. 9. Part of Wei's article, "The Fifth Modernization-Democracy and Others," is translated in "China Clamps Down on Dissidents," The
Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 3, 1979, p. 10. See also Melinda Liu, "~ei
and the Fifth Modernization," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 2, 1979, pp. 2223.
6. The official Chinese view on the Wei case is offered in "Wei Jingsheng Sentenced,"
Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 43 (October 26, 1979), pp. 6-7. A good source on China's
human rights violations is Yuan-li Wu and others, Human Rights in the People's Republic
of China, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.
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Our knowledge of the strategies of the student democracy movement has been rather limited because they have not been fully studied
in the West. Dr. Marsha Wagner of Columbia University, a sinologist
researcher living at Beijing University during the uprising who had
extensive contact with student activists, provides an in-depth account
and analysis of their strategies with an emphasis on the hunger strike.
Since there have been many different and often contradictory accounts of the 1989 student movement and its subsequent suppression,
three first-hand reports by veteran reporters stationed in Beijing have
been selected to provide a more objective, accurate and balanced view.
David Aikman, a former chief of Time's Beijing Bureau, offers a full
account of the events in Beijing on June 2-4, including details on an
hour-to-hour basis on June 3-4. Russell Watson and his Newsweek
colleagues in Beijing and Washington offer a survey of the Beijing
bloodbath. In addition, Sandra Burton, the present Beijing Bureau
Chief of Time, presents a thorough report on the Communist crackdown. The careful reader may compare these reports and develop a
better understanding of the movement and its suppression.
Through an astonishing coincidence, Harrison Salisbury, a former New York Times reporter and editor, spent the first thirteen days
of June, 1989 in Beijing and later published his firsthand account of
the massacre in a book entitled Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in
June (Little, Brown, 1989). An excerpt, written at his Connecticut
home a fortnight after his return to the U.S. from China, records his
analysis of the Tiananmen events.
In his second article, entitled "How the Hardliners Won," the
veteran New York Times correspondent, Nicholas D. Kristof, offers a
full explanation of and considerable insight into the developments that
led to the hardliners' use of force to suppress the student democracy
movement. Professor John Fincher of the Australian National University, who is currently a visiting faculty member at Harvard University, views the downfall of Communist Party General Secretary Zhao
Ziyang as a great loss to China, and discusses the impact of the purge
of Zhao. Stanley Rosen, an expert on China's 1966-76 Cultural
Revolution from the University of Southern California, points out that
China's youth faced highly indefinite prospects in 1978, relying on the
party to expand educational opportunities, provide jobs and integrate
them into the still uncertain post-Cultural Revolution society, but by
1989 the expectations of China's young people had risen beyond the
abilities--not to mention the inclination-of the CPC to meet them.
In the aftermath of June 4, hardline party leaders have reverted to a
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concentration on control, forsaking, at least for now, the erstwhile
strategy of reaching out to the young.
Winston Lord, former U.S. Ambassador to China, who played an
important role in assisting Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in
their 1972 historic opening of China, discusses, in his lengthy article,
the effect of the Chinese crackdown on U.S.-China relations. Looking
beyond the 1989 chill in U.S.-China relations, he summarizes important criteria to guide United States policy and offers to the Chinese
authorities suggestions for advances that might invite positive responses from the United States.
Professor Chu-yuan Cheng of Ball State University, in his analysis of the impact of Tiananmen on the Chinese economy, discusses
China's economic conditions prior to Tiananmen and assesses both the
short-term and long-term impact of the Tiananmen uprising and its
subsequent crackdown. He concludes that if China's contradictory
economic program is not untangled, and if the people's incentive and
productivity are not revived, stagnation, inflation and shortages will
grow worse. As a result, the rising popular discontent may precipitate
the downfall of the hardline government.
In the last article, Winston L.Y. Yang of Seton Hall University
discusses Tiananmen's profound impact on China's reforms, foreign
relations, political and economic developments, the Hong Kong question, and Beijing-Taipei relations. He also describes China's grim
prospects in various fields, and points out that a decade of reform in
China is now in shambles.
Included in this book are several news reports written during the
days following the June 4 killings which may contain information
based on unconfirmed reports that could not later be verified. However, even if they are somewhat questionable--especially about the
crucial controversy over whether or not there was actual mass killing
inside Tiananman Square-they are valuable, first-hand, eye-witness
accounts. They are included here because they so vividly record the
sensations, the fear and the anger experienced by people on the streets
of Beijing that night. Analytic accounts written later question the initial magnified reports of the casulties, but they lack the immediacy and
the drama conveyed in the pieces by David Aikman, Sandra Burton,
and others.
The fourteen reports and articles included in this book will provide the reader with comprehensive and balanced accounts and objective and in-depth analyses of the struggle for democracy centered
around Tiananmen, its prelude, aftermath, and impact. The informed
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reader should be able to judge for himself what the future holds for
China, the most populous nation in the world.

1. THE CASE OF WEI JINGSHENG, THE PIONEER OF
THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT
Hungdah Chiu

THE FACTS
Wei Jingsheng was a native of Anhui Province, in Central China,
where he was born in 1950. Both of his parents were party officials,
and he was intensively indoctrinated with Communist theories from
his childhood on. During the Cultural Revolution, he joined the Red
Guards in 1966, but was jailed for four months early in 1967. With
the gradual waning of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, Wei enlisted in
the People's Liberation Army, which enabled him to travel widely
through China. Demobilized in 1973, he turned down an offer to become an official and took a job as an electrician in the Peking Zoo. 1
In December 1978 Wei began an underground publication called
Tanshuo (Exploration) and posted it on Xidan Wall, the now-abolished "Democracy Wall," in Peking. It included an essay bearing his
signature and calling on the Communist leaders to add a fifth item to
their official list of modernizations the country should achieve in agriculture, industry, science, and defense. The fifth and most necessary,
he wrote, is democracy. 2
Later Exploration became a mimeographed magazine and published many articles exposing the human rights situation in China.
For instance, in the March, 1979 issue of Exploration, an article entitled "The Bastille of the Twentieth Century-Qincheng No. 1
Prison" 3 vividly described the inhumane treatment and torture of
political prisoners in China. On March 29, 1979, Wei was arrested.
THE TRIAL AND THE SENTENCE
On October 16, 1979, more than six months after his arrest, Wei
1. See Fox Butterfield, "Imprisoned Chinese Dissident Leader, Wei Jingsheng," The
New York Times, October 20, 1979, p. 9.
2. Ibid. Part of Wei's article, "The Fifth Modernization- Democracy and Others,"
is translated in "China Clamps Down on Dissidents," The Asian Wall Street Journal
Weekly, December 3, 1979, p. 10. See also Melinda Liu, "Wei and the Fifth Modernization," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 2, 1979, pp. 22-23.
3. At pp. 14-20. English excerpts from the article are published in The New York
Times, May 7, 1979, pp. AI, AlO. See also Fox Butterfield, "Peking Dissident, in Rare
Account, Tells of Political Prisoners' Torture,'' ibid.
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was brought to trial by the Beijing (Peking) Municipal Intermediate
People's Court and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, with deprivation of political rights for a further three years. Wei was convicted of
providing a foreigner with Chinese military intelligence and carrying
out counterrevolutionary agitation. 4
The prosecution, debates and sentencing altogether lasted for 6
hours and 35 minutes (8:40a.m. to noon and 2:00p.m. to 5:15p.m.; it
is a custom of the PRC's officials to take a nap after lunch). The basis
of the charge was the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act, of which the
following articles were cited by the court:
Article 2. "All counterrevolutionary criminals whose goal
is to overthrow the people's democratic regime or to undermine the undertaking of the people's democracy shall be
punished in accordance with the Act."
Article 6, paragraph 1. "Those who engage in any one of
the following acts of espionage or of aiding the enemy shall
be punished by death or life imprisonment; where the circumstances of their cases are relatively minor they shall be
punished by not less than five years of imprisonment:
"(1) Stealing or searching for state secrets or supplying intelligence to a domestic or foreign enemy."
Article 10, paragraphs 2 and 3. "Those who, with a counterrevolutionary purpose, commit any one of the following acts
of provocation or incitement shall be punished by not less
than three years of imprisonment; where the circumstances
of their cases are major they shall be punished by death or
life imprisonment:
"(2) Provoking dissension among the various nationalities, democratic parties and groups, people's organizations or between the people and the government;
"(3) Conducting counterrevolutionary propaganda
and agitation and making and spreading rumors."
Article 16. "Persons who have committed other crimes
with counterrevolutionary intent that are not specified in the
Act shall be punished according to analogous specified
crimes in the Act."
Article 17. "Those who commit crimes enumerated in this
Act may be deprived of their political rights. . . ." 5
4. "Wei Jingsheng Sentenced," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 43 (October 26, 1979),
pp. 6-7.
5. Translation of the Act in Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu, Criminal Justice in
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The Chinese authorities did not reveal the transcript of the proceedings, but later an unofficial transcript of the proceedings was circulated in Beijing and subsequently published in Hong Kong and
Taiwan. 6 According to this source, Wei conducted his own defense,
but the official account neither revealed any of his arguments, nor published the complete text of the judgment, it simply announced the
following:
In order to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat,
. safeguard the socialist system, ensure the smooth progress of
socialist modernization and punish counterrevolutionary
criminals, the chief judge said, the court had sentenced Wei
Jingsheng to 15 years' imprisonment, depriving him of political rights for an additional three years in accordance with
the provisions of article 2, item 1, under article 6, items 2
and 3, under article 10, article 16 and article 17 of the Act
for the Punishment of Counter-revolution. 7
Wei Jingsheng lodged an appeal against the court's judgment to the
Beijing Municipal Higher People's Court. On November 6, 1979, in
one day's time, this court concluded the debate between the prosecutor
and Wei and rejected the appeal. 8 Under the PRC's legal process, the
case was thus affirmed; no further appeal to the Supreme People's
Court is permitted. 9
ANALYSIS OF THE TRIAL AND THE SENTENCE
A thorough analysis of the merits of the prosecution and Wei's
defense is beyond the scope of this paper; a summary of the charges
and defense will appear in the appendix to this paper. 10 Here, the focus will remain primarily on the procedural aspects of the case. First,
although a notice on the wall of the court on 16 October had said that
the trial of Wei would be open to the public, none of Wei's family
Post-Mao China: Analysis and Documents, Albany, New York: State University of New
York Press, 1985, pp. 177-182.
6. E.g., see Xie Hua, Wei Jingsheng Qishi Lu (Apocalypse of Wei Jingsheng), Taipei:
United Asia Press, 1981.
7. Amnesty International, China, Violations of Human Rights, London: Amnesty International Publications, 1984, p. 25.
8. "The People's Verdict-Wei Jingsheng's appeal rejected," Beijing Review, Vol. 22,
No. 46 (November 16, 1979), pp. 15-16.
9. See Xing Zhong, "Judicial Organs and Judicial Procedure in China,'' Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (January 12, 1979), p. 32.
10. Excerpts of the trial proceedings can be found in The New York Times, November
15, 1979, p. A22.
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members or friends were allowed to enter the court room. Foreign
correspondents were turned away. Several hundred spectators were
taken in, but a woman who attended said afterward that she had received her ticket the day before the trial at her work place and had
been instructed to attend. 11
Second, the Court apparently was not confident of the legal basis,
under the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act, upon which the charge and
sentence against Wei were based. The court therefore invoked the
catch-all Article 16 provision allowing for punishment for crime by
analogy (quoted above). The principle of crime by analogy is specifically prohibited by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which provides in Article 11, paragraph 2: "No one shall be held
guilty of any penal offense on account of any act or omission which
did not constitute a penal offense, under national or international law,
at the time when it was committed."
Third, one of the charges against Wei was that he supplied military secrets regarding the Sino-Vietnamese War to a foreigner. In regard to the question of proof required for a conviction, it is instructive
to note that the foreigner to whom the secrets were allegedly supplied
was neither called to testify nor identified. However, one spectator
said that the prosecutor, during the reading of the two-hour indictment, had mentioned several countries, including Great Britain and
France. 12 If the recipient was indeed a national of one of these countries, then Article 6, paragraph 1 of the 1951 Counterrevolutionary
Act was certainly not applicable, because Great Britain and France
definitely were not "enemies" of the PRC at that time. Ironically, the
day before Wei's trial, Hua Guofeng, the PRC's then Communist
Party Chairman and Prime Minister, began his three-week visit to four
European countries, including France and Great Britain. Moreover,
Wei was only an average citizen and held a low level job--electrician
at a zoo; it is unlikely that he was privy to top secrets of the state. The
alleged "military secrets" of the names of the commanders and the
number of Chinese troops, battle developments and the number of casualties, were already released in the Chinese newspaper Cankao Xiaoxi
(Reference News, 13 which has a circulation of several million) and foreign newspapers. 14 Furthermore, one of the· elements of a counterrevolutionary crime is that it was carried out intentionally, but the court
11. See Fox Butterfield, "Leading Chinese Dissident gets 15-year Prison Term," The
New York Times, October 17, 1979, p. AJ.
12. Ibid.
13. China, Violations of Human Rights, supra note 7, p. 24.
14. Jorg-Meinhard Rudolph, Cankao-Xiaoxi· Foreign news in the Propaganda System
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had not proven a motive of betraying the country when Wei talked
about the war with a foreigner. 15
Fourth, whether or not Wei's case was handled in accordance
with the system of "deciding a case by the Secretary," i.e., by the
Party Committee of the area, is a question that cannot be ignored.
According to an article in the Dadi (Great Earth, published on November 4, 1979), 16 the Beijing City Revolutionary Committee, i.e., the
municipal government, and the Beijing Party Committee both played
a dominant role in the arrest and sentencing of Wei. It is reported that
Wei was arrested by the Public Security Bureau on telephoned instructions from the Deputy Director of the Beijing City Revolutionary
Committee, Wang Xiaoyi. When Wei demanded that the public security personnel show their arrest warrant, 17 they replied: "We want
to arrest you, why do we need an arrest warrant!" A week later, the
arrest warrant was issued by the court. However, before the issuance
of the warrant, the court, apparently referring to the Beijing City Intermediate People's Court, expressed the view that it should wait for
instructions from the Beijing Higher People's Court. The City Party
Committee, however, instructed the court to issue an arrest warrant to
the Public Security Bureau. Later, according to the same report, the
representatives of Beijing City at the National People's Congress requested the procuracy and the court to explain the process of handling
Wei''i case, but the City Party Committee instructed the procuracy
and the court not to do so. Only after a deputy chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Tan Zhenling, criticized the City Party Committee and the City Revolutionary
Committee, was a cadre from the Organization Department of the
City Party Committee-not from the procuracy or the court-sent to
explain the process of handling the Wei case to the representatives
from Beijing at the National People's Congress. 18 In view of the process of handling Wei's case, it seems clear that Wei's sentence had
already been decided before the trial, so this is not an independent
judicial trial.
I

of the People's Republic of China, Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 6-1984 (65), p. 5.
15. Carlos Wing-hung Lo, The Legal System and Criminal Responsibility of Intellectuals in the People's Republic of China, 1949-82, Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 2-1985 (67), p. 103.
16. Information supplied by a visitor to China.
17. Wei was arrested after the promulgation of the 1979 Arrest and Detention Act.
Both the new law and the 1954 Act require a warrant for arresting a person.
18. Information supplied by a visitor to China.
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Finally, Wei was accused of writing and publishing reactionary
articles as a means to instigate the overthrow of the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat." But, looking at the alleged "evidence"
used by the Court to render the sentence, Wei only launched criticisms, and had not taken or advocated any violent action to overthrow
the Chinese Communist government. Article 19 of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights guarantees such freedom of criticism by
stating: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers." In this connection, an overseas
scholar of Chinese origin commented:
The expression of opinions contrary to the socialist system
was not equivalent to conducting subversive activities. In
fact, there were constant demands for the abolition of "guilty
derived from speech" in socialist law since this contradicted
free exercise of the freedom of speech as protected by the
Constitution. Wei's speeches might have had a harmful effect on political and social unity and stability which are indispensable for the modernization. On that ground Wei
could be found guilty. But still the degree of severity could
not justify the verdict of a counterrevolutionary crime. The
unreasonable principle of "guilt derived from speeches and
writings" cannot be removed although Deng has claimed the
abolition of such a practice many times. The trial of Wei
was thus "pure formality" and "he was presumed to be
guilty."l9
CONCLUSION
In view of the above analysis, the Wei Jingsheng case is clearly a
political case and the trial process, the substance of the alleged criminal acts and the applicable law cannot meet the minimum standard of
administration of criminal justice of civilized nations. The purpose of
the conviction and sentence by the Beijing authorities is obviously to
bring an abrupt end to his pioneering democracy movement.
19. Lo, The Legal System, supra note 15, p. 104.
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APPENDIX A
TEXT OF ARTICLE USED IN EVIDENCE
'Democracy of a New Dictatorship'
by Wei Jingsheng
(Abbreviated Translation)
This article by Wei Jingsheng was published in a special issue
of the unofficial journal Exploration in Beijing in March
1979. Wei Jingsheng was a"ested shortly after its publication. The article was cited by the prosecution at his trial in
October 1979 as one of the writings for which he was accused
of "inciting the overthrow of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and "carrying out counte"evolutionary agitation and
propaganda. " The text below is an abbreviated version of the
translation of the article by John Scott and Pamela Barnsley
which was published in the March 1980 issue of Harpers and
Queen (London).*
"Everyone in China is well aware that the Chinese social system
is not democratic and that this lack of democracy has severely stunted
every aspect of the country's social development over the past 30
years. In the face of this hard fact there are two choices before the
Chinese people. Either to reform the social system if they want to
develop their society and seek a swift increase in the prosperity of their
livelihood and economic resources; or, if they are content with a continuation of the Mao Zedong brand of proletarian dictatorship then
they cannot even talk of democracy, nor will they be able to realise the
modernization of their lives and resources. (...)
"Where is China heading and in what sort of society do the people hope to live and work?
"The answer can be seen in the mood of the majority of the people. It is this mood amongst the people that brought about the present
democratic movement. With the denial of Mao Zedong's style of dictatorship as its very prerequisite, the aim of this movement is to reform the social system and thereby enable the Chinese people to
increase production and develop their lives to the full in a democratic
social environment. This aim is not just the aim of a few isolated individuals but represents a whole trend in the development of Chinese
society. (...) Those who doubt this need only recall the [April 5],
Movement in 1976, for those who were judged by the court in the
• Reprinted by permission.
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minds of the people then, even when they were some of the most powerful in the country have not escaped its ultimate verdict.
"But are there people who remain unafraid of such a judgment?
Of course there are--and more than a few of them. Several of those at
the top who are drunk with the wielding of power often forget such
niceties as the people's judgment, and others out of their personal ambition and despotic inclinations abuse people's credulity. For example,
the speech that Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping made to leading cadres
of the Central Committee on [March 16, 1979] was an attempt to take
advantage of the people's past confidence in him to oppose the democratic movement itself. He levelled all sorts of charges at the democratic movement and ·tried to lay on it the blame for the failure of
China's production and economy when it was Hua and Deng's political system that was at fault. Thus the people are made the scapegoats
for the failure of their leaders' policies. Does Deng Xiaoping really
deserve the people's trust? No political leader as an individual has a
right to expect the people's unconditional trust. If he carries out policies beneficial to the people along the road to peace and prosperity,
then we should trust him. Our trust in him is for his policies and the
means to apply these policies. On the other hand, should he carry out
policies harmful to the people's interests, the path he is treading is a
dictator's path running counter to the people's will, and this should be
opposed. The people are as much opposed to this path ... as they are
to measures harmful to their interests and to policies undermining
their legitimate rights. According to the principles of democracy any
authority must give way to opposition from the people.
"But Deng Xiaoping does not give way. When the people are
demanding a widespread inquiry into the reasons for China's backwardness over the last 30 years and into Mao Zedong's crimes against
the people, Deng is the first to rush and declare: 'With no Mao
Zedong there would be no New China.' Furthermore, in his speech of
[March 16, 1979] he stubbornly adhered to this and even flattered
Mao Zedong's ghost when he called him 'the banner of the Chinese
people' and claimed that Mao's weaknesses and mistakes were so insignificant as to be unworthy of mention.
"Is he afraid that an investigation into Mao's mistakes would lead
to an investigation into those who were his collaborators? Or is Deng
simply preparing to continue the Mao Zedong brand of dictatorial socialist government? If the former is the case, then Deng has nothing
to fear, since the tolerance of the Chinese people is great enough to
forgive him his past mistakes provided that from now on he leads the
country towards democracy and prosperity. But if the latter is the
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case, we will never forgive him, even if recently he has been the best
[of the leaders]. If his aim is to continue the Mao Zedong style of
dictatorship, inevitably his course of action could only lead to eco·
nomic ruin and the abuse of the people's interests. Anyone forgiving
such a criminal would himself be indirectly guilty of committing
crimes against the people.
"Does Deng Xiaoping want democracy? No, he does not. He is
unwilling to comprehend the utter misery of the common people. He
is unwilling to allow the people to regain those powers usurped by an
ambitious bunch of careerists. He describes the struggle for demo·
cratic rights-a movement launched spontaneously by the people-as
the actions of troublemakers and of people who want to destroy nor·
mal public order which must therefore be repressed. To resort to such
measures to deal with people who criticize mistaken policies and with
people who demand social development reveals the government's great
fear of this popular movement.
"We cannot help asking Mr. Deng what his idea of democracy is.
If the people have no right to express freely their opinions or to enjoy
freedom of speech and criticism, then how can one talk of democracy?
If his idea of democracy is a democracy which does not allow others to
criticize those in power, then how is such a democracy in the end any
different from Mao Zedong's tyranny concealed behind the slogan
'The Democracy of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'?
"The people want to appeal against injustice, want to vent their
grievances, and want democracy, and so they hold meetings. The peo·
pie oppose famine and dictatorship and so they demonstrate. This
clearly shows that without democracy their very livelihood lacks any
safeguard. Is it possible, when the people have no power and are so
much at the mercy of others . . . that such a situation can be called
'normal public order'? If such ·normal public order' is one that gives
to the careerist dictators the right to wreak havoc with the people's
interests, then does it benefit the careerists or the people to safeguard
such an order? Is the answer not painfully obvious? We consider that
normal public order is not total uniformity; particularly in politics,
where a normal state of affairs only functions when there exists a great
diversity of opinion. When there are no divergent opinions, no diverse
discussion and publications, then it is clear that a dictatorship is in
existence. Thus, when there is total uniformity, this must surely be
called 'abnormal order'. When social phenomena are interpreted as
the occasion for criminal elements to make trouble and are used as an
ex~u~e to d~ away with the people's right to express their opinions,
thts ts the ttme·honoured practice of fascist dictators both new and
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old. Remember the [Tiananmen] Square incident, when the Gang of
Four used the pretext that certain people had burnt cars as an excuse
to crush the popular revolutionary movement. Above all else the people should be forever wary of placing unqualified trust in any one ruler
invested with their authority.
"The people should ensure that Deng Xiaoping does not degenerate into a dictator. After he was reinstated in 1975, it seemed he was
unwilling to follow Mao Zedong's dictatorial system and would, instead, care for the interests of the people. So the people eagerly looked
up to him in the hope that he would realize their aspirations. They
were even ready to shed their blood for him-as the [Tiananmen]
Square incident showed. But was such support vested in his person
alone? Certainly not. (...) If he now wants to discard his mask of
protecting the people and take steps to suppress their democratic
movement ... then he certainly does not merit the people's trust and
support. From his behaviour it is clear that he is neither concerned
with democracy nor does he any longer protect the people's interests.
By deceiving the people to win their confidence he is actually following
the path to dictatorship.
"It has been demonstrated countless times throughout China's
past history that once the confidence of the people has been gained by
deception, the dictators work without restraint-for as the ancients
said: 'He who can win the people's minds, can win the empire'. Once
masters of the whole nation, their private interests inevitably conflict
with those of the people, and they must perforce use repression against
those very men who are struggling for the interests of the people themselves. So the crux of the matter is not who becomes master of the
nation, but rather that . . . the people must maintain a firm control
over their own nation, for this is the very essence of democracy. People entrusted with governmental positions . . . must be controlled by
the people and be responsible to the people. According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, organizations and individuals in the administration must be elected by the people, empowered
and controlled by an elected government under the supervision of the
people and responsible to the people; only then does there exist a legality for executive powers.
"We would like to ask the high officials who instigate the arrest of
individuals-is the power you exercise legal or not? We would like to
ask Chairman Hua and Vice-Chairman Deng-is your occupation of
the highest offices of state based on any form of legality? Further, we
would like some elucidation as to why it is the Vice-Chairman and the
Vice-Premier and not the courts or organizations representing the peo-
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pie who announce who is to be arrested. Is this state of affairs legal or
not?
"And again we would like to ask, according to Chinese law, does
the label 'bad element' constitute a criminal per se. In fact by what
criterion does one define a 'bad element'? And on whose judgment is
such a criterion made? If these simple questions are not clearly answered there is no point in talking about rule by law in China.
"The experience of history tells us that there must be a limit to
the amount of trust conferred upon any individual. Anyone seeking
the unrestricted and unconditional trust of the people is a man of unbridled ambition. The important problem is to select the right sort of
person to put one's trust in, and even more important is how such a
person is to be supervised in carrying out the will of the majority.(...)
We can only trust those representatives who are supervised by us and
responsible to us. Moreover such representatives should be chosen by
us and not simply thrust upon us. (...)
"Only a genuine general election can create a government and
leaders ready to serve the interests of the electorate. If the government
and its leaders are truly subject to the people's mandate and supervision, those two afftictions that leadership is prone to--personal ambition and megalomania--can be avoided. No one should blame leaders
for being prone to a touch of power fever.( ...) Nor should we blame
the people for their ignorance in not daring to strike a single blow in
their own interests. This may happen because we are without a social
system in which a wise people supervises and counterbalances equally
sagacious and worthy functionaries.
"Furthering reforms within the social system and moving Chinese politics towards democracy are the prerequisites necessary to
solve all the social and economic problems that confront China today.
Only by being elected by the people can the leadership gain their voluntary cooperation and bring their initiative into play. Only when the
people enjoy complete freedom of expression can they help their leaders to analyze and solve problems . . . Cooperation, together with policies formulated and carried out by the people, are necessary for the
highest degree of working efficiency and the achievement of ideal
results.
"This is the only road along which present-day China can make
progress. Under present-day conditions, it is an extremely difficult
path."
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APPENDIX B
EXCERPTS FROM A PEKING TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
Special to The New York Times •
November 15, 1979, p. A22.
PEKING, Nov. 14-Following are translated excerpts from a
transcript of the indictment against Wei Jingsheng, editor of
the Chinese dissident journal Explorations, as read by the
prosecutor, Gao Wenyu, in the Peking Intermediate People's
Court on Oct. 16, and of Mr. Wei's defense. The transcript
was published by the underground journal Fifth of April Forum and sold at Democracy Wall.
By the Prosecutor

Chief Judge, People's Assessors: There is no denying that Wei Jingsheng carried out an enormous amount of counterrevolutionary activities, given the amount of evidence.
First, the defendant betrayed his motherland by supplying military intelligence to a foreigner. Shortly after our country launched the
counterattack in self-defense against the Vietnamese aggressors to defend our border area, the defendant Wei Jingsheng arranged secret
meetings with foreign agents in Peking and supplied foreigner [blank]
with important military intelligence including the names of the commanders of the Chinese troops, the number of such troops, battle developments and the number of casualties. The defendant willingly
became the running dog of Vietnam. Thus he is merely a scum of the
nation.
Charge Regarding Publication
Second, the defendant wrote many reactionary articles to carry out his
counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation for the overthrow of
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system. Between
December 1978 and March 1979, the defendant wrote over 10 reactionary articles such as the "Fifth Modernization," and put them up in
such places as Xidan Street [the location of Democracy Wall] or
printed them in the reactionary journal Explorations.
In these articles he tried his best to vilify Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong thought as a prescription only slightly better than the
medicine peddled by charlatans. He also slandered our socialist sys•

© 1979 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.
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tern as an autocratic system that oppresses democracy. He said it is
nothing but a feudal monarchy disguised as socialism.
The above-mentioned counterrevolutionary crimes of Wei Jingsheng are directly in violation of Article 56 of our Constitution, which
stipulates that "citizens must support the leadership of the Communist
Party of China, support the socialist system and safeguard the unity of
the motherland."
Our Constitution clearly stipulates extensive democratic rights.
However, our democracy should be a democracy protected by law. It
does not mean absolute freedom for one to do as one likes. Freedom
of speech of the individual citizen must be based on the four basic
principles of insisting on the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the party and Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong thought. The citizen has only the freedom to support these
principles and not the freedom to oppose them.
The defendant hid his criminal aim of overthrowing the dictatorship of the proletariat and changing the socialist system under the
guise of democracy. If such individualistic freedom of the minority is
allowed to run rampant, the freedom of the majority will be lost. The
people will sink into misery and the nation will be doomed.
By Wei Jingsheng

I believe the charges enumerated in the prosecutor's indictment are
untenable. I published articles and wrote big-character posters on the
basis of Article 45 of the Constitution, which says that citizens have
the freedom of speech, correspondence, assembly, publication, association, parade, demonstration and strike as well as freedom to write bigcharacter posters and hold big debates.
We published our journal for the purpose of exploring China and
making it rich and powerful. We believe that only by free, unrestrained and practical exploration is it possible to achieve this purpose.
On the first charge, the indictment states that a counterrevolutionary crime is committed when our country's military intelligence is
given to a foreigner. The word military intelligence is a very broad
concept. Citizens have the duty to keep secrets, but the premise is that
citizens must know what secrets are to be kept.
Question of What Is a Secret
I was never told of the secrets I must keep. After the outbreak of the
Chinese-Vietnamese war, I had no access to anything classified as
secret.

20

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

I am an ordinary man in the street and my source of information
was hearsay and not any official government documents. The news I
talked about could not cause any harm to the situation on the front
line. I took this into account beforehand. For instance, I mentioned
the name of the commander in chief at the front. Who has ever heard
that one side ever lost a battle because the other side [knew] the name
of the commander?
Of course, the prosecutor might say that according to law this is a
military secret. But during the time of the Gang of Four, anything
was taken as a secret and any random talk with foreigners could be
construed as illicit relations with foreign countries.
Does the prosecutor want people to follow the practice of the
time of the Gang of Four?
If the prosecutor thinks I have committed errors because the content of my talks included things that the Government did not wish me
to tell, I will totally accept it, since this is the duty of every citizen.
But I still hope the Government can specify more clearly the scope of
the secrets that should be kept by the people.
The Meaning of Revolution
Second, the indictment states that I carried out counterrevolutionary
propaganda and agitation. If this is so, we should first clarify what is
revolution and what is counterrevolution. Because of the policy of
hoodwinking the people adopted by the Gang of Four, some people
have the following view: It is revolutionary to act in accordance with
the will of the leaders in power and counterrevolutionary to oppose
the will of the people in power.
I cannot agree with this debasing of the concept of revolution.
Revolution is the struggle between the old and the new.
Since the revolutionary tides are different in different historical
periods, the targets of the phrase "counterrevolutionary" are also different. The current historical tide is a democratic one, which opposes
feudal, fascist dictatorship. The central theme in my articles such as
the "Fifth Modernization" is that without democracy there will be no
four modernizations. [The Four modernizations-agriculture, industry, science and defense-are China's official goals.]
How can such a theme be counterrevolutionary? People that oppose it should justly be labeled counterrevolutionary.
Marxism Is Said to Change
Third, the indictment says I "slandered Marxism-Leninism-Mao
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Zedong thought as a prescription only slightly better than the
medicine peddled by charlatans." I did not. No things exist in the
world that never change from beginning to end. Marxism is no exception. After 100 years of development, Marxism has been successively
changed into many different branches, for example, Kautskyism, Leninism, Trotskyism, Stalinism, Mao Zedong thought and
Eurocommunism.
We find that some governments organized under the dictatorship
of the proletariat in which power is concentrated in a few hands, such
as the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and China before the Gang of Four
was smashed, have degenerated into fascist governments, with a minority of the leading class exercising dictatorship over the broad
masses of the working people.
The fate of Marxism is like that of many schools of thought in
history. Its revolutionary essence was emasculated after its second
and third generations. Some of the ideals of its teachings have been
used by rulers as the pretext for enslaving people. Is this not a prescription that is only slightly better than medicine peddled by
charlatans?
Constitutional Provision Oted
Fourth, the indictment states that I "put forth the banner of so-called
freedom of speech and the demand for democracy and human rights
to agitate for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat." I
must point out that freedom of speech is not a wild allegation, but is
guaranteed in black and white in the Constitution. The tone in which
the prosecutor talks about that right shows not only that he is
prejudiced in his thinking, but that he has forgotten his responsibility
to protect the democratic rights of citizens.
The prosecutor accuses me of trying to overthrow the socialist
system. In the course of my editing, our publication Explorations has
never engaged in conspiracy of violence. Explorations is a journal of
theoretical investigation on public sale. It has never taken the overthrow of the government as its aim.
The prosecutors perhaps do not agree with my theories. In my
several conversations with them we have talked about this. I would
just like to add a point. The Constitution gives the people the right to
criticize leaders because they are human beings and not deities. Only
through criticism and supervision by the people can they reduce their
errors.
Criticism cannot possibly be nice and appealing to the ear or all
correct. To require criticism to be entirely correct and to inflict pun-
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ishment if it is not is the same as prohibiting criticism and reforms and
elevating the leaders to the position of deities. Is it really true that we
must again take the path of superstition of the Gang of Four?
The above is my defense.

2.

FANG LIZHI AND HIS ACI' OF DEFIANCE*
Orville Schell**

On Feb. 22, 1989, a representative from the American Embassy
in Beijing arrived at a bleak apartment building in the Zhongguancun
suburbs of the capital and pressed a bell on the 11th floor. When it
finished ringing out an electronic rendition of "Happy Birthday" and
the door opened, he delivered two crisp envelopes for the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi and his wife, Li Shu:xian, a professor of physics. They
were not a little surprised to discover that the envelopes contained
invitations to a Texas-style barbecue banquet, to be given by President
George Bush four days hence in the grand ballroom of the Great Wall
Sheraton Hotel. Their surprise was understandable; since January
1987, when Fang was dismissed from his job as vice president of the
prestigious University of Science and Technology and expelled from
the Chinese Communist Party for his advocacy of democracy and
human rights, he had been an official nonentity in China. (In his new
job, as a researcher at the Beijing Astronomical Observatory, he has
been allowed to retain his membership in the Chinese Academy of
Sciences.)
"I had simply not imagined that we would be invited to such an
occasion," he told me later, his boyish face registering delight and his
voice still tinged with incredulity.
For the last decade, Fang, now 53, has been recognized for his
work in cosmology as one of China's most brilliant scientists. It was
not until 1986, however, when he traveled around the country speaking out at major universities on the need for the party to democratize
its reform program, that he also began to emerge as China's bestknown and most respected dissident political thinker. But unlike
many Chinese intellectuals, who in the past had been silenced by party
censure and persecution, Fang, after his defrocking in 1987, broadened
• Reprinted by permission of ICM, Inc., dated March 28, 1990, from The New York
Times Magazine, April 16, 1989.
•• The author prepared this article before the 1989 student uprising. After the June 4,
1989 crackdown of the democracy movement, Fang Lizhi and his wife took refuge at the
American Embassy in Beijing, where they stayed until their departure for London on June
25, 1990. For details, see Sheila Rule, "China Dissident to Study in U.S. and to Speak
Out," The New York Times, July 14, 1990, p. 5.
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his critique of the undemocratic nature of Communist Party rule and
of socialism's failure in China.
By doing so, he earned not only the adulation of students and
many members of the intelligentsia, but the ire of ranking officials,
including that of senior leader Deng Xiaoping, whose notions of reform do not embrace the kind of freewheeling political dialogue espoused by Fang. Given his vulnerable position within China, it is
understandable that Fang welcomed Bush's invitation, both as a form
of personal protection and as a means of helping focus worldwide attention on the fledgling democracy movement which, during the
months preceding the President's visit, had been gathering new
momentum.
On Feb. 25, the day before the banquet, Fang discovered that
Perry Link, an American professor of Chinese literature and director
of an office that conducts scholarly communications between the
United States and China, had also been invited. Because Link knew
Fang and lived nearby, the two decided to drive to the event together.
As Fang would soon appreciate, this was a fateful decision.
When Fang and his wife emerged from their building the next
evening around sunset, he in a dark Western suit and tie, she in a
white-and-black checkered evening dress and heels, they were in high
spirits. They stepped into the Datsun in which Perry Link and his
wife, Jean Wong, had just arrived with their driver, and set off.
But 20 minutes later, as they came within a few blocks of the
Great Wall Sheraton, they found their car suddenly halted and ominously surrounded by a phalanx of armed police. Thinking at first
they had been stopped for a routine security check, they did not try to
get out. But when their driver was told to pull across the street next to
the Kunlun Hotel-which is reported to have been built and run by
the Public Security Bureau-and then suddenly charged with an unexplained traffic violation, the two couples found themselves obstructed
from getting out of the car so that they could walk to the Sheraton.
As Fang, ever the logician, later recalled: "Since we were not
driving, I said, 'All right. If the driver has violated traffic laws, why
don't you keep him and let us go?' " The police did not respond, however, nor did they respond to attempts by Fang and Link to show
them their official invitations.
When the four finally did succeed in getting out of the car, Fang
and his wife were suddenly shouldered off by a serum [sic] of police.
Only after Fang's repeated requests to speak to someone in authority
did a man step forward and identify himself, according to Fang, as the
"main person in charge of the security for President Bush's visit." He

FANG LIZHI

25

told Fang that because neither his nor his wife's name was on "the list
provided to us by American security," they would not be allowed to
proceed.
"I thought this was quite an amazing statement," recalled Fang,
"for the truth was that they had not yet even asked us our names!"
Shortly thereafter, the two couples finally managed to join up
again and they decided to go to the American Embassy, where they
hoped someone would be able to confirm their invitations. At this
point, they discovered their car had disappeared.
Mindful that Fang might well have been destined for detention
inside the Kunlun Hotel had the Links not been accompanying him,
the two couples found themselves with no choice but to head over to
its main entrance, where a few cabs were waiting. Finally getting a
car, they had gone no more than a few blocks when they were again
halted by police, who this time declared that the taxi could not con·
tinue because of an allegedly defective rear light.
Leaving their second impounded vehicle, this "strange little
band," as Fang referred to them, next tried to board a series of public
buses. But each of these, in tum, was directed away from the bus stop
by agitated police. By this time, it was nearing 8 o'clock-an hour
after the banquet had begun-and with no alternative left, they set off
on foot, a retinue of police cars and plainclothesmen with walkie-talkies following along behind.
Later, Fang expressed his unalloyed gratitude for the way the
Links had stood by him and his wife: "There was never any question
about what they would do. Again and again they reassured us that
under no circumstance would they leave us, that we would all stay
together throughout."
"If Fang had been alone in his own car, I don't know what the
police would have done with him," said Link. "But the unanticipated
presence of my white face probably made it 'inconvenient' for them to
do what they had originally planned."
After an hour wandering around trying to find a phone in the
back streets of Beijing, the four finally reached the residence of the
United States Ambassador. Unable to raise anyone inside, they were
considering what to do next when David Horley, a Canadian diplomat, happened to walk by on an evening stroll with his wife. Recognizing Fang immediately from photographs, the Horleys invited the
wanderers to take refuge in their nearby apartment.
Meanwhile, in t~e banquet hall, Chinese President Yang
Shangkun stood up, facmg an enormous flag of Texas, and delivered a
speech which was utterly out of synch with what was going on outside.
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"We are most delighted tonight to be able to meet again joyously
and to chat freely at this grand dinner given by President and Mrs.
Bush," he intoned, then declared that the President's visit had "added
another chapter to the annals of friendship between the Chinese and
American peoples."
President Yang had entered the ballroom with Prime Minister Li
Peng only after Fang, whose activities had been particularly galling to
Party leaders in the weeks before the banquet, had been waylaid.
Although the state-controlled media has tried to embargo almost
all news about him since his defrocking two years ago, word of Fang's
outspoken views has still managed to spread through the grapevine.
In fact, his reputation seemed to grow exponentially in proportion to
the Party's efforts to suppress it, so that few educated people in China
are now unfamiliar with his name.
This is not to say that all Chinese intellectuals agree with Fang's
uncompromising views. Over the last two years, however, more and
more of them have come to sympathize not just with what he was
saying, but with the fact that he dared speak out so forthrightly. Like
a volatile new chemical element which is capable of transforming a
stable compound, Fang's voice was becoming an ever more powerful
catalyst in changing the once-fearful attitude in intellectuals toward
the Communist Party.
Particularly alarming to the leadership about this change was
their recognition that in the past it was precisely the alienation of the
educated elite which had prefigured the downfall of so many other
Chinese governments. It had been just such alienation, in fact, that
sent intellectuals into the streets in 1919 during the May 4 Movement,
in effect launching the Chinese Communists revolution itself.
Before the much-publicized student demonstrations of 1986,
Fang was already describing socialism as a "failure" and human rights
as "a critical component" of China's reforms. In May 1988, while
Party officials were busy celebrating the 90th anniversary of Beijing
University in a nearby stadium, Fang suddenly appeared elsewhere on
campus, and before a crowd of several hundred enthusiastic students
spoke of the "urgency" of stressing "freedom of the press, of ideas and
speech." On a trip to Australia and Hong Kong that summer, he proclaimed the necessity of a two-party system in China, and repeatedly
criticized party officials-including the children of high-ranking leaders-for using their privileged positions to bilk the state and then deposit their ill-gotten wealth in foreign bank accounts. Shortly
thereafter-reportedly on direct orders from Deng Xiaoping-his exit
visa for a trip to the United States, where he had applied to lecture at
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several universities and engage in six months of cosmological research,
was cancelled.
Undaunted, on January 6, 1989, Fang made his boldest move yet.
With the same calm rationalism that distinguishes his scientific work
on the origins of the universe, he wrote an open appeal to Deng,
which, though appearing abroad and circulated among Chinese intellectuals, was never officially published in China.
"Dear Chairman Deng," he began, "1989 is both the 40th anniversary of the People's Republic of China and the 70th anniversary of
the May 4 Movement . . . . Therefore, I would like to sincerely suggest
that a general amnesty be declared, and what is more, that Wei Jingsheng and all other political prisoners be released. Regardless of how
one might view Wei Jingsheng, to release someone such as him who
has already served nearly a decade in prison would, in my view, be a
humanitarian gesture which could not but have a beneficial effect on
the morale of society . . . ."
Wei Jingsheng is, of course, the Democracy Wall activist who in
1978-79 protested that Deng's vaunted Four Modernizations- agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defenseshould have included a fifth, namely, democracy. Arrested on a contrived charge of having given military secrets to a foreigner, he was
ultimately sentenced as a "counterrevolutionary" to 15 years in jail.
In spite of the fact China continues to deny that it has any "political
prisoners," Wei remains in prison-along with other Democracy Wall
activists such as Liu Qing, Xu Wenli and Wang Xizhe.
Until Fang's letter, no concerted effort had been made in China to
protest their arrests or their treatment in jail, never mind to make an
appeal to China's paramount leader to set them and all other "political
prisoners" free. By publicly raising this question, Fang's letter, with
its electrifying simplicity and directness, had succeeded not only in
resurrecting the names of these prisoners from oblivion, but in forcing
forward the boundaries of permissible discourse in China by one more
giant step.
As if in antiphonal response, a second public letter was released
to foreign correspondents in Beijing on Feb. 16, this time addressed to
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and written by the short-story writer and poet Bei Dao:
"Mter having learned of Mr. Fang Lizhi's open letter of January
6th to Chairman Deng Xiaoping, we are deeply concerned. We believe that the release of political prisoners, especially Wei Jingsheng
and others on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the People's
Republic of China and the 70th anniversary of the May 4 Movement
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would be a salutary move, and would create a more harmonious atmosphere which would be good for reform, and which would conform
to the universal trend toward human rights in the world today."
The letter was signed by 33 intellectuals, not just the handful of
already disaffected cultural figures whom the Party might have expected, but a host of new people, who had much to lose and little to
gain. Their support was a clear indication that levels of alienation
among intellectuals had now reached a new and dangerous high-water
mark. As Fang noted at the time, "There will be more events like this,
because they are part of a larger trend that will be hard to stop." Indeed, before the month was out, yet another letter of support calling
on China's leaders to guarantee freedom of speech, publication and
information had been signed by 42 prominent scientists.
On Feb. 22, the Chinese Government responded in a way as confusing as it was hapless. Using a convoluted form of quasi-legalese
which has become typical of recent Party efforts to stifle its adversaries, an unnamed Justice Ministry official declared, "It is against
China's legal principles for the writers of this letter to stir up public
opinion in an attempt to overturn an independent jurisdiction by soliciting signatures."
Thus, on Feb. 25, when Bush arrived for his 40-hour visit in Beijing (from Tokyo, where he had attended the funeral of Emperor Hirohito), he found himself in a country not only transformed since his
days as head of the United States Liaison Office in 1974-75, but also
steeped in political dissent.
From the outside, there were conflicting agendas on the American side. On the one hand, Bush's trip had been conceived as a nostalgic homecoming which would help cement Chinese-American ties, in
advance of the summit between Deng and Soviet leader Mikhail S.
Gorbachev scheduled for mid-May. On the other hand, as a State Department official who was closely involved with the trip later explained: "Mindful of the whole precedent of Reagan's trip to the
Soviet Union, where he had met with dissidents in 1988, Bush wanted
to include some of the people who had been speaking out in China."
United States officials seemed only dimly aware of how Chinese
intellectuals, lacking the ability to make themselves heard at home,
looked toward the President's visit as a way to help focus world attention on China's continuing lack of freedom and democracy. It should
hardly have been surprising that these intellectuals would be inclined
to place some hope in Bush, the self-proclaimed heir, after all, to Ronald Reagan's legacy of uncompromising anti-Communism.
As it turned out, however, the original list of invitees- which
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included several other politically controversial Chinese figures-had
not been prepared in Washington, but by Bette Bao Lord, Ambassador
Winston Lord's Shanghai-born wife. Having long taken a keen interest in China's new and more independent intelligentsia, Bette Lord
had frequently entertained large numbers of intellectuals at Westernstyle gatherings in the Ambassador's residence. In fact, not since "liberation" in 1949 had Beijing seen such an energetic social hostess, and
her soirees-complete with disco dancing-had turned the residence
into a kind of liberated zone of United States culture in the middle of
the People's Republic.
The list had finally been approved by Washington, but how far
Bush would be willing to take his symbolic gestures of solidarity with
dissidents was unknown, and how the Chinese Government would react never seemed to have been adequately considered by American
officials.
"I knew that the Chinese probably would be irritated," admitted
one United States official involved in arranging the trip. "But I did
not anticipate a major reaction."
As soon as the guest list became public, however, there was indeed a "major reaction." Chinese officials began insinuating that the
United States had violated protocol by not having "checked" the list
with them before issuing invitations. They also let it be known that
under the circumstances, Prime Minister Li Peng and President Yang
Shangkun might refuse to attend President Bush's farewell banquet.
After hailing China's "courageous" economic reforms at the welcoming banquet in the Great Hall of the People, Bush managed only
to allude to certain "areas of disagreement" between the United States
and China, and spoke only in passing of the need to base future relations "on respect for the individual as well as the integrity of the
state." And the next day, when he met with Prime Minister Li and
Deng Xiaoping, he said nothing more about China's distinctly undemocratic political system, or the human rights violations in Tibet.
Nor did he challenge General Secretary Zhao Ziyang that afternoon
when he found himself being sternly lectured about the "serious consequences" of "some elements in American society who support people
who are dissatisfied with the Chinese Government .... "
It was not until just hours before the banquet that Bush's silence
seemed to be rewarded. Protocol officials on both sides reached a
compromise: the Prime Minister and the President of China would
attend the Bush barbecue if the Americans promised there would be
no mingling during the sit-down dinner, and if those at the head table
agreed not to proffer toasts to guests on the floor.
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Indeed, even at 8:30 that evening, as Perry Link was trying to call
the Great Wall Sheraton from David Horley's apartment, the Americans, having not yet noticed Fang's absence, thought the compromise
had succeeded. It was only after duty officers at the Citizens Services
Section of the United States Consulate, where Link had finally gone in
desperation, reached the Great Wall Hotel a half-hour later that the
White House realized something had gone wrong. By this time, the
banquet was ending.
Returning to the Horleys' apartment, Fang and Link decided
that, since members of the foreign press had now frantically begun
telephoning around the city to try to ascertain what had happened to
the banquet's most celebrated guest, they should immediately go to the
White House press briefing room, which had been set up at the Shangri-La Hotel on the other side of the city.
At about 10:30 P.M., hungry, tired and slightly dazed, Fang entered the glittering lobby of the luxurious hotel. It was as if he had
crossed a symbolic line. Outside lay the world of the Chinese Communist Party and its minions from the Public Security Bureau; inside, like
the interior of a Faberge egg, lay a miniature and elegant Western
world, which tonight was filled with media representatives from every
television network in the United States and most major news
magazines, wire services and newspapers in the world. It was, in
short, an authoritarian government's most nightmarish vision made
incarnate: an articulate political dissident loose in the sanctuary of a
Western hotel with 300 members of the free press.
Ushered to the podium in the grand ballroom, Fang stood bathed
in klieg lights between Chinese and American flags, and in broken but
steady English responded to questions shouted out to him from the
floor. Then, rushed upstairs, he was shuttled back and forth from
ABC to NBC, and from CBS to CNN. Responding to questions candidly and with great dignity, he held up his Presidential invitation for
the cameras, told the world what had happened, spoke both of the
humiliation he felt his country had inflicted on itself that night and of
his hopes for a new and more democratic China.
"What we are calling for is extremely basic, namely, freedom of
speech, press, assembly and travel . . . . However, it is easy to see from
this incident what the human rights situation is like here in China ....
How can I tell you I was not afraid? But since such human rights
violations have happened so often here, I am by now somewhat used
to them . . . . concepts of human rights and democracy, although the
founding principles of the U.S. government, should not be viewed as
something exclusively Western. Actually, they are a legacy to the
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world. Only if we view them in this way can progress toward democracy be made around the world. And only if the U.S. acts as a leader
can such progress take place."
It was strange to watch Fang as he made these rounds, sheltered
by an army of interested foreign reporters inside this brightly lit, warm
and comfortable hotel. It was momentarily almost possible to forget
the reality outside against which Fang was making his protest. But by
2:30 that morning, the brouhaha was over, and Fang once again found
himself back in his own precarious world, eating a bowl of noodles in
his small, cold, dimly lit apartment.
Like many others, Fang waited the next day to see what President
Bush's reaction would be to the bizarre hegira which had been forced
on him and the Links the night before. But at the airport that morning, Bush did nothing more than briefly to express "regret" over the
affair, ask the United States Ambassador in Beijing to look into the
matter, and then fly off to Korea. He left the rest to his press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, who later that day on board Air Force One
told querulous reporters that when it came to China, as far as the
United States was concerned, "Human rights is one aspect of the relationship ... we wouldn't want to say that it is the cornerstone .... "
Later on, Bush himself would finally be confronted at a Washington press conference by a reporter who wondered if the incident meant
that the United States would henceforth adopt a policy toward other
countries of seeking "harmony rather than confrontation over human
rights."
"But you know," Bush replied, "there's two schools of how you
do the human rights agenda. So, it all depends, you know, what approach you take. But I think quiet discussion is a good approach to
try to effect the human rights objectives that I feel very strongly
about."
As the President's plane was making its way home, however,
scores of reporters back in Beijing trooped up to Fang's apartment for
their own post-mortem of the night's events. When they asked a
weary Fang if he had been contacted yet by United States diplomats,
he said that he had not, admitting that their failure to do so did impress him as "a little strange." When informed of Bush's evasive expression of "regret" at the airport, he said simply, "It is not enough."
And then, in his straightforward but understated way, Fang said:
"Some say that Bush was too soft .... I will only say that the
West should not operate on a double standard by criticizing human
rights in the Soviet Union but not in China."

3. PRELUDE TO TIANANMEN-THE REASONS WHY
CHINA ERUPTS*
Nicholas D. Kristof

Emperors and eunuchs, warlords and revolutionaries - all have
presided over Beijing's Tiananmen Square. Last month was the turn
of the hunger strikers.
Beginning in late April, 3,000 young people lay nearly comatose
on the ground, feeble and sunburned, but galvanizing all of China with
their threat to kill themselves rather than live without democracy.
Oceans of protesters, more than a million bobbing heads, jostled in
and around the vast square, fighting their way forward to read more of
the angry red banners calling for the resignation of the senior leader,
Deng Xiaoping, and the Prime Minister, Li Peng.
When Mr. Deng and Mr. Li responded by imposing martial law,
citizens flung themselves in front of army trucks and tanks, stopping
and often reversing the long convoys. The soldiers retreated, some of
them sobbing as they abandoned their orders to quell the uprising.
"Our Government is too harsh to the students," snarled Sun Yong, an
army engineer who marched against the government. "The People's
Liberation Army belongs to the people, and it is time for every Chinese to speak out."
The outlook for China's immediate future is murky, but most
Chinese seem to expect that whatever the near-term setbacks, the nation has been set on the road toward less control by the Communist
Party. The uprising of the last six weeks, whether it is renewed or
repressed, seems to mark a turning point, and it happened with startling, and seemingly inexplicable swiftness. No one predicted that the
convulsions would happen when they did, and not even China's most
famous savants can safely predict what will happen next.
But if the timing and scale of earthquakes is uncertain, at least the
fault lines can be mapped. In China, for most of the population, these
fault lines - the immediate causes of public dissatisfaction - relate
not only to vague yearnings for democracy but, more importantly, to
profound economic frustrations and disgust over social inequities and
corruption.
• Reprinted by permission of New York Times, Inc., dated November 2, 1989, from

The New York Times Magazine, June 4, 1989.
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Before the turbulence, experts looked at China and saw an economic miracle - a society that in little more than a decade has managed to propel itself from the bland egalitarian poverty of Maoism to
the new-found consumerism of color television sets, earrings and disco
dancing. During the last 10 years, the average income in China has
more than doubled.
But the expectations of the Chinese have risen even more. Foreign analysts see double-digit growth, but the Chinese tend to focus on
the washing machine that they can now dream of but still can't afford,
the rising prices that seem to cheat them out of their higher salaries,
the bribes that they must pay in order to change apartments or, in
defiance of official policy, to have a second child. The result is dissatisfaction and anger, mixed with bitterness at the advantages that high
officials enjoy. In April and May, these subterranean pressures finally
erupted in the volcano of protest that, whatever happens, has profoundly changed the way China will be governed.
If the proximate cause of the rebellion was this festering discontent, the underlying reason was that the Communist Party has been
losing its grip on the country. This began long before the demonstrations, and it did not happen overnight; the Party has suffered a prolonged erosion of its moral authority - and its ability to intimidate.
Throughout the country, the love, fear and awe that the Communist Party once aroused have collapsed into something closer to disdain or even contempt. Young people used to dream of joining the
party; now they often speak condescendingly of their peers who join.
"Me? A Party member?" Cheng Lin, a 22-year-old woman who is
one of China's best-known pop singers, responded to a reporter's question. "Nobody joins the Party now, among young people," she cheerfully exaggerated.
But it is not only young people who disdain the Party. Just as
often it is ordinary working Chinese who undermine its authority,
sometimes with an extra dash of daring, or even cruelty - people like
Lei Xiding. A small-town peddler, Mr. Lei had tax evasion rather
than rebellion on his mind when he took on the Government. Four
officials went to his village to make him pay taxes on 46 pigs he had
purchased, but Mr. Lei and his family tore up the men's legal papers,
robbed them of their watches and locked them in cages with the pigs.
Then, according to China's official press, Mr. Lei and his relatives beat
the tax collectors for five hours, urinated on them, and paraded them
blindfolded through the streets.
Eventually, the four men were released, alive - which makes
them luckier than some of their colleagues. Since 1985, according to
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The People's Daily, 13 tax collectors have been murdered, 27 crippled
and 6,400 beaten up.
Dissidents and student demonstrators have received most of the
attention abroad, but among ordinary Chinese the practice of ignoring
or defying the Party has become nearly universal. For example, China
propounds a "one couple one child" birth-control policy, but in 1987
and 1988, according to Beijing University's Institute of Population Research, Chinese couples could be expected to have an average of 2.45
children. The law also says women must be 20 and men 22 to marry,
but as of 1986 (the last year for which the State Family Planning Commission has figures), more than a fifth of all marriages involved at least
one partner who was underage; and in some remote areas these illegal
marriages account for 90 percent of the total.
Though Chinese must have permission to move to another city,
Shanghai officials acknowledge that fully 2.5 million of the city's 14.5
million residents have no permission to live there. Waves of illegal
migrant laborers are sweeping across China, workers who search for
new jobs without waiting to get permission. In February and early
March [1989], more than 2.5 million laborers flooded into Canton,
ignoring sharp warnings from the Government. Suddenly, the city
center was packed with sun-weathered peasants, huddled beside sacks
of their belongings -mute testimony, two months before the demonstrations, to the diminishing control of the Government over the
population.
Of course, during the last six weeks it was the students who were
in the vanguard - as they have been so many times in recent Chinese
history. But after they showed the way, many others flocked to follow. Workers defied their bosses to walk alongside the students, citizens from all over Beijing came out to help block the soldiers' entry
into the city, and thousands of Chinese journalists signed their names
to a petition calling for more press freedom.
"The students have shown that the will of the people can't be
resisted," said Yan Jiaqi, one of the country's most prominent political
scientists. "This is now a dominant idea in Chinese politics."
But even as exhilaration swept through the captial in May,
among intellectuals and officials especially there was also a lurking
tension, a fear that flits in the comers of the mind but takes no obvious
shape. To some it is the specter of nationwide anarchy and the disintegration of China as a coherent unit, to others a vision of soaring crime
and inflation that might finally shred China's social fabric, transforming the country into an oversized, Oriental Bolivia. It is these fears of
spiraling unrest and chaos that seemed to inspire Mr. Deng and Mr. Li
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to crack down on the protests; even for many ordinary Chinese there
is an apprehension of luan, or chaos.
Perhaps it is the pessimism of smart young Chinese, their obvious
lack of appreciation for the regime that in the last decade has so palpably increased their opportunities and material comforts, that most
strikes foreigners. Many Chinese hold the somewhat surprising perception that China is in the middle of an economic crisis.
True, China's annual inflation rate has passed 25 percent a year,
and the country has seen such unfamiliar problems as bank runs and
cash shortages. Bribes and abuse of power are no longer peripheral to
the economy; they are the fuel that makes it run.
But all countries have graft and economic problems; indeed, some
people who have lived on both sides of the Taiwan Straits say that
corruption is even more massive on Taiwan. What is more worrying
than the economy itself is the perception of crisis. Inflation and corruption have fueled a sense of economic frustration that lets people
convince themselves that they are becoming worse and worse off financially. Statistically, this is nonsense; even after inflation, the economy
is growing at 11 percent a year, and the overwhelming majority is better off than it used to be. In strict economic terms, China arguably is
modernizing more successfully than any other undeveloped or socialist
nation in the world today. But it is suffering a crisis of confidence.
The diminishing role of the Communist Party has exacerbated
and magnified some of China's economic problems. There is neither a
planned economy nor a market economy, but an economy that displays some of the vices of both. Growth is unplanned, so that investment in energy and infrastructure is inadequate; the result is power
cuts and long delays in transporting goods. The lack of planning has
led to absurdities. During the last two years, for example, managers at
a number of Chinese companies heard that because of the AIDS epidemic, there would be a huge growth in world demand for the disposable rubber gloves used by health-care workers. Though many other
countries were already producing such gloves, companies all over
China rushed to manufacture them. Today, China alone makes more
rubber gloves than the world needs.
If there is no planning, neither is there much of a market. Raw
materials do not go to the most efficient operator - the one that presumably would be able to pay the highest price - but to the enterprise
with the best connections. Provinces have begun to compete with one
another, refusing to allow their raw materials to be processed elsewhere. Xinjiang Province, for example, used to produce fine wool and
cashmere for processing in Shanghai's mills, but now Xinjiang refuses
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to let the wool go, processing it in its own newly-opened, crude factories. Some provinces have stationed armed guards at their borders to
prevent raw materials from leaving.
Even before the demonstrations, the Party's decline had led to a
marked expansion in what Chinese could openly say. People were still
afraid, but far less so than before.
"In China today, if you don't directly challenge the Party authorities, you are basically left alone," said Joseph Y.S. Cheng, a senior
lecturer at the Chinese University in Hong Kong. "You can condemn
the Party after a couple of glasses of wine and it's all right. As long as
you don't take active steps, as long as you're not a threat to the Government, you're left alone."
Now, after the demonstrations have shown that massive numbers
of people are willing to take on the Government, the difficulty in intimidating the masses may become more acute. "There will be a lesstotalitarian society," Mr. Cheng predicts. "People will have more
freedom."
As the Party's power declines, some Chinese find historic parallels in the disintegrating dynasties of imperial China, such as the corrupt Qing Dynasty early in this century, which stubbornly refused to
modernize until it was too late. Perhaps there is something to those
parallels, but there are other scenarios: the rise of Taiwan just when
its leadership was most discredited; the rise of Hong Kong just as the
Korean War embargo of China seemed about to extinguish the colony's economy.
It is clear, in short, that, whatever the result of struggles at the
top, the Party is losing control, and many Chinese intellectuals despair
that the worst is yet to come. But though such despair may well have
its own consequences, it is not yet clear if it is warranted.
The withering of the Party can be seen most poignantly in the
generation gap that has emerged in China today. Many successful
young Chinese business executives and Government officials are. children of "old revolutionaries," men and women who joined the Communist Party in the 1930's or 40's and fought their way to power. The
parents devoted their lives to the Party, but the children are ideological atheists. Over dinner recently, in the company of an old revolutionary and his American-educated son, the son was asked if he was a
Party member. The son laughed, his expression a mixture of horror
and astonishment. "Which Party?" he asked. His father laughed too,
but there was pain in his eyes.
It is not just the younger generation that sees things differently.
Consider Zhang Hanzhi, a former English teacher and interpreter for
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Mao Zedong and the widow of former Foreign Minister Qiao
Guanhua. In 1976, in a speech to the United Nations, Mr. Qiao
earned fame for his stinging attack on the United States.
But Ms. Zhang surprises anyone expecting to meet a genuine firebreathing Maoist. Behind the charming conversationalist is a
thoughtful woman profoundly aware of the quandaries of Chinese
Communism.
"My generation was very inspired by the revolution," Ms. Zhang
recalled. "When my friends and I get together, we miss the good old
days. Life then wasn't so comfortable, but there was a tremendous
sense of honesty and pitching in for the common good."
Yet if Ms. Zhang can wax nostalgic for the exhilarating days in
the early 1950's, when Communism really did seem to be the answer,
not the problem, she also acknowledges that those days are past.
Many Chinese, she says, now dream of a future that is not necessarily
socialist, and they want a more democratic atmosphere. Looking at
the state of Communism in China today, she has misgivings.
"I'm worried about whether all this corruption will be difficult to
correct without big change," she said. And then she spoke most
poignantly about the drift to America of many of China's young people. Her own daughter, sent to the United States in the mid-1970's by
Mao Zedong to learn English and help the motherland, now lives in
New York.
"To see them all settling down over there and not coming back is
somewhat depressing," Ms. Zhang said. "My daughter, my niece, and
the children of almost all my friends. Almost every time a young person comes by my house to say goodbye, I have the feeling they're not
coming back."
Throughout Chinese history there has been an ebb and flow of
central control. Typically, a vigorous leader proclaimed himself emperor and established a dynasty. He pulled the country together,
strengthened central authority, eliminated rivals for power; but, just as
typically, his descendants proved less adept at maintaining it and the
nation gradually disintegrated again until - perhaps hundreds of
years later - a new strongman emerged as emperor and founded another dynasty.
Some see the same process happening now. They liken Mao
Zedong - who founded the People's Republic in 1949 and changed
more people's lives in more ways than perhaps anyone else in this century- to the first man to rule unified China, the first Qin emperor.
Known as Qin Shi Huang Di, he was one of the greatest and
fiercest of them all. He unified China in 221 B.C., protecting it by
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linking various short segments of a wall into the Great Wall. that still
stands. He standardized China's system of laws and of wetghts and
measures burned books, and buried Confucian scholars alive. According to legend, he defied his advisers and tried to build a bridge
across the Pacific Ocean. The first Qin emperor predicted that his dynasty would last 10,000 generations; instead, less than four years after
his death, his dynasty collapsed.
Mao Zedong was not opposed to comparisons with the first Qin
emperor, and the similarities are indeed striking. Both were great, impetuous and brutal leaders, and the work of both men's lives began to
be rapidly undone soon after their deaths. The question now is
whether the Communist dynasty will crumble like the Qin or whether
it will evolve into something more humane and practical.
Mao said that "political power grows from the barrel of a gun,"
but in Chinese history it has also grown out of the "mandate of
heaven" - a kind of moral authority to rule. In the long run, the
Communist Party relies not only on guns but also on some consensus
that it provides a legitimate government.
In recent years this moral legitimacy dissipated, not only because
ordinary people became embittered by the inflation, corruption and
injustice around them, but because fewer and fewer people believed in
Marxism. The Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's and early 70's
turned much of the nation away from Communism, and though many
were willing to give it a second chance when Mr. Deng took the helm
in 1978, in China today there is remarkably little faith in Communism.
Even Party members do not usually believe in it in any traditional or
meaningful way; rather, the believers talk about the need for social
justice[,] equal opportunity and populist rule. They sound more like
American democrats than communists. The result is an ideological
vacuum.
Ironically, these are the same factors that led to the collapse of
the Nationalist regime in 1949, when the Communists emerged victorious in China's civil war. It was also corruption and inability to modernize that doomed the Qing Dynasty, forcing the last emperor to
abdicate early in 1912.
Many intellectuals see a common thread in the disintegration of
the three regimes: "Absolute power corrupts absolutely," as a poster
in a demonstration last month noted, quoting Lord Acton. China has
never had any independent institution, such as a strong parliament or
a free press, or even an organized church, that could dilute this absolute power, that could supervise the country's leaders and check their
hubris. That is one reason intellectuals are so enthusiastic about free-
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dom of the press: they see it as an independent mechanism that can
restore some balance and control to the exercise of power in China.
The Party's decline has been hastened by structural changes in
the economy and society that have given people more room to maneuver. Before, every Chinese was under the strict supervision of the
"work units" and "neighborhood committees" that regulated every aspect of life, to the point of charting women's menstrual cycles to get
early warning of a pregnancy. Now, independent business people have
no "work unit" to control them, and in the countryside the communes
have been disbanded, so there is less authority over peasants as well.
All this has fostered a new sense of freedom, a giddy sense of liberty;
Big Brother is no longer peering over one's shoulder.
This breakdown of authority could worsen as a new generation
takes power. Mr. Deng, the senior leader, was no longer regarded by
most Chinese as a hero or savior, even before the declaration of martial law. But to many people that hardline step rendered him a tragic
figure whose enormous achievements have now been undermined by
his inclination to whim and hubris and repression. Even so, this 5foot, 84-year-old bridge player, probably the only world statesman in
recent years with a taste for dog meat, remains a giant, the last Chinese leader of the revolutionary generation, and the last civilian to
have enjoyed unequivocal military support, although now he may have
lost even that.
As events unfold, more and more young Chinese fear a return of
the chaos and weakness that plagued China from the First Opium War
in 1840 to the collapse of the Nationalist regime in 1949. Wu Jialang,
a prominent Communist Party theorist, is blunt about the risks:
"I think China is falling into chaos," he said during a recent interview. Mr. Wu's prescription to avoid the plunge is "neo-authoritarianism," a theory that many Chinese officals, including Mr. Deng,
endorsed. Supporters of neo-authoritarianism emphasize the need for
order and stability, and point to the economic miracles achieved by
the authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea. Mr Wu's version also emphasizes the need for the Government to respect individual human rights, but the style of government would amount to
enlightened and benevolent despotism.
Mr. Wu and others prescribe such a system partly because they
see a growing risk of urban unrest. As China's labor unions become
more independent and workers more indignant, their discontent could
boil over. One immediate challenge is the desperate shortage of cash
in the hands of the central Government and state-owned companies.
The official press has already acknowledged that some larger state
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companies are unable to pay workers more than 40 percent of their
wages. According to a People's Daily report in April, workers in a
large Sichuan Province factory responded by beating their bowls in the
factory cafeteria and singing the "lnternationale," the song of revolution. During the May demonstrations, many workers went on strike
to support the students, and it may be only a matter of time before
workers stage walkouts to back their economic demands as well.
Further urban unrest might also be triggered by young workers
and the unemployed who congregate in many cities, looking . for
trouble. On April 22, in the cities of Changsha and Xian, they took
advantage of student protests to riot, burning and looting whatever
they could find. A Shanghai diplomat said that city, too, was combustible, and noted that the authorities had recently moved hundreds of
thousands of young migrant laborers away from the city to reduce the
danger of clashes.
The risks of rural unrest are probably lower, but in a country
with a tradition of peasant revolts, they cannot be ignored. The impoverished Government has recently been unable to pay peasants for
their grain, pork and other products, and instead has been giving them
white slips of paper as i.o.u.'s. Peasants in several areas have vowed
that they will not sell their produce to the Government again, except
for cash, and there could be confrontations during the summer
harvest.
Some young Chinese expect the country to fragment, sometime
during the next century, into competing provinces or military regions.
Most foreign China watchers are not so pessimistic; they think it far
more likely that China will thrive and become a strong and essential
member of the international community.
"My problem is that I cut my teeth on China during the Cultural
Revolution," says Harry Harding, a China scholar at the Brookings
Institution in Washington. "There was tremendous social and political unrest in society, you had even stronger regional fragmentation,
and yet it held together." Mr. Harding argues that many Chinese tend
to overdramatize the risks, noting that the inflation rate of about 27
percent would inspire jealousy in Brazil, and that the student protesters are apple-polishing school-children, compared to the South Korean militants.
Not everything is known about what Soviet President Mikhail S.
Gorbachev discussed with Mr. Deng during their summit meeting in
mid-May, but they could have commiserated with each other over the
difficulties of opening up socialist systems. By any normal standard
Mr. Gorbachev's problems are greater: Russians number only halfth~
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Soviet population, several republics probably would like to go their
own way, and the economy has been so numbed by state controls that
it is scarcely responding to restructuring. In China, on the other hand,
the economic problems are not those of stagnation, but of dynamism
- overheated growth, to be more precise - and separatist tendencies
are confined to peripheral regions, such as Tibet and Xinjiang.
Perhaps the most startling difference, however, is that the glasnost
and perestroika in the Soviet Union seemed to trickle down mostly
from above, but in China they bubbled up mostly from the grass roots.
Beginning in the late 1970's, for example, peasants themselves divided
up the vast communes before the Government could get around to the
task. In recent years, entrepreneurs started up tens of thousands of
small businesses even before it was clear that they were legal. In the
Soviet Union, political change came at the initiative of Mr.
Gorbachev; in China, such changes came at the initiative of intellectuals inside and outside of the party who forced the leadership grudgingly to retreat. This process will be extremely difficult to reverse.
It would be difficult for the Party to get a grip even on its own
scattered units. Today, the Party central committee makes pronouncements in Beijing, and local Party organizations look the other
way. When people talk about the Party losing power, in part what
they mean is that the Communist Party as a coherent, centralized organ has lost power. Indeed, the local units have in some cases increased their power by snapping up the decision-making authority that
Beijing was trying vainly to pass on to individual industrial companies.
China's leaders may try to recover a measure of their economic
and political authority, but it will be extremely difficult. Wang Dan, a
student leader at Beijing University, says that even if he is eventually
arrested, others will take his place.
Perhaps he is right, for the student protests have exacerbated the
sense of weakness in the Party, while emboldening people throughout
China who are embittered by corruption and lack of control over their
own lives. During one recent demonstration, a young Government
official emerged from his office to stand with the students and support
them. He gazed at the endless river of young men and women, as
mighty as the Yangtze and as central to the nation's future. "Now,"
he murmured, "the Chinese have minds of their own."

4. THE STRATEGIES OF THE STUDENT DEMOCRACY
MOVEMENT IN BEIJING
Marsha L. Wagner•
I. THE CAMPUS MOOD BEFORE APRIL 15, 1989
China's college students knew in advance that 1989 would be an
important year, but they did not anticipate that it would be a major
turning point in Chinese history. None of the issues that sparked the
December 1986 student demonstrations had been resolved; in fact,
with steeply rising double-digit inflation, conditions on China's university campuses had worsened. Pleas to the central government for additional support for higher education seemed to fall on deaf ears; in
fall 1988 rumors circulated that Chinese Communist Party General
Secretary Zhao Ziyang and his economic reform policies were in disfavor among the increasingly powerful hardliners in the Politburo of the
Communist Party. Economic reform was associated with cultural liberalization; a signal of the impending crackdown on intellectual freedom was the public attack in September, 1988, by conservatives such
as Vice President Wang Zhen on the six-part television film series
Heshang ("River Elegy"), by Su Xiaokang and others, which had been
aired twice during the summer on national television with Zhao
Ziyang's personal approval.
Intellectuals and students, along with others on fixed salaries,
bore the brunt of the economic hardship. Their bitterness was exacerbated by watching government leaders enjoy free access to luxurious
transportation and commodities, as well as privileges for their family
members; private entrepreneurs get rich from profiteering on the black
market; and guandao-Party officials obtaining goods, often illicitly,
at an artificially low fixed state price and reselling them at a high profit
on the open market. In his "New May Fourth Manifesto," student
leader Wuer Kaixi represented general student opinion in identifying
the following grievances:
At present, our country is plagued with problems such as a
bloated government bureaucracy, serious corruption, the de• The author is a sinologist who spent the 1988-89 academic year, with support of the
Committee for Scholarly Exchange with the People's Republic of China, researching a
book on contemporary Chinese fiction. She lived on the campus of Beijing University and
had daily contact with university students and faculty from August 25, 1988, until June 6,
1989.
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valuation of intellectual work, and inflation, all of which severely impede us from intensifying the reforms and carrying
out modernization. 1
In the eyes of the students, corruption represented a barrier to the
development of democracy in China.
The graduate student dropout rate took a dramatic jump in fall
1988; faced with a future of barely subsistence wages and nearly intolerable living conditions as college teachers, many of China's best and
brightest chose instead to strike out on their own, devoting their energies to wrangling visas to the United States, using "back doors" to
secure positions in international companies in China, or simply arousing the envy of their classmates by turning a tidy profit selling blue
jeans and sunglasses from roadside carts. Selfishness, corruption,
petty thievery and dishonesty seemed rampant; older Chinese lamented that the sterling revolutionary values of the 1940s and 1950s
had become so gravely tarnished.
The students who remained on campus were largely apathetic
and cynical. They joked that the most popular "factions" were those
who played cards and mahjong all the time (the mapai, a pun on
"Marxist faction") and those who did nothing but study for the
TOEFL exam as an escape route (the tuopai, a pun on "Trotskyite
faction"). Depression verging on suicidal paralysis was very common:
unable to believe in the nationalistic and Maoist myths of China's
greatness, despairing about the future, many students wondered
whether life was worth living. The lyrics to popular rock singer Cui
Jian's songs, such as "Nothing to my Name," captured this mood.
Other students felt that only a major change in Chinese society would
make life worthwhile, and a few of these students were willing to risk
their status at prestigious universities to organize political activities.
They set as their goal a student demonstration on the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, the 1919 patriotic, anti-imperialist street protests by students at Beijing University demanding
modernization of China through science and democracy.
Wang Dan, a history major at Beijing University, was one of the
young student leaders who in late 1988 and early 1989 organized "democracy salons," informal gatherings of students on a lawn of the university campus to discuss such topics as school conditions,
1. Wuer Kaixi's speech, read at Tiananmen Square on May 4, 1989, is translated in
full in Han Minzhu and Hua Sheng, eds., Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from

the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1990, pp. 135-137.
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modernization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, western political systems
and individual rights. Other universities in Beijing-including
Qinghua, People's University, and Beijing Normal University, held
similar activities, though on a smaller scale. Some "salons" to which
foreign visitors were explicitly invited were deliberately held off campus because the foreign involvement made them even more sensitive.
But the organizers felt it was vital for their classmates to be exposed to
new ideas and to learn about living under alternative political systems.
The speakers at these meetings might be students or intellectuals invited from off-campus; they would be encircled by dozens of students
who would eagerly ask them questions or counter their arguments.
Early in 1989, government and Party officials-also anticipating
illegal activities on May Fourth-acted both constructively and
preventively. Attempting to co-opt student enthusiasm, they organized a series of official commemorations of the 1919 student protests.
At the same time, they stepped up security, including checking passes
of visitors entering the university gates and denying permission for
certain dissidents to speak on campus. On April3, Wang Dan and 55
other students boldly put up on the bulletin board in the central "Triangle" area on the Beijing University campus a poster responding to
university officials' harassment of their activities.
Addressed to the university president, Party secretary, Party
committee, department of student affairs and youth league committee,
the students' open letter began affirmatively, in patriotic language that
would characterize much of the democracy movement:
This year marks the seventieth anniversary of the May
Fourth Movement. As the birthplace of this extraordinary
movement of democratic enlightenment, Beijing University
has always held high the banners of democracy and science
and marched at the very forefront of our nation's progress.
Today, as Chinese commemorate the May Fourth Movement, we, students of Beijing University, the hallowed
ground of democracy, continue to hope that we will be able
to carry on the distinguished tradition of Beijing University. 2
Couched in conciliatory terms emphasizing the continuity of a proud
national revolutionary tradition and the importance of maintaining
"school stability and unity," the open letter went on to propose only
local liberalization, not sweeping political change:
We should begin by working hard to improve the democratic
2. Translation from Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 16-17, with commentary.
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environment in school. It is our belief that in institutions of
higher learning, such as Beijing University, there should be
full freedom of speech and academic freedom. . . . Beginning
last semester and continuing today, from Activity Room 430
in Building 43 to the "democracy lawn" in front of the statue
of Cervantes, thirteen democracy salons have been spontaneously organized by students concerned with the future of the
country and the Chinese nation. These salons have provided
the students with excellent opportunities for the exchange of
ideas as well as for theoretical discussions. Recently, however, a few salons have run into interference from the Beijing
Municipal Party committee, the Party Committee of the
University, the Security Department, and the Party branch
in every academic department. Some students have also
been personally subject to considerable pressure from authorities. We believe that these salons offer an opportunity
to explore spontaneously various ideas; such forums greatly
help to enliven the academic atmosphere and promote the
exchange of ideas. 3
Finally, the students requested the university to take steps to protect
their freedom of speech, such as removing all types of pressure, granting them freedom to invite P.articipants, allowing them the use of the
regular meeting place, and not preventing the student organizers from
receiving diplomas. Though polite in tone, the April 3 poster was a
direct challenge to the authorities that foreshadowed the confrontations to come in the next few weeks: the Party's surveillance of the
democracy salons and of the students' activism indicates they were
intolerant of this kind of open discussion. The students must have
known how much the broader political climate would have to change
before their demands for freedom of speech could be granted, yet the
relative success of the first thirteen democracy salons, support from
their teachers, sympathy of the university president, and reinforcement from leading intellectuals from outside the university gave them
some grounds for optimism.
Inspiration for students to boldly demand these freedoms was
provided by some distinguished older and middle-aged intellectuals.
In January, word spread like wildfire that respected astrophysicist and
audacious anti-Marxist Fang Lizhi, who had been expelled from the
Party in January 1987, had written a public letter to Deng Xiaoping,
asking that in this year of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of
3. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
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the PRC, the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement,
and the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution, a general national pardon be granted to Wei Jingsheng and other political
prisoners. 4 Wei Jingsheng was the author of several famous essays
from the Democracy Wall period, including "The Fifth Modernization- Democracy," who was arrested in March 1979 and was reported to be suffering from mental illness after serving ten years of his
fifteen-year prison sentence under particularly harsh conditions. 5
Fang Lizhi's appeal was especially disturbing to Deng Xiaoping and
other officials for several reasons: it asserted the existence (which the
government denies) of Chinese political prisoners; it emphasized humanitarian action and human rights (which the government claims are
culturally relative) as a universal concern of mankind; and it mentioned by name the activist Wei Jingsheng for whom Deng Xiaoping is
reported to have a special antipathy. Moreover, since Fang Lizhi and
his wife Li Shuxian had been speakers at the Beijing University democracy salons, their relationship with the students was particularly
close, and thus their influence on students alarmed the government. 6
To underscore the significant impact of Fang Lizhi's open letter,
in February a group of thirty-three leading intellectuals, mostly from
literary circles-six of whom (Wu Zuxiang, Tang Yijie, Yue Daiyun,
Zhang Dainian, Huang Ziping, and Chen Pingyuan) were faculty at
Beijing University, organized by the well-known poet Bei Dao, signed
4. The translation of the full text of Fang Lizhi's letter appears in Han and Hua, supra
note 2, pp. 24-25. The original is reprinted in Jiushi Niandai (The Nineties), no. 229,
1989.2, p. 18. Copies of this and other intellectuals' petitions are in the China 1989 Democracy Movement Archive at the C.V. Starr East Asian Library at Columbia University
and in similar archives at Chicago, Harvard, and other universities.
5. On Fang Lizhi, see the essay by Orville Schell in this volume; on Wei Jingsheng, see
Hungdah Chiu's essay in this volume.
6. In the Chinese political system, certain kinds of executive and administrative power
are granted to the state government, while the Party's power is in ideological guidance and
policy setting. In reality, however, the Party influences and dominates virtually all state
matters. Therefore, in this paper I shall use the term "government" loosely-as do most
Chinese students--to indicate the entire central political power structure, including both
Party and state.
Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong gave a speech to the Eighth Session of the Seventh National People's Congress Standing Committee on June 30, 1989, in which he presented the
official version of the history of the students' "turmoil." He placed particular blame on
Fang Lizhi as instigator, and indicated that the government had meticulously collected
data on Fang's activities, including his close relationship to the Beijing University "democracy salons." The speech was published in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), July 7, 1989, pp.
2-3; a full translation appears in Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen:
Reform and Reality in Modem China, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989,
pp. 194-233.
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a petition which echoed Fang's. 7 Copies of these petitions were published in Hong Kong and elsewhere, and they were posted on the "Triangle" bulletin boards at Beijing University and on other university
campuses, though they were summarily removed by university officials. At various points during the history of the PRC, individual
writers have called on the government to offer more freedom or to
change a policy, but this was the first time since 1949 that a group of
intellectuals had joined together to petition the government. The February 13 petition was followed two weeks later by a long petition from
forty-two Beijing scientists, and in March by an open letter signed by
forty-three humanists (deliberately one more than the scientists' signatories, to symbolize the snowball effect), primarily from the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences. 8

II.

APRIL 15-25: RESPONSE TO mE DEAm
OF HU YAOBANG

Thus, by early April, tensions were mounting and resentment was
seething on university campuses and in intellectual and cultural circles
in Beijing. But no one anticipated that the ferment among small
groups of students and scholars would quickly be transformed into a
national protest movement of unprecedented scope and intensity. The
catalyst was the sudden death on Saturday, April15, of Hu Yaobang,
former head of the Party, who in January, 1987, had been forced by
Deng Xiaoping to resign because of his tolerant attitude toward recent
student demonstrations. The students regarded Hu Yaobang not only
as a champion of liberalization but also as one of the few top government leaders not tainted by official corruption. Within hours of the
death of this beloved figure, before official announcements had been
made, students on campuses had begun posting elegies. One of the
most frequently quoted poems began with the haunting couplet:
Those who should have died live,
Those who should have lived have died. 9
7. Jiushi Niandai, no. 229, 1989.2, text, p. 18; discussion, pp. 18-27; signatories identified, p. 19. For a translation of the full text ofthe February 13, 1989, petition, see Han and
Hua, supra note 1, p. 25.
8. On the scientists' February 26, 1989, petition see Qian Linzhao et al., "The Open
Letter of Forty-two People from Beijing Science Circles," Jiushi Nandai, no. 231, 1989.4,
pp. 20ff; on the March 14, 1989, letter initiated by Dai Qing and Su Wei, see "The Open
Letter of Forty-three People from Cultural Circles," Jiushi Niandai, no. 231, 1989.4, pp.
25ff.
9. The full text of this long poem, posted at Beijing University, is translated in Han
and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 6-8.
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By late afternoon, mourners began to appear in Tiananmen Square
bringing wreaths of white paper flowers and streamers of elegiac couplets. This spontaneous gathering at the Monument to the People's
Heroes resembled the April 4, 1976, mass demonstrations to mourn
the death of Zhou Enlai-an event later interpreted as a popular protest against Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four, and the end of the
Cultural Revolution. In April, 1989, those who gathered not only
mourned Hu Yaobang but also shouted slogans and waved banners
calling for more democracy and an end to government corruption.
On Monday, April 17, Beijing University students organized a
large march to Tiananmen Square that would set off just after midnight on the 18th to avoid the interference of authorities; three thousand Beijing University students were joined by several thousand from
People's University and elsewhere. In the early morning of the 18th,
they attempted to deliver a petition containing seven student demands
to a representative of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress, China's nominal parliament. 10 The seven demands were:
1) reevaluate Hu Yaobang, 2) renounce the 1987 anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign and the 1983 anti-spiritual pollution campaign,
3) increase freedom of the press, 4) reveal the salaries and net worth of
Party and government leaders and their families, 5) rescind the Beijing
municipal government's ban on public demonstrations; 6) increase
state funding for higher education, and 7) provide objective news coverage of the current student demonstrations. 11 The students were frustrated and angry when only a deputy bureau chief was willing to
appear and accept their petition-agreeing to convey it to the higher
bodies. This event was important in that it established a pattern to be
repeated again and again in the weeks to come: the students appeal to
the government, following constitutionally sanctioned channels but
asking for more than the officials are willing to grant, and the leaders
refuse to meet with the students or acquiesce to any of their demands.
Many of the students' suspicions that the government was not acting
in good faith also date from this occasion of unresponsiveness.
During the week of April 17-21 there were daily gatherings at
Tiananmen. On the nights of April 19 and 20, student demonstrators
assembled at Xinhuamen, the main gate of the Chinese Communist
Party compound, Zhongnanhai, demanding democracy and freedom.
Their demands this week were radical, and included "Down with die10. An account of this early-morning march is translated from a big-character poster
by a student eye-witness at People's University, in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 11-12.
11. For more details on these demands, see Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 9-10.
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tatorship!" "Oppose tyranny!" "Strictly punish government profiteering by officials!" and "Long live rule by law!" As in the case of the
seven demands, freedom of the press was a major concern of the students, and many of their slogans attacked government control of the
media: "People's Daily cheats the people!" "Beijing Daily tells lies!"
Enlightenment Daily is not enlightened!" "CCTV [Chinese Central
Television] reverses black and white!" 12 Students claimed that they
were beaten by police wielding clubs in the early morning of April
20th; the government denied this and counter-claimed that only policemen were injured by unruly protestors. Angry at the reports of
police brutality, posters with red characters "blood"-reportedly written with blood-began to appear at Beijing University, and a boycott
of classes began on Friday, April 21, and gathered momentum over
the weekend, until a full-fledged strike against classes had been organized in every department by Monday, the 24th. 13
The official memorial service for Hu Yaobang was scheduled for
Saturday morning, April 22, and the authorities, wanting Tiananmen
Square to be free of demonstrators for this event, declared that the
Square would be sealed off by early morning. However, thousands of
students streamed from the university district in the northwest of the
city to Tiananmen Square on Friday night and succeeded in occupying
the Square before the security forces had prepared to remove them.
Thousands of older residents who lined the neighborhood streets and
watched the students courageously marching into likely confrontation
with the police recalled the brutal dispersal of crowds during the
"Tiananmen Incident" of 1976 and were deeply moved. Ordinary citizens showed their support by providing the students with tea, soda, ice
cream sticks, cigarettes, bread and donations of money. At
Tiananmen Square, an uneasy truce was arranged, and the 200,000
demonstrators who had gathered were allowed to occupy a section of
the Square during the official memorial ceremony, in effect holding an
alternative "people's memorial" outside the Great Hall of the People.
Thus another precedent was set, establishing a credibility gap that
would affect the students' strategy in the ensuing weeks: the government was not able to carry out its threat of preventing an action when
they were overwhelmed by large numbers of demonstrators.
After the termination of the state memorial service, students in
the Square chanted for Li Peng, the head of the government, to come
12. A photograph of a poster listing these witty slogans is reprinted, with a caption
translating the wordplay, in Yi Mu and Thompson, supra note 6, following p. 54.
13. Photographs by the author of big-character posters, now in the China 1989 Democracy Movement Archive of the C.V. Starr East Asian Library at Columbia University.
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out and recognize them. He never appeared, but three students passed
through the lines of police guards and knelt for about forty-five minutes on the steps of the Great Hall of the People in a dramatic gesture
echoing the manner in which petitions were presented to China's emperors in the dynastic periods. As on April 18, there was no response
from the leadership to this humble appeal. Student reaction was
mixed, and the differing views prefigured some of the controversy over
tactics which would follow during the next weeks. Some found the
students' gesture solemn and moving, and the cold unresponsiveness
of the leaders provided evidence that they no longer had any conscience or desire to serve the people. Others found the entire event a
charade; they believed the grieving of top officials like Deng Xiaoping
who had ousted Hu Yaobang hypocritical, and declared the students'
act of kneeling to them futile. A more radical group felt the students'
petitioning was humiliating, a sacrifice of self-respect and human dignity not appropriate in the 1980s: "What a self-mockery to use a feudal method of expression in a struggle for democracy in present-day
China! And what powerlessness and impotence it implies!" 14
After the outpouring of support for the April 22 alternative memorial for Hu Yaobang, events took on a momentum of their own. In
fact, the students were faced with a social movement that had sprung
up spontaneously, which they had not entirely created or controlled.
There was no clear leadership, and the goals-such as more democracy and freedom of speech-were vague. During the week before the
Hu Yaobang memorial service, the official student unions, with representatives appointed by the Party to oversee official student activities,
had been attacked as nonrepresentative, and on April 20 an announcement was made that the autonomous Beijing University Students' Solidarity Committee had been established. Announcements of similar
autonomous student unions at People's University, Qinghua, Beijing
Aeronautics Institute and other campuses soon followed. On April 22
the citywide autonomous Provisional Students' Federation of Capital
Universities and Colleges was established. It in turn transmitted a letter to schools across the country, and a National Federation of Auton14. April22, 1989, poster of the Geology Department, in Han and Hua, supra note 1,
pp. 64-65. The same book also includes a translation of a big-character poster written by
graduate students of Beijing University honoring the moving spectacle of the students submitting the petition, and attacking the government: "Your actions have deeply wounded
the hearts of a generation. Your actions have demonstrated to the entire world that you are
a bureaucracy opposed to democracy and freedom. But there will come a day when history
will mete out just punishment for your ruthless actions" (pp. 63-64).
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omous Students Unions of Universities and Colleges was formed. 15
However, these hastily organized federations were initially precarious, and none of them achieved enduring stability. Leaders were
necessarily self-appointed because only a small group of students were
actually willing to be nominated to take the spotlight, since they knew
that this kind of illegal organizing meant risking their university degrees, job assignments, chances of travel abroad, and personal freedom
for as long as there was an individual dossier to follow them through
life. Not all the self-styled leaders had the strong support of the students, and there was throughout the movement sporadic jockeying for
position. Moreover, most of the communication among campuses
took place through the inefficient means of student messengers riding
bicycles; the significant coordination that was achieved overcame
daunting obstacles, including unavoidable delays, crossed communications, inexperience, and interference from Party watchdogs.
On April 24, students at Beijing University called for a mass
meeting of all the students at the school, at the appropriately named
May Fourth Athletic Field. Mass gatherings at stadiums and athletic
fields were common phenomena during the Cultural Revolution; waving little red books and shouting quotations of Chairman Mao, huge
crowds were whipped into a frenzy of unified revolutionary fervor. If
such unity was the goal of the students who organized the May 24
mass meeting, they could not have been more disappointed. The milling crowds could not hear or would not listen to the speakers; various
self-appointed student leaders vied for control of the bullhorns; soon
the students dispersed in dissatisfaction or disgust or at the factionalized in-fighting and lack of clear leadership. This was an important
turning point, for it was the last time such a mass meeting was held on
campus--except for the gatherings of hunger strikers later at
Tiananmen Square, alternative means of organization took their place.
The new student leaders, who themselves had been brought up to be
passive and obedient, not to take initiative or to lead, rapidly devel15. The precise dates of the founding of the students' autonomous organizations is difficult to pinpoint. One source records that as early as April 22, it was reported in
Tiananmen Square that the previous evening, April 21, a Beijing Students' Federation had
been established, see Wu Muran et al., eds., 89 Zhongguo Minyun Jishi (Daily Reports on
the Movement for Democracy in China: April15-June 24, 1989, Hong Kong: 1989, Vol.
1, p. 27. The editorial commentary interspersed among translations of primary documents
in Han and Hua, supra note 1, gives a good account of the development and modification of
student organization and leadership during the movement. Lee Feigon's China Rising:
The Meaning ofTiananmen (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1990) points out interesting contrasts in style and ideology among student organizations from different campuses, especially People's University and Beijing University.
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oped leadership skills and learned quickly that a democratic movement needed new strategies. Yet inexperience and inadequate
preparation time plagued the movement relentlessly.
The next day, students met to elect representatives from each department. The practice of assigning dormitory rooms by department
facilitates classmates' assembling by discipline, and many of these student gatherings in the dormitories resembled mini-town meetings or
spontaneous study groups. The theory was that student representatives from each department could in tum elect representatives for the
entire campus. This ratification process gave more authority to the
newly formed autonomous student group, and similar procedures were
followed at other campuses. However, there were many forces working against a systematic execution of this model. Not all students were
willing to even attend a meeting that would unofficially "elect" "representatives" to an illegal group; since assuming leadership was so personally dangerous, many "candidates" "ran" unopposed, and in some
cases anyone who dared to make a speech automatically became recognized as a "leader." The intense external pressure, fear of spies,
emotionalism, and lack of agreed-upon procedural guidelines caused
more than one of these meetings to degenerate into chaos. At Qinghua
students openly split over whether or not to accept a government offer
to meet with selected students.
It is not difficult to find explanations for passivity, disorganization, internal conflicts, and leadership crisis in the spring 1989 student
democracy movement; what is actually more challenging is to account
for how-under these extremely trying and threatening circumstances-the students were able to organize themselves as effectively
as they did. By Wednesday, April 26, the autonomous Provisional
Students Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges announced at
their initial press conference that forty universities and institutes in the
capital of Beijing had joined their umbrella group. They proposed
three new demands, saying that students would return to class as soon
as the government would discuss and give reasonable answers to these
key points: 1) a dialogue between students and government leaders,
2) an investigation of the April 20 police beating of students, and 3) an
apology from the official news agency for the distorted reporting of the
student movement and a guarantee "that the press will speak the truth
and report fairly from now on." 16
16. A big-character poster signed by the Provisional Students' Federation of Capital
Universities and Colleges and dated April26, that appeared at People's University, summarized this press conference (see Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 72-73).
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Meanwhile, many of the striking students were out in the streets,
putting up posters and passing out handbills to the citizens of Beijing
explaining the goals of the student movement and offering the students' own version of events that had taken place and had been misconstrued in the official media. In approaching the common citizens,
students instinctively stressed issues and attitudes that would be most
likely to gain their support: non-violence, selfless idealism, patriotism,
and loyalty to the Four Cardinal Principles. 17 From soliciting financial donations, students knew how deep was their support from the
ordinary people, who were also angry about official corruption and
economic hardships. On one streetcorner in the Haidian district, for
example, on April 24 students who were explaining the goals of their
movement to passersby collected 2,464.38 yuan in a four-hour period,
including three 100-yuan notes: this is a huge sum (equivalent to U.S.
$665) for a population with virtually no disposable income and often
unable to meet escalating prices of fruit and vegetables. 18 Thus, in
spring 1989 the students managed to bridge the gap between China's
well-educated elite and the masses of the people-a gap that persisted
through the centuries of traditional imperial Chinese society, and continued as a problem Mao Zedong tried repeatedly to resolve, through
extreme but ultimately futile measures.
III.

APRIL 26-MAY 11: RESPONSE TO THE APRIL 26
EDITORIAL AND THE MAY FOURTH
MOVEMENT ANNIVERSARY

On April 22, the day of Hu Yaobang's memorial service, not only
17. The Four Cardinal Principles are adherence to the socialist path, the leadership of
the Communist Party, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and the people's democratic dictatorship.
The students accurately assessed the common concerns of the ordinary people, as confirmed by an informal survey conducted in early May by young teachers in the psychology
department at Beijing Normal University of 865 Beijing residents, which found that 95.4%
either "strongly supported" or were sympathetic to the student demonstrations, while only
4.7% believed the government assertions that a handful of troublemakers "behind the
scenes" were causing instability. (Elsewhere, citizens expressed support for the students
because they believed their goals were unselfish.) The demands the students emphasized
were well received by the largely young, well-educated people polled: 85% felt a dialogue
with the government was both reasonable and important, 69% expressed confidence the
demonstrations would stimulate democratic reform, and 71% believed corruption was the
main cause of instability in China. See Seth Faison, "Poll Shows Support for Demonstrations," South China Morning Post, May 12, 1989, pp. 1, 12.
18. Reported in a big-character poster at Beijing University; from a photograph by the
author, now in the China 1989 Democracy Movement Archive ofthe C.V. Starr East Asian
Library at Columbia University.
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were 200,000 Beijing students and residents demonstrating ~n
Tiananmen Square, but smaller demonstrations had taken place m
Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xian, and other cities around the country.
Party leaders felt they could no longer ignore the students' movement
or wait for it to die out. The Standing Committee of the Politburo
convened a meeting on April 24 at which they ordered that telephone
lines to Beijing University dormitories be cut and telegrams from campus to campus across the country be blocked. The next day, Li Peng
and Yang Shangkun met with Deng Xiaoping, who insisted that they
must "take a firm stand ... in opposing and ending this turmoil." 19
Secretary Zhao Ziyang, away on a state visit to North Korea, did not
attend this meeting, and there was apparently no objection to Deng's
directive.
On April 26, the official Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) ran a
front-page editorial which became solidified as the official government
position for the duration of the movement and its suppression. The
language of the editorial is important not only because the Party rigidly adhered to it for the following months, but also because students'
opposition to and resolve to contradict the editorial determined their
strategy from its publication until mid-May. According to the People's Daily, there had been no peaceful, patriotic student appeal for
democratic reform in the government. On the contrary, "an extremely
small number of people with ulterior motives" used deceit and rumors
"to slander, insult, and attack leaders of the Party and state." They
"blatantly violated the Constitution, and encouraged opposition to the
leadership of the Communist Party and to the socialist system." They
used force on campuses to take power from the official student unions,
to use the public address systems and to prevent students from going
to class. This "extremely small group of people" was
trying to destroy the democratic legal system. Their goal
was to poison people's minds, to create turmoil throughout
the country, to destroy political stability and unity. This was
a planned conspiracy, a riot, whose real nature was to fundamentally negate the leadership of the Chinese Communist
Party and to negate the socialist system.
The editorial concluded with dire warnings: all such illegal organization must be halted; illegal demonstrations are forbidden, "those who
deliberately create rumors and spread slander must be held criminally
responsible in accordance with the law. " 20
19. See Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 83.
20. From the translation of major excerpts of the April 26 front-page People's Daily
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If Party leaders expected that an attack on the students' demonstrations and appeals for reform, as well as firm threats of reprisal,
would end the movement, they badly miscalculated. The People's
Daily editorial had the opposite effect: it aroused the students and
citizens of Beijing in opposition to the government. The newly organized autonomous student unions vowed to go ahead with the march to
Tiananmen Square planned for the following day, April 27, although
they had heard rumors that the 38th Army had already been summoned to remain on the alert outside the city of Beijing. The evening
television news showed grimly solemn meetings of Party members in
Beijing and Shanghai resolving to carry out Deng's crackdown. The
students' apprehension ironically increased their determination to defy
the government; they persuaded each other they could prevail if the
demonstrators were numerous and united. Parents and teachers came
to the student dormitories the night of April 26th. They had heard the
government's dire warnings and they were afraid of bloodshed; they
tried, often unsuccessfully, to persuade the students to protect their
lives by staying on campus. Many students feared the worst and wrote
out their wills. At least one carried a small packet of gasoline in his
pocket, vowing to immolate himself if he were arrested.
On the morning of the 27th, campus loudspeakers ominously
blared more warnings: "Stay on campus. Do not go out. Demonstrating is wrong." "Think of your parents, your teachers, how you
will hurt them. Punishments will be severe." "Most students want to
go to class. Do not continue the strike. Your duty is to study."
Meanwhile, thousands of students prepared to take to the streets.
Although the autonomous Qinghua Students Union had broken away
from the citywide students' federation in opposition to this demonstration, thousands of Qinghua students marched south to join students
from Beijing University, red flags flying, student monitors holding
hands along the sides of the columns to protect the students inside and
to keep agent provocateurs out. As these groups merged, their ranks
were swollen by representatives from other schools to the northwest;
they passed People's University and their numbers increased again.
Their lead banner read: "The people love the police. The police love
the people." Just beyond People's University, they encountered their
first police roadblock. Students gently pressed against the rows of police with linked arms; crowds of local residents, including workers,
who had turned out in support, pushed somewhat less gently, and the
editorial in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 84-85. The complete text is translated in Yi Mu
and Thompson, supra note 6, pp. 155-157.
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police lines yielded without a fight. At every major intersection all the
way to Tiananmen this tactic was repeated; as the students broke
through successive police barriers, they felt a jubilant sense of triumph. Only later did it become known that on the evening of the 26th
the chief of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau had
threatened to step down rather than use force, and finally had insisted
that his men not bear arms against the student demonstrators.
In a surprise manoeuver, when they arrived at Tiananmen, the
demonstrators from thirty-two colleges did not allow themselves to be
herded into the Square where they might be surrounded; instead, they
continued marching to the east, and circled back along the Second
Ring Road to complete a 25-mile course. Crowds of Beijing citizens
and workers supported them all the way, with cheers and food. The
government was humiliated: the students had refused to be intimidated, and with mass support they had successfully defied the authorities. When the Beijing University students arrived back at the campus
about midnight that night, their classmates who had stayed behind
gave them a heroes' welcome at the campus gate, with cheering and
singing, firecrackers and banging on pots and pans; the official dining
halls were opened and the university food staff served the victors a hot
meal at 1 a.m. By the next morning, triumphant banners proclaimed
"History will never forget April 27." 21
Several factors in the students' strategy-along with a lack of
willingness of the local police to use force against peaceful demonstrators-account for the success of the April 27 demonstration. The students' determination and defiance were daunting in themselves; this
courage was palpable and inspired respect among the onlookers. The
citizens had already been persuaded by handbills and streetcorner discussions to sympathize with the students; watching them audaciously
take the streets reinforced the spectators' admiration for their movement. The marchers were also extremely well organized and self-disciplined, with rows of arm-banded monitors stretching along both sides
of the column to maintain security and order. The Provisional Students Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges had earlier announced strict guidelines. According to one spokesman,
We have decided to avoid at all costs direct confrontation with the authorities, including the police. We have
asked more students to take ,up the responsibility of maintaining order during demonstrations. Special attention is
21. Author's photograph in the China 1989 Democracy Movement Archive in the C.V.
Starr East Asian Library at Columbia University.
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paid to weeding out from our ranks hooligans who have infiltrated demonstrations for ulterior motives. 22
Moreover, the students were deliberately charming. They overwhelmed the police "as much with courtesy as with force," and after
pushing through a police blockade,
... the demonstrators pause to say, "Thank you, police." A
few students are assigned to pick up any shoes lost in the
shoving and return them to their owners, be they police or
protestors. 23
The students set a moral example of civility that was soon emulated by
most of the citizens of Beijing, creating a general atmosphere of public
courtesy and mutual respect in sharp contrast to the self-centered hostility that was palpable on Beijing streets before the student movement
began.
But above all, the students were protected with their highly patriotic slogans on April 27. Gone were the radical chants such as "Down
with dictatorship!" Instead, the slogans of the day were politically
correct, almost as if dictated by the People's Daily April 26th editorial:
"Oppose turmoil!" "Oppose violence!" The Provisional Students'
Federation had assigned patriotic slogans, including "Support the
Communist Party and socialism!" "Pledge to defend the Constitution
to the deathl" 24 Even chants such as "The people's army protects the
people" and "the people love the police"-while obviously serving the
immediate interests of the demonstrators-were politically unobjectionable. Moreover, these proper slogans avoided alienating or alarming the bystanders; on the contrary, many citizens were moved by the
students' innocent claim, "Patriotism is not a crime!"
For some of the demonstrators, these patriotic slogans were simply interpreted at face value. They had been brought up to love the
Communist Party and though they may have doubted certain policies
or practices, most still had not broken their faith. For others, the use
of patriotic slogans was a deliberate tactic, a mere shield to hide behind.25 For many, there was probably a certain ironic edge, but they
22. Quoted anonymously in Willy Wo-lap Law, "New Tactics to Cope with Unrest,"
South China Morning Post, April 22, 1989, p. 8.
23. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Beijing Students Keep Doctrine in Their Sights," New York
Times, rpt. in International Herald Tribune, May 8, 1989, p. 1.
24. The Provisional Students Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges "unified
slogan" list for the April 27 demonstration is translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, p.
73.

25. With increased pressure just before the crackdown, some students again began to
use suggestion rather than uttering a taboo phrase. Michael S. Duke reports that on May
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felt no need to analyze the degree of irony. Nicholas Kristof reported
in early May that after two weeks of interviews with dozens of students, he concluded that student comments in favor of Communist
rule are partly tactical and partly sincere. They wanted to deny the
charges of the People's Daily editorial that they intended to overthrow
the socialist system and Communist rule, and they "began to wave
pro-Communist banners like amulets to ward off the police."26 Furthermore, many Chinese students supported the Communist Party because they felt there was no viable alternative, that a transition to a
multi-party system that they abstractly might favor was unfeasible or
premature. Even Wang Dan, organizer of "democracy salons," when
asked if he supported the leading role of the Communist Party in
China, replied, " 'You can say I support correct leadership by the
Communist Party,' emphasizing the word 'correct.' " 27 (When Beijing
University students carrying a banner that read, "We resolutely support the correct leadership inside the Party," were asked which leaders
were correct, one of them responded, "None."28) Nevertheless, most
students interviewed insisted that they still had faith in the Communist Party, they just wanted to encourage it to reform itself. In a group
interview at Qinghua University, one student said,
"We're not against the government, just against the way it is
run. It's a question of the Party atmosphere, of corruption
and of the bureaucracy." Then the students looked a bit uneasy, as if they might be giving the wrong idea about their
goals. One said, "Remember, though, we can't always say
what we think." 29
Thus, a dominating strategy from April 26 until about May 15 was to
avoid directly challenging the Party or any specific leaders. In an interview with a western reporter, even Wuer Kaixi acknowledged he
hoped to join the Party: "It has internal problems [such as bureaucracy, lack of democracy and corruption], but if they are solved the
27 on the unofficial loudspeaker at the "Triangle.. area at Beijing University a woman
"read out a dangerous poem that was both a riddle and a warning." It began, "There is one
sentence,/ Spoken aloud it brings calamity," but it never states what that powerful sentence
is. "The sentence that youth did not disclose, though undoubtedly many thought it, was
Dadao gongchandang! "Down with the Communist Party!" See The Iron House: A Memoir of the Chinese Democracy Movement and the Tiananmen Massacre, Layton, Utah: Peregrine Smith Books, 1990, pp. 65-66.
26. "Beijing Students Keep Doctrine in Their Sights,'" supra note 23, p. 1.
27. Ibid., p. 5.
28. Sandra Burton and Jaime A. FlorCruz, "China: Spring of Discontent," Time, May
8, 1989, p. 16.
29. Kristof, "Beijing Students Keep Doctrine in Their Sights," supra note 23, p. 5.
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Party is still good," he said. 30
After the April27 victory, the first of many changes was made in
the leadership of the student movement. On April 28, the Provisional
Students Federation became the permanent Federation of Autonomous Students Unions of Beijing Universities and Colleges. Zhou
Yongjun, from the University of Politics and Law, who had been its
chair for its mere five days of existence, was relieved of his position for
having prematurely decided to cancel the April 27 march without consulting members of the steering committee. He was replaced by
twenty-one-year-old Wuer Kaixi, a first-year student in education at
Beijing Normal University. 31 The movement began to emphasize two
related goals: government recognition of the autonomous Beijing Students' Federation and an open dialogue with top government leaders.
At this point, the government seemed willing to hold a dialogue,
but they could not recognize an unofficial organization; student activists, on the other hand, claimed that only the autonomous Federation
was truly representative. When government spokesmen led by Yuan
Mu held a televised "dialogue" on April 29, big character posters attacked the gesture as bad faith. In an essay entitled "Was it Dialogue-or a Lecture?" Beijing Normal University students protested
that the "dialogue" consisted of leaders talking for 90% of the three
hours with grandfatherly condescension to a hand-picked group of
"student representatives" who "were completely unable to represent
the masses of progressive young students who have been active in the
student movement. " 32 A second dialogue on April 30 with invited
student representatives was also an occasion for the government to
clarify its position and run logistical and rhetorical circles around the
inexperienced and uncoached students. On May 1 the Beijing Students' Federation denounced these dialogue gestures as a ploy to split
the student groups, and the following day they presented a more specific set of guidelines for "equal dialogue:" that it be broadcast live,
witnessed by Chinese and foreign journalists, and include the highest
government leaders as well as elected student representatives who
would suffer no reprisals afterwards. The government once again
procrastinated in responding.
By May Fourth much of the momentum of the democracy movement was diminishing, and this long-anticipated anniversary
threatened to be a final anti-climax to three weeks of demonstrations.
30. Dorinda Elliott," 'We Have Enthusiasm and Daring,'" Newsweek, May 8, 1989, p.

16.
31. See Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 70, 111.
32. Translated in full in Han and Hua, supra note 2, pp. 112-114.
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However, many students did once again perform the arduous long
march from their campuses to Tiananmen, both out of a sense of historical duty and as a sort of festival observance. It would have been
difficult for the police to interfere with a student march on a national
holiday commemorating student marches. The mood was relaxed and
festive, though the turnout of approximately 100,000 students was
only about half that of the victorious April 27 demonstration, and
many of the participants in the May Fourth demonstration were from
out of town. In his upbeat speech to the demonstrators assembled in
Tiananmen Square, Wuer Kaixi listed a series of vague moralistic demands, including more rule by law, press freedom, and support for
education; he concluded, "our views are not in conflict with those of
the government. " 33
As many students wavered in early May, unsure of whether or
not to return to class, lively debate was continuing on campuses and in
editorial offices all around Beijing. Numerous big- and small-character posters and position papers began to appear arguing against oneparty rule and autocracy, or discussing comparative political theory. 34
Editors of People's Daily gave balanced coverage to the unofficial demonstrations on page 1 of the May 5 issue covering May Fourth activities; over one thousand journalists jeopardized their careers by signing
a May 9 petition demanding more freedom to report the news accurately.35 On that day, most weary students failed to appear for a rally
to support the journalists, but about 10,000 demonstrators did turn
out the following day in response to a clever change in tactics: rather
than walking to Tiananmen Square, students were organized to ride
their bicycles there.
By this point, student leaders were quite divided. Mter the return of Zhao Ziyang to the capital on May 1, there were signs the
government might be more conciliatory. Moderate students saw no
reason not to return to classes. Wang Dan announced that students
would return to class, and said the end of the class strike was not an
admission of failure:
"The student movement has realized two goals that have
33. See the "New May Fourth Manifesto," Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 135-137.
34. See, for examples, Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 139-176.
35. The May 5 issue of People's Daily featured, next to the official schoolgirls dancing
to commemorate the May Fourth Movement, an equally prominent photograph of the democracy demonstrations with the large banner of the outlawed autonomous Beijing Students' Federation as the striking focal point.
The May 9 journalists' petition is translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 190192.
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never been achieved before," he said. "The first is the creation of a student organization, which was badly needed. The
second achievement is the huge amount of public support
we've received. " 36
The more radical leaders did not want to yield too soon, however,
because the government had not satisfied their demands for a sincere
and equal dialogue. This conflict foreshadowed the future contention
over whether or not hunger strikers should withdraw from Tiananmen
Square, a decision with much higher stakes. Some hoped that their
movement could regain momentum by coinciding with the May 15
arrival of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Beijing. Most students at Beijing University and some at other schools were still on
strike 37 and might be persuaded to continue until Gorbachev's visit.
Thus, both the government and the student leaders were stalling for
time, the government hoping the movement would gradually peter
out, the students hoping they could draw attention away from the international interest in the state visit that was to symbolize the reconciliation of China and the Soviet Union after thirty years of tensions.
Among the more moderate student leaders were a group who on
May 3 had formed a new student organization, the Students' Dialogue
Delegation of Beijing Universities, chaired by Xiang Xiaoji of the University of Politics and Law and Shen Tong of Beijing University. On
May 6 they submitted a petition to the government stipulating only
two basic conditions to an "equal dialogue": that the students select
their own representatives and that the meeting be broadcast live on
television and radio. 38 The government did not respond until May 12,
and then the concessions it offered were minimal at best. 39 The ultimate result was that no meaningful dialogue was ever held. One session that was finally organized on May 14 was aborted; the Dialogue
Delegation walked out when they discovered the proceedings could
36. Daniel Southerland, Washington Post, rpt. in International Herald Tribune, May 67, 1989, pp. 1, 5.
37. A May 8 informal survey at Beijing University showed 67% of the students wanted
to continue to strike, 24% wanted to return to class, and 8% abstained.
38. See the report on the Beijing Students' Dialogue Delegation as published in the
students' Xinwen Daobao (News Herald), No. 3, May 12, 1989; translated in Han and Hua,
supra note 1, pp. 187-188. The original Chinese versions of many of these documents and
handbills are collected in the China 1989 Democracy Movement Archive at Columbia and
similar archives at other universities.
39. See the People's University Students' Autonomous Union's protest of this "cheap
trick" on the part of the government, translated in Han and Hua, supra note l, pp. 193-194.
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not be broadcast as previously agreed. 40 And the May 18 meeting between Li Peng and hunger striking students was merely a significant
dramatization of the failure of communication and compromise, for it
took place after decisions to invoke martial law and use troops against
the students had apparently already been made. 41
IV. MAY 12-19: THE HUNGER STRIKE
The students' democracy movement had gradually decreased its
demands from seven to three to an eventual emphasis on one: a dialogue representing its autonomous organizations. Yet the government
would not even accede to this single demand. A group of radical students were frustrated and angry; they had no more patience to wait for
a government concession, and they did not want to lose the momentum of what had become a nationwide student movement. It seemed
to them necessary to regain the initiative, to escalate the confrontation
and force the slow-moving government to respond. So on the evening
of May 12, they posted at the Beijing University "Triangle" a list of
forty-odd students who intended to undertake a hunger strike. An
early declaration articulated three reasons for the hunger strike:
First, to protest the indifferent and cold attitude the
government has taken toward the boycott of classes by Beijing students.
Second, to protest the government's foot-dragging in
[arranging] a dialogue with the Beijing Students' Dialogue
Delegation.
Third, to protest the government's continuing tactic of
branding this patriotic, student Democracy Movement as
"turmoil," and to protest a series of distorted news reports. 42
One of the original group, Chai Ling, later explained that she embarked on the hunger strike to test the government: "to see whether it
intends to suppress the movement or to ignore it, to see whether the
people have a conscience or not, to see if China still has a conscience
or not, if it has hope or not. " 43 Many student leaders such as Wang
40. See "Record of the Aborted 'May 14 Dialogue'" in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp.
204-206.
41. See "Transcript of May 18 Meeting between Premier Li Peng and Students," in
Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 242-246, and for a slightly different version, "Li Peng's
Conversation with Student Leaders," in Yi Mu and Thompson, supra note 6, pp. 168-176.
42. See "Hunger Strike Declaration," in Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 202.
43. See translation of taped interview with Chai Ling in late May in Han and Hua,
supra note 1, pp. 197-199.
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Dan and Wuer Kaixi were at first skeptical about this strategy, but
were eventually persuaded by Chai Ling to add their names to the list
of hunger strikers. 44 By Saturday, May 13, the number of students
committed to the hunger strike was about 300, mostly from Beijing
University and Beijing Normal University. They took an oath, tied on
red headbands, ate one last meal with supportive teachers who took
them out to a restaurant for lunch, and at 2:00 p.m. departed for
Tiananmen Square. There they settled down at the foot of the Monument to the People's Heroes, encircled by a protective ring of
thousands of supporting classmates, and waiting for a government response- which most expected to precede Gorbachev's arrival in Beijing on Monday, May 15.
The strategy of a mass hunger strike of indefinite length was unprecedented in China. 45 Three thousand years ago, two loyal martyrs,
Bo Yi and Shu Qi, refused to eat the grain of the conquering dynasty.46 Mao Zedong himself cited examples of ancient and modem
individual heroes who starved rather than eat food handed out in contempt.47 The students' hunger strike also echoed the tradition of patriotic officials like Qu Yuan who risked their own lives to boldly
remonstrate with the emperor over incorrect policies. However, the
students' predecessors were individuals; the hunger strike that began
on May 13 was historically significant because it was a mass action; it
eventually included over three thousand fasters plus tens of thousands
of supporters who provided physical, medical and political assistance.
The individuals who refused food on principle in China's past
were rejecting food that originated from a tainted source. One implication of the 1989 student hunger strike was that the food provided
44. See Lee Feigon, supra note 15, p. 195.
45. There are reports of many short-term hunger strikes during the Cultural Revolution and of a two-day hunger strike in 1980 among more than fifty student activists at
Hunan Teachers' College in Changsha to protest school authorities' interference in elections for a representative to the local National People's Congress, but these events are not
well known among young students in China.
46. Bo Yi and Shu Qi died on Shouyang Mountain because they considered it unrighteous to eat the grain provided by the Zhou conqueror King Wu, who had waged war to
aggrandize his power before the mourning period for his father, King Wen, was completed.
See Shiji (Historical Records) #60, translated by Burton Watson in Cyril Birch, ed., Anthology of Chinese Literature from Early Times to the Fourteenth Century (New York:
Grove Press, 1965), pp. 103-105.
47. In his essay in memoriam to Stuart Leyton, Mao Zedong praised Qinghua University professor Zhu Ziqing, who in the late 1940s died from illness after he had refused on
principle to eat "relief" wheat flour because it was shipped by imperialist America. See
Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 4, Beijing:
Renmin chubanshe, 1960; rpt. 1969, p. 1384 and note 8, p. 1387.
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them-directly by the state-subsidized university dining halls, and ultimately by the Chinese government-came from such a compromised
source that they would not swallow it. They were thus acting out a
gross insult to the Chinese Communist state, particularly since government leaders are so proud that an undisputed accomplishment of communist rule since 1949 is its virtual elimination of the threat of
starvation so prevalent before "liberation." The "iron rice bowl," government grain coupons and subsidized staple foods even now provide
security from hunger for each member of society. The hunger strikers
no longer wanted to participate in this contract with the government,
a contract which suggested a reciprocal obligation: the government
feeds the people, and in tum the people obey the government.
The philosophic foundation of the People's Republic of China
rests on the government's love and concern for the people. Like parents, rulers are responsible for nurturing and providing for their citizens, who thus assume the role of their children. The notion of
reciprocal obligations between parents and children, government and
governed, goes back to Confucius, who preached that children and
subjects should respect and obey their parents and rulers, who should
in tum provide for their needs. When the students refused food, they
were rejecting this bond of reciprocal obligation; they would rather
starve than participate in the system. By rejecting what was provided
by the government, they were also making a statement that the leaders
had failed to satisfy their basic needs. These students had studied democracy, they had tasted freedom, and they were no longer willing to
swallow the meager rations they were offered. By refusing to eat, they
removed themselves from the social structure the government had established, and caused the leaders a profound loss of face for having
failed as good parents. This rupture in the reciprocal bond partially
explains the violence of the government's reaction. The students, infuriated by the luxurie~pecially the elaborate banquets and imported
cigarettes and liquor~njoyed by the political leaders who benefit
from official profiteering and corruption, demonstrated they would
rather die than eat out of the hands of those officials who fed themselves first.
The rhetoric of the hunger strikers and of their supporters emphasized parent-child relationships. A prevalent slogan throughout
the spring 1989 democracy movement, especially after the April 26
People's Daily editorial, was "Mama, I am not wrong." This plea was
both personal and political. The nation is one's motherland; a protest
outlawed by the government would be a defiance of one's mother
country unless the protest appealed to a higher principle on behalf of
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the nation. The May 13 Beijing University Hunger Strikers' Statement says, "In the spirit of sacrificing our lives, we fight for life. But
we are children, we are still children! Mother China, look earnestly
upon your sons and daughters!"48 The Communist Party is also often
referred to as "the mother of the people" and opposition to the Party
could be considered a betrayal of one's "mother." Thus, in an allusion
to the appeals to "mama," one big-character poster at Beijing University was entitled, "Party, I am not wrong."
On the personal level, many mothers tried desperately to persuade their children not to risk their futures or their lives by participating in this student movement; when a student decided that patriotic
loyalty, idealism, or sacrifice for the future of China was a higher calling than obedience to. one's own parent, he or she would attempt to
justify this choice with banners and posters headed, "Mama, I am not
wrong." 49 But the protestors were still betraying their parents' trust;
Chinese parents typically make enormous sacrifices for their children,
but it is expected that the children will live on to repay them by caring
for them in their old age, and a premature death-especially of an only
child-would affect the entire family structure. The Beijing University Hunger Strikers' own statement reads:
As we suffer from hunger, Papa and Mama, do not grieve ...
Farewell, mother and father! Please forgive me, your child
who cannot be loyal [to the country] and [meet the demands
of] filial piety at the same timel 50
Many of the hunger strikers did not dare to confront their parents
with this cause for anxiety. One of the primary duties of the roommates of some hunger striking students was to receive phone calls
from worried parents and to lie reassuringly about the activities of
their son or daughter.
48. Translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 201. See Han and Hua's discussion of
this theme on p. 199. Other variations are the poem, "Mama, We're Not Wrong," translated on pp. 127-128, and the intellectuals' responsive slogan, ''The children are not
wrong."
49. See Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 126-128.
50. Translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 210.
Another statement, "Parting Words [of a Hunger Striker]," echoes this concern:
Perhaps I will not be able to fulfill my filial duty. For thousands and
thousands of parents and their children, I have tearfully made the choice to go on
this hunger strike. . . .
Since time immemorial, it has been impossible to satisfy the demands of both
loyalty [to one's nation] and filial duty to one's parents. Papa, Mama, please
understand why your son takes this action!
(translated in full in Han and Hua, supra note 1. pp. 202-203).
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Determined to employ only nonviolent means, earnestly hoping
to persuade the government their movement was not one of "turmoil,"
the students were inspired by Gandhi's method of passive resistance,
perhaps even by hunger striking political prisoners in South Africa or
Northern Ireland. But more importantly, the drama of young people
refusing food tapped deep Chinese nerves. Eating is central to Chinese
culture; according to a common Chinese proverb, "The people consider eating of prime importance" (min yi shi wei tian ). In a country
where the population is so great and the proportion of arable land is so
small, where floods and famines occur with devastating frequency,
hunger and starvation are the most primal fears. In China, cuisine is a
highly developed art form, a basic societal element, and a source of
both national and regional pride. One of the hunger strikers' banners
read: "We love to eat, but we love freedom more."
The hunger strike was extremely effective, and deadly serious, as
political theater. In Beijing, tens of thousands of citizens flocked to
Tiananmen Square around the clock after May 13, out of curiosity and
concern, to see the spectacle. Moreover, with television now widely
available throughout China, the image on the screen has an overwhelming power to move the population. The hunger strike coincided
with an expanded international media presence in Beijing for
Gorbachev's visit and also with three days (May 16-19) of extraordinarily bold press freedom within China, before the government began
its vengeful repression. National Chinese television featured interviews with medical workers, teachers, and students prepared to die for
democracy. The coverage was charged with intense emotion, especially striking in contrast to the sterility and cheeriness of normal Chinese television news. One evening a weeping mother appeared on the
television screen; she had donned a headband like those the hunger
strikers wore and had gone to Tiananmen Square to visit her fasting
son. Through her sobs, she explained she supported her son's ideals,
but he looked so weak, and she could not bear to watch him die.
Nightly Central Television brought the ominous pictures of unconscious youths on hospital stretchers, intravenous drips, exhausted
white-coated medics, and wailing ambulances into viewers' homes, as
the hours of waiting for a compassionate government response ticked
away. The students had sacrificed their health and strength for their
country. Surely, the people believed, the government could sacrifice a
bit of its mighty strength to achieve a resolution. How could a government that claimed to love the people leave its most promising children
to die?
After several days it became clear that the hardline leaders re-
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fused to make concessions to the students' modest demands. As Chai
Ling had predicted, this inaction exposed the coldness of the Party
officials. The moralistic drama juxtaposed innocent victims against
cruel tormentors, and it galvanized the population. To the extent that
the citizens were moved by the self-sacrificing children, they were enraged by the selfish government leaders. They poured out into the
streets in outraged defiance, over a million strong. They not only
wanted to oppose the bad rulers; they also had to compensate for
them, to act as foster parents, supporting and nurturing the idealistic
children abandoned by the government. Moved by deep generalized
parental love to fight for an end to spiritual and political starvation,
they resisted courageously and defiantly until they were literally
crushed by the government's tanks.
Each day during the week of May 15 the crowds at Tiananmen
grew larger, the walks of life represented broadened, the number of
supporters from outside the city of Beijing increased. A common activity at the Square was counting signs of new work units making a
public appearance for the first time: groups of workers and journalists, Party members and students at the Central Party School, private
entrepreneurs and cadres from government ministries. Throughout
the week, more and more open letters were sent to the government
leaders, and reported in the press, supporting the students: these came
from ten university presidents, the All China Women's Federation,
managers of nine Beijing factories, journalists at the major media, and
individuals, including Party members. The slogans on banners became more radical with each passing day; early in the week, most
avoided using proper names, for example; then mid-week small bottles
were broken symbolically, because the words "small bottle" (xiaoping)
sound like Deng's name; but by Thursday and Friday Li Peng and
Deng Xiaoping were often attacked directly. The naming of Li Peng
and Deng Xiaoping of course intensified after the declaration of martial law.
Although the hunger strike was a brilliant strategy for arousing
nearly all the population of Beijing and much of the rest of China to
sympathize with the hunger striking students, the unresponsiveness of
the government placed those students in a very difficult position. The
hunger strike played upon a deep Chinese cultural penchant for martyrdom, but it was also constrained by the limitations of self-destruction. The rhetoric and much of the galvanizing power of the hunger
strike was connected to death: "Without democracy, we would rather
die!" read the hunger strikers' shirts; "Bloodshed in a just cause" and
"The people do not fear death" appeared on some of their headbands.
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Having so dramatically vowed victory or death, it was very difficult
for the hunger strikers to compromise.
Some of the inherent problems with the hunger strike strategy
were practical. The student leaders could hardly avoid joining the
hunger strike, yet no one is at his best in planning moves and making
rational decisions after several days of starvation. Naturally, tempers
were short and creativity was diminished. Even during the first week,
medical supplies were insufficient, hygiene conditions were poor, and
hundreds of students were hospitalized. Perhaps for these reasons, endorsement of the hunger strike was at first shaky: the autonomous
Beijing Students' Federation originally opposed the idea, but later supported it.
Moreover, beginning with the second day of the hunger strike
there was conflict about how the students might withdraw voluntarily
without admitting defeat. There were four major decision-making
points in the controversy over whether or not to abandon Tiananmen
Square: May 14-16, May 19, May 27-29, and before dawn on June 4.
On May 14, in the aborted dialogue meeting, some moderate student
representatives suggested the hunger strikers heed the pleas of Yan
Mingfu, Secretary to the Party's Central Committee Secretariat, to
abandon the Square, while "hardline" student leaders insisted on a
struggle to the death. On the same afternoon, a group of twelve prominent intellectual leaders met to compose a statement supporting the
students' goals, but they also had trouble agreeing on whether or how
strongly to urge the hunger strikers to withdraw from the Square;
largely because they ended up urging the students to leave, their visit
to the hunger strikers was perceived as more antagonistic than supportive. 51 At 5:00 on the afternoon of May 16, Yan Mingfu went to
the square by himself to try to negotiate with the hunger strikers, making several accommodations to the students' demands but not recognizing the legitimacy of their autonomous organizations or
repudiating the People's Daily's editorial of April 26, 1989. Some of
the student leaders, such as Wang Dan, Wuer Kaixi, and Wang
Chaohua, fearing that continuation of the hunger strike would unnecessarily lead to bloodshed, were inclined to accept the offer, and tried
to persuade hunger strikers to terminate. But the hunger strikers
voted several times to continue until the government was forced to
make concessions. At that point most of the hunger strikers felt that
with so many people from all walks of life out on the streets demon51. The two-edged statement ofthe twelve intellectuals, as reported by the Guangming
Daily News Service, is translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 207-208.
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strating in support of them, the government would not dare to use
force against them. 52 And as Wuer Kaixi explained in the meeting
with Li Peng, the decision-making system in the Square was not majority rule, but rather "one in which 99.9 percent follow 0.1 percentso if a single hunger striker refuses to leave the Square, then the other
several thousand will not leave either." 53
When rumors circulated on Friday, May 19 that Li Peng was
about to declare martial law, many of the hunger strikers began to
contemplate strategic withdrawal. At 9:00 p.m. the Hunger Strikers'
Group declared that the hunger strike had been converted into a sit-in
protest; this decision was reported on national television. One hour
later, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun announced to a special meeting of
high Party and army officials that martial law would be formally declared at 10 am on Saturday, May 20; this meeting was broadcast on
national television just after midnight. Soon large numbers of citizens
rushed to the outskirts of town to form human barricades to prevent
army vehicles from entering the city. At the same time, students
bravely rushed from their campuses back to Tiananmen to protect
their weakened, hunger striking comrades.

V.

MAY 20-JUNE 4: MARTIAL LAW

After May 20, the student movement was geographically and
strategically split. The hardliners who remained in occupation of
Tiananmen Square were reinforced by groups of visitors from out-oftown, who established a "tent city" and seemed prepared to camp out
indefinitely. The majority of the students from Beijing universities returned to their campuses. From there, they encouraged citizen resistance to the troops, helped erect barricades, and continued to press for
democratic reforms. A primary activity was "educating the soldiers."
Student speakers on the unofficial loudspeaker at Beijing University
urged classmates to go ask the soldiers how they felt about not having
been told where they were being sent or why, to explain to them that
the movement was non-violent, patriotic, and supported by most of
the citizens of Beijing, and to entreat them not to hurt the people.
During the week of May 15, city police had virtually disappeared from
sight; the same students who had effectively maintained order and
smooth traffic flow around Tiananmen Square during the hunger
52. See Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon, Tiananmen Square, Vancouver and Toronto:
Douglas & Mcintyre, 1989, p. 109.
53. See Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 243; compare Yi Mu and Thompson, supra note
6, p. 169.
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strike continued to assume responsibility for crowd control and traffic
regulation around the campuses and throughout the city after the declaration of martial law. They set up roadblocks on the major arteries
at the outskirts of the city, and all drivers heeded their polite requests
to show nonmilitary identification before entering the city limits. The
students succeeded in persuading classmates and city residents to exercise restraint and avoid provocation of the army.
Individual students still were self-consciously charming, polite,
nonviolent, and well organized, but the student organizations continued to be plagued by internal dissention, unstable leadership, and lack
of institutionalized decisionmaking processes. The students' vague notions of democracy were rivaled by more familiar concepts of unity.
Slogans such as the one on a public bus banner, "The entire country of
one mind," hardly supported democratic pluralism. Under the battlefield stress of the conditions of late May, pluralism of any sort was
probably felt to verge on anarchy and chaos. On May 23 Wuer Kaixi
lost favor with the students after announcing on May 22-without
prior consultation with other student leaders-that they should retreat
from the square to the embassy district. He was a spokesman at their
press conference four days later, however. At the same time, sixtynine schools represented in the square voted to transfer leadership
from the Beijing Students' Federation to a temporary group, which
was on May 24 named the Protect Tiananmen Headquarters and
headed by Chai Ling. By this time, the Hunger Strikers Group, which
had earlier replaced the Beijing Students' Federation, had been replaced by the non-Beijing students group. As leadership shifted, the
debate about how to end the occupation of the square continued. On
May 27 Wang Dan, Wuer Kaixi and Chai Ling announced the students would leave the square May 30.
"It is very difficult to continue our sit-in," ... Wuer Kaixi
told a press conference. "As leaders, we have responsibility
for the students' health, and the difficulties are obvious. Hygiene is extremely bad and the food is insufficient." 54
Other students said the terrible conditions were injurious to their
health, and it was not worth enduring them when the government continued to ignore the students' demands. Various alternative activities
were suggested, including talking with workers in factories, distributing leaflets, building a network of student organizations around the
54. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Students Urging End to the Siege of Beijing Square," New

York Times, May 28, 1989, p. l.
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country, and opening "Democracy University" on the Square.ss
But the next day, May 28, the Protect Tiananmen Headquarters
and other groups in Tiananmen declared they would stay at least until
June 20 when the National People's Congress was scheduled to meet
in regular session. Chai Ling resigned from her post as commander of
the Protect Tiananmen Headquarters on the 29th, though she returned within a few days. The reasons for staying were mixed, and
may not have been the same for the Beijing students who had been
demonstrating for over a month and the more recent arrivals from far
away. A 23-year-old student from Shenyang named Chen Di gave a
western reporter an idealistic explanation on May 29, "Tiananmen
Square has become a symbol of democracy in China. We can't abandon it. "s 6 On the other hand, a classmate of hers named Liu Gang
had calculated the risks and gave a strategic explanation:
If we left, the student movement would certainly lose. And
if we stay, the Government will be forced to make a choice.
Either it will agree to a dialogue with students, or it will
stage a crackdown. And if it chooses the crackdown, it will
lose support. s?
Thus, one motive of continued occupation of the square was to force
the government into a comer, no longer to press it to capitulate to the
students, but rather to provoke it to discredit itself by resorting to
violence.
Amidst this debate, morale was boosted on May 30 with the arrival of the Goddess of Democracy statue created by students at the
Central Art Academy. The planning for the inauguration of Democracy University, to be opened at 8 pm on June 3, continued until the
last minute. On June 2, four new hunger strikers arrived for the first
shift of a planned rotation of short-term fasts by younger intellectuals.
Up until the very end, the student movement was remarkable for
its creativity. Earlier, these students had drawn cartoons, written
poems and songs, made up riddles and jokes to support the movement.
In late May and early June, the government began to pay workers to
participate in pro-government demonstrations. A group of students
promptly organized a parody of those demonstrations: wearing student clothes but covering their faces with masks, on June 2 they rode
their bicycles through the city's streets offering ten-yuan notes to citi55. Ibid., p. 16.
56. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Chinese Students, in About-Face, Will Continue Occupying
Square," New York Times, May 30, 1989, p. AlO.
57. Ibid.
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zens who would join them, shouting sarcastic slogans such as "Down
with democracy!" "Down with students!" "Down with America!"
and "Support dictatorship!" "Support tyranny!" "Support the emperor!" Some feared that even this kind of activity was too provocative, and a number of male students invented a way to protest silently:
by shaving their heads, they made a statement wufa ("no hair"), which
is a homonym in Chinese for wufa ("lawless," as in the phrase wufa
wutian, "no law and no justice"). This kind of creative maneuvering
and persistence is one of the brightest signs of hope for the re-emergence of the next phase of the Chinese students' democracy movement
in the future.
Finally, the students who remained in Tiananmen Square courageously held their ground even when confronted by Army troops.
Though they were all willing to die, they negotiated a strategic withdrawal to minimize pointless loss to their forces just before dawn on
June 4. By that time hundreds of citizens of Beijing had already been
killed, and thousands more injured, in the People's Liberation Army's
excessive use of force in moving into position at Tiananmen Square.

VI. REFLEcriONS ON THE STUDENTS' STRATEGIES
Of the student leaders mentioned in this article, Wang Dan was
reportedly arrested in July, 1989, and there are unconfirmed rumors
that Zhou Yongjun was also arrested; his whereabouts are unknown.
Shen Tong legally traveled to the United States as a student; Xiang
Xiaoji and Wuer Kaixi escaped from China to the West illegally, and
reemerged in summer 1989. Chai Ling and Wang Chaohua amazingly
eluded capture within China for ten months, with the support of an
underground network, then escaped to the West in the spring of 1990.
Many other student demonstrators were arrested, and some of them
have been released; others were punished by poor job assignments, denial of permission to study abroad, or repeated writing of self-criticisms. All of the students, within and outside of China, are still
reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the student democracy
movement, and on China's future prospects.
Some of the harshest criticism of the movement has come from
sympathetic comrades. The four intellectuals who organized a seventy-two-hour hunger strike beginning on June 2-popular singer
(originally from Taiwan) Hou Dejian, Beijing Normal University Assistant Professor Liu Xiaobo, former Beijing University sociologist
and Stone Computer Corporation executive Zhou Duo, and Communist Party member and former editor Gao Xin-issued a "Hunger
Strike Manifesto" which pointed out that in "the present movement,
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both the government and the students have made mistakes," though
"the greater fault for the present situation lies with the government."
However, they specified,
The students' mistakes are mainly manifested in the internal chaos of their organizations and the lack of efficient
and democratic procedures. Although their goal is democracy, their means and procedures for achieving democracy
are not democratic. Their lack of cooperative spirit and the
sectarianism that has caused their forces to neutralize each
other have resulted in all their policies coming to naught.
More faults can be named: financial chaos, material waste,
an excess of emotion and a lack of reason; too much of the
attitude that they are privileged, and not enough of the belief
in equality; and so on. 58
Liu Xiaobo's bold analysis of the need to transform "empty democracy" into "democracy of action," to move from abstract idealism to
concrete implementation, was more sophisticated than the vision of
most of the young student leaders. His "Manifesto" also rejected
Maoist notions of class struggle and violence and advocated pluralism
and peaceful democracy, in which each citizen would play a responsible role. In its emphasis on the need for fundamental structural
change in Chinese politics to establish a system of checks and balances
and abolish absolute power, the "Manifesto" indicates how far and
how rapidly the democracy movement had progressed in the two
months since Wang Dan's April 3 big-character poster. It also suggests that if the next movement begins where this 1989 movement
ended, even more progress toward democracy and a new "political
culture" will be made.
But most of the student leaders did not regard fundamental structural change of the Chinese political system as their goal. On the contrary, they regarded themselves more in the traditional role of loyal
remonstrators; like the scholar-officials of ancient China, or the patriotic Beijing University students of 1919, they assumed the responsibility of encouraging more moral behavior on the part of the Chinese
government leaders. The conspicuously public actions the students
chose-marching through the streets and writing big-character posters, erecting a statue and kneeling in petition, hunger striking and
occupation of the square at the heart of China's government build58. The "Manifesto" is translated in full in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 349-354;
this passage is from page 352. For more information on Hou Dejian's background and the
hunger strike, see Simmie and Nixon, supra note 52, pp. 163-167.
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ings--conveyed the moral force of their demands, and left procedures
for practical implementation up to others. Moreover, their moralistic
demands emphasized ending corruption and telling the truth: rather
than alter the system, they proposed replacing dishonest officials with
men of integrity; the focus on freedom of the press did not suggest a
competitive free enterprise media system but rather the journalists' obligation to avoid distortion and lies. Other demands also involved
moral pleas to tell the truth: for example, by re-evaluating Hu
Yaobang and others who had been attacked by the 1983 anti-spiritual
pollution campaign and the 1987 anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign. Confucian ethics were invoked in the students' demands for a
"rectification of names": to restore the correct leadership of the Party,
or for the people's police, government, and army to serve the people.
A large banner in the April 27 demonstration proclaimed that the students were the "soul" (hun) of China; they appealed to the government for moral leadership, and this principled idealism aroused the
consciences of the Beijing citizens who supported the students. The
students felt that by risking their futures in public demonstrations,
they could save China. The populace trusted them because they had
no selfish motives; even the demand for increased state funding for
higher education was dropped soon after April 22. The impact of the
students' moral persuasion was evident in the sharp decline in theft
during the period the students dominated the streets of Beijing.
This moralism not only unified the people's support for the students, it also made the government look even more untrustworthy in
contrast. The government was exposed in its use of methods of authoritarian dictatorship, including lies and brute force. While the students looked idealistically to the future of China, the government took
desperate measures to avoid losing what it had gained in the 1930s and
1940s. Government leaders not only tried to turn the clock backwards, they also revealed the extent to which they were out of touch
with the humanistic yearnings of both the students and large portions
of the population of China.
However, although the notion of ethical integrity in government
is deeply embedded in Chinese traditional and modern attitudes to
politics, it has also served for centuries as a spotlight on the moral
character of individual leaders, and as an obstacle to the development
of impersonal political institutions to protect individual rights and insure justice, or rule by law. When the students' moderate patriotic
demands were ignored, they began to attack specific leaders, as if replacing them with different personalities would solve the problem of
the students' fundamental powerlessness. The student movement did
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not have time to prepare a plan for systematic alternatives to China's
political structure, nor did they even have an outstanding leader who
remained in favor with the students for the entire nine weeks the
movement lasted. Indeed, as the movement developed, the emotionalism of its moral appeal intensified with the spectacle of the hunger
strike and the Beijing citizens' outpouring of support for it.
In fact, the students' movement did have a central practical, concrete demand of profound institutional significance, but this implication was generally eclipsed by the moral rhetoric in which it was
cloaked. The students claimed the right to organize their own autonomous representative group, outside the control of the Communist
Party's monopoly of power. If the government had granted recognition of this autonomous students' federation, it would have meant the
"legalization of the first completely independent political organization
in PRC history, and the effective negation of Deng Xiaoping's four
basic principles, as Deng understood them. " 59 The formation of this
representative autonomous federation-as well as similar ones by Beijing workers, intellectuals and other groups-establishes a highly significant model of unprecedented autonomous political organizing in
China. But the students vacillated, ideologically and rhetorically, on
the issue of how hard to press for legalization of their unauthorized
organization. Many of them may not have been audacious enough to
want to push this demand to its full logical extent of defying the
Party's ultimate control. On the other hand, recognition of the students' own federation, and holding a publicly broadcast dialogue with
its members, were their two most consistent demands.
The student demonstrators agreed they wanted a more honest
and truthful government; but they were internally split on whether or
not they opposed the current government. The People's Daily editorial
had attacked them for being anti-socialist and anti-Party, and many
students wanted to prove these accusations were false. For example,
in an essay published in America as an op-ed piece, Wang Dan was
very careful to avoid saying his movement intended to overthrow the
government of China. He only went so far as to say their aim "is to
exert pressure on the government to promote the progress of democracy. Nor do we wish to hide the fact that our political views differ on
some points from those of the government and the Party." But he
ends with a dramatic rhetorical flourish: "We assure you that we will
59. Andrew J. Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 185.
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fight to the very end for the realization of democracy in China. "
This vacillation between caution and flamboyance, the juxtaposition of
moderate restraint and absolute ultimatum, was one of the internal
contradictions of the movement.
The students' use of official language sometimes placed them in a
similar double-bind. When student leaders realized that the radical
language used in slogans during the week of April 15 made the movement too vulnerable, they cleverly demanded that the demonstrators
tone down their rhetoric. They demanded only rights guaranteed
them by the PRC Constitution, "appealing to the authorities to live up
to the values they themselves had articulated." 61 This echoing of politically correct language was successful in encouraging moderates to
join the movement and in warding off government attacks. However,
by emphasizing a nonadversarial position, it sometimes prevented the
students from clarifying their position. For example, the students'
meaning in asking for a dialogue was very different from the government's meaning in arranging one, yet they used the same word.
Therefore, even while Li Peng was declaring martial law, he reiterated
that the Party and Government would "continue" [sic] to hold dialogues with "students and people from all walks oflife." 62 The lines of
communication initiated by both sides did not intersect.
Given the ambiguity that arose from both sides' claiming to believe in the same values, language became devalued. For example, it
was impossible to negotiate a settlement, for the two sides could not
state their opposing positions and then gradually hammer out a compromise solution. Instead, actions often spoke louder than words.
Acting out replaced negotiation. Though Li Peng may have dominated at the May 18 meeting with the students, he was upstaged by
Wuer Kaixi who accused him of arriving late and attacked him for
wasting time. Furthermore, Wuer Kaixi's appearance in striped hospital pajamas, his use of a nurse-assisted oxygen inhaling apparatus
during the "dialogue," and his dramatic fainting after having declared
that the government was insincere and the meeting was useless made a
stronger impact than any speeches. The government's eventual deployment of the People's Liberation Army against peaceful demonstrators also spoke louder than any previous verbal reprimands or
threats.
60. Wang Dan, "China: Students Will 'Fight to the Very End' for Democracy," Washington Post, rpt. International Herald Tribune, May 17, 1989.
61. Nathan, supra note 59, p. 183.
62. See Yi Mu and Thompson, supra note 6, p. 179, for a translation of Li Peng's
speech declaring martial law.
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A significant and unprecedented feature of China's 1989 popular
movement was the major role played by the media. Television viewers
reacted more strongly to Li Peng's tone of rage in declaring martial
law than to the words of his speech, they were more moved by the
sight of unconscious bodies of hunger strikers on stretchers than by
their speeches, slogans and banners. No previous Chinese movement
had been so public, internally or internationally. Some of the actions
of the main players-the Politburo members' visit to weakened hunger
striking students in the hospital on the morning of May 18, or the
students' demand for a live broadcast of their "dialogue," for example-expressed an awareness that they were playing to a mass audience and they were calculating visual effectiveness. The heady
experience of hearing their interviews quoted over Voice of America
or BBC radio, or published in western newspapers, also affected the
way student leaders presented themselves.
The leadership of the students' movement showed awesome courage. Their strategic planning was flexible, innovative, and creatively
responsive to changes in the environment. They created an image of
patriotic student demonstrators that won the hearts of the populace.
And they were brilliantly successful at an orderly mobilization of over
a million people, crowd control, systematic assignments and rotations
of monitors and traffic controllers, and maintenance of non-violence.
But because leaders were often in effect self-appointed and their
positions were only vaguely institutionalized, an individual's personality and support network could be more important than accountability
to an office, a constituency, or a legal code. Bureaucratic problems
that arose, including authoritarian decision making, lack of compromise, and indecisiveness, are readily understandable when one considers the CPC models these students had known; they had no personal
or organizational experience with democratic processes or rules of order, pluralism or majority rule--not to mention financial management
of large amounts of cash. Some wanted more unity, and less voting
and re-voting, while others favored more pluralism and debate. Finally, the absence of an institutionalized, agreed-upon way to handle
conflicts or differences of opinion sometimes resulted in internal splits
and hesitation to act.
Moreover, the movement was largely spontaneous and reactive;
there was no time to plan ahead to establish institutions of governance
or to prioritize goals and demands. The students reacted to a rapid
succession of events: to Hu Yaobang's death; to the People's Daily's
editorial of April 26, 1989; to the anniversary of the May Fourth
Movement; to the government's foot-dragging in arranging a dialogue.
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In the absence of recognized far-sighted leadership, much of the time
and energy students might have devoted to political discussions and
creation of long-term procedures and principles was instead spent on
tactical debate about short-term issues of symbolic importance such as
whether or not to withdraw from the square.
Nevertheless, the 1989 student democracy movement was much
more than a learning experience. The truly significant accomplishment of the students was to mobilize around common concerns and
demands millions of Chinese in at least eighty cities throughout the
country. The students inspired these people to break their silence,
and- often for the first time in their lives-to speak out for the principles they most cared about, to take personal risks for the goal of freedom in China. Not only did intellectuals bravely step forward, but
also workers and government officials, private entrepreneurs and Party
cadres, people from all walks of life. These people crossed a line by
following their consciences, and though since the crackdown they
have been forced to confess and self-criticize, to deny and repudiate,
they will not forget how it felt, during those euphoric days of midMay, to tell the truth. Beijing citizens will remember the acts of heroism they witnessed as old ladies defied army trucks: "If you enter the
city, you will have to crush me first." In their minds they will recreate the sense of satisfaction that came from doing what was right,
not what one was told to do, and discovering that hundreds and
thousands of fellow citizens felt the same way.
The galvanizing of support for the Chinese students' democracy
movement also crossed China's borders. The international press presence for the Gorbachev state visit facilitated the transmission of news
of the movement to the entire world. Massive demonstrations took
place in Hong Kong and elsewhere. The Chinese students' courage
inspired people in many other nations, from Eastern Europe to
Mongolia, to carry on their own struggles for democratic government.
Overseas Chinese were moved to initiate a wide variety of ongoing
support activities.
On the government side, not only the current government leaders
but the Chinese Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and
the entire political system lost credibility as a result of the violent and
excessive crackdown on the student movement. The Chinese people
had excused many "errors" committed under this system of government in the past, but the massacre of June 4, 1989, went too far for
most to tolerate. The leaders' self-interested response in order to hang
onto their own power discredited themselves as individuals and discredited the entire political system which would allow such unpopular
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brutality. Most urban people in China today do not believe the government's version of what happened on June 3-4.
In the year that has elapsed since June 4, 1989, it is clear that the
China democracy movement is not dead. Part of it has gone underground within China, part of it has emerged overseas. Students are
still a major force, and they are still agitating on campuses in Beijing.
The "gang of elders" who remain in power are paralyzed; they cannot
move forward and they cannot move backward due to internal splits
and lack of popular support. Many Chinese citizens feel a sense of
emptiness and anticipation; they ask not if but when the democracy
movement will arise again. In the meantime, the number of student
leaders and intellectuals on the government's "most wanted list" who
have managed to hide safely or to escape from the country is clear
evidence of support for an unprecedented underground organization
from all levels of society. China has for centuries been governed by
one-man rule, whether by an emperor, warlord or Communist Party
leader. The spring 1989 democracy movement will be a permanent
landmark of the moment in Chinese history when millions of people
proclaimed they would no longer tolerate such an autocratic system,
and demanded freedom and democracy.

5. THE BATI'LE OF BEIJING*
David Aikman

JUNE2
For days, many of Beijing's 10 million residents had slept fitfully.
Ever since the first giant student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square
on April 16, following the death of China's reform-minded former
Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, the warm spring
air had carried a heady fragrance of excitement. The new mood was
one part exhilaration, one part uncertainty and a large dose of fear.
Not since th'e Communists came to power in 1949 had there been such
huge protests in the Chinese capital in favor of freedom and democracy. Not since teenage Red Guards turned China upside down in the
first three years of the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution had young people so unceremoniously disrupted normal life in the city. But the Cultural Revolution's chaos had been deliberately fermented for political
purposes by China's Communist Party Chairman, Mao Zedong, and it
was he who decided when the demonstrations would end. Now, on
the night of June 2, 1989, nearly two weeks had elapsed since an angry
Premier Li Peng had declared martial law in sections of Beijing. During this period, China's military commanders had embarrassingly
failed to get their troops anywhere near the center of Beijing.
For the few hundred students still camping out in army tents in
the center of Tiananmen Square, the sense of victory was mixed with a
feeling of disquiet. True, convoys of troop-laden trucks that had entered the city when martial law was declared had been turned back to
the outskirts by vigilant citizens determined to protect "their" students. Crowds of shoppers, off-shift workers and students corralled
the troops in their trucks, lectured them on the need to "love the people" and respect democracy, plied them with cigarettes, refreshments
and food, then, almost condescendingly, sent them back in the direction they came. Even at the Beijing railroad station, where thousands
of troops from the suburbs and distant provinces had later tried to
disembark, students seemed to have succeeded in blocking them. Was
it really possible that the 3.2 million-strong People's Liberation
• Reprinted by permission of Time, Inc., dated November 1, 1989, from Massacre in
Beijing: China~ Struggle for Democracy (New York: Warner Books, 1989).
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Army-the world's second largest military force, obedient to Communist Party leaders who were themselves hardened by years of combat
and civil war-would meekly succumb to civics lessons by 20-yearolds and hectoring by middle-aged housewives?
Some of those 20-year-olds dozing and chatting in the insurrectionary Tiananmen encampment may have believed so---especially the
out-of-town students, who had poured into Beijing in the last days of
May and now outnumbered the increasingly weary local students. For
the newcomers, the atmosphere of the square was intoxicating. Pennants and flags from campuses all over the country fluttered bravely
from atop the lines of tents in the stiff spring breeze. The Goddess of
Democracy, a 30-foot statue of plaster-covered styrofoam, faced north
toward the portrait of Mao Zedong on the Gate of Heavenly Peace.
The statue was surrounded by a circle of blue and white pup tents
provided by Hong Kong supporters of the pro-democracy movement.
Piles of garbage, make-shift tents, student leaders and Western television crews had long since taken over the upper balustrade area of the
Monument to the People's Heroes. Student marshals prevented
crowds of well-wishers and passersby from ducking under a barrier
rope on the bottom level. Large banners strung across the monument
indicated the new boldness that was infecting students, and indeed all
of China's intelligentsia, in the past seven weeks. CONVENE THE
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, IMPLEMENT DEMOCRACY, DISMISS LI PENG, BRING AN END TO MARTIAL
LAW, they said in huge yellow letters on a red background. Lower
down, another message declaimed, WE ARE ON HUNGER
STRIKE, WE PROTEST, WE CRY OUT, WE REPENT. Even
jaded Western journalists could not but be touched by the naive optimism of China's youth at Tiananmen Square.
The more experienced among Beijing student leaders, however,
were nervous. Among them was Uerkesh Daolet, 21, an Uighur education major at Beijing Normal University who was better known by
his Chinese name, Wuer Kaixi. A dynamic, elfiike figure, Uerkesh
had been voted out of the leadership of the Autonomous Students'
Union of Beijing Universities, in part for proposing to end the occupation of the square on grounds that the military was about to take it
over by force. Chai Ling, an electrifying orator also from Beijing Normal University, had taped a tearful interview with ABC News announcing that she would go into hiding because the entire protest
movement, she prophesied, would soon be put down in a bloodbath.
Other Beijing students were concerned about a more mundane matter:
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the "movement," as they called their occupation, was so physically
fatigued that it was in danger of breaking up.

JUNE3
Not long after midnight on June 3, word swept through the
square that the army was on the move again. Convoys of trucks had
been spotted in the north of Beijing, in the south and in the west.
Oddest of all, thousands of soldiers, unarmed and wearing khaki pants
and standard white shirts, were attempting to jog in ranks ten abreast
down Changan Avenue, from a starting point in Tongxian County
some six miles away from Tiananmen. From the opposite direction,
trucks and military buses were gingerly approaching Tiananmen with
the rifles, ammunition and other equipment that the jogging troops
would need when they reached the city center.
In no time, students and sympathizers on bicycles and
motorcycles roused Beijing's by now politically savvy citizenry. People swarmed in their shorts and undershirts out of apartment blocks
and the city's hutongs (alleyways) to surround the invading forces and
demonstrate the same extraordinary "people power" that had kept the
military at bay for the previous two weeks. Road blocks of hastily
commandeered buses and trucks were set up at key intersections. At
the Yanjing Hotel, on Changan Avenue three miles to the west of
Tiananmen, the first group of marching uniformed soldiers was surrounded by crowds and searched for weapons. Some of the military
vehicles were overturned by citizens on the Yongdingmen Bridge in
southern Beijing. Out west of Muxidi, where the dead straight
Changan A venue crosses a canal in its sweep from west to east, tires of
military trucks were slashed. If the army wanted a fight, it now had a
justification for one.
7 a.m.
The last body of foot soldiers, who had jogged into the city, retreated eastward down Changan. Sweaty, exhausted and in some
cases weeping, they presented a pitiful sight. They had run a gauntlet
of invective, abuse, argument and even physical assault on their way
into the city. Many had become separated from their officers and were
completely disoriented. They had been halted at 3 a.m. just in front of
the Beijing Hotel, a sprawling blocklong complex east of Tiananmen
Square. Most were teenage peasant recruits who seemed quite unsure
why they had been sent into the city. "We came here to restore order," a soldier told the crowd that had surrounded his unit on the
eastern part of Changan. "We were obeying orders. Beijing people
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don't understand us." Crouching in the road nearby, a woman retorted, "We do understand you. We do not need you here."
Some of the soldiers were cruelly mocked by the crowds who
tried to block or taunt them as they moved into town. In some cases
refreshments were thrust into their faces as they jogged or staggered
along. On both sides-army and citizenry-nerves were stretched
taut by the bizarre, cat-and-mouse approach that the military seemed
to be taking toward implementing the martial-law decrees.
Now, by first light on June 3, an ominous souring of relations
between the people of Beijing and the army seemed to be setting in.
No one had attempted to steal guns or ammunition from the army on
any of the military's previous forays into the city, and the troops themselves had in general been treated correctly, sometimes quite well. By
7 a.m., though, students and young workers outside Zhongnanhai
were smashing their way into two military buses filled with AK-47s,
light machine guns and crates of ammunition. "We are peaceful students who love our country," shouted a young man with a white headband. "Why must the People's Army threaten the people with guns?"
As for the isolated pockets of troops hemmed in at intersections and
overpasses around the city, the crowd was not in a mood merely to
lecture them. In some places, soldiers were stripped almost naked,
chased or struck by angry citizens. Other injured troops had difficulty
getting to hospitals as mobs deflated or slashed the tires of military
ambulances.
Incidents such as these were used by the authorities to justify the
mobilization of the army. "Beginning in the small hours of June 3,"
said Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong in a statement released after the massacre, "a band of counterrevolutionary thugs incited some people to
illegally set up roadblocks, steal the troops' arms and equipment, destroy and bum military vehicles and stop and block martial-law troops
from taking up their positions." Time and again, continued the
mayor, his charges wildly belying the facts, "they frenziedly stormed
Zhongnanhai, the Great Hall of the People, broadcasting stations and
other key departments, and looted shops."
Wisely, the student leaders had anticipated government attempts
to provoke violence, and had kept tight control over their own rank
and file, lest they unwittingly abet them. In Chai Ling's taped account, smuggled out of China to Hong Kong one week after the massacre, she described how the military had tried to bait the dissidents.
"Several army trucks were put deliberately in our hands," she said.
"In the trucks, there were weapons and soldiers' coats." On learning
that protesters were helping themselves to the contents of the truck,
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student leaders took action. "We handed all the weapons to the Public Security," she stated. "We still have the receipt."
By the time Beijing had eaten its early breakfast and set off to
work June 3, its people came upon some startling scenes throughout
the city: disabled military buses and trucks, their windows smashed
and their tires deflated; barricades of buses, trolleys and commandeered trucks parked across intersections; and pockets of demoralized
soldiers, some of them injured, either trapped by intransigent crowds
or wandering around aimlessly in small groups, trying to find their
officers. Chinese student leader Wang Dan commented on this latest
in a series of military fiascos: "The awareness of the public was very
high. That was the reason they couldn't get us."
But "they" had not stopped trying. The efforts of China's military leaders to penetrate the city had foundered ignominiously so far,
but there was no sign at all that the overall strategy was going to be
modified. Meanwhile, the first fatalities from the army's latest push
occurred. A jeep that formed part of a nine-vehicle convoy racing into
town from the east in the early hours of Saturday had skidded out of
control on the rain-drenched streets and run into four pedestrians.
Three were killed, one of them dragged along under the jeep's bumper
as the driver struggled to bring his vehicle under control. When the
jeep careened to a halt, the driver jumped out and tried to get away,
but was caught and barely escaped a severe beating at the hands of an
enraged crowd.
Until that moment, the seven weeks of swirling demonstrations in
China's capital had produced only a handful of injuries and not a single known death. Hours later, China Central Television came forward
to accept blame for the incident, saying that the jeep had been borrowed from the police for a film being prepared for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. But the semi-apology
did little to soothe angry emotions. An ugly genie seemed to have
been let out of the bottle.
On Tiananmen Square, the morning hours of Saturday passed by
much as they had during the previous week. One thing was new,
though. In a khaki army tent on the upper level of the Monument to
the People's Heroes, a new hunger strike was under way. It had
started the previous afternoon, and was something of a last-ditch effort
by student organizers to rekindle the enthusiasm for protest that had
characterized the pro-democracy demonstrations during the first few
weeks. Though all four strikers would be considered intellectuals,
none was a student. The most prominent of them was Hou Dejian, a
well-known songwriter and vocalist who had dramatically defected to
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Beijing from Taiwan in 1983. The other three were Liu Xiaobo, a
lecturer in the Chinese department of Beijing Normal University;
Zhou Tuo, a lecturer in sociology at Peking University; and Gao Xin,
former editor of the Beijing Normal University Gazette and a Communist Party member.
Hou had been ambivalent about becoming so visibly involved in
the student demonstrations, though he had actively supported them
from behind the scenes. The strike was scheduled for 72 hours, but
Hou's recording schedule in Hong Kong required him to limit his own
involvement to 48 hours. He agreed to take part, he told a friend in
Beijing Friday, because he saw no other way to keep up the momentum of the protest movement. "The problem with Chinese intellectuals," he said, "is that they are all talk and no action. That is the
reason I think I should do [the hunger strike]."
At a Friday press conference, the four strikers had told journalists that they had four "basic slogans." In light of the violence that
descended upon Beijing less than a day later, they make interesting
reading today. "1. We are not against anybody and do not let hatred
and violence poison our fight for democracy. 2. We are all responsible
for our own past backwardness. 3. We are Chinese citizens. 4. We are
not seeking death, but a real and better life."
Hou and his three fellow hunger strikers sat inside the darkened
tent Saturday as throngs of student supporters and the just plain curious crowded up to a rope on the lower steps to gape at the scene.
White-clad medics occasionally came and went, ensuring that none of
the four was in medical danger. From different parts of the square,
loudspeakers relaying pro-democracy sentiments from student leaders
kept up a cacophony over the heads of the thousands of young people,
sightseers and even occasional foreign tourists treading their way
through tents and parked bicycles.
On Changan Avenue on the north side of the square, there were
far more bicycles than usual, meandering along to look at the mayhem
from the early morning hours. Normal traffic had a hard time moving. Vehicles traveling west across the square, in fact, were diverted
by traffic police south in front of the Great Hall of the People. West of
the square, Changan was now closed for a few blocks because the avenue was still obstructed by the weapons and ammunition buses that
students had broken into earlier in the morning. Glass and rocks littered the street, and Beijing's bicyclists wove slowly in and out of
groups of pedestrians who also wanted to see the latest evidence of the
clash of wills between the army and the people. Further west along
Changan, there were still isolated groups of soldiers trapped inside, or
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alongside, their trucks, and subjected now to almost constant barracking and harassment by the cocky citizenry.
2 p.m.

The students and the curious youth of Beijing bicycling slowly
from one bottleneck to another might have thought at this point that
life could possibly continue in this manner almost indefinitely: the
army would try, the citizens would react, the army would try again,
the citizens would stop them a second time, and so on until, perhaps
the government stepped down.
But two things had changed. First, as Beijing's inhabitants would
find out to their horror later, a military plan was already afoot to
crush the pro-democracy movement with full lethal force. Second,
both China's military and the People's Armed Police, who are under
the control of the Ministry of Public Security and the Defense Ministry, had become almost paranoid about the busload of weapons and
ammunition that had been broken into earlier in the morning just half
a block away from the main entrance to the Zhongnanhai compound
on the north side of Changan Avenue. What might happen, the authorities worried, if the peace-loving students lost control of the situation and mobs of angry workers tried to storm the political heart of
Beijing with AK-47s and machine guns?
The bus the authorities most worried about was at Liubukou,
where Fuyou Street intersects Changan, on the western end of the
Zhongnanhai block. Shortly before 2 p.m., loudspeakers operated by
the army broadcast orders for students and ordinary citizens to return
the guns and ammunition they had taken from the smashed bus and
hand over the bus itself. In the milling crowd, there were jeers and
snickers. Suddenly, at 2:10 p.m. fear swept through the thousands of
people around the buses. Wearing helmets and wielding nightsticks,
some 3,000 People's Armed Police stormed out of Zhongnanhai's
main entrance and blocked off Changan Avenue. They then tore into
the crowd around the Liubukou weapons bus. Rocks were thrown,
people started running and tear-gas shells were fired directly into the
crowd. It was the first known occasion in the 40-year history of the
People's Republic that tear gas had been employed in Beijing against
the city's inhabitants. Later, an angry student showed an American
reporter a discarded tear-gas shell stained with blood where it had
smashed into someone. "Metak 38m MN-05" was written on the shell
casing.
For several minutes the crowd fought back. But the Armed Police displayed greater resolution than security forces had at any time in
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the seven previous weeks of demonstrations. Men, women, young and
old were clubbed or smashed openly by tear-gas canisters if they got in
the way. Ambulances roared up, sirens wailing and blue lights flashing, to remove the first casualties of the battle for Beijing. Furious
now, young people gathered up any bricks and rocks they could find to
hurl back at the riot police, who seemed to be changing the equation in
the struggle. The crowds thickened and began smashing street lamps
and the windows of army buses parked on the south side of the street.
Several rocks were hurled at the very gate of the Zhongnanhai
compound.
Overwhelmed by numbers, the riot police fell back down Fuyou
Street, finally taking refuge inside Zhongnanhai via the compound's
west gate. Possibly fearing that the crowds might attempt a frontal
assault on Zhongnanhai, about 40 soldiers with clubs came out of the
main gate and stood shoulder to shoulder in front of the entrance.
Though jeered and insulted, they made no effort to attack the swirling
mobs in front of them. A young rock thrower who came too close to
the gate was smashed to the ground by the troops before managing to
wriggle free and make his escape.

3 p.m.
Within less than an hour, a large crowd had surrounded a military bus at the Xidan intersection, one long block to the west of
Zhongnanhai along Changan. The bus, containing military supplies
and weapons, held about 80 troops. The crowd lectured the troops,
admonishing them not to kill the people. For their part, the soldiers
replied politely that they were only following orders. Later in the day
the bus remained at the intersection but all its windows had been
smashed. Inside, the frightened soldiers had stuffed bedrolls into the
windows to keep out the mob. After the massacre, the bus was found
empty and burned.
Meanwhile, a new locus of tension between troops and students
had come into existence outside the western side, that is, the back, of
the Great Hall of the People. Just as the People's Armed Police were
surging out of Zhongnanhai, 2,000 or so helmeted and backpacked
troops had come marching out of a ground floor side entrance to the
Great Hall, which has long been known to have underground passages
that connect it with the Zhongnanhai compound on the other side of
Changan. The troops may have been secreted into the Great Hall via
Zhongnanhai, and it is possible that they had even made their way to
Zhongnanhai itself via Beijing's underground network of bomb-shelter
tunnels built under the orders of Mao Zedong in the late 1960s. For-
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eigners had occasionally been shown a glimpse of the tunnels, one of
which was entered through a secret, electrically operated sliding door
in a clothing store on Da Sha La Street. The tunnels were said by
Chinese officials to extend for miles under the city's streets and to be
capable of protecting much of the city's population from all but a nuclear direct hit.
The Great Hall troops may not have intended to proceed very far,
but from the perspective of the Tiananmen students and the Beijing
citizenry now supporting them, the only obstacle separating them
from the square was the Great Hall itself. The soldiers were already
worryingly close to the political heart of the pro-democracy movement. Within minutes, thousands of students and citizens had gathered from the square and nearby streets to block the movement of the
soldiers, who were from the 67th Army. Two city buses were also
driven up and parked near the Great Hall, cutting off the soldiers from
Changan A venue. Thousands of people now surrounded the troops,
who were instructed by their officers to sit down on the sidewalk and
roadway in the shade. There was a lot of shouting, and many young
men climbed atop the commandeered buses for a better view and to
observe the troops more closely. When an American network camera
crew arrived on the scene, the crowd cheered lustily.
But it was already a hot day, and the officers were in a sour mood.
As some of the students pushed too close to the edge of the sitting
troops, some of their commanders took off their belts and swung them
into the students' faces, drawing blood and infuriating the crowd.
Groups of students, in tum, would from time to time snatch a helmet
from a sitting soldier and run off with it, to a roar of delight from
those nearby. On Tiananmen Square for much of the afternoon, students triumphantly wheeled around flatbed bicycles with trophies of
their various confrontations with the army mounted atop them: helmets, J.D. cards, officers' caps, even an occasional rifle.
5 p.m.
Spectators on the western steps of the Great Hall watched the
slow-moving confrontation between the crowd and the Hebei troops
with interest, occasionally shouting insults up at staff workers who
were looking out of second-story windows in the hall. "Li Peng, step
down!" was one popular demand hurled upward in unison by a group
of young people. Then, impatient at the ugly reaction of the beltwielding officers, angrier members of the crowd picked up stones and
began throwing them into the ground floor compound areas of the
Great Hall, smashing windows in a small guard booth and in the hall
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itself. A few students with headbands tried to reason with the troops
and their officers, and white-coated students from the Beijing Union
Medical College set up a temporary first-aid station right in a patch of
the roadway amid the besieged troops. Bloody-faced students continued to stagger out, victims of the belt buckles of an increasingly angry
officer corps.
The rising anger of crowds at intersections along Changan all the
way to the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution was
now being expressed in rock throwing at the People's Armed Police
and several government buildings. Windows were smashed not just in
the Great Hall, but also in the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Central Committee and the Ministry of Radio, Film and
Television. Several guards at these buildings, as well as Zhongnanhai,
had by late afternoon been injured by flying rocks.
One reason for the crowd's fury was the violence employed by the
riot police attempting to clear Changan in front of Zhongnanhai and
to recover the blockaded weapons and supply buses. A woman caught
by riot troops at the Xidan intersection in mid-afternoon, for example,
was kicked to the ground by five policemen, then beaten with truncheons as one held her hair. Nearby, a man was cornered by three policemen who beat him about the face and chest for a full minute before
letting him go. His face and upper body streaming with blood, he
staggered off, barely conscious.
News of these ferocious incidents flashed back and forth from
crowd to crowd in a one-mile radius of Tiananmen Square, along with
scattered and panicky accounts of yet another troop movement in
some part or other of the city. Around 5 p.m., several hundred young
workers donned their yellow construction helmets and headed for
Tiananmen with makeshift pikes and clubs, as though preparing for a
violent confrontation with the military. A crowd of about 1,000 ordinary citizens, meanwhile, pushed down the wall of a construction site
near the Xidan intersection and made off with tools, bricks, reinforcing bars and anything else that seemed usable as a weapon.
To the beleaguered authorities of both Beijing municipality and
the Communist Party Central Committee, the new developments were
the stuff of every Communist leadership's nightmare: the "people"
turning against the "people's leadership." Though the pro-democracy
movement had meticulously avoided any public attacks on the Communist Party, or indeed upon socialism itself throughout most of the
long weeks of escalating protest, such self-restraint was evaporating
fast. The June 14 official government report on the massacre asserts
that Tiananmen loudspeakers in the hands of the Autonomous Work-
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ers' Union were broadcasting appeals "to take up arms and overthrow
the government." It is unlikely that the union was saying anything of
the sort, but it is possible that some individual workers were calling for
extreme action against the authorities. Some of the many worker and
student rallies proceeding on the square in late afternoon had their
own independent bullhorns. Who knows what was said in the flush of
antipolice anger?
Words, though, are seldom merely words in the dense legal mythology of Communist power. Even a whispered yearning for weapons by a hunger-striking student in the comer of a dark tent would
have been seized upon as evidence of anti-Communist intent. For the
martial-law authorities in Beijing, whatever insurrectionary sentiments
were publicly voiced around 5 p.m. at Tiananmen Square on Saturday
seemed to serve as the judicial trigger for much that happened in the
next few hours.
The Plan

Just how many troops were outside Beijing may never be precisely known. Nonetheless, a source in close touch with the White
House throughout the crisis said flatly that there were as many as
350,000, drawn from all seven of China's military region commands.
Deng Xiaoping had summoned the regional commanders to a meeting
in Wuhan to obtain their support for the crackdown. Western intelligence was not privy to those confidential discussions, but once the
troops began to actually enter Beijing, it was a relatively simple matter
to keep track of them. Makeshift tactical orders were being transmitted by radio in the clear, without scrambling or encryption. As aresult, U.S. intelligence agencies using satellites could listen in on radio
communications right down to the battalion level.
Deng himself was kept informed of all the major troop movements and decisions, and had insisted that elements of all Chinese military regions take part in the final crackdown on the students. This
was a precautionary measure both to prevent the emergence of an allpowerful military warlord should the military operation prove a striking success, and to spread the responsibility among as many units as
possible should it be a failure. On his return from Wuhan, Deng remained in the Beijing area for a few days, but then left once more, on
May 28, for the Yellow Sea resort of Beidaihe. Equipped with comfortable villas for the use of high Chinese officials on vacation,
Beidaihe had several times in the past served as the locale of important
Chinese policy gatherings when Deng-and before him Mao
Zedong-needed to forge agreement at high levels in a less formal and
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more confidential setting than was possible in Beijing. During the last
days of May and the first one or two days of June, Deng presided over
the planning for the military operation and double-checked the political allegiances of both his military commanders and the political leadership at Politburo level. Deng, despite his semi-retirement in 1987
from day-to-day administration, still held the one vital lever for controlling political power in the People's Republic: chairmanship of the
Central Military Commission.
The last details in place, Deng evidently returned to the Beijing
area before June 3. He did not, however, go back to his official residence. Instead, he went to the Western Hills, where some senior Party
officials have villas in a well-guarded area away from the prying eyes
of foreigners or ordinary Chinese. A temporary military command
post appears to have been set up nearby when the assault on Beijing
began. It is possible that most of China's top leadership still considered loyal to Deng also met there, until it was apparent that the military would gain the upper hand in Beijing. Then, on June 6, three
days after the crackdown began, the martial-law authorities moved the
tactical military command post into the Great Hall of the People.
Even with a determined effort to involve every major military region in the Beijing assault, Deng left nothing to chance in his delegation of authority. His primary conduit was President Yang Shangkun,
who, along with the already disgraced party General Secretary Zhao
Ziyang, was a vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Yang, in tum, was related by blood or marriage to at least three of the
key personnel entrusted with completing the takeover of Tiananmen
Square:
• His son-in-law, Chi Haotian, chief of the general staff of
the P.L.A. and thus the one man in a position to coordinate all military deployments within China.
• His younger brother, Yang Baibing, chief of the general
political department of the P.L.A.
• His nephew (and Yang Baibing's son), Yang Jianhua,
commander of the 27th Army, a unit within the Beijing
military region that is based in Shijiazhuang in Hebei
province.
The detailed operational planning of the troop movements into
Beijing was in the hands of Chi Haotian, whose final instructions from
Deng Xiaoping could probably be summarized as follows: use
whatever force necessary to complete the suppression of the student
movement. As Chief of Staff, Chi bears major responsibility for the
violence unleashed upon Beijing's citizenry by his troops. Yet he al-
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most certainly hoped that firepower would not be necessary during the
operation. For one thing, there was profound unease throughout the
officer corps at the use of the military for purposes of political control.
For another, China's field commanders, like the field commanders of
virtually any other regular army in the world, probably dreaded the
prospect of subjecting their troops to the serious logistical problems of
moving around within a densely populated city, and especially of exposing them to the fury of the aroused and politically radicalized
populace.
In retrospect, it is obvious that the operational plan to take
Tiananmen Square envisaged the use of a tough and heavily armed
field army as a last resort. None of the military units deployed in the
initial probing forays into the city on the night of June 2 had been
provided with ammunition. Some of them, as noted earlier, did not
even have weapons. There were sound military and political reasons
for that caution. The 38th Army, based at Baoding, 90 miles from
Beijing, was composed of officers and troops native to the Beijing area.
A number of the students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square had
even done their reserve training in the 38th. Many officers of the unit
had relatives or friends who were students. Politically, the 38th Army
may have been the P.L.A. unit most sympathetic to student arguments
and thus least psychologically suited to carry out the task of suppressing them. In fact, tanks from the 38th Army were used early on
in the approach to Tiananmen, but they were not armed and their
turret-mounted heavy machine guns were never used against demonstrators. Several unit commanders were later reported to have been
removed, and some even executed, for refusing to move aggressively
against Beijing. Had any of their soldiers been armed, these officers
might have turned the guns against the troops that were prepared to
suppress the population.
Low motivation was apparent in other units brought into the vicinity of Beijing from China's seven military regions. From Chengdu
in Sichuan Province, home of Deng Xiaoping, came elements of the
70th Army; from Shenyang, elements of the 40th and the 65th (with
the 65th containing some troops from Inner Mongolia). From Datong
came elements of the 28th Army. These units, as well as others that
have not been identified, formed part of the military stranglehold that
Chi Haotian hoped to put into place on the center of Beijing during
the afternoon and evening of June 3. Some had made their way to
Beijing by road, but the bulk of troop movements evidently took place
by air, with the Nanyuan military airfield south of Beijing being heavily used in the final hours before the June 3 assault. As for the Chinese
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air force, responsible for troop movement by air, there were repeated
though unconfirmed reports that its commander, Wang Hai, had been
opposed to the initial declaration of martial law in Beijing. "The air
force had nothing to do with this," Wang Hai supposedly said when
the scope of the Beijing massacre became apparent.
It is not clear exactly how many of China's armies were in place
around Beijing when the final assault took place, but it could have
been as many as ten, even if not all were at full strength. Besides the
27th, 28th, 38th and 65th, there were divisions or smaller units from
the 16th, 17th and 69th. To add real combat muscle to these forces, at
least one regiment of the 15th airborne division, from the Wuhan military district, was also on hand. Troops from most or perhaps all of
these units were involved in the military occupation of Beijing that
took place once Tiananmen Square had been taken. But one field
army behaved with particular ferocity and brutality on the night of
June 3--4: the 27th Army under the command of Yang Jianhua, Yang
Shangkun's nephew. Some of its troops had been recruited into the
army only as a last resort to avoid prison sentences. Many were combat-toughened veterans of China's 1979 battle with Vietnam. The men
of the 27th, generally older than the teenage recruits who had so dismally failed to penetrate Beijing in convoys or in jogging units, were
mostly of peasant background, and they seemed to feel nothing in
common with the young people of the Chinese capital. No doubt because of their presumed impermeability to propaganda blandishments
within Beijing proper, they were entrusted with the task of ensuring
that, whatever else happened, China's military would secure a tactical
victory on Tiananmen Square.
Chi Haotian's plan called for the 27th to be held in reserve to the
east and west of the city, in case other units failed to secure the square
and real shooting was needed. But the unfolding operation was a
lengthy one, additionally complicated by uncertainty over which
troops would be able to reach the center of Beijing from which axis of
approach. From the south, for example, troops moving toward
Tiananmen from Nanyuan airfield had a more difficult task than those
scheduled to make the approach from the west or the east. That is
because none of the north-south streets of Beijing offer the broad and
uninterrupted axis of approach to Tiananmen provided by Changan
Avenue. Navigating through crooked intersections around the Temple of Heaven Park, troop trucks and armored personnel carriers were
easily blocked by commandeered buses and other vehicles in the
Yongdingmen area, south of Tiananmen.
On Dongzhimenwai Street, which leads into Beijing from the air-
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port, a convoy of some 50 trucks was finally halted around 5:30p.m.
when students and local citizens overturned a vehicle and completely
blocked the relatively narrow road. As the crowd grew and citizens
surrounded the halted trucks to talk to the troops within them, several
buses were placed across the main Dongzhimen intersection to prevent
any further efforts to bring in troops from this sector.
6 p.m.
A strange quiet now came over the center of Beijing, as though
each side in the approaching clash was sizing up the other. There
were still thousands of people and bicycles in and around Tiananmen
Square itself. Changan remained closed off in front of Zhongnanhai.
But there had been no more tear gas or fighting since early afternoon.
Behind the Great Hall of the People, crowds of students and citizens
continued to hector each other and clash in small ways with the
thousands of troops hemmed in on the roadway. Nonetheless, it now
seemed clear that the soldiers were unlikely to attempt any aggressive
action for the remainder of the evening. Pockets of stranded troops
and trucks continued to fidget amid humming crowds in different
parts of the city, though with little sign that violence was about to
erupt.
Meanwhile, the authorities in Beijing were preparing to warn the
city that matters had now reached the point of no return. At 6:30
p.m., the municipal government and the martial-law authorities issued
a new emergency statement. Broadcast repeatedly on radio and television, it called on residents of the city to "heighten their vigilance" and
to stay off the streets and away from Tiananmen Square. Workers
were urged to stay at their jobs or remain in their homes. The students in the square almost certainly paid little attention to the emergency statement, any more than did Beijing residents caught up in the
all-consuming task of keeping the army at bay. After all, had not
there been one "serious warning" after another ever since the original
martial-law declaration on May 20? Why should this one be any
different?
The tear gasings, beatings and other injuries on Saturday afternoon had all occurred in the vicinity of Zhongnanhai. Yet it was the
presence of fully armed troops so close to Tiananmen Square that
~ee'?ed to have students and citizens most worried. The belt lashings
tnfttcted on some of the students by officers went on intermittently
until evening, and sometimes bricks and bottles were thrown back and
forth. Whenever things seemed to be getting out of hand or the troops
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looked as though they were about to fight back, the crowd would
shout out in unison, "Don't fight! Don't fight!"
8:30p.m.

Suddenly the orders seemed to have changed. At about 8:30
p.m., some 2,000 men clambered to their feet, formed up in ranks,
then marched uneventfully back into the ground-floor gate of the
Great Hall from which they had originally emerged. At least one crisis now appeared resolved. Perhaps others might be defused in the
same nonviolent way.
That was not to be. Possibly as part of the decision made around
5 p.m. by the martial-law authorities, new waves of troops began surging into the city along whatever axes were not already blocked. When
about 40 trucks filled with troops came down the first ring road to the
Jianguomenwai overpass, just two miles to the east of the square along
Changan, they were also stopped by citizens. This time the soldiers
sensed the mood was not at all friendly and clutched their rifles nervously. Some of the crowd clambered over the halted trucks or tried
to disable them by removing parts of the engines. As diplomats
brought their families out onto the balconies of the Jianguomenwai
foreign compound to watch, a tense standoff developed.
Meanwhile, the military was not giving up. Yet another contingent of about 1,200 men, helmeted and armed, had somehow approached undetected along Qianmen West Road, just to the southwest
of Tiananmen. Once again, thousands of young people streamed toward it from the square, which was now illuminated brightly by the
floodlights on huge lamp standards surrounding Tiananmen. An articulated bus, jammed to capacity with young people, 50 to 60 of them
perched dangerously on the roof, lurched out of its temporary location
in front of the eastern steps of the Great Hall-that is, facing the
squar~traight toward the intersection of Qianmen West with the
square itself. As TV crews turned their own lights on the bewildered
and hemmed-in troops, the bus shuddered to a halt diagonally across
Qianmen West, the newest sally in the people's guerrilla traffic blockade. Harangued, squeezed between the crowd and obviously exhausted, the soldiers waited passively for new orders against a
background din of shouts, the tinkling of bicycle bells and the now
more sinister, consistent ee-aw, ee-aw of arriving and departing ambulances. Finally, the officers ordered the men to line up and march
back down Qianmen to the west. As they did so, there was a roar of
approval from the crowd, which once again drifted back to the square.
Not long after this, yet another group of troops, this time un-
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armed, tried to double-time into the square from the east. It is not
clear from where they had come, but they were literally collared by
hundreds of angry citizens just in front of the Beijing Hotel. Several of
the soldiers were beaten on the spot, while others retreated north.
Probably no one in Beijing at this moment could have grasped
exactly what was taking place all over town. Great caravans of trucks,
with armored personnel carriers behind them, lay backed up along at
least four axes into town: east along Changan; west along Changan
(with about seven miles separating the two main pincer arms of the
approaching 27th Army); south along Yongdingmen Street that, for
about seven long blocks, heads due north into Qianmen guarding the
south of Tiananmen; and from the airport to the northeast. Tires had
been slashed, bottles and rocks thrown and the troops often beaten up
and chased away from their trucks. Commandeered city buses and
trucks had been jammed into dozens of intersections by angry and
frightened citizens in the desperate hope that they would somehow
keep the army out of the city center. Broken glass, rocks and pieces of
brick covered the usually litter-free streets in the center of the Chinese
capital.
Yet the military was inexorably closing in, coiling itself for the
final strike against the pro-democracy movement. As if temporarily
flitting in from another universe-though he was probably at the
Western Hills command post at this time-Premier Li Peng appeared
on television late in the evening to give a speech on environmental
problems. He had not been seen or heard from in public for nine days.
In Tiananmen Square, the final target of the advancing troops, an
eerie calm prevailed. Several thousand students and their supporters
were milling around, listening to speeches, catching snatches of news
from around the city from the student-controlled loudspeakers, gazing
at the Goddess of Democracy or at the tent containing the hunger
strikers on the Monument to the People's Heroes. BBC senior correspondent Kate Adie remembered being impressed by the confident
mood of the bystanders. "It was a real atmosphere of a Saturday night
on the town," she recalled. "It was not tense. There was a sort of Ithink-we've-done-it feeling."
Hawkers selling meat on skewers unconcernedly plied their trade
in the southwest of the square, not far from the malodorous assemblage of temporary outdoor toilets. Couples wandered about, hand in
hand. A ceremony--small but, in the context of the pro-democracy
movement, important-was unfolding. Yan Jiaqi, then the director of
the Political Science Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was delivering a speech in honor of the formal opening of the
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University of Democracy, a sort of unofficial colloquium of Chinese
academics who support political and social pluralism and want to expose Chinese young people to the underlying philosophical concepts.
(Yan, a supporter of Zhao Ziyang, later escaped from China and took
his campaign for democracy education among Chinese abroad with
him.) His remarks were brief, as befitted an evening that was still rapidly unfolding. When he finished speaking firecrackers were set off to
honor the occasion. They were the last nonlethal explosions heard in
Beijing that night.
10 p.m.
The killing began less than four miles west of Tiananmen Square,
along Changan. Without warning, the 27th Army opened fire on demonstrators at Muxidi Bridge. That landmark, over a canal that drains
the lake in Yuyuantan Park, a few blocks to the north, is the second
and last major bridge before Changan reaches Tiananmen. Earlier in
the evening, it had become a junkyard of trolleys and buses as group
after group of citizens had sought to make the way into the city center
impassable. West of the bridge, long lines of trucks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) belonging to the 27th waited impatiently to
move on.
Shortly before 10 p.m., the troops were given the order to clear
the obstacles, disperse the crowds using whatever means necessary and
keep moving. First, tear-gas shells were fired into the crowds, and
soldiers with truncheons ran forward on foot, beating anyone who got
in the way. The troops ran around or between the blockading buses,
looking for people to hit. Then, infuriated, the crowd rallied and
started fighting back, hurling rocks and bottles at the soldiers and
forcing them to retreat. Molotov cocktails started smashing into the
buses and the troop trucks trying to nudge forward. Some youths
brought rugs from nearby apartments, doused them with gasoline,
placed them on or in the buses and ignited them, attempting to create
a wall of flame through which the incoming troops would have to
move. As the rain of bottles, rocks and Molotov cocktails intensified,
the first shots rang out. At the beginning, the troops did not seem to
be shooting at people so much as over their heads, but the distinction
quickly vanished. Within minutes, AK-47 barrels were lowered and
bodies began falling on Changan A venue and on the side streets
nearby.
The troops pushed forward again and the crowds once more fell
back. Heavy equipment was moved up to push the burning buses and
trucks out of the way. This too was attacked. So were municipal fire

THE BATILE OF BElliNG

99

trucks that were summoned to douse the blazing buses but that had to
retreat when they themselves became the targets of a withering barrage of fire bombs and rocks. Gas tanks exploded and the sky turned
into an orange inferno sliced through by occasional tracer bullets.
"Fascists! Fascists!" the crowd chanted after a volley of gunfire would
crackle and ricocheting AK-47 rounds smashed into walls, pavement
and people.
As the advance proceeded, one troop truck or APC after another
was set on fire. Within an hour of the assault on Muxidi Bridge,
twelve army vehicles had been burned out in a four-mile stretch of
Changan. Meanwhile, virtually every military vehicle crawling slowly
into the city from the west had to fight off attacks by Molotov cocktails. The troops themselves were no longer aiming simply at rioters
but in virtually every direction where there was a crowd of people.
Ordinary citizens were cut down in apartment buildings lining
Changan. In Nos. 22 and 23, residences reserved for senior government officials or retired Party leaders, there were several deaths and
injuries, including at least one official at the vice-ministerial level. An
old woman was struck in the head and died instantly while she was
cleaning her teeth. A travel agent from Oregon staying at the nearby
Minzu Hotel watched the carnage in disbelief from his balcony, but he
had to duck as bullets smacked into the hotel near his room. He was
then warned by public security officials that anyone observing the
scene from the balcony might be shot at.
The warning was no bluff. When the American went downstairs
into the lobby, plainclothes officers from the Ministry of State Security
darted into the hotel and shot in cold blood a Chinese who had taken
refuge there. The body was dragged across the carpet, leaving a dark
stream of blood in its wake. Shortly afterward, army sharpshooters
took up positions in several of the Minzu Hotel's windows, firing both
into the street and into buildings they suspected might be used by
demonstrators to fire on the army. After the military had taken complete control of the city, the authorities repeatedly maintained that
some of the automatic rifles and machine guns stolen from army buses
early Saturday morning had been used against the military coming
into the city. That was possible, though there was no independent
evidence to support the assertion.
Firing from trucks and in the street, the incoming troops were
now aiming low. As a student near him was hit in the leg, Associated
Press correspondent John Pomfret heard the youth cry out as he collapsed, "Live fire! Live fire!" Many of the students were slow to grasp
that message, though blood was now thick on the streets and side-
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walks. Determined pedicab or freight bicyclists were frantically pedaling back and forth to nearby hospitals with the latest victims of the
mayhem. The cacophony was uninterrupted: deafening volleys of
AK-47 rounds, the heavy pop of tear-gas canisters, the crunch of
metal against metal as tracked military vehicles pushed blazing wreckage out of the path of the incoming trucks and APCs, the downpour of
bottles and rocks smashing into military vehicles and immobilized
buses, shouts of anger and abuse at the troops, screams of the
wounded, the wail of ambulances and the whoomph of gasoline
explosions.
Just east of the square, several thousand people had gathered on
and around the pedestrian overpass at the intersection of Dongdan
Street and Changan. There was no violence or shooting here, but
three rows of buses had already been parked across the avenue to
block any vehicles coming in from the east. The crowd, aware of the
fighting now going on west of the square, clearly expected the troops
to come into town from the east at any point. John Landy, New Delhi
bureau chief for· United Press International, was surprised to come
across about 800 soldiers, surrounded by crowds who were now
screaming at them, sitting in the middle of Beijingzhan Street, the
broad road leading perpendicularly off Changan to the Beijing railroad
station. The soldiers were armed with automatic rifles and had obviously been there a long time. But they looked befuddled and unsure of
themselves. Landy and some journalist colleagues, exhausted from a
long day's reporting, ducked into a Korean restaurant in an alley off
Beijingzhan Street. The proprietor offered the reporters beer, food and
soft drinks. The vague presence of attractive young women in the
background soon became apparent to the reporters: in the midst of
the battle for Beijing, they had wandered into a brothel.
11 p.m.

Back at Muxidi, the battle was raging. Incredibly, the troops had
made little forward progress. Pierre Hurel, a correspondent for the
French magazine Paris-Match, watched as a noncommissioned officer
stood up in a jeep and bellowed at his troops through a megaphone,
"Charge, you bunch of cowards! Clear away all that!" Some of the
soldiers then hurled strange grenades that exploded as they hit the
ground but failed to produce much noise. As the troops charged
clumsily forward, the crowd briefly retreated, then regrouped amid a
new hail of bottles and rocks from all across the road. "Fascists! Fascists!" the crowd kept shouting as a group of four students, stripped to
the waist and standing to face the soldiers alone in front of a blazing
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barricade, banged together the poles on which the scarlet banners ?f
their universities were flying. Around 11:30 p.m., Hurel watched m
astonishment as hundreds of new troops jumped out of trucks backed
up along Changan and riflemen coolly fanned out to take up firing
positions against the stone throwers. Next to Hurel, and close to the
canal flowing under Muxidi Bridge, the T shirt of a 15-year-old exploded in red as an AK-47 round smashed into his chest. From behind a tree, Hurel caught sight of the army sniper leaning against the
side of a bus and calmly taking aim again. As Hurel took off with the
screaming crowd away from the deadly volleys, a bullet slammed
across his lower back, drawing blood but miraculously missing both
his kidneys and his liver. After a quick swig of bourbon and some
stitches inserted by a German doctor, the journalist went back to the
streets.
Hurel, like the majority of Western reporters, had concentrated
on the fierce fighting along the western sector of Changan as the 27th
Army slugged its way toward Tiananmen Square. The focus made
sense. As the Chinese authorities would later admit, more than 300
military vehicles-tanks, trucks, APCs and jeeps-were "obstructed
or besieged" along Changan A venue west of Tiananmen. But the convoys trying to approach the city center from Nanyuan airfield in the
south were having a nightmare too. The intersections were obstructed
by buses, trucks, bicycles, even furniture. Moreover, the narrower
streets in this part of town made it easier for demonstrators to attack
the trucks at close range. Dozens of trucks and APCs were hit by
Molotov cocktails and burned. The troops fired at the demonstrators,
and shortly before midnight some of the fiercest encounters anywhere
in the city were taking place on the roads north from the Temple of
Heaven. Journalists observing events from balconies on the upper
floors of the Beijing Hotel watched orange machine-gun tracer fire
crisscrossing the sky about half a mile south of the square. Several
civilians were shot down not far from the Kentucky Fried Chicken
franchise south of the square.

JUNE4
The four hunger strikers in the tent and the other students still
gathered around Tiananmen Square's Monument to the People's Heroes had begun to hear reports of the killings that had been taking
place at Muxidi to the west. A young woman covered in blood came
rushing from Changan and spoke in a loud emotional voice to the students and supporters gathered around the monument. The bloodstains were not her own, she explained, but came from wounded
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victims she had helped carry away from the line of fire. Her listeners
were horrified. Some students nearby had armed themselves with
makeshift bamboo spears, and several workers had already banded together to resist the military with whatever puny weapons they could
find. But political scientist Yan Jiaqi, still perhaps hopeful of some
miraculously peaceful end to the day's violence, appealed for a conciliatory approach. "Ifthe soldiers leave Beijing," he said, "we can forget
the rest [of what they have done]."
What "rest"? his listeners may have wondered. The indiscriminate shooting, the beatings, the headlong destruction wrought by advancing Chinese troops? One of the most gruesome events of the night
was about to occur a few miles east along Changan, where some 40
army trucks, each with about ten soldiers, had been blocked on the
Jianguomenwai overpass for nearly four hours. They had tried to
move onto Changan from the ring road, which passes under the overpass in a north-south direction. More than 5,000 students and citizens
had gathered on the bridge, and they had already pushed seven of the
trucks, complete with troops in them, onto the middle of the overpass
to serve as an obstacle for military convoys that might be coming from
the east. Just after midnight, a lone armored recovery vehicle--essentially a tank without a turret that is used to tow disabled armored
vehicles-roared eastward toward the overpass from the direction of
Tiananmen, though no one was quite sure where it had started. As the
crowds scampered to safety, the driver managed to negotiate thenarrow space still left between vehicles on the overpass, then roared toward the Jianguo Hotel, a popular, Western-managed watering hole
conveniently close to the Jianguomenwai and Qijiayuan foreign
compounds.
Then, to everyone's amazement, the vehicle swung around and
headed back toward the overpass. As it approached, it accelerated to
about 50 m.p.h. Once more the thick crowds on the overpass scattered to either side of the road. Less fortunate were the students and
soldiers sitting and squatting atop the trucks in the middle of the overpass. This time the armored recovery vehicle made no effort to steer
through the parked trucks. Crunching relentlessly over hastily abandoned bicycles, it smashed at full speed into one of the parked army
trucks. That vehicle toppled instantly, sending flying from its canvas
roof about a dozen soldiers and civilians who had been perched there
discussing the immorality of the army's assault on the square. One of
the civilians, a short young man with matching pale jacket and pants
and black cotton shoes, was smashed into the pavement with such violence that his brains spilled out on the road. The body lay curled in a
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pool of blood for four days before the military finally allowed its removal. A soldier with a serious head injury was quickly placed on a
flatbed pickup truck and taken to the hospital, still clutching his AK47 rifle.
The crowd reaction to this ramming of one military vehicle by
another was immediate. "This is the most terrible scene I've ever seen
in my whole life," said a visibly shaken Mao Xiangdong, 25, a former
computer salesman. "The leaders don't care about our lives at all."
Angry groups from the crowd then dragged several of the frightened
and equally horrified soldiers, all from the Shenyang-based 39th
Army, out of the trucks to view the civilian corpse. "Look at what
they've done to your brother!" one screamed. "How can you bear
this?" A third kept shouting, "Shameless! Inhuman!" Several of the
troops unashamedly started crying as the crowd pleaded with them to
abandon their positions. "Down with Li Peng!" the crowd chanted.
"Bum Li Peng to death!" Beside the truck not far from the bridge, a
tall, lean Chinese man in his 60s lectured a junior officer sitting in the
passenger seat of a truck. "I was a soldier for 40 years," he bellowed
in a thick, provincial accent. "Watching what you've been doing these
days, I cannot find any place to hide and cry. In 1949, when we
moved into Beijing, the people offered us water to drink. Can you
expect them to do the same now?"
Joe Kahn, a reporter for the Dallas Morning News, was following
the murderous armored recovery vehicle on his bicycle as it careened
down Changan back toward Tiananmen. Just after the vehicle left the
scene of the ramming on the overpass, it crushed a row of abandoned
bicycles by the roadside and seriously injured an old woman who was
too slow getting out of the way. Then it vanished as mysteriously as it
had first appeared.
Just minutes earlier, not long after midnight, a lone APC had
broken through the obstacle course along Changan into Tiananmen
Square from the west, roared across the north of the square, then disappeared in an easterly direction. Less than half an hour later, another APC rolled into the square, this time from the southeast. It
drove north alongside the museums of the Chinese Revolution and
Chinese History, then hit a metal barrier that the students had erected
for the purpose of halting just such vehicles. It stopped momentarily,
got its tracks caught, then tried to back away. But the crowd was onto
it in a fury. Smashing metal bars against its side and further entangling its tracks, the mob then piled clothing and other material atop
the hull, doused it with gasoline and set it on fire. When some of the
students objected that the driver would be incinerated if he was not
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permitted to get out, the crowd shouted back, "It's okay. He's not a
human being." The driver and whoever else was inside the APC
quickly burned to death. The vehicle, No. 003 painted in white atop
the camouflage pattern on its hull, was the first Chinese military vehicle to come to a halt in the square, and the first to be destroyed.
Not long afterward, another APC came up from the south toward
Changan. A bus was driven into it to prevent it from moving back
toward the west. Then it too was set afire, but the crew jumped out.
They had barely got a few yards from their blazing vehicle before being set upon by the mob and savagely beaten. An American student
who was close to the incident and tried to prevent the mob from killing the soldiers was himself badly beaten. An hour later the APC was
still burning. The fate of its occupants was unknown.
Other youths in the crowd were trying to pull down or otherwise
disable the remote video cameras mounted on lamp standards up and
down Changan A venue in the vicinity of the square. Their instinct
was correct. Footage from the cameras, which had been installed ostensibly for traffic monitoring, was later screened again and again on
television by the authorities, both to construct an image of the prodemocracy demonstrators as wanton rioters and to identify those the
authorities sought to arrest.
1 a.m.

As the truck and APC columns from the south fought their way
toward Tiananmen, laying down a blanket of tear gas and rifle fire, the
first regular infantry troops moved into the square from the south.
They were sweaty and exhausted, and many of them were injured.
They slumped down to rest in front of Chairman Mao's Memorial
Hall. But they had little respite. Crowds quickly formed, and a rain
of bottles and rocks fell upon them. Some of the soldiers were badly
injured in this new barrage, but there were apparently no medics
among them, and it was impossible for military ambulances to get
through into the square. A squad of riot police that arrived to clear
away the mob came under a deadly hail of bottles and rocks.
By now, however, troops were beginning to move into the outskirts of the square from all sides. Several hundred of them, armed
with long sticks but equipped with neither rifles nor bayonets, came
into the square from the southeast. They walked between the Museum
of the Chinese Revolution and the Hong Kong material supply station, a temporary assemblage of tents and tables on the square that
Hong Kong students had been using as a base to supply the material
needs of the pro-democracy students. Hong Kong students who

THE BATILE OF BEUING

105

watched the soldiers walk by to take up positions in front of the museum said they looked calm and unwarlike. Some of the troops, they
reported, even promised not to harm the students in the square. There
was handshaking between the two groups. It may have been the last
gesture of friendship of the whole night between the People's Army
and "the people."
Now the noise of the hard fighting along the western portion of
Changan was becoming threateningly close. Paul Caccamo of Garden
City, N.Y., who was teaching English in the northern city of
Changchun, had come into Beijing two days earlier. He left the square
at the north end around 12:30 a.m. and moved with some Chinese
friends toward where the noise of strife was loudest, about a mile away
to the west. "Suddenly the crowd in front of me halted," he recalls.
"I thought the troops in front of us would move and tum back. There
was this faith in the People's Army. Some people even told me that
the soldiers were using only plastic bullets. The people in front of me
had linked arms. But the soldiers facing them were kneeling down
and were spraying the crowd with bullets. In the first second, everybody turned and ran. I thought I was never going to stop running."
Eventually, a Chinese grabbed Caccamo by the arm and told him
he could stop: the immediate danger was past. A man came up to
him and shouted, "Foreigner, foreigner, come and look at this!" "I
walked over to where he was," Caccamo says, "and there on a bicycle
rack was an 18-year-old girl with a bullet through her chest. That
changed my mind about everything."
As the crowd retreated to another intersection blocked by buses,
there were frantic shouts to set the vehicles on fire. But the troops
were moving fast now and had already jogged around the buses and
were taking aim again at the swirling mob in front of them. Caccamo
and several Chinese raced down Fuyou Street, next to Zhongnanhai,
but a squad of the troops followed, shooting indiscriminately. Caccamo dived to the ground. When he thought there was a safe moment,
he sprinted to the Zhongnanhai wall. Looking round, he saw dozens
of bodies lying in the street. Some of the victims were probably still
alive, but he could not stop to check: He and many others raced north
to escape pursuit.
Meanwhile, BBC's Kate Adie had persuaded her driver to leave
the relative safety of the Palace Hotel and circumnavigate the Forbidden City. After midnight, this was the only reasonably safe way to
approach Changan A venue to the west of Tiananmen. The car took
the first ring road and approached the overpass at Fuxingmen. Long
before reaching it, Adie was suprised by the number of roadblocks that
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citizens had put up at almost every major intersection. The car
stopped some 400 yards from the overpass, and Adie and her crew got
out to take a look. "We couldn't believe it," she said. "The whole of
the top of the overpass on Changan had blazing trucks on it. Soldiers
were silhouetted against them and were firing at people. There were
heavy trucks and APCs pushing through. We were at the bottom of
the exit ramp from the ring road and were crawling on the grass. I
saw about five people fall to the ground nearby. Others were just
standing there in disbelief. There were a lot of people who didn't seem
to realize how lethal the shooting was."
At the intersection of Xidan and Changan, four buses were on
fire. There was hand-to-hand combat all around the intersection, with
the demonstrators and units of the 27th Army mingling in a furious,
running melee. A Chinese photographer of the liberal intellectual
magazine Nexus was aiming her camera at the scenes of violence
around her. A junior officer approached her from behind and shot her
in the back with his pistol. The bullet passed through her body and
left a gaping wound in her stomach. Astonishingly, she survived.
Just west of the intersection, the mob began rocking an officer's
jeep and succeeded in overturning it. Furious, the officer crawled out
and fired several times into the crowd, killing four people. When he
had stopped firing--either for lack of ammunition or because his gun
jammed-the mob jumped him and beat him to death. Then they
stripped him, castrated him, slit open his stomach and disemboweled
him. They hung his body by the neck against the side of a gutted city
bus, an officer's cap placed contemptuously on his disfigured head. A
crudely written slogan placed near the corpse read, "The people will
be victorious."
At about the same time, near Qianmen, another officer fell into
the hands of the enraged mob after shooting several women to death.
He too was beaten to a pulp, then hung by the neck from the overpass
at Qianmen and the eastern side of Tiananmen. Other soldiers caught
by demonstrators after assaulting civilians were thrown from overpasses, set on fire, castrated or thrown into Beijing's canals. In an
attempt to vilify the demonstrators, Chinese television for several days
subjected its audience to grisly shots of the disemboweled Xidan officer. Even nearly two weeks after the massacre, it was airing horrifying footage of incinerated cadavers of soldiers literally being shoveled
out of the charred remains of burned out trucks and APCs.
Tracer fire over the square was becoming almost constant. Gunfire was lapping at the very edges of Tiananmen from the south, particularly around the Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise, and the western
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end of the square on Changan. Nick Griffin, a correspondent with
Asia Television in Hong Kong, decided with his crew that the monument, stuck in the middle of the square, was both a dangerous place to
be based and a difficult spot from which to observe the swirling current of events. So along with his team of two cameramen, two reporters, a technician, his boss and a personal assistant, Griffin moved to
the side of the square just south of the Great Hall and climbed to the
roof of the public lavatory. "It gave us a great view of Tiananmen,"
he said.
What he saw was not encouraging for the students. Some 5,000
troops had infiltrated the square from the south, in addition to those
already resting on the ground by Mao's Tomb or lined up with sticks
in front of the museum. The crowds shouted, "Leave, leave, you
mustn't kill them [the students]!" But the troops marched impassively
down the side street at the south end of the Great Hall, then entered
the large building. Later, along with other troops already inside the
Great Hall, they were to emerge through the main doors on the east
front and move down the steps into the square. Meanwhile, ambulances were coming and going into the square to pick up critically
injured demonstrators who had been treated at a temporary first-aid
station. Many of the wounded had serious gunshot wounds and were
close to death. Volunteer Chinese doctors from nearby hospitals, as
well as medical students and some medics from Hong Kong, worked
in desperate conditions-no running water, no proper medical supplies, no sterilization-to save what lives they could. "These are the
children of China," a Chinese physician told a Western reporter. "I
will be the last to leave." If he was, he almost certainly suffered the
fate of several Chinese doctors in the square, who were bayoneted or
shot to death as the 27th Army advanced.
Perhaps no group in Beijing behaved more heroically during the
night of June 3-4 than the doctors who worked to save lives and limbs
in the hospitals close to the center of Beijing. Several doctors from the
Beijing Union Medical College Hospital and other institutions took
turns providing basic first aid on the square. Many were either killed
where they were working or arrested for allegedly assisting
demonstrators.
The hospitals quickly turned into scenes out of Bruegel or Hieronymus Bosch as the dead and wounded were carried in-sometimes
on stretchers, sometimes on bicycles, sometimes even on doors converted in desperation to portable beds. The dead were often dumped
unceremoniously into side rooms because the hospital morgue was already overflowing and the staff had no time to cope with people who
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were no longer alive. The BBC's Kate Adie, like several Western reporters, found her car and driver at one point swept up in a desperate
effort to get wounded Chinese as rapidly as possible to medical care.
She recalls, "I came to a section of the crowd that was shouting 'hospital!' There was a woman with her brains hanging out, dying. We took
her and a man and a female relative to the Children's Hospital, got her
out of the car and raced in. The place was heaving with action. We
realized we were in a procession. There were people on bicycles, on
park benches, on tricycle rickshas. Park benches, with wounded people on them, were being carried directly into the operating theater. I
went into one theater and found, at a quick estimate, that there were
30 people lying on the tloor. All of them had major gunshot wounds,
to the head, the body, the legs, everywhere."
"A man with a two-way radio seized me. The Chinese escorting
me shouted 'Party man! Party man!' and hustled me away from him.
There were 30 to 50 people brought in in the first 20 minutes there,
and the doctors and nurses were in a state of rage. There was no confusion in their minds as to what had happened. They were screaming
with sheer outrage."
A few hours later, after returning to the Beijing Hotel to telephone her broadcast to London, Adie took her crew to the Beijing
Union Medical College Hospital, the largest and best-equipped medical facility in the vicinity of Tiananmen. "The operating theater was
on the third tloor," she recalled. "The surgeon was saying, 'We just
can't cope. How many have come through here? Hundreds. But you
must be careful.' A middle-aged woman, an official, started screaming
at me, and the students with me screamed back at her. Then they took
me to another room and pointed out to me a Xinhua News Agency
reporter with a serious head wound. A lot of people were unconscious. There was no treatment being given. Two days later they told
me that many doctors and nurses had been shot on the square. There
was a struggle around me between the party people and the students.
All the people were shouting, 'Tell, tell, tell the world!' "
Dr. Michael Mueller, an American physician who was in Beijing
at the time, was told by Chinese medical friends that at least nine doctors had been killed helping the wounded in and around Tiananmen
and that several doctors had been beaten up inside the hospitals by
troops who came in looking for wounded students. "They were very
scared," Mueller said of his Chinese colleagues. Chinese physicians
and nurses told Western reporters that the troops in a few instances
pulled life-support systems away from seriously wounded patients,
then struggled with doctors who tried to interfere. Some Chinese
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medical personnel were almost certainly killed inside their hospitals.
As for the corpses, the hospitals at first refused to permit relatives to
see or collect them. But at some hospitals the crush of angry relatives
was so great that the authorities had to relent. Still, many hospitals
kept their cadavers for days afterward, under instructions from martial-law authorities not to reveal the number of dead they held.
1:30 a.m.
It was only a matter of minutes before the 27th Army would
burst through the final barriers with tanks and ACPs and occupy
Tiananmen Square. Some students and even teenagers were sharpening tent poles and other crude pikes. Other demonstrators were donning surgical masks against the anticipated tear gas. A few formed
what they called "daredevil squads," which would, they hoped, attack
the troops in needle-like guerrilla actions around the city.
All evening long, the war of the loudspeakers had continued, with
the more powerful, Party-controlled amplifiers repeating the martiallaw warnings to people in the square to disperse or else accept full
responsibility for any physical harm they suffered. The less powerful
student loudspeakers broadcast defiant accusations of military brutality and recordings of the Internationale, the socialist anthem.
At precisely 1:30 a.m., a chilling new order came booming from
the government speakers. "A serious counterrevolutionary rebellion
has occ1.J,rred in the capital this evening," it declaimed ominously.
Many of the students flinched at the word counterrevolutionary, a
deadly accusation in Chinese Communist parlance. It had not been
previously used in government descriptions of the pro-democracy protests, but its currency now meant only one thing: the army would be
pitiless in its suppression of the protest. The announcement continued: "Rioters have furiously attacked soldiers and robbed them of
their weapons and ammunition. They have burned military vehicles,
set up roadblocks and kidnaped officers and men in an attempt to subvert the People's Republic of China and overthrow the socialist system. The People's Liberation Army has kept an attitude of restraint
for some days. However, the counterrevolutionary rebellion must now
be resolutely counterattacked. Residents of the capital should strictly
abide by the specific regulations as provided by martial law and cooperate with the soldiers to safeguard the constitution and defend the
security of the socialist motherland and its capital. The personal
safety of anyone cannot be guaranteed if he disregards this warning.
He will be held responsible for all the consequences."
The announcement was repeated over and over. As the official
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voice began to blend with the furious noise of the army breaking into
the square, the students responded with an appeal of their own. "Do
you still have a conscience?" their loudspeakers asked the troops beginning to pour into Tiananmen. "We are all Chinese."
Other demonstrators were driving buses back and forth on the
north side of Changan in front of the Gate of Heavenly Peace while
the students inside tried to figure out what to do with them. One bus
was driven directly into the narrow tunnel in the middle of the gate
and parked with deliberate awkwardness at an angle from one side to
the other. The driver seemed intent on protecting the students in the
square from being attacked by motorized units possibly concealed
within the ancient courtyards of the Emperors. In another, almost
suicidal maneuver, one driver smashed his bus right into the front of
the first convoy to reach the square. As a result, the tanks and APCs
ground temporarily to a halt just 100 yards west of the square proper.
Behind them were several helmeted troops.
Quickly, military snipers started running along the wall of the
Forbidden City, shooting as they went, and taking up positions to protect the north flank of the 27th Army as it prepared to enter the square
proper. There were still thousands of people in the square, though
none seemed to know exactly what to do. The headlights of armored
personnel carriers, tanks and trucks were gleaming malevolently in the
blackness, as though hunching up for a final pounce.
About 100 yards in front of them, a thin line of students and
workers, arms linked, stood defiantly, waiting for the military to make
the next move. Then the rattle of automatic fire was heard, and several in the front line of demonstrators crumpled to the ground. Shooting now seemed to be going on from several points on the northern
side of the square. There was a constant to and fro of flatbed bicycles
and tricycle rickshas coming and going with the wounded, blood dripping onto the street, or in some places left thick upon the ground.
Ambulances continued to make their way through the crowds to the
center of the square or to the first-aid tent not far from the Goddess of
Democracy. Several ambulances arrived at nearby hospitals with bullet holes in the doors.
The most militant of the demonstrators fought back with little
effect on the relentless advance of the soldiers. Molotov cocktails
bounced against some of the APCs. Rocks were hurled through the
air toward the west where the bulk of the armor and troops still held
itself coiled for the final push. But most of the crowd now ran in
terror from the volleys of AK-47 rounds that smashed back and forth
in front of the gate.
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2 a.m.

Soon there was almost constant firing in the northern part of the
square, most of it by troops moving eastward to block access along
Changan. But while the crowd that had been herded east by the incoming troops had given ground in the square, it still contained
thousands of demonstrators. More firing broke out. More people
dropped, bleeding, to the street, and the pain stricken demonstrators
began to disappear up north-south streets leading off Changan.
To Hong Kong correspondent Nick Griffin, watching from his
perch on the roof of the public lavatory south of the Great Hall, what
was frightening about the newest wave of troops entering the square in
his vicinity was their demeanor. "They looked doped up to their eyeballs," he recalled. "They were waving their rifles around. When civilians would grab at them, they would nod as though spaced out."
Other reporters who had seen the 27th Army up close on its way down
Changan found chilling the manner in which some of the soldiers were
smiling as they discharged their rifles. These impressions lent currency to a persistent rumor that the men of the 27th had been given
amphetamines before their final thrust into Tiananmen. The most
commonly relayed account was that the troops had been told they
needed immunization against the poor hygiene in the square, and were
then given either injections or tablets. There was no official confirmation of those reports.
Not far from the square, Michael Fathers, Asia editor of the British daily newspaper The Independent, was set upon by 27th Army
troops. "Several soldiers broke ranks and ran to me, punching me and
kicking me," he reported. "There was pure hatred in their eyes. They
pushed me into a kneeling position and had another go at me, whacking me across the back with their rods and kicking, always kicking,
until I fell over. They pulled off my spectacles and crushed them."
Added Fathers: "If this is the People's Army, God spare China."
Dozens of APCs were now grinding across the square from west
to east, taking up positions facing south. With them came more helmeted troops, assault rifles at the ready. Amazingly, a bus filled with
young demonstrators went speeding westward against the flow of the
crowd straight into the advancing APC columns, evidently determined
to help stop the military onslaught. From their increasingly dangerous perches on the top level of the monument, Western camera crews
recorded the scene as riot police boarded the bus as soon as it stopped,
dragged out the driver and other occupants, and began beating them
with long truncheons.
Light machine guns were now being set up on tripods on the
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north and west sides of the square, and Tiananmen was already
hemmed in by troops on three sides. Only to the south was there
room for crowds to come and go. The gaps were rapidly being filled
here too, as more and more soldiers came in from the convoys that
had by now broken through by the Kentucky Fried Chicken store.
When some people in the large crowd still in the northern part of
Tiananmen started shouting "Strike! Strike!" the troops fired directly
into them.
Bullets began thudding into the upper stories of the Beijing Hotel,
which offered a clear view of Tiananmen to several Western camera
crews inside. But that vantage was not safe. People on the hotel's
balconies spotted army sharpshooters on the roof of the Ministry of
Public Security building across the street. Military snipers seem to
have occupied other high points in and around the square. Some Beijing Hotel occupants were warned by public-security officials that they
would be shot at if they came out to watch what was happening.
Whenever the cacophony of rifle fire would let up a little, though, another sound would filter up to the balconies, the sound of the screams
and groans of the wounded and the incessant torrent of abuse shouted
at the troops.
3 a.m.

By now, Changan Avenue between the Beijing Hotel and
Tiananmen Square had been cut in two by several lines of soldiers who
sat or knelt sullenly, aiming their rifles toward the angry and taunting
crowds. The crowds moved back and forth on foot or on bicycle between stalled buses and other vehicles dragooned into service as barricades by angry citizens. In the square, a few thousand students and
workers were left, boldly taunting the incoming soldiers with shouts of
"Fascist!" and hurling insults at Li Peng. The student loudspeakers
were responding to the endless government repetition of the martiallaw warning with news of the casualty situation.
In the south of the square, troops were putting together a perimeter toward Qianmen, trying to keep people away from the Great Hall.
Many of the troops had bayonets fixed on their AK-47s, lending a
sinister new dimension to their growing numbers. In the tents closest
to the edge of the square, most of the students roused themselves from
sleep and other activities and moved closer to the monument. Surprisingly, Hou Dejian, the Taiwanese vocalist and hunger striker, was still
there with his companions. Around 3:30 a.m., he succeeded in negotiating with a senior officer in the square a moratorium on a fullscale
military assault, pending a student vote to withdraw from the square
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peacefully. The officer agreed to allow additional time before clearing
the square.
But Hou had little room for maneuver among the remaining students, workers, and sympathizers close to the monument. An hour
earlier Chai Ling, the spellbinding student orator, announced to her
fellow demonstrators over the public address system that those who
wished to leave could do so. Yet even this declaration had intensified
disagreements among the remaining protesters. Hou and Beijing Normal University lecturer Liu Xiaobo, two of the four hunger strikers,
took turns appealing for calm and nonbelligerence through the student-controlled speaker system. But when they convened a meeting of
student representatives in one of the tents, one faction favored a quiet
withdrawal from the square while another insisted that everyone
should stay until death.
Several students had prepared Molotov cocktails, and one group
had a rifle and a machine gun captured from troops the previous
morning. A student organizer later explained, "One worker held onto
the machine gun with one hand and brandished an iron bar with the
other. He swung against anyone who tried to wrest the gun out of his
hands. But we patiently explained that, yes, he could mow down several soldiers, but it would be at the cost of several hundred of us getting killed too. Finally, he relented and we had the gun removed from
the square."
4 a.m.

The initiative was hardly with the students now. As the government-controlled loudspeakers kept up their ominous warnings, the
bright street lights, which had burned every night during the student
occupation of Tiananmen, were suddenly and without warning extinguished. It was 4 a.m. There was a brief and dramatic silence before a
spotlight came on and illuminated thousands of helmeted soldiers with
mounted bayonets coming out of the Great Hall and taking up positions in front of the building, ready to move into the square. "They
filled out the whole parking lot," recalled David Schweisberg, U.P.I.'s
Beijing bureau chief. "Their uniforms and bayonets were glinting.
Immediately, the students played the Internationale on their speaker
system and began singing it. Some of them lit fires around the monument. Otherwise, it was pitch dark. Then people seemed to come
back into the square from side streets and joined in the singing of the
lnternationale. It was eerie."
The lights came on again at 4:39 a.m. APCs were rumbling into
the center of the square, heading for the tent city that had occupied
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that area for weeks. At the same time, there was a great burst of gunfire all over the square, most of it, at first, apparently over the heads of
the people. Suddenly, a great fear seemed to take over most of the
remaining protesters still in the square, and a large exodus began, all
of it to the southeast, where the troops had kept an exit corridor open.
Over a loudspeaker, Hou Dejian explained why he and the other hunger strikers, who were now essentially the leaders of the remaining
protesters, were willing to quit the square. "We're not afraid to die,"
he said, "but we've already lost too much blood."
About ten APCs had started rolling into the tents now, smashing
them fiat and destroying everything in them. On the west side of the
square, the thousands of troops from the Great Hall also started moving in, forcing anyone in their pathway to move, bayoneting some who
resisted or were not moving fast enough, beating and occasionally
shooting others. Students later claimed that several of their number
had been crushed to death in the tents by the APCs. The authorities
denied that charge, but given the fury of the assault it is likely that
some people did die beneath the tracks of the vehicles.

5 a.m.
Chinese commandos in camouflage uniforms surrounded the
monument with AK-47s and drawn pistols and issued a three-minute
ultimatum for people to leave. Most of the remaining demonstrators
took heed and moved quickly away from the monument to the south.
Others, though, hesitated and were shot on the spot. At exactly 5 a.m.
a sudden and unexplained burst of artillery and heavy machine-gun
fire was heard from somewhere south of Tiananmen. Within ten minutes, troops were pouring into the center of the square from all directions. The attack forced the several hundred students who remained
either to flee to the corridor still left open, where student marshals
were guiding their comrades to the safety of side streets, or to face
near certain death.
By now firing was continuous in the vicinity of the square, though
it was difficult to be sure exactly from which direction it was coming.
Over the loudspeakers, students called on the ordinary citizens of Beijing to do what they could to stop the troops. Nonstudent crowds in
the square area responded by trying to block the intersections leading
into it. Despite plaintive appeals for calm, some demonstrators continued to hurl Molotov cocktails at incoming APCs, and two were set
alight on the outskirts of the square. As many of the students trickled
out of the square, they chanted, "Down with fascists! Down with vio-
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lence!" Others flashed the V sign and shouted "Go with us!" at applauding Beijing residents.
At the eastern end of the square, ambulances were no long being
permitted through the defense perimeter set up by troops across
Changan A venue near the Beijing Hotel. Thousands of young people
were angrily milling around about 75 yards from the sitting soldiers.
Many people were shouting "Fascists!" and "Beasts!" From time to
time, a group of troops would stand up, or adopt a kneeling position,
and fire straight at the most provocative looking knots of people, felling several and sending the others scurrying for cover.
What happened in the next hour or so is difficult to piece together, but it is almost certain that this is when the most deaths occurred in the square. At about 5:15a.m., a convoy of eight tanks, 21
APCs and more than 40 trucks crammed with troops roared down
Changan Avenue, past the Jianguo Hotel and across the Jianguomenwai overpass toward Tiananmen. Despite the absence of other
traffic, it took them 15 minutes to reach the square. They had to
smash through low railings, disabled buses and piles of debris left on
the road by Beijing citizens to try to slow down incoming units. At
5:30a.m., the tanks crunched at high speed past the Beijing Hotel and
into the square. The tanks led the convoy, chiefly because they were
the only vehicles capable of plowing through the burned-out buses and
piled-up construction equipment that still blocked Changan at the intersection with Wangfujing Street. As they stormed by, the lead tank
smashed over the last main obstacle on the street, a small construction
dozer that forced the front of the tank up into a 30° angle. The dozer
was split, and a pathway was cleared for the APCs and trucks.
As the tanks roared on, the sound of machine-gun and automaticrifle fire from the trucks was constant, and some of the APCs started
emitting noxious clouds of tear gas. Despite the danger, young men
were still crouching in front of the wall of the Forbidden City, hurling
rocks and bottles vainly at the fast moving vehicles and howling with
rage. But the tanks kept moving toward the square, and it was probably just after 5:30 that one of them knocked over the Goddess of Democracy statue. Grainy government television footage aired several
hours later showed a single tank toppling the statue amid signs of desolation and destruction in the surrounding parts of the square. Most
of the shooting from the incoming trucks seemed to be aimed in the
air, though citizens were still being killed and injured as the convoy
came through. Then at 5:45, there was intense machine-gun fire either
from the northern end of Tiananmen Square or from inside the Forbidden City. Tracer fire also continued to arc through the sky, and the
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occasional heavy boom of a tank or artillery round punctuated the
night.
6 a.m.

The last of the students staggered out of the square. Even then,
though, they were not safe. As they walked, arms linked, down Qianmen Road, several were chased by APCs. As many as eleven people
were crushed as they tried to make their way first west, then north to
their universities. Several dozen students were shot at point blank as
they approached Changan A venue on their way north on Beixinhua
Street. Eyewitnesses said the gunfire was ferocious for several minutes. Other students in the street were crushed against walls by APCs.
Back on the square, the army was mopping up. The number of
corpses may never be known, or what happened to them or to the
unfortunates who were wounded and could not be evacuated. There
were persistent reports soon after the massacre that flamethrowers and
blowtorches were used to incinerate piles of dead on the spot. Other
reports asserted that several of the casualties were removed from the
square and taken west along Changan in military trucks. Some versions had it that the dead were taken to Babaoshan Revolutionary
Cemetery, one of the few large crematoriums in Beijing, and that the
bodies were immediately cremated. Other stories spoke of a mass incineration of corpses out in the Western Hills within the military-security zone.
In the official effort to rebut charges of indiscriminate shooting in
the closing minutes of the military attack on Tiananmen, political officer General Zhang Gong asserted that "there was not a single casualty on the square." It is conceivable, though unlikely, that in the
central part of the square around the monument, there were no fatalities during the period in question. Too many reporters, other foreigners and Chinese, however, witnessed volley after volley of gunfire
directly into crowds on Changan on the edge of the square, and heard
furious fusillades within the square during the time in question, for the
government claim to be taken seriously.

Dawn
As the sun came up on June 4, citizens of Beijing who were unaware of the night's chaos awoke to a shocking sight. Spirals of black
smoke were rising over several parts of the city from burning military
and civilian vehicles. Dozens of intersections were littered with the
carcasses of burned-out buses and trucks, with rocks, bricks, smashed
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bottles, half-demolished construction equipment, discarded shell casings, and pedestrian and bicycle guard rails dragged into the street and
then twisted into baroque shapes by the tracks of onrushing armor. A
smashed bus still burned near the Wangfujing and Changan intersection. It had not been used as an obstacle to the military but as a makeshift ambulance. Toward the west along Changan, destruction was
still taking place. Bold groups of citizens were systematically destroying APCs that had either parked or stalled during the slow move eastward into the city the previous night. Before long, the line of burnedout APCs near the Minzu Hotel looked more like a national military
debacle than what the authorities termed, early Sunday, as their "initial victory" over the "scum of society."
The army later acknowledged that 364 military vehicles-tanks,
trucks, APCs, jeeps and military buses---had been destroyed in the
furious hours of combat with unarmed civilians in the center of Beijing. Authorities claimed that some 1,000 troops had been killed or
injured. Some Western military attaches put the figure higher.
In any case, the killing of civilians was still continuing, now in
broad daylight. Near the Beijing Hotel along Changan, group after
group of civilians would come within 50 yards of the sullen lines of
troops guarding the square and taunt them. Then, provoked to the
point of anger, an officer would give an order and a volley of AK-47
rounds would fly, sending the crowd scrambling once more and leaving another dozen or so bodies on the street. A particularly vicious
round of gunfire at 10:27 a.m. left dozens of people littering the surface of Changan. Several rounds also hit the Beijing Hotel, where a
handful of Western reporters had managed to elude the room searches
conducted earlier in the morning by angry public-security officials.
Alexis Feringer, a graduate student at Tufts University's Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy and working temporarily for Cable
News Network, carefully observed every major event from her eleventh floor Beijing Hotel balcony from late Saturday night until early
Monday morning. Her notebook indicates six incidents of troops firing into the crowds on Sunday: at 10:55 a.m., 11:53 a.m., 12:10 p.m.,
1:10 to 1:15 p.m., 2 p.m., and 3:20p.m. On each occasion, there were
casualties. Meanwhile, Chinese military helicopters were landing and
taking off from Tiananmen Square at almost five-minute intervals,
probably helping evacuate the seriously wounded from Tiananmen.
How many civilians died in the battle for Beijing? No one may
ever know the precise figures, even if the regime in China were to
change and a truly honest investigation were conducted. Children
were killed holding hands with their mothers. A nine-year-old boy
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was shot seven or eight times in the back, and his parents placed the
corpse on a truck and drove through the streets of northwest Beijing
Sunday morning. "This is what the government has done," the distraught mother kept telling crowds of passersby through a makeshift
speaker system. A similarly gruesome traveling atrocity exhibition
was arranged by students at the pro-democracy Political Science and
Law College of China. The cadavers of five students who had been
crushed by APCs after leaving Tiananmen Square early in the morning were packed in ice and carried in grisly pomp from university to
university in northeastern Beijing.
Workers were shot bicycling to factories, old people died in their
apartments as bullets thudded into the building. Students were
crushed even on Sunday morning by APCs roaring west along
Changan. Moreover, many bodies may never be located. Aside from
isolated soldiers thrown into canals or the question of the dead on
Tiananmen Square, some corpses were dumped into rooms in buildings that had no connection with hospitals. Mitch Presnick, of Centerville, Va., a graduate student at Peking University, was taken
surreptitiously into a building in northeastern Beijing and shown several corpses-all of student age-lying on tables. He never discovered
where they had been killed, or what the bodies were doing there.
U.P.I.'s David Schweisberg called several Beijing hospitals for a
body count for the first three days after the massacre and added up a
total of 321 dead-until the hospitals refused, under government pressure, to give out any more figures. Officials of the Chinese Red Cross
reported that 2,600 died, but then they too were ordered to keep silent
and to deny that they had ever given out such figures. The mayor of
Beijing announced that more than 1,000 army personnel had been
killed or wounded in the street fighting, but he made no mention of
civilian casualties, which, it stood to reason, would have been greater.
A courageous announcer for Radio Beijing's English service told listeners that "thousands" of protesters "had died in the tragic incident"
and called upon the people of all countries to "join our protests against
the barbarous suppression of the people." Several minutes later, another version of the same news item was broadcast, and the announcer
who had read the first bulletin was never heard again on the radio.
The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that Beijing hospitals
queried by its correspondents had come up with a total of about 700
deaths. At the other end of the spectrum, Beijing-based Soviet correspondents reported privately to their editors that they estimated the
number of dead to be close to 10,000. Experienced East European
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diplomats who specialize in Chinese affairs also seemed to find this
figure comfortable.
In all probability, the total number of civilian dead in Beijing during the 24-hour period beginning around 10 p.m. Saturday, June 3,
was between 1,000 and 5,000. The number of soldiers killed was probably in the scores or low hundreds.
Whatever the number, all were the victims of what can only be
called a massacre. All died because of efforts by a reactionary regime
to stop the clock on political change in the world's most ancient continuous civilization. As a youthful leader told a Western correspondent shortly after the taking of Tiananmen Square: "Our calls for
democracy have reached the living rooms of a largely apolitical people. Now, at least, they know that there are such things as democracy
and freedom and that they too deserve them."

6.

BEIJING BLOODBATH*
Russell Watson**

Almost to the end, the students thought they could win. As
troops closed in on Tiananmen Square before dawn on Sunday, the
unarmed protesters defiantly stood their ground. "You have to give
your life to the movement," the students shouted over their loudspeaker. But two hours later, as gunfire echoed outside the square, the
last holdouts gave in to despair. "We can't let any more blood flow,"
someone shouted over the loudspeaker. "We must leave." The last
1,000 or so students wearily walked out of the square, many of them in
tears. At that point the Army stormed down the streets toward
Tiananmen-tanks, armored personnel carriers and trucks full of
troops, spitting gunfire in all directions. They smashed through the
protesters' frail barricades and charged into the square, where they
demolished the students' provocative statue, the "Godess of Democracy." Angry civilians poured into the streets shouting, "You beasts!
You beasts!" The soldiers shot back, killing 500 to 1,000 people and
leaving the democracy movement in ruins.
After seven weeks of nonviolent protest-and a strangely passive
response from the government-the upheaval in China finally produced the bloodbath all sides had feared. The crackdown began 24
hours before with a feeble thrust by mostly unarmed soldiers. Repulsed and humiliated, the Army came back for more, and some of the
demonstrators took to throwing rocks and even firebombs at them.
Just after midnight on Sunday morning, the Army sent an armored
personnel carrier roaring through the top of the square where a huge
portrait of Mao Zedong sits atop the gate to the Forbidden City, the
old imperial palace. Later, when two more APC's entered the square,
protesters were waiting for them with Molotov cocktails. One escaped
in flames. The other stalled and burned, its crew jumping free only to
be beaten by the crowd.
The Army had a provocation that it may have been seeking. Its
own loudspeakers warned the protesters: "If you have taken guns
from soldiers, do not use them"--even though a NEWSWEEK corre• Reprinted by permission of Newsweek, Inc., dated November 1, 1989, from
Newsweek, June 12, 1989.
•• The other authors of this article include Melinda Liu, Tony Clifton, Lenore
Magidan, Carroll Bugent, and Douglas Walker.
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spondent in the square could see no students carrying firearms. Soon
the Army began its paroxysm of violence. In the casualty room of one
nearby hospital, where blood was inches deep on the floor, a man shot
through the arm told a wire-service reporter: "They were simply raking the crowd with bullets."
The military move may have been intended, in part, to break a
political stalemate. For two weeks, Deng Xiaoping, China's 84-yearold senior leader, had been trying to purge Zhao Ziyang, 70, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, who had argued for conciliation with the students. Deng was supported by Prime Minister Li
Peng and other hardliners, most of them elderly. They accused Zhao
of "counterrevolutionary" and "antiparty" intrigues, but he refused to
confess his "crimes," according to a liberal source. Many Party officials had little stomach for a deep and bitter purge of Zhao and other
moderates. As the power struggle dragged on, some hardliners argued
for the face-saving symbolism of a move by the People's Liberation
Army, itself apparently divided, to restore order in the capital. "It
won't do for the PLA not to enter Beijing,'' Qiao Shi, head of the
Party's security department, told his colleagues.
Pyrrhic victory: The Army thrust apparently restored the government's control over Tiananmen, but did not quell the spirit of protest. Knots of angry people gathered all over the city, sometimes
drawing more gunfire. Deng's crackdown was almost universally condemned. "I deeply deplore the decision to use force against peaceful
demonstrators,'' George Bush said in Maine. And at the edge of
Tiananmen, a weeping girl said the bloodshed had gained the regime
nothing. "The government has won the battle here today," she said.
"But they have lost the people's hearts."
The crackdown seemed to begin inauspiciously for the hardliners.
Before dawn on Saturday, a column of soldiers marched almost timidly down Changan A venue toward Tiananmen Square. The troops
were young; they wore uniform trousers and white shirts and carried
no firearms. Several hundred yards short of their objective, crowds of
civilians swarmed out to block the way, pelting the troops with rubbish and shoes and imploring them to stop. The People's Liberation
Army fell back without a fight. Sheepishly, some of the soldiers said
their mission was to combat "bad elements" and "hooligans." "Do we
look like bad people?" asked one demonstrator.
At about the same time, other columns heading for Tiananmen,
some equipped with firearms, were stopped and turned back by protesters. An Army officer leading one convoy of 40 trucks was quoted as
saying: "We will not suppress the people. The people and Army must
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stand together." The result was a victory parade on Saturday afternoon, when some 60,000 workers and students celebrated what they
described as "people's power."
By afternoon, too, hardline military officers were citing the
Army's loss of face-including student seizures of soldiers' AK-47 assault rifles-as a reason for reprisal. The troops began to move into
position again. Soon the confrontations started. A block or so from
the square, thousands of people hurled stones and bottles in a futile
effort to push back a column of troops. The soldiers-apparently
older and more determined than their comrades of the morning
before-whipped students' faces with belts and hit them with long
sticks. "You can't hit the people," the crowd chanted, but the soldiers
continued to beat them.
In a fracas outside Zhongnanhai, the government compound near
the square, troops fired about 20 canisters of tear gas into a crowdthe first use of gas in seven weeks of demonstrations. The demonstrators responded, hurling bricks and rocks at the soldiers and their
buses. In Tiananmen, government loudspeakers announced new martial-law orders. They instructed people to stay in their homes and
warned that security forces were authorized to use any "methods necessary to break through the barricades." The crowds held fast. Near
the Jianguomenwai diplomatic compound, about 30 military trucks
were halted, some with slashed tires. Civilians thronged around, lecturing the troops about democracy.
The shooting began at around 10 p.m. Saturday night. Off to the
west of Tiananmen, protesters pelted a column of troops with chunks
of paving and set a military bus aflame. The troops opened fire and
forced their way through. After midnight, soldiers began to move into
Tiananmen, setting the stage for the bloody denouement.
For several days before the final crackdown, it appeared that
Deng's purge might fizzle. By the end of last week, the Communist
Party Central Committee still had not formally voted Zhao Ziyang out
of office. At a meeting of about 100 committee members, many agreed
that Zhao had broken discipline and should be removed as General
Secretary of the Party. But they balked at labeling him a "counterrevolutionary," which would get Zhao expelled from the Party and eliminate any chance for a political comeback. A meeting of all 170 voting
members of the Central Committee was postponed, apparently because Deng was unsure of his political support.
Warming up their old-fashioned propaganda machine, the hardliners staged pro-government rallies, blaming the student unrest on
Chinese dissidents and foreign interests; in at least one parade, the
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villains wore Uncle Sam costumes. At workplace meetings Zhao and
his supporters were accused of counterrevolutionary intrigues, but
even the Party faithful had trouble swallowing that line. At one session in a prestigious academy, Party members shouted: "That's
wrong! That's ridiculous!" After a Party circular had been read, another member stood up and, in a voice dripping sarcasm, said: "Li
Peng is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time."
Despite martial law, about 10,000 student demonstrators decided
to stick it out in Tiananmen. They defiantly erected the Goddess of
Democracy, a 33-foot statue made from plaster and plastic foam and
bearing an obvious resemblance to New York's Statue of Liberty.
State-controlled television called the statue "an insult to our national
dignity." The students were of two minds about their long vigil.
Some militants wanted to continue it until the government agreed to
their demands: the end of martial law, withdrawal of troops from the
city, lifting of censorship and a promise of no reprisals against the
campaigners for democracy. Other students were ready to leave the
square. Some of them had a new protest in mind: shaving their heads.
"We would be shaven-headed like prisoners," said philosophy student
Xiao Yang, "because the government has turned this whole country
into a prison."
Old slogans: Deng tried to buttress himself by bringing back
some survivors of the Long March generation-revered veterans of
the revolution, many of whom had been forced into retirement for opposing his economic reforms. Chen Yun, 84, head of the Central Advisory Committee, a panel of elder statesmen, used the rhetoric of
earlier purges to blame China's troubles on a "very, very few people
who intend to create turmoil." Banners suddenly appeared bearing
another old slogan: "Resolutely oppose bourgeois liberalism."
What the old guard especially disliked about Zhao was his habit
of acting on his own, instead of deferring to the elders. President
Yang Shangkun, 82, who has strong connections to the military,
charged that Zhao had revealed the existence of "two different voices
within the Party" and dared to insist on his own ideas, even when
Deng spoke against them. But the old guard was not unanimous. One
of the veterans, former Beijing mayor Peng Zhen, 87, an old foe of
Deng's, said the students' motives were "good, pure, wholesome and
constructive." There were rumors that Prime Minister Li would be
replaced, or that the Party elders were scheming to depose Deng himself after next October's 40th anniversary of the communist triumph in
China. Deng was said to have resurrected some of Zhao's reformist
aides to offset the old guard.
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He recruited one useful ally in Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, a supporter of Zhao who reportedly had opposed the use of troops to restore order. After a long absence from public view, Qin turned up on
the television news Saturday evening, bringing fraternal greetings from
Deng and Li to soldiers in Beijing. One theory was that Qin had
thrown in his lot with the hardliners in order to avoid splitting the
military. Another was that the hardliners had agreed to a compromise
with some of the moderates: an agreement to deploy the troops in
exchange for a lighter touch in the coming political purge.
The military crackdown that resulted from Deng's political maneuvers played badly overseas. In Hong Kong, scheduled to revert to
Chinese control in 1997, pro-Beijing leaders began to talk about renegotiating the terms of the merger. In Taiwan, an important source of
investment for the mainland, President Lee Teng-hui said that Beijing
"bared the true face of a communist and his true violent nature."
Other foreign businessmen were expected to be skittish about investing
in a China whose political and economic future suddenly looked so
uncertain.
'Death and taxes': George Bush warned that the hard-won "constructive relationship" between Washington and Beijing cannot be
fully resumed until China returns "to the path of political and economic reform." In an interview on Cable News Network, Secretary of
State James Baker said China's use of force "will disturb the U.S. government and will disturb the American people considerably." Baker
refused to be drawn into a discussion of how the United States might
punish China for the crackdown; he even pointed out that Beijing had
displayed "a significant amount of restraint" for several weeks and
that there may have been "some violence . . . on both sides., But in
Congress pressure already was building for sanctions against China.
Republican Sen. Jesse Helms, who accused the Chinese of "acting as
communists always do, .. wanted to end all U.S. military cooperation
with Beijing. Democratic Rep. Stephen Solarz warned that if Bush
didn't cut off U.S. arms sales to China, Congress would do it for him.
"The enactment of that legislation is as sure as death and taxes," said
Solarz.
Some people in Washington did not want to hurt U.S.-China relations at a time when Beijing is enjoying a thaw with the Soviet Union.
"There's a relationship worth maintaining with a country of more
than 1 billion people," said a senior administration official. "We cannot undermine 17 years of diplomacy because of one weekend., A few
members of Congress also were reluctant to go off half-cocked by immediately suspending arms sales to China. But one of them, Sen. Clai-
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borne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
conceded that if "the crackdown continues and there is further loss of
life, this cannot help but affect relations between the United States and
China."
In a speech he made at the start of the student movement, Deng
warned that without the unquestioned rule of the Communist Party,
university students would become "unbridled and brazen. They will
run wild," he said. But now that Deng has begun to use force to crush
the students, things may only get worse for China, and for his own
regime. "The immediate winners, politically, are likely to be losers
over the long run," says Sinologist Michael Oksenberg of the University of Michigan. Deng's economic reforms will probably be put on
hold. He will owe the military a debt of uncertain dimensions. His
government will be handicapped by the resentment of the people
China needs most: the young, the intelligent, the energetic and innovative. The dead of Tiananmen will be exalted as martyrs, a constant
rebuke to Deng and the hardliners. By opening fire on the democracy
movement, Deng and his supporters may have condemned China to
the fate they fear most: chaos.

7. THE CRACKDOWN*
Sandra Burton

The first account that the sleepless people of Beijing heard from
their government was sharply at odds with what they had seen and
with the live television coverage that the rest of the world was watching. "A handful of thugs who crave nothing short of nationwide chaos
stirred up a serious counterrevolutionary riot in Beijing," said Mayor
Chen Xitong in a statement that crackled over Beijing Radio late Sunday evening, some 24 hours after the massacre. The army and police
had rushed to the defense of the socialist system "with a courageous,
dauntless spirit," the mayor added, but had managed to win only a
"preliminary victory in the struggle to end the turmoil and smash the
counterrevolutionary scheme." The People's Government, he concluded, had no choice but "to resolutely crack down on the rioters and
severely punish them without mercy."
The student leaders of the democratic movement, who just two
weeks before had attracted millions of people to their cause, were paid
only cursory attention in the mayor's account, and their allies among
the intelligentsia were altogether ignored. Mayor Chen's most glaring
omission was predictable. He made no reference to the power struggle
between Deng Xiaoping and the hardliners represented by Premier Li
Peng, on the one hand, and the liberal faction of fallen Party General
Secretary Zhao Ziyang on the other, which had paralyzed the leadership for the previous six weeks.
As reruns of old Korean War movies on the state broadcasting
network gave way to selective replays of the mayor's message and
other official statements that were even more farfetched, it became apparent that the government intended to cover up the brutality of its
crackdown on the democratic movement. Although vestiges of a major military operation were everywhere in evidence, a clutch of latterday thought controllers was hard at work behind the scenes to say it
wasn't so. Tanks and armored vehicles were positioned not only in the
square and other combat areas, but also at major points of entry
outside the city and at most major intersections inside as well. The
military had established a particularly heavy presence around the capital's foreign enclaves, where diplomats, journalists and businessmen
• Reprinted by permission of Time, Inc., dated November 1, 1989, from Massacre in
Beijing-China's Struggle for Democracy (New York: Warner Books, 1989).

(127)

128

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

worked and lived.· The undulating wails of ambulance sirens and the
sharp retort of automatic-weapons fire punctuated the silence of a city
that was temporarily void of daytime civilian traffic. At night the
alien groan of APCs navigating the gradual inclines of freeway flyovers made sleep difficult.
As word of the carnage that had taken place on the way to the
square spread through Beijing on Sunday and Monday, tempers flared.
One group of grieving students laid the body of a young Tiananmen
Square victim out on ice and paraded it from campus to campus for all
to see. At the University of Political Science and Law, the students
arranged a grisly exhibition of dead bodies. Other students speeded up
the distribution of posters and tracts, which had begun to serve as an
alternate press during the heady days of the student demonstrations.
A concise, 15-point summary of Hong Kong press reportage of the
Tiananmen massacre, which was posted in the middle of a busy shopping area, drew throngs of passersby. Likewise, a photocopied handbill identified as "Peking University leaflet" and several photographs
of gruesome civilian casualties, faxed from Hong Kong, were eagerly
examined by residents of a hutong just behind Tiananmen Square.
"Loyalists of June 3," read the document, "the 27th Army is a murderer and a slaughterer."
Many people who had taken up defensive positions on the barricades w~en the army moved in switched to the offensive when the
major fighting ended. Surrounding stranded convoys wherever they
found them on Sunday and Monday, they clubbed fleeing soldiers,
broke open the gas tanks of their vehicles and set them aflame. In
some cases soldiers beat civilians to the job, torching their own trucks
after removing ammunition and supplies. By Monday the streets of
the city were littered with the smoldering hulks of dozens of vehicles.
Soldiers who approached the inevitable knots of bystanders that gathered near the wreckage were routinely jeered. Just as routinely they
fired at those who taunted them, adding more casualties to the already
overburdened hospital wards.
By then the propaganda campaign was well under way. Official
party organs, which only weeks before had burgeoned to include actual news and photos of the student movement in the streets, were
suddenly transformed back into the sort of shrill broadsheets that
characterized the Anti-spiritual Pollution Campaign of 1983. Television, too, took several steps backward, dropping the usual news reports and substituting the texts of the proliferating martial law
decrees. TV newsreaders could not bring themselves to look the camera in the eye as they spouted the new government line. The broad-
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casters were warned that they would lose their jobs if they did not put
a happy face on the revisionist statements they were required to read.
Among the most startling of that genre was one handed down by
the Party Central Committee and State Council on June 5, addressed
to "all Party members and the people of all China." The purpose of
the counterrevolutionary riots, it claimed, was "to negate the Party's
leadership and the socialist system" by "killing all47 million Communist Party members" if necessary. The masterminds of the plot, according to the message, were an "extremely few people who have
doggedly persisted in taking the stand of bourgeois liberalization and
have colluded with hostile forces overseas, providing Party and state
vital secrets to illegal organizations."
Given the outside objectives of the propaganda campaign, it had
to be at least as crude as the previous weekend's military campaign if it
were to be effective. The target of the Communist Party Central Committee's leadership group for propaganda and ideological work was
not primarily the audience that had witnessed the truth, either firsthand or through the lenses of foreign television cameras. Rather, it
was the vast silent majority of Chinese, who it feared might have been
infected by the same bourgeois liberal notions of free speech, independent association and government accountabilility that had
animated the pro-democracy demonstrations. Chief among those the
propagandists wished to inoculate were the 47 million Party members
who had been exposed to General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's assertions
that political reform was an essential adjunct to economic reform.
Determined to eradicate any traces of such heretical thinking,
Party hardliners had well before the massacre purged all Zhaoists
from the propaganda group and even forced the hospitalization of one
member of questionable zeal. The replacements the hardliners chose
were orthodox political thinkers like Shanghai party boss Jiang Zemin,
who could work compatibly with the martial law information units
that had taken over newspaper editorial offices and the state broadcasting apparatus. The campaign that this newly constituted group
unveiled two days after the massacre was couched in the only language
every Chinese citizen understood: the language of fear.
"Maybe we underestimate the viability of Stalinism as a force today," commented a senior Asian diplomat as the government's campaign of intimidation quickly took on a life of its own. That campaign
began with the broadcast of a segment of cleverly edited black-andwhite video footage of the devastation wrought by protesters on the
night of June 4. The tape was shot by the British-made remote-control
cameras on Beijing's major thoroughfares. Purchased by the Chinese
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partly with development aid and purportedly installed to monitor city
traffic, the system's cameras had been rolling throughout the six-week
period of the demonstrations.
The cameras had a low-light feature that allowed them to record
scenes at night, and their lenses stripped the protective cloak of darkness from the rioting near Tiananmen Square. They also homed in on
individual protesters, like the one caught in the act of smashing the
windshield of a military truck and hurling bricks at its trapped driver.
The official voice-over of China Central Television (CCTV) reported
that both the driver and his assistant had been killed. Both narrator
and editor ignored the rest of the action depicted on the tape, which
showed APC's roaring by the disabled truck in pursuit of the primary
mission of the evening: to retake the square from the pro-democracy
forces.
As that and similar tapes were played repeatedly on state television in the days following the massacre, the propaganda group, aided
by 10,000 clerks, combed through miles of other footage previously
recorded by the same cameras during the weeks of peaceful demonstrations in the square, looking for frames of key leaders. Once identified, their faces were frozen into individual electronic mug shots for
display on the evening news. Not that the leaders were likely to elude
the ever expanding police dragnet, which included university campuses, transport terminals, known dissident safe houses and those previous preserves of quasi-immunity, the foreign diplomatic compounds,
which housed journalists as well as diplomats.
During the day or two after the massacre, student leaders, their
intellectual mentors and their chief contacts inside the Party ran for
their lives. Those who had made contingency plans and secured exit
permits were able, with the help of accommodating diplomats, to obtain foreign passports and visas. Among them was Marxist theoretician Su Shaozhi, 63, who was ousted from his post as head of the
Institute of Marxism-Lenism and Mao Zedong Thought in the wake of
the 1986-87 student movement. Provided with a Dutch travel document, Su was able to board an evacuation flight with a group of European students. An indifferent immigration official simply stamped his
passport without questioning what a Chinese man of his age was doing
in such company.
Others sought refuge inside embassies or prevailed on foreign
friends to hide them and help spirit them to safety by way of a sort of
underground railway to the freewheeling Special Economic Zones in
southern China. There, sympathetic entrepreneurs and bureaucrats
helped shepherd the suspects to freedom across the border into Hong
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Kong and Macao. One fugitive made his way onto a Chinese sightseeing boat and jumped overboard off Macao, where he was rescued.
Several others, who are believed to have been smuggled out of Chinese
ports in cargo containers, surfaced safely weeks later in France.
On the morning of Wednesday, June 7, several people who would
figure prominently on the government's most-wanted list of alleged
counterrevolutionaries were secretly hidden in the diplomatic compound of Jianguomenwai and the adjacent embassy row. Without
warning, soldiers manning a checkpoint in the vicinity launched a series of terrifying puzzling maneuvers. Just before 10 a.m., thousands
of foot soldiers and a convoy of scores of trucks loaded with troops
belonging to the despised 27th Army left Tiananmen Square and
rolled eastward. All night long the men of the 27th had been moving
out of the capital, to be replaced by fresh troops.
When the trucks approached the Jianguomenwai overpass, several detoured into a side street on which the American and British
embassies are located, firing shots into the air and yelling, "Go home!
Go home!" as they passed. Meanwhile, the main column of troops
proceeded down Changan Avenue, spraying the air with erratic bursts
of gunfire, as if to ward off possible attack from unseen enemies. As
bullets rained down on them, bicyclists and shoppers scrambled to escape the apparently trigger-happy troops by ducking behind hedges or
hitting the ground.
To residents of the apartments inside the Jianguomenwai, which
overlooked the street, and to employees in the adjacent thirty-story
office tower belonging to the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), the incident seemed anything but random.
The bullets that crashed through the plate glass seemed to come from
buildings of similar height across the street, rather than upward from
the soldiers on their trucks. In addition, the shots appeared to have
been aimed at specific targets.
The small office of the Yugoslav industrial-engineering firm
SMELT Global Project Management on the 27th floor of the CITIC
building, for example, was left a shambles by eight shells, which shattered the windows, ripped the blinds and tore through the plasterboard walls and ceilings, dusting the desktop computers with shards of
insulation. Ballistics experts who examined the flat trajectories of the
bullets concluded that some of the shots came from the roof of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a hotbed of behind-the-scenes
support for the student movement that had been occupied by the military immediately after the massacre.
SMELT's commanding view of the academy and Tiananmen
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Square beyond had made it a popular vantage point from which to
photograph army maneuvers. Just before the attack, a Japanese TV
cameraman had been warned by Foreign Ministry officials not to continue taking pictures from SMELT's windows. Afterward; an East
European diplomat speculated that the attack was "a planned action
to frighten away foreigners." Said he: "This is the sort of terror that
does not cause any physical harm."
Minutes later, hundreds of rounds were fired into the nearby
apartments of eleven American diplomats and numerous other foreigners. The firing was so intense that the U.S. Embassy lodged an
official protest with the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The U.S. charged
that the army had made a deliberate and premeditated attack on a
building inside the diplomatic compound that had become a popular
observation deck from which foreign military attaches could watch the
tanks patrolling the bridge below. The embassy report challenged the
official Chinese account, which held that the apartments were fired on
by troops who were retaliating against a sniper. "There is no doubt in
this embassy's opinion that certain apartments were deliberately
targeted by the army," said the U.S. report, which was released a
month later. It noted that one U.S. defense attache's quarters had
been pockmarked with 18 bullet holes.
One intelligence expert offered an explanation for why the Chinese fired into that particular embassy building. "The night before,
the Public Security Bureau and the soldiers arrested 24 people and had
them kneeling on the ground in the execution position while we
watched from a balcony," he recounted. The security officers, aware
that foreigners had trained their binoculars on their prisoners, moved
away. "I am absolutely convinced that those people would have been
killed if diplomats had not been there." He was quick to admit, however, that he had no idea what happened to the prisoners afterward.
Early the following morning at least one of the diplomats was
warned by his Chinese counterparts not to remain in his apartment.
By noon his flat was among those that had taken direct hits. Meanwhile, Chinese soldiers had sealed off the gates to the compound on
the pretext that the mysterious sniper was inside. Residents were
barred from leaving until plainclothes agents had removed an unidentified Chinese man. Witnesses reported that the man they removed
was not looking especially worried, leading many foreigners to suspect
that he was a plant and that there was no suspected sniper at all. In
fact, some sources claim that the man the authorities were really looking for was Fang Lizhi. According to reports by the Hong Kong magazine The Nineties and Agence France Presse, Fang had been briefly
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hidden there after the massacre while waiting for the U.S. Embassy to
answer his request for refuge.
The family and friends of Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian, a
physics professor at Peking University who is as active a crusader for
political change in China as her husband, feared for the couple's safety
after the imposition of martial law. In late May their friend Perry
Link, a professor of Chinese literature and director of the U.S. Academy of Sciences office in Beijing, who had been with the Fangs when
police prevented them from attending a Feb. 26 banquet hosted by
President Bush, inquired of an American diplomat whether the Fangs
could seek refuge inside the U.S. Embassy, if the need arose. The answer he received was noncommittal.
The morning after the massacre, Link bicycled to the Fangs' spacious apartment near Peking University to check on the safety of his
controversial friends. He found them relatively calm regarding their
own condition, but fearful that the country's leaders had gone mad.
Before they parted company, Li had agreed that if they needed Link's
help, she would telephone him with a coded message: "Please bring
the children here to play."
At 5 p.m. that day she called with the message. Link rushed back
to find her nearly mute with fear. Friends had phoned to tell them
that their names topped the government blacklist. This time it was
Fang himself who queried Link about the possibility of seeking temporary refuge in the U.S. Embassy. Because it was Sunday, however, the
embassy was closed. So Link drove the Fangs and their son to the
nearby Shangri-La Hotel and booked them a room in his name.
On Monday Li's students called her to report that the military
was preparing to take over the campuses located in the university belt
in northwestern Beijing. They told her they were ready to die on the
barricades, but urged that she and Fang seek protection. With that,
Link drove the family to the U.S. Embassy, where they met with three
ranking officials. Fang asked permission to hide in the embassy for a
couple of days until the matter blew over. The diplomats explained
that it would be impossible to keep his presence there a secret, given
the large Chinese staff employed by the embassy and the likelihood of
bugs. On the other hand, to grant him official protection as a temporary refugee was tantamount to sentencing him to a long confinement
inside the embassy-not to mention the damage such a gesture would
do to Sino-American relations.
Realizing that public disclosure of any attempt by Fang to seek
shelter from Americans would discredit both himself and the democratic movement, he decided to abandon the idea and settle for a U.S.
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visa. That afternoon Link installed the Fangs in the nearby Jianguo
Hotel. When he tried to call them the next day, June 6, he received no
answer.
In Washington on the same day, a State Department official said
that Fang Lizhi and his family had been permitted to take refuge in
the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. According to Agence France Presse,
Fang was smuggled out of the hotel and into what was regarded as a
more secure hiding place inside the Jianguomenwai compound that
afternoon. The following morning, shortly after the shoot-out in the
street, residents noted that limousines belonging to top-ranking American and British diplomats, which had been parked in the compound
lot, departed just minutes before Chinese soldiers rushed in.
Before the day was over, the city was roiling with rumors that
Deng had died, Li Peng had been shot by an assassin and civil war
between rival army divisions was imminent. Anti-American rhetoric
grew heated with the announcement on CCTV that Fang had indeed
fled to the U.S. Embassy. A Foreign Ministry spokesman termed U.S.
charges that the Chinese military had massacred students "flagrantly
unwarranted" and called the Bush Administration's suspension of
arms sales and military exchanges with Beijing "absolutely unacceptable to us." In a televised news conference, government spokesman
Yuan Mu defiantly pronounced the regime "unafraid" of either "condemnation or sanctions." He also produced new official casualty
figures for the June 3-4 fighting: no more than 300 people had died,
only 23 of them students.
One diplomat felt he had witnessed it all before. "Everything we
have seen in the past four days is preparation for a red Stalinist terror," he said. "What they are doing is attempting to drive out every
foreign eye, so they can go about their executions." The shooting in
the streets set off a stampede among expatriate dependents to join an
evacuation effort that was already under way. Husbands with large
attache cases stood in long lines at the Bank of China's foreign-exchange windows, waiting to change renminbi bills that were nonconvertible outside the country. Meanwhile, their wives and children sat
anxiously in a convoy of embassy vans, trapped inside the locked
gates, until police completed their search for the alleged sniper. Hysteria mounted as they watched Chinese soldiers outside, pointing their
guns at residents and forbidding entry to embassy guards who had
been assigned to escort the convoy.
The scene at Beijing International Airport was chaotic even
before that particularly besieged group arrived. Donna Anderson, an
American, had been camped inside the terminal with her husband and
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three children for 24 hours by that time, waiting with hundreds of
other foreigners to get on a flight to Tokyo. "We didn't know about
the shoot-out until just before we boarded the plane,'' she recalled.
"The report was that someone had fired rockets into the CITIC building." By then, said Anderson, "order inside the airport had broken
down. The waiting lines had deteriorated, and people were shoving
each other and tearing at the standby list. We were walking on the
conveyor belts to get from section to section, and the employees, who
seemed to be as scared as anyone else, were not telling us to get off.
People were beginning to panic."
The panic was palpable that night, as an Asian diplomat watched
an army supply convoy of 127 trucks pass under his balcony, bound
for Tiananmen Square to the west. The lurid yellow-green glow of
mercury-vapor lamps along the highway silhouetted the bayonets that
protruded from the backs of the troop trucks escorting the convoy.
Earlier in the day the 20 tanks and the APC's of the 27th Army that
had blocked the intersection below pulled out and headed east. That
move fed rumors that the soldiers were preparing to defend themselves
and their bloody conquest of the square from one of the rival armies
that was said to be riding to the rescue. Ever since the massacre, Beijing residents talked wistfully about the prospect of civil war between
the "bad guys" of the 27th Army and the "good guys" of the 38th,
who had reportedly balked at orders to enforce martial law.
An Asian diplomat did not dismiss such specualtion. For one
thing, the presence of an estimated 250,000 troops in the Beijing region was a reflection of the political power struggle that was being
waged there. Before martial law had been declared, many commanders had questioned the deployment of troops into what was essentially a political arena. A few commanders had reportedly refused,
and they had been replaced. There were reports that more armies had
been called up to prevent the dissident officers from pulling a coup.
"The troops did not arrive here exclusively to deal with the students,"
a Western diplomat acknowledged. "There was a certain form of
power play going on there, and troops were positioned against each
other. One reason there were so many troops was that each faction
was, in effect, showing its cards."
For another, wall posters in Beijing described "skirmishes" between several armies. Moreover, a segment of one of the ring roads
that encircles the city remained littered with chunks of concrete road
dividers well after street sweepers had begun cleaning up most of the
city's streets. That was no accident, according to an Asian defense
attache. "Those chunks are standard antitank barricades that are
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designed to snarl the treads," he said. Two barricades had been
erected at that particular junction, he explained. "The first barricade,
which was made of buses, was erected by the people, but the second,
the pieces of concrete, was laid out by the 27th Army." The 27th
presumably wanted to stop some other unit's tanks.
Other evidence that Beijing-based diplomats and military experts
had collected was more circumstantial, but no less intriguing. "Some
of the troops that moved through Beijing on the night of June 4 were
not issued any ammunition," said an Asian envoy. "Only Yang
Shangkun's men were given ammunition. So for the first few days,
Yang was saying, 'We have all the firepower, so don't move against
us.' " His informants contended that although the Chinese military
was indeed divided over the use of force against the students, its commanders were too loyal to Deng to bolt while he was alive. "According to one scenario, there are a lot of fence sitters in the military who
are waiting for Deng to die, at which point they can switch allegiance," he said.
Given the uncertainty of the situation, it was no wonder that the
government had been prompt to deny the report, first broadcast in
Taiwan, that Deng was dead. Continuing headlines, in Hong Kong
and elsewhere, that he was suffering from prostate cancer kept the
level of tension high. "They are not sure where the threat is coming
from, so the tanks swivel in all directions," the Asian envoy observed,
"and the soldiers are very paranoid, very jumpy."
Yet reports of major clashes in the western hills or at the
Nanyuan military airfield to the south of the city remained unverified.
So did stories in the Hong Kong press describing divisions within the
ranks. The independent newspaper Ming Pao alleged that because
other armies had refused to clear the square, the tough 27th Army,
which was loyal to Yang, had been given the job. As compensation,
added the paper, all brave officers would be promoted one grade and
courageous soldiers sent to military training schools. Other stories described the resentment that was building against the 27th by troops
who did not take part in the massacre.
Soldiers from a Beijing military region unit that had chosen not to
shoot their way through the citizen barricades were reported to be so
distraught on June 5, when they learned about the violence wreaked
by the 27th Army, that they ripped off their badges, abandoned their
tanks and trucks and retreated into the nearby Military Museum.
Protesters promptly torched the vehicles.
"They are not fighting it out," said an Asian ambassador about
the curious behavior of some other military units, "they are just rna-
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neuvering around each other." The big question mark in the minds of
most foreign observers was the Beijing garrison, which was believed to
be under the influence of Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, its former commander. A longtime ally of Deng, Qin was said to have opposed the
use of force against the students. He was eyed by his fellow officers, as
well as by foreign diplomats, as a likely candidate to lead a coup.
"Those elite forces, which have not yet been brought into play,
are sitting it out in the west of the city," said the ambassador. His
defense attache had assured him that rival forces were "trying their
best to disengage and compromise rather than use massive force
against each other." However, he remained uneasy. "You never
know," he commented. "One of my Chinese sources says the army
has gone mad. He warned me, 'The soldiers have blood in their
eyes.'"
On June 9, Deng Xiaoping broke the suspense by addressing a
group of top military officers, Politburo Standing Committee members
and Party elders. It had been 24 days since the senior leader had made
his last public appearance, his historic meeting with Mikhail
Gorbachev. The setting-Deng surrounded by top government leaders at a large oval table inside Zhongnanhai-was designed to show
that he was not only alive, but in charge and undaunted by world
criticism of the massacre. As television cameras panned the assembled
guests, diplomats studied their TV screens carefully, preparing to note
any significant absentees.
One by one, the members of the Central Military Commission
and the general staff greeted Deng, who walked under his own steam
and stood unaided during a silent tribute for the June 3-4 military
"martyrs." Then the group posed for a photo. There was General
Yang Shangkun, dressed in a sports jacket, as if to underline his civilian role as President rather than his military role as Permanent Vice
Chairman of the Military Commission and de facto commander of the
martial-law forces. There were his brother Yang Baibing, a member of
the Central Military Commission and the army's top political commissar, and Chief of Staff Chi Haotian, another relative of Yang's by marriage. More interesting was the parade of officers who had been
rumored to favor Zhao Ziyang. Defense Minister Qin Jiwei was present, as were Deputy Chief of Staff Xu Xin and Central Military Commission member Hong Xuezhi.
"Absolutely unified," declared a Western intelligence expert afterward. "Every element of the general staff was present, including
the two members of the Party's Central Military Commission who we
believed were on opposing sides." The only glaring absence had been
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anticipated: Military Commission First Vice Chairman Zhao Ziyang.
What had earlier looked like signs of civil war had probably been no
more than "the usual sorts of arguments that a military man would
use about calling in military forces to handle what should be a political
situation," the intelligence expert mused. Despite such reservations,
he argued, "the army will follow orders."
That was very much the message Deng delivered in his speech to
the assembled leaders. He looked frail. His left hand trembled, his
face was puffy, his eyes were ringed with dark circles. But as he spoke,
his words grew in coherency. At one point he dismissed an unwanted
bit of prompting from Li Peng, who sat in the seat of honor to his
right, with a withering look.
"This storm was bound to happen sooner or later," he began.
"As determined by the international and domestic climate, it was independent of man's will." He classified the problem as "turmoil," and
had said as much in the vituperative speech to his inner circle, which
was distilled into the notorious April 26 People's Daily editorial. Because some elements of the leadership had disagreed with his conclusion about how to handle the situation, he argued, events had got out
of control and had provoked a "counterrevolutionary rebellion." At
that point he had had to reach out to other elements of the Party and
to the military for support.
Gesturing to the top leaders and to the four members of the socalled Gang of Elders who surrounded him at the table, Deng said,
"We still have a group of senior comrades who are alive, we still have
the army, and we also have a group of core cadres who took part in
the revolution." The leadership, he said, had been able to analyze the
situation and detect that behind the students and the ordinary people
who took to the streets there lurked "a rebellious clique and a large
quantity of the dregs of society," who were intent on "overthrowing
the Communist Party and the socialist system . . . and establishing a
bourgeois republic entirely dependent on the West."
The army had stopped them. "This army retains the traditions of
the old Red Army," said Deng with evident satisfaction. Noting that
"there are not so many veteran comrades in the army, the soldiers are
mostly little more than 18, 19 or 20 years of age," the old Long
Marcher was all the more heartened by the troops' performance. "No
matter how generations change," he said "this army of ours is forever
an army under the leadership of the Party, forever the defender of the
country, forever the defender of socialism, forever the defender of the
public interest."
The show of unity by the military and the old revolutionaries
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under Deng certainly quelled speculation about impending civil war.
Yet it also heightened anxieties that a clutch of paranoid old men
would now have the power they needed to carry out a massive purge
of all the individuals and interest groups whom they perceived to be
enemies of the Party. The performance also raised the question of
what price Deng had had to pay for the Old Guard's support.
Throughout his decade in power, he had played the role of master
balancer of factions, seemingly belonging to none. Had he been forced
by circumstances this time to sell out to the hardliners? The events of
the next two weeks led even his admirers to conclude that he had.
Ideological slogans that had not been widely heard in recent years
suddenly seeped back into the public vocabulary. Two of the elders,
former National People's Congress Standing Committee Chairman
Peng Zhen, 87, and State Vice President Wang Zhen, 80, had been
among the key architects of the 1987 campaign against "bourgeois liberalization." Zhao had managed to derail that campaign, and Deng
had gone along with him. Now Deng himself laced his speeches with
warnings against bourgeois liberalization. At the same time "class
struggle," a Marxist concept that Deng had publicly tossed into the
dustbin of history at the momentous Third Plenum of the Eleventh
Central Committee in 1978, returned to vogue. That plenum, which
launched China's historic process of modernization, also ordained for
the first time that economic development and modernization must
take priority over class struggle.
More chilling than the reactionary phrases were the images of
repression that quickly bombarded the TV screens. On Saturday came
the announcement that 400 "scoundrels" accused of attacking soldiers
had been arrested in cities all over China. Footage that would be repeated on national TV again and again over the next week showed a
sweating prisoner, his hands cuffed, his head bowed, being led into an
interrogation room and questioned at gunpoint by police.
A student and a worker in Shanghai who had belonged to independent associations that supported the democracy movement in
that city also figured prominently in the initial propaganda. The
worker, Li Zhibo, had been beaten in the head by his interrogators and
sported a puffed-up eye. Yao Yongzhan, a Hong Kong student activist who had been accused of heading the Shanghai Autonomous
Union of College Students looked to be in better physical shape. He
had been grabbed at Shanghai airport while in the company of a group
of British students and several consular officials who had provided him
with a ticket to Hong Kong. He was detained for carrying restricted
articles.
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As if to caption the scenes of justice that were being meted out to
this first group of prisoners, the authorities announced a nationwide
ban on autonomous student and worker associations. Fearful from the
start that groups without ties to the Communist Party might root
themselves among the masses, much as the Solidarity labor movement
did in Poland, Deng had warned intimates to beware of Chinese students' demands for an independent student union. Were independent
student unions to crop up, he had predicted back in April, "we will
have many Lech Walesas, not just in Beijing but in every province."
Throughout that weekend, CCTV repeatedly broadcast the first
in a series of show-and-tell features: an attempt to persuade viewers to
tum themselves and their neighbors in to the authorities, rather than
wait to be hunted down. The 69-second video clip was identified as
footage from an American television interview of a 40-year-old Beijing
resident. In it he described the "massacre of students by the army" at
Tiananmen Square, claiming that 20,000 people had died. Superimposed on the footage was the message "This man is a rumormonger,"
followed by instructions to denounce "those spreading false rumors"
by going to the nearest police station.
In fact, CCTV had violated canons of international broadcasting
behavior-and, probably, law-by snatching a sequence of raw video
feed belonging to ABC News off a satellite during transmission from
Tokyo to New York City. Moreover, CCTV had passed the sequence
off as information that had already been aired on American television.
It had not. On seeing the Chinese version, ABC correspondent James
Laurie recalled, "I was extremely upset." CCTV had, he realized,
aired footage that ABC had left on the cutting-room floor.
What happened was that the day after the massacre, Laurie had
conducted one of the many man-in-the-street interviews in Beijing
with the Chinese man in question. In the 21/z minutes of conversation
that Laurie's crew captured on tape, the man had touched upon several taboo topics, including the death toll in the square. Deprived of
direct satellite transmission from Beijing since the imposition of martial law, Laurie shipped his unedited tape to Tokyo for transmission by
satellite to New York. He then sat down in his hotel room in Beijing,
wrote a script to go with the images, and read it, together with instructions on how to edit the tape, over a phone line to ABC in New York.
What finally appeared on ABC's nightly news was a mere eight-second
snippet of the man in the street with an English-language voice-over
paraphrasing what he had said about bloodshed in the Chinese capital.
"We are probably naive," says Laurie, "but we never thought anyone
would do that." What is worse, the Chinese stratagem worked. Sev-
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eral days after the "rumormonger" was exposed on CCTV, he was
identified and arrested in his hometown of Dalian.
The state network later showed the accused man, Xiao Bing, an
aluminum-window maker, in police custody. Two women had spotted
the "rumormonger" buying cigarettes. They had followed him to his
hotel, reporting his whereabouts to the Public Security Bureau. "At
first he refused to confess what he did," said the People's Daily. "But
after the videotape was played, he confessed."
On Sunday CCTV went after Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian.
"These two criminals are escaping to avoid punishment," read the
government appeal for their capture, without mentioning that they
had taken refuge inside the U.S. Embassy. "Once they are found, they
should be immediately detained, and the Beijing Public Security Bureau informed." Under an old photo of Fang, the TV report offered
this description of China's most famous dissident: "About 1.72 meters, a little fat, hair hangs to one side; long, square face, glasses;
throws out chest and raises head when walking."
As the Fangs' photos and descriptions flashed before the eyes of
viewers, the Chinese government stepped up its verbal attacks on the
couple. Beijing Radio read an order from the city Public Security Bureau to alert border guards and airports throughout the country to
prevent their escape. Meanwhile, the controlled press published ever
more shrill anti-Fang commentaries. The authorities even issued a
pamphlet titled The True Face of Fang Lizhi to discredit him.
"You've gone to hide inside a foreign embassy?" questioned an unsigned letter in People's Daily. "Exactly what kind of hero are you?"
On the same day a signed commentary in that paper questioned Fang's
patriotism and his continued usefulness to the pro-democracy movement. "Now he hides himself in the U.S. Embassy and has degraded
his position to that of a beggar," said the commentator.
As the pace and quantity of arrests escalated early the following
week, the nightly television news expanded beyond its usual 30 minutes to accommodate the proliferation of mug shots and the increasingly heavy propaganda. On Tuesday most of the extra air time was
devoted to photos of 21 student pro-democracy activists wanted for
leading the "counterrevolutionary rebellion." Most of the faces that
flashed on the screen were frozen stills lifted from tapes made of the
demonstrations in Beijing and other cities, or photos shot by the hundreds of plainclothes police who mingled with the demonstrators
throughout April and May. Authorities had scrutinized the footage
and matched faces with police records and other evidence, such as the
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license registrations of the countless bicycles that police had picked up
at demonstration sites and confiscated.
The most charismatic of the student leaders, Uerkesh Daolet
[Wuer Kaixi], was doubly honored by the showing of a separate short
feature that was taken by a remote-control camera mounted on the
wall of a dining hall in the Beijing Hotel. The footage was aired with a
voice-over implying that the students at the table had been feasting
when they were supposed to be fasting. Yet decipherable dates on the
clip showed that the dinner actually took place more than a week after
their hunger strike had ended.
By Wednesday the frequent replays of the list of most-wanted students began to pay off. Zhou Fengsuo, a 20-year old physics student
at Qinghua University in Beijing, was arrested in the central China
city of Xian. Zhou was turned in by his sister, an employee of the Air
Force Institute there. "Just after the evening broadcast of the arrest
warrants on television," said the TV commentator, "Zhou's sister and
her husband went and made a report to the local police after talking it
over. Five policemen went and arrested him. He admitted he was a
student leader."
Foreign residents were horrified at what they saw as his sister's
betrayal of Zhou Fengsuo. But a Chinese viewer saw it otherwise.
"She had to do it," he said, "there is no place to hide in China." Indeed, in a country where marital spats and birth control are the business of neighborhood committees, privacy and secrecy are at a
minimum. Even in the best of times, Chinese citizens have been prisoners of their hukoubu and individual identification cards, which are
necessary for obtaining jobs, housing and rationed food staples like
grain and edible oils. Chinese travelers must routinely show their
identification cards to buy train and plane tickets, and sometimes even
provide letters of permission from their work units before boarding
long-distance sleeper trains. Passports for foreign travel are good for
one trip only. Chinese citizens who wish to go abroad must either buy
foreign-exchange certificates on the black market, at a premium, or
apply to the Public Security Bureau for coupons with which to buy
airline tickets or limited amounts of foreign exchange.
During the first few days after the massacre, controls in train stations and airports were lax. Those fugitives who were lucky enough to
possess the proper papers, forged or otherwise, could slip onto trains
bound for distant provinces or even out of the country. However,
those who did not get out early faced almost insurmountable obstacles.
Once the crackdown came, soldiers stationed themselves in and
around airline terminals and train stations, and special teams were
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mobilized to check the papers of arriving and departing passengers.
Photo charts of the most prominent fugitives from the democracy
movement were posted at airline ticket-sales counters all across the
country. Travel restrictions were tightened in such a way as to render
visas obtained before the massacre useless without an additional exit
permit.
More ominous than the limits placed on travelers trying to leave
China were those confronting people who had no choice but to stay.
"My work unit has been assigned a quota of baotu to bring in," said a
young Communist bureaucrat, who supported the student movement.
So had his Party branch. Although he could hardly be classified as a
rioter, he had openly participated in some of the demonstrations.
While he was unlikely to be detained, even a self-criticism would serve
as a black mark against him in his dossier and would almost certainly
hinder his career for as long as the conservative leadership remained in
power. The Party branch's quota concerned him even more. "Expulsion from the Party is the worst thing that can happen to a Chinese,"
he said unequivocally. Loyalty to the Party told him to confess and
write a criticism, but adherence to his own ideals told him not to repudiate his support for democracy.
Students were in an even more precarious position than bureaucrats, since their actions had been so openly recorded, and since they
were dependent on the state to assign them their jobs. Prominent
leaders of the illegal student organizations like Zhou Fengsuo were in
the most immediate danger. Even if they managed to ftee to a distant
province, they ran into problems when they tried to get jobs, housing
or grain. "Even the pedicab drivers are organized," explained a Chinese official. Anyone applying for a job, no matter how menial, would
have to present an identification card, as would anyone wishing to buy
rice at the low, state-subsidized price. A fugitive risked discovery or
starvation unless he had enough money to buy food and shelter on the
open market, or he had had the foresight and the necessary Hong
Kong connections to forge a new identity-and a new ID card-for
himself and a new hukoubu for his family.
"In the new, open economy brought about by the reforms, the
hukou did not seem so important," said a Chinese official. "People
who could find part-time work in private or foreign companies and
who earned enough money to buy their food and rent their housing on
the private ~arket could get along without one. Or, for a price, they
could get thetr hukou transferred from their hometown to Beijing by a
corrupt Public Security Bureau official." But the crackdown had momentarily changed that. "Many young people who had not committed
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serious crimes fled Beijing when the crackdown came," said a foreign
resident. "They had been in technical violation of the law for staying
on in the capital after graduation without a hukou, and they feared
they might be picked up for that reason."
As the propaganda intensified and the number of arrests multiplied, it began to appear that workers were even more vulnerable to
arrest and harsh penalties than students, intellectuals and bureaucrats.
Whether they lacked the connections to obtain travel documentspassports, visas-or whether family responsibilities prevented them
from fleeing quickly enough, workers constituted the bulk of those detained in the immediate wake of the crackdown. And, as a Shanghai
court made clear in the first trial related to the democracy movement,
workers were the first to draw the death penalty for their participation
in the movement.
On June 15, three workers who had been charged, along with
seven other people, in the burning of a train in Shanghai were sentenced to death. The incident stemmed from a June 6 sit-in on the
railroad tracks to protest the Beijing massacre. An oncoming train
had rammed the demonstrators, killing six of them. In retaliation,
protesters attacked the train with petrol bombs, setting it on fire and
beating some of the fire fighters who attempted to extinguish the
flames. No further deaths were caused by the fire, but nine carriages,
six police motorcycles and 900 bags of mail were destroyed, and transport on the busy Shanghai-Beijing line was halted for 50 hours. The
court took pains to stress that the three accused had nothing to do
with the student movement, but were "local hoodlums and thugs taking advantage of the disruption to cause trouble."
The tough verdict was intended as a warning that the government
would not flinch in the face of hostile world opinion to eliminate what
it regarded as the sources of domestic disorder. On the same day the
Shanghai verdict was reported, People's Daily carried a front page
analysis of Deng's speech to the army. "If we give the impression of
concessions or weakness, China will become a vassal of the imperialists once again," according to the paper. Analysts believed the death
sentences also reflected the government's fear that the latent dissatisfaction prompting so many workers to join the student protests might
flare into unrest and strikes later on.
As dramatic as news of the death penalties was, the proceedings
in the Shanghai courtroom were no match for the performance that
was playing itself out in the court in the Manchurian city of
Changchun the same day. There, 26 workers charged with the relatively minor crimes of instigating social unrest and spreading rumors
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were paraded at gunpoint into a packed hall. In a ritual that was re~
iniscent of the Cultural Revolution, the audience jeered as the detainees filed past, heads shaven and wearing placards around their necks
imprinted with their names and crimes.
The manner in which the Chinese government and state media
chose to flaunt the harsh public treatment of prisoners sparked a storm
of protest in Western nations. The U.S., which had suspended arms
sales early on to protest the mass killings in the square, had prepared a
list of additional sanctions that could be brought to bear in the event
that the executions proceeded. No sooner did the Shanghai verdict
become public knowledge than U.S. Congressmen began lobbying for
the enactment of those further sanctions unless the Chinese authorities
granted clemency to suspects who had been sentenced to die.
The U.S. outcry did not daunt Chinese law-enforcement officials,
who sentenced eight more people-workers, peasants and a jobless
drifter-to death in Beijing for beating soldiers and burning vehicles
on the night of June 3-4. In fact, the Supreme People's Procuratorate
even moved to speed the wheels of justice by instructing judges that if
the evidence was clear and sufficient, the courts "should not be hamstrung by details, and should expedite the process of arrests and prosecutions." Furthermore, as an official circular suggested, public
sensitivities should not be spared. "It is necessary to pay attention to
publicity," said the circular, "to increase the social benefit of the cases,
suppress and deter criminals, and encourage the masses to struggle
against counterrevolutionaries and serious criminal offenders."
No sooner had such instructions circulated than some particularly gruesome footage was aired on Beijing TV screens. It showed the
charred and mutilated body of a dead soldier, slouched against the
wheel of an army vehicle. As the camera tightened its focus on the
dead man, one could see that his torso had been ripped open by a
sharp object and his entrails pulled out and prominently displayed.
The man accused of disembowelling the soldier, Zhang Jianzhong, was
shown under interrogation by police. Zhang reportedly admitted to
being a member of a "dare-to-die brigade" that had assaulted soldiers
in Tiananmen Square. According to the voice-over, Zhang confessed
to picking up a shard of glass from the pavement and using it to disembowel the dead soldier. Zhang was said to have described in detail
how he tied a length of plastic rope to the man's intestines, pulled
them out and displayed them prominently over his body.
Zhang's story proved to be a clever diversion on the part of the
government. It increased viewers' awareness of the intensity of the
violence that was unleashed in the streets on the night of June 3-4. At
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the same time it further compounded the confusion sown by the authorities as to which side had committed the worse crimes, the soldiers
or the students.
As the symphony of propaganda swelled, analysts feared that a
purge of major proportions was under way. Whether or not Deng
could control it was a question that could not be answered, they
agreed, until the Party Central Committee finally met to determine the
fate of Zhao Ziyang. Zhao had not been seen in public since his tearful
visit to the hunger strikers in Tiananmen Square on May 19.
Although it was a foregone conclusion that he would be replaced, the
Party leadership--like the government bureaucracy-was divided between the "dove" faction that supported Zhao's soft line on the protests and the "eagle" faction that wanted to smash the students and
dump Zhao. As a result of that split, Deng had been unable to secure
a consensus. "You delay a Central Committee meeting when you are
not sure how it will come out," commented a Western analyst.
The hardliners were not deterred by the stalemate. They simply
intensified their lobbying of Central Committee members. While
Yang Shangkun briefed the Central Military Commission about
Zhao's failings, Li Peng ordered the secretaries of all 30 local, provincial and regional Party committees brought to Beijing, where he proceeded to meet separately with each one. After a full week of such
dialogues in late May, he had built a core of support within the 175member Central Committee for bringing a limited case against Zhao.
It took him another month to secure enough votes to call a plenum.
Finally, on June 23, the Fourth Plenary session of the 13th Central Committee was secretly convened to take formal action on the
matter. As a precaution against any unforeseen vote switching or any
sudden surfeit of abstentions from resentful members, the army was
called in to "protect" the meeting. "They used guns to force us to put
up our hands in approval," one member confided to the Hong Kong
magazine Zheng Ming. Fifty of the 285 members and alternates reportedly pleaded illness and did not attend.
With communication between Chinese sources and foreigners
sharply curtailed under martial law, veteran diplomats and journalists
fell back on the China-watching skills they had honed during the Cultural Revolution in an attempt to analyze the scarce data available.
"It's just like the good old days," mocked one diplomat, on hearing
the phrase antiparty clique for the first time in twenty years.
The only immediate source of information on the plenum was a
picture taken by the photographer son of Yang Shangkun that ran on
the front pages of the official newspapers the next morning. It showed
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Zhao and Hu Qili, the sole Politburo Standing Committee ~ember
who had sided with him, seated across a table from Deng dunng the
meeting. Surprisingly, both appeared to be applauding Li Peng.
"That's Party ritual," said a senior Asian diplomat, who explained
that the significance of the photo was not in the applause but in the
fact that the two fallen members were present to hear the charges
against them. "The picture is the Party's way of saying, 'We have
them under control and we are handling the matter within the Party in
our own way.'"
Although the verdict against Zhao did not go so far as to accuse
him of counterrevolutionary activities, as rumor had predicted, it was
harsher than that brought against either of his two ousted predecessors. "At the critical juncture involving the destiny of the Party and
the state," read the communique that was later made public, "Comrade Zhao Ziyang made the mistake of supporting the turmoil and
splitting the Party.'' More than that, it charged that the General Secretary himself had "unshirkable responsibilities for shaping the turmoil." The man who had, first as Premier and then as Party chief,
overseen the implementation of a decade of unprecedented economic
reform in China, received only faint praise for having done "something beneficial to the reforms and the opening of China to the outside
world."
The traits that had stood him in good stead when the economic
reforms were popular and the rate of growth double-digit now
weighed like shackles on him. He had, said his peers, taken "a passive
approach to the adherence of the Four Cardinal Principles and opposition to bourgeois liberalization." Likewise, he had "gravely neglected
ideological and political work.'' Accordingly, the Central Committee
voted to strip him of all his posts-though not of his Party membership. In a somewhat ominous compromise, the "doves" and the "eagles" also agreed to reserve the right to "look further into his case."
Optimists observed that the prospect of further investigation signified
that Zhao had not given his opponents the confession they wanted.
Pessimists were worried that the Old Guard was trying to press more
severe charges against him.
Even thornier than the dilemma of how strongly to sanction Zhao
was the question of who should replace him. With Zhao's elimination,
at least temporarily, from the succession sweepstakes, the new Party
chief would automatically vault straight to the head of the line of possible heirs apparent to the aged and ailing Deng. Each of the
octogenarians was playing kingmaker and pushing his protege for the
job. Chen Yun supported the conservative Vice Premier and State
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Planning Commission Minister Yao Yilin. The ambitious Peng Zhen
championed Public Security Minister Qiao Shi. Known as "the Chinese Andropov"-a reference to the late Soviet leader Yuri Andropov,
who was once KGB chief-Qiao was widely perceived as the front
runner for the post.
In the end, Deng imposed his own, more malleable choice by winning the endorsements of former President Li Xiannian and Li Peng
for Shanghai Party boss Jiang Zemin, 63. Jiang was ultimately acceptable to the other factions because, lacking a political base or appreciable military support, he did not threaten any of them. "He's
manageable, and he'll serve as a place holder until this power struggle
is sorted out," said an Asian diplomat.
"Deng was looking for a carbon copy of himself when he chose
Jiang," said a Western diplomat, "someone who was for reform but at
the same time tough on nonsense." An engineer who worked briefly
as a trainee in the Stalin Automobile Factory in Moscow in the mid1950s, Jiang slogged his way up through the bureaucracy from the
state import-and-export and foreign investment commissions. In those
agencies, he was involved in the establishment of China's Special Economic Zones. He eventually became Minister of the Electronics Industry and then Mayor of Shanghai. Like Zhao, Jiang satisfied Deng's
preference for someone with hands-on experience in the implementation of his precious reforms.
Not coincidentally, Jiang's easy manner with foreign businessmen
and his ability to speak their languages (Japanese and English, as well
as Russian and Rumanian) figured heavily in his selection. Party liberals obviously hoped he would help restore the lost confidence of international investors and lenders and moot the cries for more
sanctions from the West. A Beijing-based diplomat came away impressed after a first meeting with the beefy new secretary. "He seems
like someone you could sit and drink a bottle of wine with," he said.
At the same time the hardliners looked favorably on the decisive measures he had taken to quell the unrest that roiled Shanghai in the wake
of Hu Yaobang's death. Among other tactics, Jiang paid the people's
militia, a volunteer brigade armed with clubs, 30 renminbi (about
$7.50) a day to disperse student demonstrations. Although it seemed a
crude tactic before June 4, it was subsequently judged a humane alternative to calling in armed troops.
The Central Committee also ratified the elevation of Jiang and
two other Politburo members to the elite Politburo Standing Committee, making it a six-member body and therefore under the thrall of tiebreaking nonmembers Deng and the Gang of Elders. Significantly,
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none of the six Standing Committee members was named to replace
Zhao on the Party's all-important Central Military Commission. The
Standing Committee was thus left without a direct line to the other
major power broker behind the throne, the army. That gap left a convenient role for Yang Shangkun, the Military Commission's permanent Vice Chairman, to fill. China watchers pointed to a photo in
which Yang was flanked on either side by three Standing Committee
members as illustrative of the fragmented nature of the newly constituted leadership.
Backed by the military, in full control of the media and with a
presentable new party chief in place, that leadership immediately set
about trying to convince the world-and its own people-that life had
returned to normal. Besides denying that a military massacre had
taken place in Beijing, the state-controlled media began insisting that
the worst was over and that nothing was substantially wrong with
China that a strong dose of ideological education could not cure.
The return-to-normalcy campaign began the week after the crackdown with a photo on the front page of the official English-language
China Daily showing two foreign tourists, two soldiers and a farmer
all smiling together on the Great Wall. "Beijing is gradually returning
to normal, with the tourist industry showing the most serious effect of
the recent social unrest," the article began. But Beijing was far from
normal, as a group of Japanese tourists learned some days later.
Soldiers halted their bus and, citing martial law restrictions, forced
them at gunpoint to tum over films they had taken of Tiananmen
Square under military guard. Two tourists who refused were taken
into custody and briefly detained.
Foreign businessmen were treated with greater sensitivity. Those
who had fled to Hong Kong or beyond were plied via phone and telex
with promises of heretofore unattainable appointments or concessions
on their return to China. "I expect all will be back very soon, since
security is now no problem for them," commented Economic Relations and Trade Minister Zheng Tuobin at a press conference in midJune. Those foreign traders who stayed on in Beijing were showered
with invitations and publicly eulogized for their dedication. An official of the Italian automobile company Fiat was invited to meet a vice
minister who had eluded him for months. During a reception at the
Great Hall of the People, however, he suddenly found himself branded
an "official friend" and surrounded by TV cameras.
That incident made other members of the foreign business community more wary of the hospitality of the Chinese. "There is great
sensitivity on the part of the American business community not to be
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manipulated or ambushed for an interview by Chinese television," said
a U.S. official. "Many companies are keeping their people out of
China for that reason. They don't want to contribute to the credibility
of the Chinese leadership."
That credibility had rested for a decade on the words and deeds of
a government trying to convince the world it was dedicated more to
modernization than to ideology. The perception that Deng Xiaoping's
China was a more benign and pragmatic Communist society than its
Soviet counterpart was destroyed on the night of June 3-4. Many foreigners underestimated Deng's obsession with stability and the primacy of the Party, and thus felt shocked and betrayed by his sudden
resort to violence. The subsequent propaganda campaign only deepened their revulsion.
The reality behind the rosy Chinese propaganda was that the
economy, which had already been going through a painful process of
restructuring aimed at cutting inflation and recentralizing state control, was in dreadful shape. Inflation had not fallen below the high
30% mark of the previous year in some cities. Indeed, it was expected
to exceed that rate when the cost of keeping 250,000 martial law
troops in and around Beijing and the production losses incurred during the months of political unrest were factored in. "Some sources are
already talking about 100% hidden inflation," said a European diplomat, who was concerned that the government was so preoccupied with
its theories of political conspiracy that it was ignoring economic
problems he considered even more threatening to its survival.
"I don't think they have had time to focus on the mess they are
in," said a Western analyst. "They are putting most of their energy
into re-educating people." Indeed, everyone from soldiers to Party
cadres to factory workers to graduating college seniors was required to
spend several weeks studying "the important speech" delivered by
Deng on June 9, in which he asserted that the student demonstrations
had "developed into a counterrevolutionary rebellion." Once they understood the origins of the counterrevolution, the Party ideologues
contended, they would shed their bourgeois liberal tendencies.
Meanwhile, foreign trade and tourism-at once the cause of and
the deliverance from their problems-were in the doldrums. Tourism,
the country's No. 1 foreign-exchange earner, was expected to fall to
half the nearly $2 billion it earned in 1988. The upheaval in Beijing
had occurred during the peak spring travel season, resulting in the
cancellation of some 300 tour groups, totaling 11,535 people, in the
month of May alone. Similar losses during the fall season would reverberate far beyond the mirrored and marbled lobbies of China's lux-
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ury hotels. A month after the crackdown, there were so few tourists in
Beijing that Rumors Disco, which catered to foreigners, waived its
$13.50 entrance fee.
Nor was the prospect much better for 1990, when Beijing was
scheduled to host the Asian Games. Although Chinese officials assured the organizers of the Games that they would go on as scheduled,
only about half the necessary 27 stadiums and gymnasiums were
ready. The government was still $58 million short of the $150 million
it was expected to need for the event. Worse, if the political situation
remained unstable, the Games might fail to attract enough spectators
to be profitable or might be canceled altogether. That would only exacerbate the country's growing budget deficit. In a speech reported by
the People's Daily in July, Finance Minister Wang Bingqian disclosed
that state expenditures, including subsidies to money-losing state factories, had risen twice as fast as revenues during the first five months
of the year.
Faced with the dreary outlook for tourism in general, joint-venture partners looking to cut their losses in unfinished hotels and convention centers grew increasingly quarrelsome. One particularly
ironic tussle was over which side would pay damages for the 310 windows of the sleek new Beijing World Trade Center complex that PLA
soldiers had shot out during their June 7 rampage down Changan Avenue. "Why would the soldiers do that?" questioned a Singaporean,
whose firm is under contract to decorate one of the center's two hotels.
"Didn't they know that it's not a foreign project, but one that is jointly
owned by China?"
Bigger questions than that one remained unanswered after the
crackdown. Foremost among them was why Deng, who had often
said he wanted to live to see the historic raising of the Chinese flag
over Hong Kong, had given orders that were so certain to destroy
confidence in the viability of his "one country, two systems" concept
for recovering sovereignty over the British colony. Beijing's new Party
chief Jiang Zemin tried to limit the damage when he met on July 11
with a small delegation of Hong Kong officials helping draft a new
Basic Law for the colony. The officials were impressed with his style
but far from reassured about his government's intent. "We practice
our socialism, and you may practice your capitalism," the affable
Jiang told the Hong Kong visitors, giving each a warm handshake and
addressing the largely Cantonese-speaking group in their common language, English. Jiang added a bit of folk wisdom: "The well water
does not interfere with the river water."
Not long afterward, Jiang's words rang hollow. Beijing fired Lee
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Tze-chung, the director of Wen Wei Po, the mainland-supported newspaper in Hong Kong that had denounced the massacre. Lee's removal
made a mockery of the provisions for a free press that were enshrined
in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Agreement on Hong Kong.
When the crackdown began, orders went out to Party cadres and
security forces to go after five types of counterrevolutionary elements.
Guided by those criteria, several thousand people were picked up and
questioned or detained, and at least 30 were executed. (This figure
does not include secret executions). On June 30, "Circular No.3" was
issued to Party members. It doubled the types of crimes that could be
labeled counterrevolutionary. Crime No. 10, for instance, involved
people who take revenge on those who informed on them for any one
of the nine other crimes.
The 25,000-word report, which Mayor Chen of Beijing presented
to the 8th Meeting of the Standing Committee ofthe National People's
Congress on the same day, added more fuel to the frenzied search for
counterrevolutionary elements that was now going on nationwide.
The report strung together a wealth of quotes, opinions and rumors
lifted largely from the Western and the overseas Chinese press into one
enormous paranoid conspiracy chronicling the rise and fall of the rebellion. "Some political forces in the West always attempt to make
socialist countries give up the socialist road," the Mayor began. These
sinister Western forces, he said, plan eventually on "bringing these
countries under the rule of international monopoly capital and putting
them on the course of capitalism."
Chen's evide;nce was bizarre. First he cited a Sept. 19, 1988,
meeting between Zhao and an American "ultra-liberal economist,"
who turned out to be the American conservative economist Milton
Friedman. The Mayor intimated that the publicity given this tete-atete in Hong Kong newspapers showed that a plot was afoot between
Zhao and the U.S. to "topple Deng." The essence of the plot was to
"whip up public opinion for covering up Zhao Ziyang's mistakes and
pushing on with bourgeois liberalization in an even more unbridled
manner."
On that shaky foundation, the Mayor proceeded to erect a leaning tower of innuendos and half-baked conclusions that embraced all
the government's perceived enemies-from Fang Lizhi to elements of
the U.S. Government, whom Chen implicitly accused of conspiring
with Zhao and the students to overthrow the Chinese Communist
Party. "The hardliners are preparing to try Zhao," warned a disaffected senior Party member. "Behind the scenes they are building a
case that effectively accuses him of treason." He cited an unreported
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speech during the June Central Committee plenum in which Mini~ter
of Public Security Wang Fang, a longtime confidant of Deng Xiaoping, accused Zhao of being in cahoots with an American CIA agent,
the Hungarian-born American anti-Communist philanthropist George
Soros and several associates of China's best-known private enterprise,
the Stone Corp., in plotting the overthrow of the Chinese Communist
Party.
As if that were not enough, the hardliners also made Zhao a target of the Party's newly energized drive against corruption. In summarizing the lessons learned in the course of putting down the
counterrevolutionary rebellion, Deng had stressed that many people
had lost confidence in the Party's leadership because of corruption. In
no time at all, the new party leader launched an anticorruption campaign in which Zhao and his businessmen sons were offered up as convenient scapegoats.
"Our efforts in cracking down on corruption were not very successful in the past," State Council spokesman Yuan Mu told a press
conference in mid-July. "This was inseparably linked to the mistakes
of Zhao Ziyang," he declared, explaining that the Party General Secretary had taken a casual attitude toward corruption, brushing it off as
an inevitable by-product of economic reform.
As shrewd observers of the situation were quick to point out,
however, Zhao's enemies would prosecute the fallen General Secretary
at their own peril. "If they want to be really stupid, they can try him,"
said a Western diplomat. Given his reputation as an economic reformer, many of whose programs would continue to be followed, and
the fact that he had been ousted for siding with the students, he had
the makings of a martyr. "They are treading dangerous ground," said
the diplomat. "The leadership could make a real antihero out of
him." No one knew that better than Deng, who had made a political
comeback as a martyr himself and was therefore judged unlikely to
hand Zhao such an opportunity.
Meanwhile, however, Deng did nothing to restrain the elders and
their allies from their goal of "mercilessly rooting out" all the manifestations of "bourgeois liberalization" that had cropped up during the
years they had been relegated to the political sidelines. They ordered
the jamming of broadcasts by the popular Voice of America, planted
vicious editorials against it in the press and secured the expulsion of
two of its correspondents. Zealous followers in several cities even
turned in a few unfortunate Chinese who were caught listening to it.
They pressured foreign joint-venture hotels in Beijing to halve the
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number of satellite broadcasts of foreign news programs to their guests
and banned the sale of foreign periodicals and a growing list of books.
As substitutes, they began promoting a patriotic line of audio and
visual aids to understanding the counterrevolutionary rebellion. The
official Xinhua news agency launched a TV ad campaign for sets of
twelve "commemorative" photos of the "suppression of the counterrevolutionary rebellion" at the exorbitant cost, by Chinese standards,
of $20. The captions were as memorable as the street scenes. "This
picture shows hooligans inciting those masses ignorant of the facts to
attack the enforcers of martial law," read the caption on a stock photo
taken on June 3 of chanting students atop a barricade of buses, with
helmeted soldiers looking on.
Newspaper ads promoted a cassette tape featuring ten top hits
from China's early revolutionary years and the later Cultural Revolution, including I Am a Soldier and Party, Beloved Mother. A government-produced video titled The True Story of the Turmoil, which went
on sale to foreigners at a seminar for overseas travel agents, bore a seal
authorizing airport customs agents to exempt it from the confiscation
prescribed for private photos and tapes of the June 4 violence or its
aftermath.
"The conservatives definitely won this round," said a Western
diplomat. "They are in full sway, and they don't need to worry too
much about the balance between factions at this point." That made
for a dangerous situation, he explained, because they were devoting so
much energy to the purge that they were overlooking the ultimately
more destabilizing problem of the economy. "They feel they are on a
roll," he said. "They are saying to each other, 'Let's cure the country
of Zhao once and for all.' " Such madness was likely to continue for
another three months, before the country's real problems intruded on
their fantasies of a populace purged of its bourgeois tendencies and
once again grateful to the Communist Party for all it has given them.
"The tragedy of China is that there is no system of retirement,"
observed an Asian ambassador to Beijing. "The people who took part
in the Long March made a tremendous contribution to the building of
this country. But these people, who are now over 80, and whose
minds probably function for only two hours a day, are still making
policy. For them the revolution is more important than anything else.
In its name they shed blood in the past and are doing so again."
United in their age and the ties made in their young manhood,
China's leaders had become so hopelessly isolated from more than
50% of the population born after the founding of the People's Republic that many younger Party members who considered themselves
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good Communists no longer identified with them. "There is a mystical nature to the relationship between the octogenarians and the
Party," observed a veteran China watcher. "The threat they perceiyed
from the students was a threat not to the country but to that mystical
body, the Party, as constituted behind the walls of Zhonghanhai." It
was a threat not only to their power and privilege but to their theology. "Because what the leaders said was considered canon law," he
added, "what the students were advocating could only be heresay."
The old leaders' remedy-large-scale ideological re-educationwas being administered under the gun. Students tolerated it because it
was a prerequisite to a diploma and a decent job assignment. Factory
workers went through the motions rather than visit trouble on themselves by resisting. But after ten years of relative leniency, most Chinese chafed under the discipline of reciting the catechism.
Few relished the notion of forsaking the bourgeois pleasures just
as they were on the verge of being able to afford them. And, like upwardly mobile groups everywhere, the concept of democracy appealed
to their burgeoning sense of self-confidence and to their idealism,
neither of which the Party had properly addressed.
"It's too late for re-education," observed an American official.
"In Beijing even the Party cadres' kids were involved in the student
movement. These are not the country bumpkins of the 1960s. Like
kids in the U.S. they are more sophisticated than their parents in many
ways. They have grown up on TV too."
If the elderly leadership had succeeded in suppressing the autonomous students' and workers' groups and their democracy movement
for now, it appeared to have given little thought to how to solve the
problems of official corruption, rising prices and untapped human potential, which had bred the discontent that ignited the protest movement in the first place. Nor had it been able to produce an acceptable
successor. "The new Party leadership is probably transitional," commented a Western diplomat on the selection of Jiang Zemin. "They
need a supreme leader, but there is no one in sight."
Conventional wisdom ruled that when Deng died, Yang
Shangkun would replace him. However, given Yang's age, that was
merely a temporary solution. "This is the only country in the world
where an 81-year-old is running to replace an 85-year-old," joked the
diplomat.
"Since June 4, China has entered a dark period," intoned the
country's most prominent journalist, Liu Binyan, to an audience in
Hong Kong one month after the massacre. "Perhaps it is not the
darkest moment in Chinese history, but it is certainly the darkest in

156

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

the past 40 years," he said. And yet Liu predicted that this period of
repression would last no longer than two years. By then the country's
economy would be in chaos, and discontented peasants would join students and urban workers in demanding change.
As he spoke, student leader Uerkesh Daolet [Wuer Kaixi], political scientist Yan Jiaqi and four other survivors of the Beijing Spring
surfaced in France to announce the establishment of the Chinese Student and Democracy Movement United Association [Federation for a
Democratic China]. For the first time since 1911, the government in
Beijing was about to face a well-financed revolutionary movement in
exile, not unlike the one that had succeeded in overthrowing the imperial system.
Time was on the side of these young activists. Deng's repressive
policies, predicted Yan, would "quicken the end of the present regime." It was time for China to adopt a new political structure to end
"thousands of years of the dynastic cycle." As an adviser to Zhao,
Yan had hoped to point the way for the Party leaders themselves to
spearhead the political reform that he considered an essential complement to economic reform. His efforts and those of Zhao had failed,
but his blueprint was still valid. As for the students, although scores
of their number were now in jail on the mainland and many more were
on the run or in hiding, their nascent network remained intact. And,
as it had so many times in the recent past, the vast, extended family of
overseas Chinese was ready to provide the necessary moral and financial support to perpetuate itself abroad until the day when it could
reunite within a stable and prosperous nation.
On July 4 the leaders of the new movement issued from France a
declaration "in the name of the students and masses slaughtered in the
recent student and democracy movement as well as those who are now
on the wanted list." Addressed to "all descendants of the Chinese
people and the peace-loving people of the whole world," it proclaimed
June 4 a national day of sorrow in China. The declaration also
launched a campaign to obtain the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize for the
Chinese students and the citizens of Beijing. "The progress of China's
democracy movement is now uncontrollable, like the Yellow River
breaking its dike," said the declaration. Announcing a break with the
ideology on which it had been weaned, China's new generation proclaimed, "Modem and contemporary Chinese history has taught us
sufficient lessons that fighting violence with violence and 'political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun' will never guide China to
genuine freedom and democracy."

8. A FORTNIGHT LATER*
Harrison Salisbury**

Back in Connecticut following Tiananmen and its aftermath. I
think I have been able to fill out the story of the massacre-how it
happened, why it happened, who was responsible, and what lies ahead.
It is not a pretty tale. The origins go back to the autumn of 1986
and the vicious campaign that drove out Hu Yaobang, with his brilliant, almost childlike curiosity and daring ideas. Hu was a man intent
on real change in China. He had Deng's confidence. He was a genuine threat to the geriatric relics of the Long March and to their reactionary allies, the military.
Like Deng, Hu had little sense of measure. He often overshot the
mark. It may seem silly, but his off-the-cuff proposal that China abandon chopsticks in favor of Western knives and forks was the straw that
broke the camel's back.
All of China hooted Hu down. Much of the West joined in. This
and a dozen similar eccentricities were picked upon by the elders when
Hu demonstrated sympathy and an inability (or unwillingness) to
combat student and intellectual unrest. The student pro-democracy
demonstrations began in the fall of 1986 and peaked in November and
December.
Hu tendered his resignation as Party Secretary on January 16,
1987. Almost immediately a campaign against what was called spiritual pollution was launched, designed to combat the Western ideas
that Hu had permitted to flourish. Liu Binyan, China's most influential newspaper writer, an investigative reporter of heroic stature, was
expelled from the Communist party and forbidden to write for his
newspaper, the People's Daily. Liu specialized in exposes of corruption within the Communist party, and was known for his honesty and
courage. He proclaimed himself-much as did the students on
• Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown & Co., dated November 7, 1989, from

Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in June (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989).

** Through an astonishing coincidence, the author spent the first thirteen days of
June, 1989 in Beijing and later published his firsthand account of the massacre in a book
entitled Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in June (Little, Brown, 1989). This excerpt,
written at his Connecticut home a fortnight after his return to the U.S. from China, records
his analysis of Tiananmen.
(157)
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Tiananmen-as a supporter of an ethical Communism, one true to its
ideals and not dedicated to privilege and power.
This was the public side of the Hu Yaobang-"spiritual pollution"
crisis.
There was a hidden agenda, as I discovered in following up the
revelation that PLA officers at that time were forbidden to listen to
BBC and VOA.
The army and public security administration began, for the first
time, to prepare for riot control. Both the army and the Security Bureau purchased riot-control chemicals, stanchions, and protective
clothing for the riot force. Selected military and security battalions,
including the elite 8341 regiment stationed in Zhongnanhai, began
training in crowd control.
The security forces probably began to study South Korean tactics
in combating student demonstrations. The Security Bureau purchased
a device that went into extensive use in the Tiananmen crisis, a miniature TV camera developed by the Japanese that is smaller than an
electric pencil sharpener. The camera can be automatically controlled
from a central station to transmit pictures of all four sides of an intersection. The Japanese used the images from these cameras to help
adjust the stop-and-go system of traffic lights to speed the flow of traffic through congested areas. The Chinese purchased seventy-three of
these cameras and put them up at Beijing's principal intersections.
They said they would use them to spot traffic violators. The videotape
pictures taken by the cameras would provide irrefutable evidence of
violations.
Whether that innocent purpose was the real reason behind the
purchase cannot be known. In fact, in the Tiananmen affair the cameras were used to photograph demonstrators, street battles, and students. They produced grainy, low-lighting pictures seen by American
(and Chinese) viewers on TV of many of the combat actions. These
cameras enabled the Security Bureau to identify participants in the
demonstrations.
But there is no evidence that the troops brought into the city had
had the benefit of the special riot training. The evidence goes the other
way. On July 2 Li Peng told a Chinese-American visitor that the
army had been compelled to use live bullets because it possessed
neither tear gas nor rubber bullets. But tear gas was employed by
some units, including the 8341 regiment. If riot-control equipment
was not on hand, it could readily have been purchased and delivered in
the six weeks between the decision to use force and June 4. Clearly,
the government wanted a riot-a police riot.
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The fact that these preparations were put in motion in early 1987,
a time when student demonstrations were more intense than they had
been at any time since Deng Xiaoping came to power, supports my
notion that the military was readying itself for another and more severe outbreak of unrest.
There was no way in advance to predict that Hu Yaobang would
die on April 15, 1989, nor that his death would touch off escalating
student demonstrations.
There had been a spate of rumors in March and early April of
1989 of a possible comeback for Hu. Much attention was given to an
unusual photograph published by the Beijing papers of him and Zhao
Ziyang in friendly conversation. Hu had been suffering from heart
disease but was said to be in improved health. However, he suffered a
massive heart attack at a Politburo meeting on April 8, brought on,
some said, by a violent disagreement over educational policy and,
quite possibly, over the government's attitude toward the students.
The report of a violent quarrel in the Politburo was officially denied.
Hu's death touched off immediate demonstrations at Beijing and
other universities, rapidly snowballing into marches on Tiananmen
Square.
This was the kind of disturbance that the security officials had
had in mind when they embarked on their preparations. It is probable
that the crisis they envisioned was the inevitable emergency that
would accompany the death of Deng Xiaoping. "Plan A" was likely
drafted for this event. When the Hu Yaobang demonstrations escalated and the decision was made on April26 to employ force (reflected
in a People's Daily editorial of that date), Plan A was apparently put
into place as a method of dealing with the Tiananmen contingency.
That Deng Xiaoping was directly involved in this there is no
doubt. A variety of sources attest that he took part in the deliberations and that, at some point, he became convinced that a plot threatening not only to overthrow the Party but also to take his life and
those of other leaders was developing under cover of the student
protests.
Deng, having come to power after the chaos, paranoia, intrigue,
and plots of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four, was highly
sensitive to such dangers. He had not returned to the elite compound
of Zhongnanhai when he came to power in 1977-78, and he discouraged his associates from living there. "It is not safe," he said: "one
bomb could kill us all." He had a house built for himself with stringent security features, TV monitors, steel walls, bullet-proof glass. It
is located just north of the Forbidden City, adjacent to the Defense
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Ministry, in Iron Lion Lane, where the old imperial granaries once
stood.
One of Deng's first moves as the Tiananmen crisis mounted was
to change the palace guards (his personal guards, that is), and he instructed his associates to take the same precaution. This was a page
out of Stalin's book. The Soviet dictator periodically changed his personal guards and usually had them shot. He acted on the theory that
after a few years in a position of high trust a man inevitably would be
tempted to join the other side. If he hadn't-too bad. Stalin was taking no chances. Neither was Deng. (The changing of guards had also
been a frequent tactic of Mao's and of Jiang Qing's and her Gang of
Four.)
Whether at this time Deng moved out of his bullet-proof house to
the security of a special nuclear-safe command center in the military
district of the Fragrant Hills, to the west, is not certain. But at a key
point in the developing drama Deng and his closest colleagues did
move there to direct operations.
Amid these mounting tensions Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang departed for North Korea on a state visit, leaving Beijing by special train
on April 23. Three days later, in his absence, the decision was made to
employ military force against the demonstrators but to delay action
until after the Gorbachev visit, May 15-17. The text of the People's
Daily editorial reflecting that decision was telegraphed to Zhao in
Pyongyang. Zhao, so I have been told, concurred with it. The rationales were the growing chaos in the city, the need to restore Party
discipline, the rising impact on industrial production, and (supposed)
evidence that a plot against the government was taking shape.
Zhao got back to Beijing on April 30. The crisis had heightened.
The students were planning a huge protest for May 4, anniversary of
the 1919 demonstration. Zhao found himself selected to give a milkand-waterish May 4 speech, and he received firsthand information
from his own staff about the true nature of the demonstrations.
Serious doubts arose in Zhao's mind about the hardline solution.
At the initiative of the Military Commission, troop movements were
already under way. Deng was Chairman of the Military Commission,
Zhao Vice Chairman, and Yang Shangkun Permanent Vice-chairman,
nominally number three on the organizational chart but, in fact, operating head of the body. (Deng has often insisted that Zhao was concentrating on the work of the Military Commission, but it is doubtful
that this was true.)
The Military Commission occupies a unique position in China.
Because the Red Army under Mao brought about the Revolution, the
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Commission has always had a special place. Mao served as Commission Chairman during his life. Deng has held that post while ostensibly shedding all others. It is the supreme and ultimate authority in
China.
In Zhao's absence, plans for the military solution of Tiananmen
had gone forward swiftly under Yang Shangkun's direction. Zhao was
not without influence with the military; he had close ties with the defense minister, former commander of the Beijing military district, and
some other professional military men. But, of course, Deng had been
put into office by a group of old Long March commanders, some of
whom in retirement still commanded enormous prestige, both military
and political. The weight of Deng and Yang Shangkun out-balanced
that of Zhao in a ratio of 100 to 1.
With the troops already moving in and the visit of Gorbachev
days away, Zhao shifted his position. He decided to oppose a military
solution. His decision aroused anger and dismay. "But you had
agreed to the proposal," he was told. "How can you change your
mind?"
Zhao held his ground. He could not be party to the planned action. Zhao's stand threw the leadership into confusion. At all costs it
wanted to present a united front. The row raged right into the
Gorbachev visit. Zhao tried to resolve the matter by tendering his
resignation. That was refused, just as Liu Shaoqi's had been during
the Cultural Revolution. Liu had gone to Zhou Enlai and admitted
that he had made mistakes; Mao had pointed them out. He wanted to
resign, go back to a farm in Yanan, and retire. He would take all
responsibility on himself-it was his fault, not that of his associates.
Let him quit and let the country get on with its business. Zhou Enlai
replied sadly: "I am sorry but you will not be permitted to resign."
Zhao took his case to Yang Shangkun, who had become very
close to him. Several times in difficult periods Yang had been of assistance. Zhao told Yang that he had to see Deng Xiaoping and put his
case before him. Yang pondered a moment and then, it was said, told
Zhao: "I'm sorry. But in this case I can't help you." Yang had become Deng's gatekeeper.
Zhao took a bold step. He told Yang he, too, was sorry, but he
could not support a decision with which he did not agree.
It may have been this defiance of the Party line that emboldened
Zhao to tell Mikhail Gorbachev that while Deng had given up all his
positions at the 1987 Thirteenth Party Congress, he had actually retained a veto over everything. "We agreed," said Zhao, "to submit all
important questions to him."
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This was hardly news. It had been apparent to all that regardless
of title, Deng possessed the highest authority in the country. But
Zhao's honest acknowledgment of this universally known secret sealed
his fate.
Not only was Zhao refusing to accept a Party decision, he was
telling the head of China's great and sometimes hostile neighbor a
Party "secret."
Events raced forward. Gorbachev came and went. Hardly had
the Soviet leader left town than on May 18 Deng left as well. He went
to Wuhan, where he had, as chairman of the Military Commission,
convened a meeting of the heads of China's seven military districts.
He had summoned the commanders to extract from them a pledge of
support for the military crackdown at Tiananmen. He spent the day
with the commanders and came away with their unanimous support in
hand. The way was cleared for action.
On May 19 Zhao visited the student hunger strikers at
Tiananmen. He had fought for three days for permission to go there.
Finally, the Party leaders gave in. Zhao went, but he was accompanied by an unsmiling, laconic Li Peng. With tears in his eyes, Zhao
spoke to the hunger strikers. He said he had come "too late, too late"
but expressed hope that the students' high aspirations ultimately
would be met. Li Peng said nothing. Later that evening under Li's
signature and that of Yang Shangkun the order placing Tiananmen
and other areas of Beijing under martial law was issued.
Tragedy now waited around the comer.
Why had events reached this critical point? There were two possible causes. First, Deng felt-and declared to his Party associatesthat Zhao had betrayed him, specifically by the remark to Gorbachev,
and in general by his support of the students and refusal to follow the
Party diktat. It is not clear that Deng believed Zhao was engaged in a
conspiracy, but it is clear that there were those who were making such
suggestions to Deng. For Deng, Zhao's "betrayal" may have served as
the final impetus to go ahead with the crackdown, an action that had
been delayed several times to that point-probably by Deng himself,
against the desires of the hardliners on the Standing Committee.
Second, from the earliest days of his comeback Deng held a negative attitude toward the students. He and his fellow members in what
was simply called the club, a cozy institution where Deng and his
council of elders met to chat, to plan, and to play bridge, contemptuously termed the young wa wa, children. They were uppity, rambunctious, ungrateful They didn't know their place. The elders knew best.
The wa wa did not appreciate what had been done for them. As Deng
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told his fellow club members, he had given them more presents than
anyone else who had ruled China. He let them go abroad by the tens
of thousands to study or to work. He put no impediment on what they
read or wrote (hardly true). The state was spending more money than
ever to educate them. The state had treated them like prodigal children-and how had they repaid this?
With shouts and slogans and, worst of all, with total betrayal. At
a time when he was engaged in the supreme diplomatic negotiations of
his career, those with Mikhail Gorbachev, they had publicly humiliated him. They had caused him to disrupt his schedule of meetings
and entertainment. He did not know from one moment to another
where he could meet his guest; he was no longer master in his own
house. This had never happened in history to a chief of state. "I
could not figure out who was in charge," Gorbachev was quoted as
saying after his Beijing visit.
Deng put his relationship to Zhao and to the students in the same
context-they had both caused him loss of face and personal humiliation. As one who knows Deng well told me: Deng is a brilliant man,
brave, courageous, bold. He took the steps that had to be taken to get
the country going after Mao and the Gang of Four. But he has a
terrible weakness. If he thinks someone he trusts has let him down or
betrayed him, his temper is like lightning. Nothing can withstand
him. This is the great tragedy.
I think, however, that Deng's temper is not the whole answer. I
date the problem back a year, just as I was leaving China at the end of
June 1988. I had expected to meet with Deng, and this hope had been
encouraged by Yang Shangkun, who was my liaison with Deng-but
the meeting never materialized. Deng had gone to Beidaihe, his usual
summer retreat. He swam and relaxed there each year, and the government moved there, too.
That June 1988 the Party simply split apart. As it met at
Beidaihe, it was unable to agree on how to handle urgent problems.
Basically those were economic-the uneven pace of development, the
overinvestment in non-economic high-rise office buildings and hotels,
the uncontrolled pouring of state funds into trivial municipal and
county projects, often riddled with graft, the inability of banks and
fiscal controllers to curb racing inflation and the rise of the cost of
living.
Two things made it impossible to resolve these issues: Deng's insistence that his development program move forward in the fast lane,
and the savage attack of the Party reactionaries, who sensed a strategic
moment to dump the whole Deng program.
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Aided by some of the military, the elders succeeded better than
perhaps even they realized. They halted the Deng program. Decisions were postponed until a later meeting, in July, when Deng was
compelled to accept transfer of economic questions from Zhao's hands
to those of Premier Li Peng. To protect Deng-beginning now to
show age-slowed responses-blame for the troubles was heaped on
Zhao Gust as earlier, in 1986-87, it had been heaped on Hu Yaobang).
The Beidaihe meetings resolved nothing. The crisis continued.
The government allotted token subsidies to the hard-pinched Beijingers and other big-city residents. The question of graft and corruption and influence peddling by sons, daughters, and relatives got only
lip service.
The arguments at Beidaihe were no more effective than those in
Petrograd in 1916 and early 1917, when Czar Nicholas II and his advisers struggled to resolve the crisis that was overwhelming Russia.
They changed nothing but the names of the ministers.
China rolled ahead to disaster with the players in the power elite
worrying not about the country but about how the power pie would be
cut. The oligarchs saw a chance to prolong their reign a few more
years. The military knew it held the top cards and that in a crisis
power would flow its way. Some individuals, like Yang Shangkun,
saw a chance for a quantum leap upward.
What Deng thought or felt is not recorded.
In August 1988, just after the events at Beidaihe, I met a gifted
(but sometimes mistaken) observer of the Chinese political scene. He
had been in China and was in a state of great excitement. Deng had
lost control. He was no longer in charge. He thought everything must
be done immediately-while he was still among the living. Haste was
the only word he understood. He was not in touch with reality. He
no longer was able to judge a situation on the basis of real evidence.
No one could talk to him. The sessions at Beidaihe had been a failure.
They had broken up with everyone in conflict. The countryside was in
awful shape. No food. The cities were a disaster because of inflation.
No meat in city or country. A total mess. The slogan was going
around: "Better Mao and 48 than Deng and 108"-meaning that
earning 48 yuan a month under Mao was better than earning 108 yuan
under Deng.
I was appalled. This report did not jibe with anything I had seen.
I knew it was false in major segments: The countryside was not starving. There was plenty of food and plenty of money. I had been traveling in China almost continuously for six or seven months. This was
not a description of the China I knew.
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What bothered me most was that this description was issuing
from very high quarters, from persons who had been at Beidaihe. This
might not be the true situation, but it was the situation in which they
wanted others to believe.
I was so upset by the report that I wrote some of my highly
placed Chinese contacts and told them they should know what kind of
stories were emerging from official quarters in China. I thought it was
propaganda to support the campaign of the reactionaries to drive Zhao
from office and compel Deng to abandon his reform and opening policies. In so doing China would move back toward the bankruptcy of
Stalinist economics-just at a time when the Soviets were trying to
imitate China's remarkable innovations.
I smelled high politics-succession politics-in all this. The
struggle for the dragon throne was under way. It seemed likely that
Deng was losing vigor. Possibly he was getting out of touch. Possibly
there were those in whose interest it was to detach Deng from reality.
Much the same had happened in Mao's last years.
After this I watched closely and listened to my Chinese friends.
The battle swirled around Zhao. Sometimes the liberals seemed to
gain a bit, sometimes Zhao unexpectedly emerged into prominence,
then was lost in a swirl of political fog. Li Peng's picture moved in
and out of circulation. A political battle was in progress, but it was
hard to distinguish it from the normal give-and-take of Chinese
politics.
Certainly I had no premonition, as China moved toward the fortieth anniversary of the Communist Revolution and the tenth year of
the Deng regime, that she would explode into Tiananmen.
Nor did the emergence of the student demonstrations in April
1989 and their escalation into May and finally June seem to me to
presage disaster. I confess I was mystified at the irresolution of the
government and its unwillingness to enter into a simple dialogue with
the students at an early stage, when an easy solution was not beyond
reach.
As tension rose, as the troops moved in, as the government began
to prepare for arbitrary action, another suspicion arose. Was there not
something deliberate in all this? Was the crisis temperature being allowed to rise until military action became inevitable and even
necessary?
That hypothesis becomes inescapable when viewed against the
background of the government's program. It was-and is-totally unable to cope with the economic problems that have been spun off by
Deng's fast-paced development. Nor does it seem able or willing to
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touch the issue of graft in high places. This made more attractive a
military solution. It would solve nothing basic, but it would terrorize
the population and give the Party a chance to impose absolute control
on an unruly citizenry. It would keep them from shouting. They
might suffer and starve, but they would be afraid of the army's guns.
Harsh, yes. But to preserve its power, the junta would halt at nothing.
The notion, held by many Americans, that the bright young people in
Tiananmen were touching the hearts and minds of Deng and his men
was naive.
Unless the army was a complete society of fools, only a deliberate
desire to initiate and continue terror could explain the manner in
which Tiananmen was handled-the extraordinary firepower directed
at random against the citizenry. Whatever the number of students
killed on Tiananmen, it was only a fraction of the general public
mowed down.
The incredulity over the casualty figures of three or four thousand
reflected the fact that these casualties were not inflicted in the center of
town but in the outskirts, where the conduct of the PLA had touched
off a genuine people's war. Tens and hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens sprang from houses and flats to oppose armor with bare
hands. The spectacle of the lone man dancing in front of an armored
column to bring it to a halt was a symbol of the people of Beijing.
They emerged en masse to try to convince the people's army that they
were the people.
A man of whom I heard walked from the suburbs and up to the
barrier line just beyond the Beijing Hotel early on the evening of June
4. He walked to that point and the Tiananmen troops opened fire.
The bullets coursed past him on either side. He could not believe it.
He threw himself on the pavement, arms outstretched. A bullet hit a
foot ahead of him, spattering fragments that injured his hand. He
went to the Capital Hospital, where his wound was treated after a long
wait. They had many more serious cases. Doctors in some hospitals
operated for seventy-two hours without halt. Many deaths resulted
when blood supplies ran out.
"Why did you go to Tiananmen?" the man was asked.
"I had to tell them," he said. "I had to talk to them and tell them
that we were the people."
No one who saw or talked to the people of Beijing can believe
that they will easily swallow the government line that Tiananmen did
not happen, that only "bad men" and "bandits" burned the trucks and
held back the troops.
To the people of Beijing it is apparent that the mantle of heaven,
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which slipped from the death grasp of Mao Zedong to the agile hands
of Deng Xiaoping, has slipped once again. Deng has lost it and no one
yet has retrieved it.
And what of the future? I have heard estimates of six months to
two years before there is another shuffle of the deck. That depends on
the lives of elderly men, particularly the life of Deng Xiaoping. His
mind, I have been told, is clear, if not as nimble as it was. His body
has deteriorated this last year. The process is irreversible. Hopefully
he will not sink into the vegetative state in which Mao spent his last
years, totally manipulated by unscrupulous handlers.
Already it is said that Deng is much in the control of a small
band of individuals. He spends little time on affairs of state (is not
strong enough or lacks the will), accepts the evaluations of others, has
little firsthand knowledge of conditions, is totally unaware of the reality of Tiananmen, quite possibly believes the vapid propaganda of the
army and the Party.
Deng's speech of June 9 to the military commanders, congratulating them on their actions of June 4, was read abroad as bristling with
anger and the determination to use any means necessary to regain control of the "counterrevolutionary" situation.
So Deng said, but the full text of the speech discloses a baffled,
almost bewildered old man, painfully clutching at his vision of a new,
open, and reformed China, a China that will go forward to economic
vigor and meet his goals for the year 2050. It is apologetic in tone.
Deng is obviously stunned at the resistance the people put up to the
PLA crackdown. There is a plaintive vein of incomprehension running through his remarks, as though he cannot really believe it all
happened, that his dreams and ambitions have been shattered in a single tragic night.
There is no way that Deng's condition will take a turn for the
better. The trend is down and it will not change. Yang Shangkun has
acquired enormous influence with Deng, with the army, and with the
elders. But although more vigorous than Deng, he is only two years
his junior. He too has entered a zone in which physical and mental
frailty may readily make their appearance. And he is not without enemies. He did not receive a unanimous vote in his election to the Military Commission.
None of my Chinese friends believes Li Peng has a constituency.
They see him as an instrument, not a player. They do not expect his
power to grow. The new Party Secretary, Jiang Zemin, has no wide
political base. He has only Shanghai behind him, and even there he is
not too popular. This is hardly an accident. When Mao had to pick a
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successor after the death of Zhou Enlai and the second fall of Deng
Xiaoping, he picked Hua Guofeng, a political unknown whom he had
met in his native Hunan. He didn't want a man of power. Deng's
choice of Jiang was based on the same kind of political calculation.
With Li and Jiang in place Deng feels no political threat.
It is a situation pleasing to the army. The military has demonstrated to Deng that without it he cannot retain power. The commanders have demonstrated to themselves that they are more
powerful than Deng or the Party. On the next round they expect to
pick their man for the top office. Not necessarily an army man, but
one who can head a tightly run military state. Something, say, like
South Korea. With a doctrine that has already been evolved by the
reactionaries, a doctrine called authoritarianism (which is just what it
says, a gloss of Nazism and fascism), they think they can do very well.
Who needs democracy? The fast-moving Asian "tigers" have done
very well without democracy. China, they think, is too big, too inchoate to function under such a system. With authoritarianism, some
peasant graft, and the guns of the armored divisions China should do
very well.
As I have been writing these lines I have talked to some of my
Chinese friends. What is there to hope for? They shake their heads in
despair. "This is only the beginning," they say. They think of it in
terms of the unthinkable: the Cultural Revolution in reruns, China
sinking back into the sloth of warlordism, fascism.
I fear they are right. I confess I was one who thought the students in Tiananmen could change the minds of the stubborn men who
run the country. Yes, even that of Deng Xiaoping.
I was as naive as that young man from Nankai whom I met in the
square. I thought he and his comrades were the wave of the future.
Like so many Americans, I was very proud of the youngsters, so
brave, so idealistic.
Now I know that China is still ruled by her three great symbols:
the Yellow River, the Great Wall, and the Dragon. The Yellow River
is believed to have given birth to Chinese civilization thousands of
years ago in its rich alluvial soil and to have established China as a
river country, not an ocean country. She still lives by the Yellow
River waters, not the blue of ocean seas, turning inward instead of
outward, as did the men of the Renaissance and the privateers of
Queen Elizabeth. Not yet have the people and their rulers begun to
see that the Great Wall keeps the people in, as well as invaders out;
that the walls and courtyards in which they contain themselves, the
great magenta walls that surround the Forbidden City and
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Zhongnanhai, confine minds as well as bodies. And the Dragon is still
supreme, China's benevolent dragon that protects the nation, protects
the throne, protects the dynasties, protects the people-so long as they
do not threaten its order.
Now I know that these myths still hold China under their sway.
The TV documentary, Yellow River Elegy, which challenged them, has
not tom China away from her ancient foundations. "If they had only
discussed these ideas," said the director of the documentary the night
before the guns roared at Tiananmen, "they would not be in this
situation."
He was right, but now, I am afraid, it will be years before the
bright dreams of the Elegy will gleam through the dark clouds of the
Dragon, break down the barrier of the Great Wall, and send China
soaring away from the silt of the Yellow River into the clean blue
waters of the sea and the endless precincts of space.

9.

HOW THE HARDLINERS WON*
Nicholas D. Kristof

Hu Yaobang always tried to do things his own way, from the day
at age 14 when he ran away from home to join the Communists to the
time in 1986 when, as Party leader, he suggested that maybe it was
time for Deng Xiaoping to retire. This year, after he had his heart
attack-embarrassingly, 40 minutes into a Politburo meeting-the
doctor ordered him to spend a week in bed. But Hu, 74, was impatient; in particular, he was tired of bedpans. In the early morning of
Aprill5, on the seventh day after the heart attack, Hu raised his lithe,
5 foot, 3 inch frame from the bed and stepped toward the bathroom.
It was too much for him. Hu Yaobang suffered a seizure, collapsed
and died.
Hu's seizure was a prelude to China's. His death triggered weeks
of massive protests, giddy days last April and May when throngs of
more than a million filled the streets of Beijing, criticizing the growing
corruption, and in general demanding more of the democracy that Hu
had come to symbolize. And then, after seven exhilarating weeks, it
all came to a sudden end. In the early hours of June 4, as the world
watched in horror, the tanks of the People's Liberation Army rolled
toward Tiananmen Square and troops fired on the crowds, killing hundreds and wounding thousands.
Behind this highly public drama lay another one, less visual and
far less understood, yet just as significant. It was enacted not on the
streets but in Zhongnanhai-the park-like compound a few hundred
yards from Tiananmen where most of China's top leaders have their
villas-and in Deng Xiaoping's own large estate a mile north of there.
This was the battle within the leadership, a struggle among ambitious
men and their competing visions of China. The echoes of this struggle
still reverberate through the country, and China's future will depend
on how it is resolved.
The following account is pieced together from conversations with
dozens of people, including many Party officials, as well as a reading of
various documents-reports and speeches-some released to the public, others "internal" and closely held. In many places in the narra• Reprinted by permission of New York Times, Inc., dated November 14, 1989, from
The New York Times Magazine, November 12, 1989.
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tive, I have avoided attribution, sometimes because those involved
spoke only on condition their names not be used, sometimes because
use of their names would put them and their families in jeopardy.
The central figure in the tragedy is Zhao Ziyang, who in 1987
succeeded Hu Yaobang as General Secretary of the Communist Party.
A wily and sometimes ebullient politician with a razor-sharp mind,
Zhao was expected to become Deng's successor as paramount leader.
More than any other official, Zhao was identified with Deng's economic "opening" of the country; he surrounded himself with some of
the best and brightest of the country's young scholars who, based in an
archipelago of think tanks around Beijing, submitted revolutionary
proposals for economic and political change. For many young intellectuals, this was China's Camelot.
By the summer of 1988, however, their patron's job was in jeopardy. Inflation and corruption were on the rise, and the people were
grumbling. Many older Party officials regarded Zhao as too impatient; they were appalled when he flirted with heretical notions such as
freeing prices and selling off state-owned companies to private shareholders. They began to criticize Zhao, in what they viewed as an attempt to save the revolution and the economy. Early this year, some
of Deng's most influential associates, most notably Chen Yun, the 84year-old genius of central planning, formally advised that Zhao, 69 at
the time, be dismissed.
Such is Zhao's situation when his predecessor, Hu Yaobang, collapses in Beijing Hospital and the drama begins.

April18
With the news of Hu Yaobang's death, university students-for
whom Hu was a symbol of change-begin hanging posters mourning
him and criticizing the Party leadership. In the predawn hours, several thousand students march to Tiananmen; within a few days,
thousands of them are effectively occupying the square and threatening to force their way inside Zhongnanhai.
During this first week, I happen to have lunches on three occasions with lieutenants or supporters of Zhao. The ruling faction in
Beijing will later claim that Zhao was behind the protests from the
beginning, plotting with the students with an eye toward seizing
power, but this week none of the aides think much of the students;
indeed, they are openly dismissive. "It's nothing," one says derisively.
"It'll be over soon." They regard the protests as just another headache for their boss, another threat to his already precarious position.

How
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At the beginning, the Zhao faction is as befuddled by the students as
anyone else.
Meanwhile, just to the east of Tiananmen Square, on Justice
Street, officials of the Beijing People's Government are appalled at the
students' conduct. Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong and local Party leader
Li Ximing have their staffs prepare reports focusing on the most outrageous of the students' slogans-those calling for the ouster of Deng
Xiaoping.
On April 23, Zhao Ziyang embarks on a previously scheduled
visit to Pyongyang, North Korea, leaving hardline officials in charge
of policy.
Apri124

The Politburo Standing Committee-now presided over by Prime
Minister Li Peng, Zhao's primary rival-meets to discuss the unrest,
and resolves that the Party must act firmly in the face of the
demonstrations.
Early the next morning, two Mercedes Benz limousines pull out
of Zhongnanhai, wind their way north and then-ignoring a "Do Not
Enter" sign-pull into a narrow alley just south of Dianmen Gate. A
team of elite guards admit Li Peng, 60, and 82-year-old President
Yang Shangkun through a steel gate and into the residence of Deng
Xiaoping, 84, China's senior leader.
They find Deng in a grim mood, outraged by the ongoing protests
and deeply alarmed at the prospect of further unrest. He comments
that other socialist countries that had been tolerant of unrest-he cites
the example of Poland-had experienced economic collapse; he also
hails the authorities in the Soviet Republic of Georgia for their firm
measures against dissent. (At least 19 protesters had been killed by
troops in a recent incident there.)
Finally, Deng tells his two colleagues that Army troops must
enter the city and crush any further demonstrations. "We do not fear
spilling blood," declares Deng, "and we do not fear the international
reaction." A stenographer takes down his words, and they are later
turned into a document that is read to other Party officials.
On Deng's orders, a hardline editorial is prepared for the People's
Daily, condemning the student unrest and calling for a crackdown.
When a draft is taken to Deng's home, the leader strikes out each use
of xuechao ("student movement") and replaces it with dongluan ("turmoil," the same pejorative used to describe the Cultural Revolution).
A copy of the editorial is transmitted to Pyongyang, and Zhao cables
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back his approval-a cable his rivals will be quick to produce when
the Party leader later tries to repudiate the editorial.
April26
The students are planning a major demonstration for tomorrow.
Though Deng has issued his orders, senior leaders spend much of the
day negotiating frantically on how to carry them out while avoiding
violence. Meanwhile, troops are brought into Beijing and given orders
to use tear gas and force if necessary to suppress the demonstration.
The chief lobbyist for restraint is Yan Mingfu, 58, a top official in
the central Party apparatus and the son of a prominent aide to Zhou
Enlai. Fluent in Russian, Yan had translated for Deng during the
early 1960's, and their long friendship gives him extra maneuvering
room. No one dares countermand Deng's explicit instructions, but
Yan argues that the regime must somehow avoid getting blood on its
hands, that bloodshed would only further discredit it. He and other
officials seek to devise a way to implement Deng's instructions while
avoiding a confrontation.
Finally, late in the evening, a decision is made by Qiao Shi, the
head of the security forces and one of five men on the all-powerful
Politburo Standing Committee. The troops will be deployed, as Deng
had ordered, but they will follow a strategy of non-violence. Soldiers
are to block the roads, and use whatever persuasive techniques they
can to calm the students; but they are not to use their guns or clubs.
For a regime struggling to short-circuit a growing mass movement, this proves to be a miscalculation.
April27
Word quickly spreads on the campuses that troops are in the
area, armed with clubs and tear gas. When students emerge from the
main gate of Beijing University just before 9 A.M., chanting democratic slogans and waving banners condemning The People's Daily editorial, few expect to reach Tiananmen Square. Some have written
their wills, expecting to be clubbed to death in the streets.
And yet a miracle comes to pass: When the students reach the
first line of policemen and troops, the men do not use their clubs. The
delighted crowd easily pushes through the lines, and soon the streets
are full of hundreds of thousands of workers and students cheering for
democracy.
It is a turning point: April 27 will come to be regarded by many
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intellectuals as perhaps the most triumphant day of protest in China
this century.
But inside Zhongnanhai, the power struggles have grown more
intense. Upon his return from North Korea on May 1, Zhao huddles
with his closest aide, Bao Tong, to discuss the situation. Bao, 57, a
lean man who doubles as a Central Committee member and secretary
to the Politburo, points out that the published version of The People's
Daily editorial differs slightly from the one transmitted to Korea. This
lets Zhao disavow the increasingly hated editorial. In a roundabout
challenge to Deng, Zhao suggests to a number of officials that the
party retract the editorial.
May4

Zhao has begun to align himself more and more with the students. In part, this is a genuine reflection of his views, but it is also a
tactical move. Slipping within the Party, Zhao sees a chance to shore
up his position by turning himself into a populist. On this day, he
carries this line a step further in a conciliatory speech on national
television.
"The just demands of the students must be met," he declares,
adding that the problems should be solved in a democratic and legal
way. In contrast to The People's Daily editorial, Zhao discounts the
"threat" posed by the students. "They are by no means opposed to
our fundamental system," he says of the protesters. "Rather, they are
asking us to correct mistakes in our work."
The speech, drafted by Bao Tong, marks the beginning of the
open split between Zhao and Deng. To cement the image of Zhao as
the great conciliator, his aide Bao has the national television networks
broadcast the speech this evening and repeat it over the next three
days. And he has The People's Daily run the text on the front page
and include a roundup of positive responses from the public.
During the week, the demonstrations subside, but Chinese journalists begin to be more aggressive in demanding freedom of the press.
For Zhao, the demands represent a chance to position himself as the
man of the future.
On May 6, he summons two senior Party officials in charge of
propaganda, Hu Qili and Rui Xingwen. "There is no big risk in opening up a bit by reporting the demonstrations and increasing the openness of news," Zhao tells them, according to an account later
circulated by the Government. The same day, Hu Qili meets with the
publishers of China's eight largest newspapers and tells them they can
ease up their control. Journalists rush to oblige Zhao, describing what

176

CoNTEMPORARY

AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

is happening in the streets. The coverage lends new impetus to the
democracy movement.
MayS

The bosses of Beijing, Li Ximing and Chen Xitong, are outraged.
The more the Party opens up, the worse they look; in the streets they
are increasingly portrayed as villains. The two officials have tried to
force Zhao to call meetings so they can confront him with his divergence from the Party line as expressed in The People's Daily editorial.
Zhao resists; but finally, today, he calls a meeting.
It is a stormy and inconclusive session. The Beijing Party faction
bitterly criticizes the Party leader's May 4 speech, accusing Zhao of
betraying the Party.
"Who has betrayed you?" Zhao retorts, according to a Government report. "It was only during the Cultural Revolution that people
were betrayed . . . If I made incorrect remarks, I'll bear the
responsibility."
May 11

The paralysis in the leadership, and the public groundswell for
change, are combining to help Zhao. According to some sources,
Zhao is at his finest when the Politburo gathers in an expanded meeting in Zhongnanhai.
In addition to the regular Politburo members, other prominent
officials fill the chairs around the table. But Deng Xiaoping does not
attend, and gives Zhao an edge; in Deng's absence, it is he who holds
the position of authority.
It is a tense time; Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev is due to
arrive in a few days for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years, and
yet the student movement threatens further unrest. Zhao seeks a mandate for his conciliatory approach, urging that the leadership move
toward some of the principles of the democracy movement-particularly an end to corruption and a more open government. He submits a
letter welcoming an investigation of his two eldest sons, who are
known to be using their connections to make immense sums of money.
This is one of Zhao's key efforts to tum himself from Party boss to
populist, and at first it seems to work. In the absence of any organized
opposition, the meeting ends with a half-hearted endorsement of
Zhao's approach.
Openness is in the air, and Zhao rushes to make clear how much
has changed. Zhao's aide Bao Tong drafts an article praising human
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rights and calling for a system of balance of powers, and he rushes it to
The People's Daily. It appears as the lead story on May 12.
That afternoon, I drop by to see Yan Jiaqi, a prominent political
scientist who will later lead the exiled democracy movement, and find
him giddy with enthusiasm. "This is the first time that the press has
ever used 'human rights' in a favorable context," he says, happily
clutching the newspaper.
Around the same time I have lunch with one of Zhao's aides, one
of the brilliant young men trying to remold China, and he is more
hopeful than he has been in months. "There is hope that Zhao can
stay in control and consolidate his position," he says. "The worst
stage ofthe fire appears to be over, but there is still danger." The key,
he says, is that Zhao's conciliatory approach has to be proven effective: The students will have to respond by ending their occupation of
Tiananmen and returning to campus.
But this is not what happens. Instead, the protests escalate, and
the students thereby doom their protector.
May 13
The students begin a hunger strike on Tiananmen Square, and
sympathetic citizens surge onto the streets to show support, literally
taking over the center of the capital.
During Gorbachev's visit, there is chaos. The embarrassed Chinese Government finds itself constantly rearranging its plans to avoid
interruption by the students.
During this time, Yan Mingfu, the party's chief negotiator, pleads
with the students to go home, warning in a private meeting that, if
they press too far, they could well destroy those leaders who sympathize with them. The students listen politely but refuse to compromise; these are matters of principle, they say. Though Zhao's rivals
view the demonstrators as pawns of the Party leader, the students'
action at this point undermines their supposed sponsor.
In the struggle within the leadership, the turmoil creates new uncertainties. Zhao, no doubt realizing that hardliners will try to seize
on the growing chaos to force his retirement, takes the offensive. On
May 16, during his televised meeting with Gorbachev, Zhao Ziyang
lunges for power.
"Our whole Party cannot do without Comrade Deng Xiaoping's
helmsmanship on important issues," Zhao tells Gorbachev and the
watching Chinese people. "We formally adopted a decision at the first
plenary session of the 13th Party Congress that on important ques-
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tions we still need him as the helmsman. The decision has never been
released until today, but it is a very important decision."
To outsiders, this seems a defense of the senior leader. It is the
opposite. Many Chinese immediately understand that Zhao is blaming his long-time patron for the stalemate over the students. Zhao is
saying that he would like to meet the student demands, but that Deng,
"the helmsman," will not allow it.
May 17
As the streets overflow with protesters and the Government loses
control of the capital, the Politburo Standing Committee is summoned
to the home of a furious Deng Xiaoping.
It is there, according to many Chinese officials, at a stormy meeting in the home of his former patron, that Zhao pleads for a program
of conciliation with the students. It is the moment of confrontation,
but Deng and his prestige prevail. Zhao is a minority of one-with
Prime Minister Li Peng and the planning czar Yao Yilin strongly opposed, the security chief Qiao Shi emphasizing the need for order and
the propaganda boss Hu Qili, though sympathetic to Zhao, still unwilling to disagree openly with Deng. Although no formal decision is
taken, it is at this meeting that China is set firmly on the course toward June 4.
Having lost the vote, Zhao does not give up. His aides lobby furiously, sensing that Qiao Shi and Hu Qili can be persuaded to come
around. Meanwhile, to put further pressure on the Party, Zhao submits his resignation.
"My way of thinking is not in accord with your way of thinking,"
Zhao writes Deng. Zhao knows that the announcement of his resignation might well bring further protests, and gambles that the Politburo
will prefer to adopt his proposals than risk being blamed for ousting
him.
But Deng refuses to accept the resignation, and a day later Zhao
revokes the offer. Instead, Zhao goes on sick leave, announcing that
because of some unspecified ailment he will henceforth not participate
in Party business. Meanwhile, he tries to take his case to the people,
leaking word of the May 17 Politburo session (reportedly, through
Bao Tong). A new wave of public anger and indignation at the leadership follows-and with it, for the first time, a certain amount of sympathy for Zhao.
Around this time, a Mercedes Benz limousine with an A01 license plate and darkened windows pulls out of Zhongnanhai. The car
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slowly circles Tiananmen Square several times, so the passenger can
see for himself the enormous demonstrations.
In the car is Zhao Ziyang. All week, he has been telling aides and
other officials he wants to visit the demonstrators-which would advance his conciliatory posture one step further. But when he proposes
this idea to his colleagues, Li Peng vetoes it as too radical a move. So
Zhao drives around the square, observing events-if only from behind
the darkened windows.
Meanwhile, after the epochal May 17 meeting, Deng and his elderly colleagues, together with Li Peng and the conservative faction in
the Politburo, decide to call troops into the capital and declare martial
law. One aim, of course, is to re-establish order and win the streets
back from the demonstrators. But there is another reason, perhaps a
more important one: Deng and his colleagues, believing they have
been betrayed by Zhao, fear the Party leader might somehow mount a
coup d'etat. They intend the troops to guard key government installations and ministries from a possible attack.
Amid this atmosphere of fear and mutual suspicion, Party officials hold hurried negotiations, debating how exactly to summon the
troops. Zhao sends for Yan Mingfu. The Party leader asks him to
visit President Yang Shangkun where, pretending he is acting on his
own initiative, Yan is to urge the President not to call in the Army.
Yan, tom between conflicting loyalties, goes to see the President.
"Zhao Ziyang has asked me to come to you and urge that the Army
not be summoned to Beijing," he tells Yang, and adds, according to a
well-placed Party official, "I was supposed to say it was my own idea,
not his." President Yang is angry at Yan for being a lackey of Zhao,
and Zhao is furious at Yan's betrayal.
Word spreads that General Xu, Commander of the 38th Army,
has refused to move his troops into the capital. The consternation at
Zhongnanhai grows. "I moved troops against the people once"--on
April27-General Xu reportedly says, "I'm not going to do it again."
Rather than command his troops, General Xu reports to a local
hospital. His disobedience is doubly worrying because he is the son of
one of China's most senior military figures, Xu Haideng. If he cannot
be trusted, who can be?
May 19

In Tiananmen Square, the hunger strikers have been fasting for
nearly a week, and many of them have begun to drift in and out of
consciousness. Each time a student faints, an ambulance races
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through the crowd along a special lane that is kept open for the
purpose.
Within Zhongnanhai, the almost constant sirens exacerbate the
sense of crisis. Zhao repeatedly asks permission to go out and show
sympathy for the hunger strikers, but other Politburo members refuse
the request.
Finally, early this morning, Zhao announces he is going to the
square anyway. In an effort to show Party unity, an appalled Li Peng
trails behind as Zhao leads a small retinue into the square. "We have
come too late," Zhao tells the students, as tears well in his eyes.
Deeply disturbed by what he regards as the chaos growing
around him, Li Peng convenes the Politburo Standing Committee later
in the day to endorse the declaration of martial law. Li also arranges
for a televised mass meeting that evening in the Army-owned Jingxi
Hotel. Zhao, who apparently led his colleagues to believe he would
preside, at the last minute refuses to attend.
"At least sit at the rostrum to show unity," President Yang reportedly pleads. "You don't even have to say anything." But Zhao
insists he cannot go along with the crackdown, and that in any case he
is ill.
Instead, Qiao Shi presides and Li Peng gives the main speech.
Then President Yang makes an impromptu announcement ordering
troops into the capital. Though the plan had been not to impose martial law until the early hours of May 21, troops are already visible on
the streets. Martial law is formally imposed on May 20.
But when the bulk of the troops arrive at the outskirts of the
capital, citizens rush from their homes to block their way, some people
lay down in the street in front of the military trucks. Hundreds of
thousands of protesters, organized in groups representing factories and
offices and even the Foreign Ministry, parade through the center of the
city.
With the troops stymied, it seems for a few days that Zhao might
win after all. But how can he convert this apparent victory in the
streets to a political triumph within the Party?
Zhao quickly turns to the mechanism of the National People's
Congress to revoke martial law and perhaps even impeach Li Peng.
Almost a third of the 158 members of the Congress's Standing Committee agree to hold a special session (an entirely legal process, but one
that eventually lands an organizer, Cao Siyuan, in prison). Zhao then
surreptitiously sends a message to the head of the Congress, Wan Li,
who is visiting the United States, to rush home.
When Li Peng finds out about the message shortly thereafter, he
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hurriedly convenes a Politburo Standing Committee meeting, which
sends an equally urgent cable to Wan Li ordering him to remain in the
United States. Having received both cables, and with the situation in
Beijing appearing increasingly chaotic, Wan has no idea what to do.
May23
Finally, after meeting President Bush in Washington, Wan Li
cuts his trip short, announcing that because of illness he is returning to
China. Bao Tong tries to have someone meet his plane in Shanghai,
but the other faction is a step ahead. As soon as the plane touches
down, a limousine sent by Shanghai boss Jiang Zemin rolls onto the
tarmac, collects Wan and bundles him off to a guest house where the
situation is explained to him. After some discussion, Wan Li agrees to
back his old friend Deng Xiaoping and support martial law.
After this episode, Bao Tong notices he is being followed, and his
telephone tapped. A few days later, he is arrested. Meanwhile, the
bodyguards assigned to his boss, Zhao Ziyang, are changed, and the
nine new guards respond not to his commands but to the Politburo's.
Zhao's secretary is dismissed, and is spared arrest only because the
Politburo thinks well of his family.
Around this time, there are frequent reports that Deng Xiaoping
is traveling to Wuhan and other cities to meet with military leaders
and ask for their support. But Chinese officials with knowledge of
Deng's movements say this never happened. Deng and his colleagues
were already consolidating their hold over the Party and the military,
and as it became clear that Zhao had lost the battle, people streamed
to the winning side.
Provincial leaders are summoned to Beijing for indoctrination.
They are housed in special guest houses and forbidden to bring more
than one aide; all their movements are controlled to prevent contact
with the Zhao forces. Some complain that they are treated as virtual
prisoners.
The conservative faction-particularly Li Peng, Yao Yilin, Li
Ximing and Chen Xitong-now has the edge, and the latter two Beijing officials are expecting promotion. But on May 31, Deng meets
with Li Peng and Yao Yilin, and tells them the Party needs fresh
faces. Deng has already consulted with his octogenarian colleagues,
Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, and decided to choose Jiang Zemin to
replace Zhao.
"I hope everyone will regard Jiang Zemin as the core of the Party
and unite together," Deng tells Li Peng and Yao Yilin, according to
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the confidential text of his remarks. "Please don't look down on each
other and waste energy fighting among yourselves."

June 3
Thousands of troops have infiltrated into the capital, and people
are growing accustomed to them--even in the Tiananmen Square
area. The demonstration itself has lost much of its impetus, with
many students from outside the capital returning to their homes.
Fewer than 10,000-probably considerably fewer-are still living in
the square.
During the early hours of this Saturday morning, thousands of
soldiers are sent into Beijing from the east, probably to bolster the
show of force in the capital and gradually restore order. At this hour,
the streets are empty of civilians, and it seems likely the plan was for
the troops to enter the city quietly, without attracting attention.
But shortly before midnight, three miles west of Tiananmen, a
speeding police van had swerved out of control, killing three bicyclists.
An angry crowd quickly gathered, and many of the suspicious people
insisted the incident was intentional. Some also declared that since the
van was racing toward Tiananmen Square, the police must be preparing to evict the demonstrators.
The news has raced around Beijing, and, for the first time in a
week, people swarm out of their houses to occupy the streets. The
angry, defiant crowds soon encounter the exhausted soldiers, who are
just finishing their forced march into the city, confirming the public
impression that the authorities are scheming to attack the students.
The indignant citizens search all vehicles passing by on the roads, and
beat up some of the soldiers.
The troops are unarmed, probably to insure safety during the trip;
their gear and weapons are transported separately in buses taking another route. Under normal conditions, these buses would never have
been stopped, but after the accident, they are halted and searched, and
machine guns are found. The discovery further inflames the crowds,
and angry citizens confiscate the weapons.

June4
News that troops have been beaten, and guns stolen, alarms the
conservative officials now holding the reins of power. Though the capital has been growing steadily calmer during the last week, the leaders
decide they have to act decisively. And so Deng and his colleagues
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order the Army to take control of the city, using whatever force is
required.
What happens before dawn on this Sunday has been much written about, and much confused. Based on my observations in the
streets, neither the official account nor many of the foreign versions
are quite correct.
There is no massacre in Tiananmen Square, for example,
although there is plenty of killing elsewhere. Troops frequently fire at
crowds who are no threat to them, and at times aim directly at medical personnel and ambulances. Some of those who are shot have been
threatening the troops--for while the students have generally urged
nonviolence, many young workers carry firebombs or pipes, and they
manage to kill more than a dozen soldiers or policemen. But many
other civilians are casually slaughtered for no apparent reason.
An acquaintance of mine, the only son of a Party member who
has always believed in the Government, is riding his bicycle to work in
northeast Beijing that morning when a detachment of soldiers sees
him. They shoot him in the back, killing him. He becomes simply
another statistic in the tragedy of 20th-century China.
Armed force enabled Deng and his colleagues to regain control
over the capital, and during the months since, the leadership has
slowly been consolidating its authority and purging those who are
judged to have failed the test. Zhao Ziyang was stripped of all his
offices and has vanished into a walled villa at No. 6 Fuqiang Alley,
where he is said to spend much of his time reading. Bao Tong remains
in prison.
Yet the killings of early June did not resolve the power struggles,
they intensified them. There still is no consensus in the leadership
about how China should be managed politically or economically. The
leaders continue to fight among themselves about what economic policies to endorse, and whom to promote or purge.
On the surface, a degree of normalcy is returning to China, and
martial law has been relaxed in Beijing. But there remain deep and
unresolved tensions that have only been exacerbated by the bloodshed.
Many Chinese compare the present period to the jockeying for power
at the end of the Maoist era in 1976, and they note that the Maoist
political hierarchy and economic system collapsed only two years after
Mao died. When Deng and his octogenarian colleagues follow Mao,
the same thing may well happen.
At that time, when change finally comes, it is likely to be all the
more rapid, all the more sweeping, for having been repressed in 1989.
Many of my Communist friends used to believe in the system. Now
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they are no longer Communists but simply Party members who believe
neither in the Party nor in Communism.
Zhao could well re-emerge-now 70, he is still four years younger
than Deng was on his triumphal return to power in 1978-but the
change will not depend on him; for throughout the Party and nation
there is a deep longing for change, a deep sadness about what has happened. Today, many Chinese remember the words of the great writer
Lu Xun early in this century: "Lies written in ink cannot obscure a
truth written in blood."

10. THE FALL OF ZHAO ZIYANG*
John Fincher

Through television millions of people around the world watched
the Chinese army's bloody suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators in and around Beijing's Tiananmen Square on the night of June 34, 1989. For its victims and witnesses, the liberating experience of
people power was no less a surprise than the carnage that followed.
Days of hopeful fraternization between the people and the "people's
army" led only to a night of slaughter. If the event may be put into an
American rather than an East Asian context, it was as if the Woodstock rock festival had been followed directly by the mass suicide at
Jonestown, and both were telecast back-to-back.
The intimacy of the final encounters between unarmed students
and tanks manned by young soldiers was unnerving. The memory of
those hot spring nights in Beijing will have lasting consequences. Efforts to argue that the slaughter was a creation of the foreign media
will not wash out the stain. The Big Lie minimizing civilian casualties
that was ordered up for television stations exposed all too clearly the
survival of a propaganda style befitting the Cultural Revolution's Lin
Biao and the "Gang of Four." Within weeks the body counts offered
by army spokesmen were invalidated even by Communist party officials. Accusations against the foreign media had to contend with millions of mainlanders who live within reach of Hong Kong and Taiwan
television. These viewers have spread Western accounts through anational population that has grown accustomed to seeing Western newscasts excerpted on its own stations.
This year's demonstrations marked the 70th anniversary of the
May 4, 1919, pro-democracy student protests to which the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China (PRC) traces its legitimacy. It is easy to imagine future commemorations of the June 3-4,
1989, incident; so many people were involved that the symbolism of
that date is likely to be long-lived. From April to June the movement
filled the stage of Chinese politics with autonomous or, as the Chinese
term them, "self-governing" organizations of students, factory workers, and professionals. Even the journalists charged with telling the
• Reprinted by permission of Foreign Policy, dated November 2, 1989, from Foreign
Policy, no. 76 (Fall, 1989), pp. 3-25.
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government's story played a prominent role as organized petitioners
and demonstrators.
Party-appointed officials who try to speak as authorities in
China's sophisticated and increasingly well-informed society have
been compromised irreparably by the crackdown. The regime that ordered its troops to fire on its own civilians and then sent its police to
harass them in a widening witch-hunt for demonstrators and supporters will not be able to suppress information about its actions. Arrests
have been numerous and executions have continued, but a surprising
number of those on the "most wanted" lists of leading agitators and
"hooligans" have escaped through the tightly woven police nets. Sympathetic concern for fugitives has combined with indifference or corruption to afford ways out of China for determined individuals.
The very length of the lists of those sought by the Chinese police
may help to build opposition, provided enough of those named actually survive. Many leaders of Beijing's democracy movement have
turned up in Hong Kong and overseas. Their potential influence as
refugees is amplified by the support of a worldwide community of Chinese-speaking people that sustains the flow of news and information
into China.
Since 1977 Chinese policy has been guided by Deng Xiaoping's
admonition to "seek truth from facts." In 1989 tens of thousands of
mainland students overseas disseminated the outside world's picture of
events in Tiananmen Square to contacts throughout China. Through
direct-dial telephone lines it became possible to subvert the Big Lie on
central television with "truth from FAX." The most powerful truths
were lamentations over events in Tiananmen Square that were printed
in the Communist Party's own Hong Kong newspapers, faxed into
China, and photocopied there for posting on walls and telephone poles
throughout mainland cities.
The spread of rapid access to information has produced local reservoirs of political awareness in the population. People now understand better their own aptitude for creating self-governing
organizations when necessity and opportunity coincide, as they did in
1989. Each of half a dozen waves of democratic activism in China
since 1976 has directly inspired leaders of the next wave, despite a lack
of continuity in leadership. The 1989 movement reached tidal wave
proportions because of that reinforcing tendency.
Democratic impulses inside China have long been stimulated by
news from Eastern Europe as well as from the West and Japan. What
might be termed the "Polish syndrome" has haunted conservative
party leaders and tantalized other Chinese ever since Solidarity ap-
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peared on the world scene. But China's own version of "Solidarity"
may already have arrived in the networks of political action groups
that appeared during the Beijing spring. Warnings against the Polish
syndrome from the party Propaganda Department may have served as
self-fulfilling prophecies.
Chinese sensitivity to changes in the world-wide Communist
movement made Hungary another source of anxiety for hardliners.
But others saw Hungary as a model. In late 1987, when Zhao Ziyang
left his post as Premier of the State Council to become the new Party
General Secretary, Party policy reflected his determination to outdo
the Hungarians in bold economic reforms and to "break through the
pass" with complete price reforms. Interest in outdoing Hungarian
economic reformers tended to license interest in following Hungarian
political reformers, who want a multiparty system as well as self-governing mass and professional organizations.
Reform of the Chinese media also became a locus for developments resembling those in Poland or Hungary. The spell of glasnost,
or openness, soon began to enchant Chinese citizens. But even before
the dramatic reforms in the Soviet Union, proliferation of free-enterprise publishing establishments around China was fueling reform.
Moreover, media reform was accompanied by steps toward electoral
reform. Under then General Secretary Hu Yaobang, China in 1980
introduced contested local elections, the first since the early days of
the PRC.
By the time of Hu's death on April 15, 1989, the National People's Congress (NPC) was inching its way toward dealing with issues
of press freedom and tolerance of nonparty organizations. Meanwhile,
more and more radical reformers still to be found in the Party signed
human rights petitions for the release of Wei Jingsheng, who was imprisoned for circulating "state secrets" as a leader of the late 1978 and
1979 Democracy Wall activists. Reformers also urged freedom in the
media to equal that reappearing in the visual and performing arts and
in literary and scholarly writing.
THE DEMOCRACY DEMONSTRATORS
The death of Hu provided a catalyst for the expression of student
demands for improved living conditions and political reform. The official response to their marches on Tiananmen Square was hardline criticism in the party's newspaper, the People's Daily, of April 26. But the
applause and solicitude of the people of Beijing during the students'
April 27 demonstration strengthened their determination to rebuff
hardline response to their protests. A new urgency shaped plans an-
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nounced long before to commemorate the May 4, 1919, student demonstrations. Activists decided to exploit the occasion to call for
democratization of present-day China.
During May, students' requests for dialogue and their ambitions
to govern their own organizations became a more direct challenge to
the authorities responsible for the tough April 26 response. Calls for
the now 85-year-old Deng's long-promised retirement and Premier Li
Peng's resignation came to look more and more like interference in
China's leadership succession question. The army's intervention of
June 3-4 insured that meetings of the NPC's Standing Committee in
late June would rubber-stamp the martial law decrees of the Li Peng
regime. Consideration of a new liberalizing press law and attention to
the succession crisis were now out of the question.
Americans have rightly taken heart at the prominence in China's
demonstrations of a "Goddess of Democracy" that resembled the
Statue of Liberty. Many demonstrators also raised two fingers in a
Churchillian "V for Victory" gesture, thanks largely to its association
with Philippine "people power."
Yet despite fears expressed in May by hardline party elders, the
events of 1989 do not represent a revived effort to roll back communism. The confrontation between Chinese democrats and their oppressors is not quite as simple as might be suggested by Reaganite and
Thatcherite accounts of the victory of capitalism over communism in
East Asia or Eastern Europe. It should be remembered that during
the hours the young Chinese protestors standing near their statue of
liberty were facing death, they were also singing the Internationale.
Appeals to Marxist, if not Leninist, traditions of critical self-scrutiny
have been an important part of glasnost. In China as elsewhere the
Communist Party has long confined the tradition of self-criticism to
semi-private confessions of a quasi-religious character. But as the task
of criticizing the Party from within has grown more open, it has
brought public notoriety to righteous individuals who are seen as virtually courting expulsion from the Party. What China's elderly
hardliners call the threat of rollback is actually closer to a developing
tradition of "peelback."
With their signs and T -shirts of welcome, China's democratic activists displayed their enthusiasm for glasnost as Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev's May 15-18 visit approached. Gorbachev's response to the student welcome was measured, but he increased his
popularity with students simply by showing up. Whatever he may
have intended, Gorbachev found himself cast in an important role in
the long drama of leadership succession in China. A similar situation
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had greeted Taiwan's minister of finance, Shirley Kuo, who made an
unprecedented trip to Beijing for the May 4 meeting of the Asian Development Bank as leader of a 12-member delegation of officials. Together the Soviet and Taiwanese visits gave then Party General
Secretary Zhao an opportunity to portray himself as China's counterpart to Gorbachev in domestic reforms and as the mainland's counterpart to Taiwan's Nationalist party leader and president, Lee Teng-hui,
in a possible "Chinese common market" program pointed toward
their countries' eventual reunification.
In both domestic and foreign matters Zhao's response to
Gorbachev's presence made him look more and more like the natural
successor to Deng as China's paramount leader. Moreover,
Gorbachev refused to distance himself from Zhao while having only
begun his still very correct relationship with Deng and, for that matter, with Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun.
Most Western and some Chinese observers have incorrectly seen
Zhao and his kind of reformism in China as in a state of steady decline
during 1987 and 1988. Thus his visit with the student hunger strikers
in Tiananmen Square just before Li Peng's announcement of martial
law the night of May 19 was viewed as the dramatic end to the slow
frustration of his reform efforts. Such interpreters are then forced to
consider a surprise the appointment of the relatively reformist Mayor
of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin, as Zhao's successor as General Secretary.
The more plausible and simpler explanation is that Zhao's campaign
to succeed Deng when he retires--ifhe retires-and Zhao's campaign
for reform had been proceeding generally successfully up to the eve of
the visits by Kuo and Gorbachev, which Zhao meant to use to further
both causes. The near success of Zhao's own leadership campaign
over the past two years is now confirmed by the appointment not only
of the Mayor of Shanghai as his replacement but also of the Mayor of
Tianjin, Li Ruihuan, to the Standing Committee of the Politburo.
Although brought about by Zhao's dismissal, the appointment of
mayors from two of China's larger, internationally important cities to
the Standing Committee of the Politburo is an acknowledgement of
Zhao's appreciation that China's present challenges and future prospects lie mostly with urban centers. Zhao is the most prominent of
China's recent leaders to have rejected the mythic power of "peasant
China" as the vanguard of the revolution to which veterans of the
1934-35 Long March or their proteges on the Politburo cling even
now. It is an inventiveness that makes Zhao appear, like Gorbachev,
all the more a practitioner of a new kind of Communist Party politics.
Theirs is a presidential style that depends upon a wide repertoire of
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new initiatives in domestic affairs. Both leaders have frequently surprised followers and rivals alike by publicly turning onto new avenues
when temporarily slowed by some obstacle. And unlike the politics of
their Leninist predecessors-including those in the Maoist modetheirs is a politics that exploits international conditions that are
favorable to nonmilitary initiatives. Both Zhao and Oorbachev might
thus be considered their countries' first genuine postwar leaders.
Their approaches reflect the goal of rendering changes in domestic and
international conditions that depend upon making a sustained transition from preparations for war to preparations for peace.
Both men have struggled with agricultural stagnation in their
countries, underproduction due in China's case largely to failures of
Mao's militaristic utopian commune system, and in the Soviet case
partly to the failures of another somewhat utopian venture, the virgin
land projects imposed by Nikita Khrushchev. In the late 1970s and
early 1980s Zhao helped Deng reform agriculture and enrich the life of
China's rural population, primarily by supporting family farms instead
of the commune system. With rural reform well in hand, since about
1984 he has concentrated on the transformation of urban China, encouraging private or collectively funded rather than state owned and
subsidized enterprises. Zhao stood at the forefront of Chinese who
realize that a decade of 10 percent annual economic growth and other
structural changes have brought China to where it may soon become
another of East Asia's predominantly urban economies and societies.
Zhao's identification with the rapid approach of China's transition from a rural to an urban society has alarmed many party
hardliners. Most of China's old leaders have been slow to realize or
unwilling to believe that by 1987 the contribution to the gross national
product of China's "rural areas" had become half nonagricultural, and
that the population of China's "urban areas" could be estimated as
more than 40 per cent of the total population. In addition, they were
alarmed that collective or private and household enterprises account
for more than 40 per cent of the industrial product that previously was
overwhelmingly accounted for by state enterprises.
Regrettably, the acceptance of Zhao's agenda came only in the
wake of military moves designed both to eliminate him from contention for the succession to Deng and to put down student demonstrators. It was also accompanied by the enforcement of martial law in a
way that could be designed to reverse the urban tendency of Chinese
society, as has happened before in Chinese history.
Although leadership of the Communist Party now has an urban
bias, Deng is the same man who suggested during the recent crisis that
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it does not matter if the students do not support the party since it can
depend on the backing of the army and the peasantry. Something of
what Deng meant can be seen from revealing footage from a still unfinished documentary on the Chinese army filmed by an Australian
crew in 1988. Some obliging army propagandists arranged a display of
antiriot training classes. While the cameras rolled, several soldiers
raced up the steps of an apartment building to capture a mock terrorist. Meanwhile, their commander attacked the culprit with abusive
shouts: "you intellectual" or "you educated element." Army personnel on the spot did not think it necessary to conceal the assumption
that students, not "hooligans," were the likely target of army action.
That episode, like the Tiananmen incident, shows again how links
and alliances between the Party Propaganda Department and army
trainers have always been close. The same can be seen from the alignments of influential Party figures involved with propaganda such as
Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun who have resisted de-Maoization or who
have consistently sought to curb political reforms.
DENG'S BALANCING ACf
Militarism is an important factor in the history of militancy in the
Chinese Communist Party. But its role has often been obscured by
foreign analyses that have exaggerated the significance of regional tensions in the army. As the Tiananmen incident shows, predictions of
geographic divisions between army units-like those asserting that the
27th Army brought from northwest China to control the capital was
the target of some unnamed unit or units-almost always prove misleading. Once again, a predicted revival of warlordism did not take
place.
The major question in this area of Chinese politics is not regionalism in the military but the overall relationship between civilian and
military rule. A critical element of China's present situation is the
tripartite division of power among the army, Party, and state. Deng's
political reforms have focused on separating and balancing Party and
state entities in a way that is essential to economic advances. They are
meant to reduce the day-to-day role of the Party in the operation of
the state and to make it easier to get the state bureaucracy out of the
economy. But the separation between Party and state has been stabilized only by balancing the two with the army. And this primitive
division of powers has been maintained by Deng's continued interventions in the Party-state balance as chairman of two nearly identical
military affairs commissions, one of the Party and one of the state.
Even if he is serious about retiring, it is difficult to see how Deng
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can get out of his position in the army without kicking over this threelegged stool. If China is not on the way to establishing the supremacy
of a civilian president as a genuine commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces, the rare but decisive interventions of Deng, the
chairman of China's Military Affairs Commission, in the Party-state
balance are hard to describe as anything but disguised military coups.
The Party-state constitutional problem is not peculiar to China,
as can be seen from Gorbachev's assumption of the posts both of party
General Secretary and of President. Deng has differed from his predecessor and other leaders of communist countries by his skill in keeping
his hand in military interventions largely unseen-that is, until the
events of the Beijing spring. These events showed the degree to which
Deng's power ultimately flows from the barrel of a gun, in particular
from those guns of army units personally loyal to Yang.
From the PRC's founding in 1949 until he was driven from
power by Mao in the Cultural Revolution, Deng had been mainly a
Party figure despite his unrivaled pre-1949 connections with military
leaders. After his return to power in 1973 at Mao's behest, he became
primarily a military figure operating in the Party and state at a slight
distance from what Chinese leaders have long called, with their fondness for military metaphors, the "front line" of politics. After Mao's
death in 1976 Deng not only profited personally from the arrest of
Mao's wife and other members of the Gang of Four, but he also engineered the abolition of the office of Party Chairman that Mao had
made the highly autocratic center of power in China. Through negotiations with Party colleagues whom he had recalled from their Cultural
Revolution banishment, Deng initiated the appointment of Hu
Yaobang to his own pre-Cultural Revolution job, General Secretary.
Without an all-powerful chairman, the Party could more easily be balanced by the state through the work of his other protege, Zhao, as
State Council Premier.
With Hu in charge of the Party and Zhao in charge of the State
Council, however, Deng also began a program of the gradual retirement of his aging Long March comrades. Deng himself in November
1987 retired from membership in the Party Politburo and its Standing
Committee, which he had chaired. He left himself only one major
formal title: concurrent Chairman of the Party and State Military Affairs Commissions.
From September 1987 to April1989 preparations for Deng's own
retirement became the central succession problem. Gorbachev's expected visit to Beijing assumed a role in these preparations: It promised to end military efforts in either country to invoke the threat of
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Sino-Soviet military conflict as a serious policy consideration. Once
the possibility of war with either power was formally declared unlikely, what substance would be left in the job of Chairman of the
Party and State Military Affairs Commissions for a man of Deng's
historic stature? If Deng were to retire after Gorbachev's visit, the job
would seem destined to go to Zhao, who since May 1988 had been
Deng's first deputy of the military affairs commission. Yang, Deng's
executive deputy in the commission, would presumably retire since
both men were already in their mid-eighties. But would Yang abide a
direct threat to his military power from Zhao?
This threat had its roots in the military's objections to the policies
of Hu Yaobang, Zhao's predecessor as General Secretary. Hu's removal in 1987 followed student demonstrations connected with his energetic pursuit of political reform and democratization. Hu's
policies-like Zhao's later-had the effect of promoting civilian authority. They rankled many of the older, conservative army leaders,
including Yang. Deng was reliably reported to have let Yang take the
credit-or blame-for Hu's dismissal.
Some of Yang's continuing restiveness was betrayed in 1987 during preparations for a trip to America to discuss military matters.
Yang stubbornly insisted that the Chinese Foreign Ministry arrange
for his American hosts to accord him treatment normally reserved for
a head of state even though he was traveling only as a military deputy
chairman. The demand revealed that Yang had been tipped for the
presidency, then still held by Li Xiannian. But it may also have revealed his exalted view of his own status as future president, and perhaps his view of himself as not a lesser man than Deng. After all,
Deng received head-of-state treatment from President Jimmy Carter
during a U.S. visit in 1979 while formally only Vice Chairman of the
Party.
Although Li Peng had become heir to Zhao's job as premier of
the State Council when Zhao took over the Party, the formal confirmation of the promotions of both Yang and Li depended on Zhao's
confirmation as Deng's "first deputy" for the military. While a premier-in-waiting, Li was ready to oblige Yang by insisting that "his"
foreign minister get the Americans to give Yang what he wanted. Li's
behavior is understandable, as he was probably still smarting from
Zhao's agreeing to his promotion from a vice minister's to a minister's
position only after a leading Party elder, Chun Yun, argued that he
was a likely candidate for on-the-job training as minister.
By the time of his confirmation as General Secretary on November 2, 1987, Zhao had already launched policies that induced the Con-
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gress to refuse to reelect to the new 13th Party Central Committee
some of the Politburo and Propaganda Department's strongest critics
of Zhao's predecessor, Hu. Those critics had campaigned against the
"bourgeois liberalization" that accompanied reforms pursued by Hu
and Zhao. The 13th Central Committee thus came to be known as
"Zhao's Committee."
By early 1989, after his election as first deputy of the state Military Affairs Commission the previous year, Zhao had kept on track his
effort to succeed Deng as army leader. But as heir apparent, Zhao
faced complicated problems in dealing with Yang, Li Peng, and ultimately Deng.
Considering the history of Deng's disguised military interventions
in the Party-state balance he had helped create, the events of late April
1989 can only be described as an attempted military coup by Yang, Li
Peng, and other leaders embraced by Deng. The enforcement of martiallaw on June 3-4 might then be described as a successful military
coup.
Zhao's approach to the succession problem had been different
from that of Hu, who lost his job in January 1987. Whereas Hu was
known for privately urging Deng to set an example for others by retiring before it was too late, Zhao chose simply to campaign for Deng's
job by assuming his patron's retirement was a foregone conclusion.
This approach was rebuffed sharply on April 25, when the first
coup attempt against Zhao took place during his visit to North Korea
April 24-29. It came in the form of a reaction to the student demonstrations that followed Hu Yaobang's death on April 15. According
to accounts of a sometime associate of Deng, and a senior editor in
Beijing, on April 25 Deng used army and police reports brought to
him by Yang and Li as the basis for developing the infamous People's
Daily editorial of April 26 that attacked student protestors. In order
to return safely from Pyongyang and to seek out Deng and key colleagues, Zhao had to telegraph some kind of confirmation that he did
not oppose the line taken by the three men. The People's Daily was
forced to represent the editorial as its own. The editorial provoked an
utterly unexpected turnout in Beijing on April 27 of tens of thousands
of students and hundreds of thousands of the general population. It
became the largest demonstration ever seen to that date in Chinalarger even than those organized with army assistance during the Cultural Revolution.
Many of those who cheered or marched with the student demonstrations on April 27 and afterward were destined to be portrayed in
official accounts as "hooligans," "thugs," and "criminals." The agents
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of their expulsion from the body politic would be soldiers summoned
to surround and enter Beijing under provisions of Li Peng's martial
law edict, which was promulgated with the full backing of Yang and
"Chairman Deng," as the propagandists began to style him, using his
military title to echo the style of address used for Chairman Mao.
Between April 27 and June 4, China saw the kind of reformism
behind which Zhao, his Party supporters, and a huge part of the population were prepared to take a stand. Upon his return from North
Korea on April 30, Zhao moved quickly to qualify the hardline attack
on students by accepting the legitimacy of their demands for continued political reform and democratization and by praising the disciplined behavior of demonstrating students and workers on April 27.
He was personally responsible for the moderation of official criticism
of the students and their supporters. He also sponsored efforts at government dialogue with hunger strikers on the important issue of freedom for self-governing student unions, relying on the same Party
official (now dismissed) who had been handling reform of relations
between the Communist and the democratic parties in the NPC.
By making public his intention to accept the students' challenges,
Zhao highlighted Li Peng's unwillingness to open a dialogue with
them. He also used the world media's anticipation of Gorbachev's
visit to introduce a de facto policy of glasnost. Full coverage of the
activities of the students, the police, and the army were guaranteed by
the presence in Beijing of hundreds of foreign print, radio, and television journalists. Just as important, however, was the liberation of Chinese journalists. The moderation of official media attitudes toward
either the students or their reform issues depended on Zhao's progress
in countering the coup attempt that produced the original April 26
editorial of the People's Daily.
ZHAO'S MOVES

Zhao and his aides shrewdly used his speech at the Asian Development Bank meeting on May 4 to promote his agenda for economic
change in the Politburo. The speech provoked excited discussion of a
more general common market relationship between Hong Kong, Macau, the mainland, Singapore, Taiwan, and possibly even South Korea.
Then, with equal aplomb, Zhao used his May 16 meeting with
Gorbachev to appeal publicly to Deng to step down from his formal
and informal positions and thereby open the way to a constitutional
solution of China's succession problem. He did this by casually revealing that Deng's "retirement" in 1987 from his Politburo position
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was qualified by retention of his right to review the decisions of the
Politburo Standing Committee.
This revelation of an innermost Party secret was followed by
leaks to the foreign press from other sources indicating that Deng had
hosted Standing Committee meetings in his own home. By this time
Chinese journalists, along with Zhao's aides, were the major source of
reliable detailed information for the world media and the student demonstrators. Chinese journalists had long resented the use of their best
investigative reporting not in publication, but as intelligence for Party
leaders. Then they saw their professional gains from promised reforms jeopardized first by the April 26 editorial dictated to the People's
Daily and next by the crackdown on the editor of a nonparty paper in
Shanghai, the World Economic Herald. Though small in circulation,
this paper had become the conscience of professionals in the print media, a kind of Chinese equivalent of LF. Stone's Weekly. Chinese journalists showed themselves fully capable of introducing glasnost and
using government leaks as some of them had seen done in
Washington.
Zhao's initiatives in price and enterprise reforms and, above all,
in coastal development were part of his campaign to win broad support in the general population as well as in the army, Party, and state
bureaucracy. He sought the approval of those whose lives had been
bettered by the agricultural reforms and the open-door policies. And
he promised to deal with problems of corruption, inequality, and inflation with more rather than fewer similar reforms.
His free-wheeling approach to economic reforms made him an
easy target of those in Chinese politics who use corruption as a
codeword for capitalist tendencies. Many organizers of the demonstrations were hurt by inflation and other problems that were easy to
blame on the reforms. They initially made Zhao and other officials a
target of attacks on corruption.
Zhao's response was direct. He consistently argued that most
corruption could be eliminated by completing reforms designed to prevent certain officials from buying some commodities at low, state-subsidized prices and then selling them for profit at higher, free-market
prices. As for actual corruption, namely nepotism among officials, he
proposed stem measures that would have restricted the ability even of
his own sons to profit from business activities, as both had been
charged with doing. At the same time he profited from Li Peng's vulnerability as someone who had achieved high power largely on the
strength of connections he inherited as the foster child of the late Premier Zhou Enlai.
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The popular open door policy associated with Zhao originated
after Mao's death in the relaxation of strict controls on all manner of
overseas connections. With the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979, the policy came to include an
emphasis on special zones for foreign trade and investment, the first on
the coast just opposite Taiwan and Hong Kong. By the mid-1980s, a
succession of cities farther up the coast and some major inland river
ports also received greater autonomy in pursuing foreign contacts and
exchanges.
During Zhao's tenure as General Secretary, the list of municipalities freed from supervision by financial governors was expanded to 12.
Many mayors of open door cities struck out on their own to develop
trade and investment ties with foreign firms and overseas Chinese.
Zhao encouraged this trend by using his new position to widen the
scope of the policy by calling for the overall development of coastal
China. As a result, in 1988 nearly 300 cities and counties-home to
more than 150 million resident Chinese and homeland to perhaps 50
million more overseas-were opened to the possibility of direct integration into the Pacific and global economies. The policy gave that
large region of China best endowed for rapid development a relatively
free hand to move without undue fear of central interference. It also
blurred increasingly artificial administrative distinctions between urban and rural areas throughout that region of the country.
The most important-and most explosive-societal implication
of Zhao's reforms was the pressure they created to open China's cities
to greater freedom of movement for the country's vast populace. The
increasing market orientation of economic policies translated into
greater emphasis on the free large-scale circulation of labor as well as
of commodities, technology, economic information, and capital. The
acceptance of freer internal circulation-often without the specific endorsement of the state-helped fill the streets of Beijing and other cities with recent migrants, temporary residents, and casual visitors
during the spring of 1989. They, in addition to the city's permanent
residents, were active in the huge show of support for student demonstrators-most of whom also were not native to the city. They have
been victims of Li Peng's campaign to enforce martial law through a
roundup of so-called hooligans and lawless elements.
CLOSING THE OPEN DOOR
As the government has emphasized in the search for democracy
movement fugitives, all Chinese have long been required to register as
permanent residents either in "rural" or "urban" households and
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work units in specific localities. Particularly under the commune system of 1957-77, all citizens have been subject to a police-administered
internal passport system whose provisions are particularly strict in
controlling movements from rural to urban areas. It does not take
martial law to arrest anyone who has lingered more than a few days
away from home without explicit local authorization that proves the
bearer is not an "illegal alien" or "hooligan."
The effect of Li's policies as premier has been to maintain direct
state control over population movements. The effect of Zhao's policies
as Party General Secretary has been to encourage local authorities'
tolerance of people's freer circulation. Tolerant policies have prevailed as growing food supplies have undermined controls on movements based on the grain-rationing system. An important related
restriction has been the failure to expand city housing much beyond
that needed for permanent residents. However, in China's increasingly entrepreneurial society this fact has not prevented the development of a booming rental market in spare bedspace and rooms. The
ultimate physical constraint on the population's free movement has
become the inability of the transportation system to cope with increasing flows of people and commodities into, around, and out of cities.
The future of mass circulation of China's 1.1 billion people now
resides very much in the hands of the army and police. The nature of
their daunting task was seen in the discovery by the state statistical
services during the 1982 census of just how far behind reality enumerations of China's urban population had fallen thanks to the rigidities
of the household registration and internal passport system. The 1982
figure for the urban population of around 20 per cent has been replaced with a 1987 figure of more than 40 per cent.
Indeed, trends identified in mid-1987 suggested that, depending
on what the data indicated as a reasonable definition of "urban" and
"rural," China might have passed the rural-to-urban point as early as
July 1, 1989. Despite the demographic uncertainties it was clear by
1989 that Chinese society was approaching an important turning point
of which Chinese policymakers, though troubled by its social and
political consequences, were well aware.
Anyone who is familiar with the farmers' markets in the centers
of mainland towns and cities or with the edges of its larger cities
knows well the changes in Chinese life that have accelerated since
1978, and particularly since 1987. The growing intermingling of rural
and urban folk is also apparent to anyone who travels the roads and
railroads of China. Chinese travelers are burdened with bags or bundles of items they are buying or selling. The explosion of service enter-
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prises catering to the needs and desires of the urban population is
accompanied by the appearance everywhere of workshops and manufactories. Extra space is turned to such moneymaking activities, and
wherever geography and local custom allow, huge blocks of land are
being used for such developments whether or not the law pronounces
them entirely legitimate.
Chinese journalists reported-before the statisticians and scholars
did-that China has been producing more and more "peasants who
are not peasants." Even the dependably settled urban and rural populations have been changing their ways. They are not the anxiously
docile souls some were when they drilled with wooden rifles and dug
air raid shelters during the Cultural Revolution. There is no doubt
that Zhao's policies and politics have made him the champion of both
the most rapidly growing component of China's society-the "circulating" population drawn from home by opportunities to make
money-and most of the urban population.
Such changes reflect what the Chinese population itself wants and
what the crushing of the student protest in Tiananmen Square most
directly threatens. It is the size of this urban population that offers the
best insurance against China's reversion to values and policies that are
threatening to its neighbors as well as to itself. That these values persist speaks to the powerful identification many of China's elderly leaders feel for the mythical entity known as "rural China" since ancient,
or "traditional," times.
Deng, for one, reportedly suggested in his admonitory talks to
leaders during the recent crisis that it does not matter if the students
and their supporters desert the Party since it can depend on the army
and the peasantry. Although army troops can be trained to treat students as hooligans, increasingly less of China is dependable in the
sense implied by Deng and others who still invoke the peasantry in all
their explanations or exhortations. When speaking of "peasants" as a
group who provide recruits and supporters of an army that can control
the cities, Deng may be speaking of something that existed in the past
mainly as a deterrent force. Forty per cent already may be a high
estimate of the proportion of the Chinese population that Deng would
call the "reliable" peasantry. And 40 per cent is probably already a
low estimate of the proportion of the Chinese population that Deng by
now would have to call "unreliable." Thus it seems that China has
evolved into a tripartite society run by a tripartite Party-state-army
political system, a fact that foreign policy makers and observers will
have to bear in mind.
Assessing the domestic costs of urban China's trauma is a com-
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plex matter, but it is hard to imagine how the current regime could
have paid a higher price abroad than that ensured by international
media coverage of the democracy movement, the final crackdown, and
the beginning of the police terror that followed. The regime damaged
itself almost as much as it hurt those it declared to be its enemies. The
current situation is reminiscent of the way Chinese army units in effect
defeated themselves while defeating Vietnamese units in 1979. Even
though Deng himself ordered the 1979 military campaign against Vietnam and decorated its "heroes," he subsequently used the "state secret" of the army's deficiencies to strengthen his own control of the
army and its budget. This control helped him buy time for the highly
successful economic reforms over the following decade and earned
him the reputation as both an adventurous reformer and a political
moderate.
Those who nourish hopes that Deng might again prove to be a
moderating influence, however, must reckon with two major differences between the domestic political impact of the attack on Vietnam
a decade ago and the Tiananmen incident. This time the Chinese casualties were entirely self-inflicted. And this time they could not be
kept secret, particularly since they happened during a glasnost campaign led by a Party chief. Moreover, Deng no longer has much time,
even if he might again have the inclination, to switch back from the
role of ruthless patriarch to that of moderate modernizer.
It will probably be at least three years after the coup against Zhao
before clear indications of the leadership situation emerge. The time
frame could be altered by either the early death or long survival of
Deng and a few of his conservative contemporaries. It will also be
necessary to wait and see just how much the new leadership combination is inclined to carry out reforms for fixed terms of office and regular Party and state congresses.
There is much interest but not much point in speculating about
the role and attitudes of Deng alone at this time in his life and in
China's history. Deng must now be seen as but one player in a fourhanded leadership game with Li Peng in charge of the state, Yang
representing the army, and Jiang Zemin with the difficult job of following Zhao's spectacular act as Party chief and would-be Gorbachev.
Although Deng would hate the comparison, perhaps the West should
approach China more consciously, albeit inconspicuously, as if it had a
monarch without an heir and a government formed by a three-party
coalition.
The open door policy continues, regrettably, only in the narrowest technical sense. A genuine resumption of the policies interrupted
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so brutally on June 3-4 will require that China end the closed-cities
policy that martial law in Beijing represents. The nationwide crackdown had the effect of beginning to close cities to the full implementation of Zhao's coastal development policies. It is possible that China's
new leaders will feel free to endorse some aspects of Zhao's coastal
development policies without hurting their own careers now that the
author of the reforms has been driven from power. But the more
likely immediate results will be a tightening of government control
over the extension of credit, the introduction of taxation on prosperous private enterprises, and other policies of Li Peng that are designed
to temper reform and "excessive" growth.
The reopening of China's cities also depends on the beckoning
and supporting presence of open cities elsewhere in East Asia, starting
with Hong Kong and Taipei but also extending to Seoul and perhaps
to Vladivostok someday. Among China's neighbors, Hong Kong and
Taiwan have too much at stake personally for Westerners to take a
righteous position toward what may look like opportunistic business
behavior. Fortunately, the democracy movements in their own societies have been inspired rather than cowed by events on the mainland,
thanks particularly to the alertness of Taiwan's President Lee, who
responded to Zhao's initiatives by sending Shirley Kuo to Beijing at a
time when Lee knew it would contribute to Zhao's success.
China's Western trading partners have the best opportunity, as
well as the responsibility, to develop a dual policy characterized by
considerable use of official sanctions plus the expectation, if not active
encouragement, of considerable private-sector exchange in business,
culture, education, and science. In both official and private-sector
contacts, no opportunity need be lost to raise human rights concerns
on behalf of the thousands of democratic activists on the wanted lists
of Chinese police, the hundreds already in custody, and the scores
awaiting execution. Deng has already prepared Party cadres and the
public for the harshest measures against "hooligans" and some activists by telling them, "Do not fear world opinion." Why then should
the world be afraid to express its opinions?
Tough sanctions stretching from military items to educational aid
will make sense if they are coordinated among countries and regularly
reviewed with an eye to their impact on the Chinese situation. Conditions in Deng's China require something akin to the environmental
impact assessments made for domestic programs of the U.S. government. These could help ensure that particular sanctions are effective.
The ultimate standard for policy judgments, in addition to the merits
of individual human rights cases, ought to be the impact of specific
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sanctions, on the one hand, and commercial and cultural contacts, on
the other, on the future size and well being of the expanding "middling" classes in China, whose political reliability is now under question but whose presence should lend a degree of stability and
modernity to China's domestic and foreign policies. States to the West
(including, one hopes, some East European states or parties) should be
trying to serve the interests of a part of the Chinese population that is,
in many respects, much like their own middle-class majorities.
The sheer size of China's "middling" classes and urban population allows confidence that measured toughness will not force China
back into the ideological mode imposed on the country by Maoists. It
also matters that xenophobic Maoism was a product of the very different world conditions of the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the product,
and partly the cause, of different conditions within China.
Today it is both safe and prudent to make the West's interest in
China's contemporary social classes a declared policy. This is particularly true in light of the confused agrarian mythologizing in both
Western and Chinese thinking that colors our understanding of what
is distinctive and hopeful-or allegedly fearsome-in Chinese society
and culture.
The trauma of Tiananmen Square might suggest a more cautious
"realism" in approaching leadership changes in communist states.
The future Zhao or Gorbachev is, after all, unpredictable. But the real
lesson from the eclipse of Zhao's brilliant career may be that when
historically rare opportunities arise it is best to be an agent of
change-and not its spectator or victim. It is too late to hope for
much moderation from Deng, but another Zhao could emerge in due
course. For their part, outside powers really have no alternative but to
work with the forces inside China that Zhao represented. For they
were creating the kind of China that can play a constructive role in the
world and that can improve the living standards of the Chinese people.
While harsh repression continues, the world cannot engage in business
as usual. But in the long run it is in the interests of China's neighbors
and friends that they renew constructive contact with the economic
and social forces Zhao was attempting to guide.

11. YOUTH AND STUDENTS IN CHINA BEFORE AND
AFfER TIANANMEN
Stanley Rosen

Over the last decade, the relations between Chinese youth and the
Communist Party of China (CPC) were marked by an increasingly
obvious irony, culminating in the tragic events of June 4, 1989. The
successful implementation of the Party's ambitious modernization
program required the active participation of China's brightest young
people. To encourage such support, the CPC had, among other
things, allowed them greater freedom of expression and association,
recruited them into the Party and promoted their overseas study. At
the same time, the gradual marketization of social and economic life
had rendered the Party's blandishments relatively ineffective, and contributed to the decline of the Party's social control. If youth faced
highly indefinite prospects in 1978, relying on the Party to expand educational opportunities, provide jobs and integrate them into the still
uncertain post-Cultural Revolution society, by 1989 youth expectations had risen beyond the abilities-not to mention the inclinationsof the CPC to meet them. In the aftermath of June 4, hardline Party
leaders have reverted to a concentration on control, forsaking, at least
for now, the erstwhile strategy of reaching out to youth.
The dramatic change in youth expectations was in fact a product
of the CPC's success in solving some of the thorniest problems left
over from the Cultural Revolution, so that the structure of opportunity,'in 1989 far exceeded the limited options confronting youth a decade earlier. The restoration of the university entrance examinations in
December 1977 marked the end of the Maoist experimentation with
educational levelling. A decade ago there was great pressure on young
people to squeeze into the small number of university places. Only
178,000 ofthe 5.7 million candidates (4.87 percent) were able to enter
a university in 1977. Those who were unsuccessful commonly became
"youth waiting for work" (daiye qingnian ). The job market was overwhelmed by the combination of current and recent-year high school
graduates competing with older, "sent down" urban youth who had
been trickling back from the countryside, particularly since the mid1970s. In those uncertain times, youth were seeking stability. Entrance to a university virtually guaranteed a state-assigned job in government or a state enterprise.
(203)
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Politically as well, opportunities for youth were far from abundant. The CPC, still recovering from Mao's Cultural Revolution assault-spearheaded by college and high school Red Guardsrecruited only five million members from 1977-1983, far below the
Cultural Revolution rate of recruitment. University students were
shunned almost completely, as many Party officials resisted attempts
to substitute ability for political loyalty as the main criterion for Party
membership. Students for their part were suspicious of political entanglements and, following ten years of educational minimalism, eagerly were pursuing professional proficiency. As late as the end of
1983, fewer than 1 percent of Chinese undergraduates were Party
members, the lowest figure since 1956. 1
If youth in the immediate post-Mao period had been seeking
largely to recover the stability associated with the mid-1950s-represented by a good job in a state enterprise-youth by the late 1980s had
expectations unimaginable a decade earlier. The pressure to enter a
university had eased, particularly in those areas, such as Guangzhou,
where a rapidly expanding economy offered a variety of educational
alternatives and employment opportunities for those unable to attend
a university. By 1987, there were 1,063 regular colleges and universities, with close to 2 million students. Nationally, 2.275 million applicants sat for the university entrance examinations in that year, and
621,000 were recruited (27.13 percent)-2 The national rate of people in
cities and towns awaiting employment had fallen from 5.9 percent in
1979 to 2 percent in 1986; moreover, employment difficulties had
shifted from large and medium-sized cities down to the lower levels.
One survey noted that the proportion of people waiting for employment in the county seats and towns relative to the total number of
people waiting for jobs throughout the country had risen from 38 percent in 1980 to 50 percent in 1986. 3
The creation of an educational system that is bifurcated into elite
1. Stanley Rosen, "The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Society: Popular Attitudes Toward Party Membership and the Party's Image," paper prepared for the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, August 31-September 3, 1989. To appear in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, July 1990, pp. 5192.
2. It should be noted that only 524,000 were recruited under the state plan, and that
41,000 were sponsored by enterprises, 14,000 were self-financed students and 42,000 were
recruited by the low prestige "irregular" T.V. and correspondence universities. Nevertheless, the contrast with the late 1970s remains striking. Zhongguo baike nianjian 1988 (Beijing, Shanghai: Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe, December 1988), p. 479.
3. Yang Guohua, "Accomplishments in Employing Workers in Townships and Cities
and the New Situation We Face," Qingnian yanjiu, No. 1, January 1988, translated in

BEFORE AND AFTER TIANANMEN

205

and mass sectors, and the increasing importance of.- and possibilities
for-material success had created differing . expectations among
China's youth. For those unable to enter a "key" junior or senior
high, continuing their schooling was considered to be a poor investment, since the likelihood of entrance to a good university was remote.
On the other hand, dropping out and finding a well-paying job, or
helping one's family prosper, became attractive possibilities.
For those who could enroll in a good university, expectations
were far higher. Of those graduating from the elite Beijing University
in 1985, for example, 55 percent enrolled as graduate students; 13.7
percent were assigned to research institutes; 5.1 percent were assigned
to colleges and universities; and, 13.3 percent went to government institutions. Only 10 percent went to production departments. The
large majority of those going on to graduate school had a reasonable
expectation that they could cap their climb up the educational ladder
by studying abroad. 4 Graduate students with marketable skills-e.g.,
foreign language or computer science majors-were able increasingly
to benefit from China's more open labor market by transferring from
their universities to well-paying jobs at one of China's new high-tech
or foreign trade corporations, albeit at the cost of a transfer fee of
several thousand yuan. Recent changes in the job assignment system,
which allowed for more individual initiative in finding employment,
had diminished further the state's control over the brightest university
students.
Politically, the Party had begun to look favorably on young intellectuals beginning in 1984. Whereas only 318 university students in
Beijing entered the CPC in 1980, over 6,000 joined in 1985. Although
joining the Party represented a calculated risk- what some Chinese
referred to as "a game of snakes and ladders"-and many resisted the
temptation to join, there is no question that the CPC's major effort to
attract the young and the talented had begun to bear fruit prior to the
1989 demonstrations. Still, relatively few students were interested in
using Party membership to pursue a career in government or politics.
One study of 344 graduating students at the elite Qinghua University
found that 73.8 percent were committed to pursuing an academic career, including study abroad; 9.3 percent expressed an interest in going
Stanley Rosen, ed., "Issues in Employment," Chinese Economic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4,
Summer 1988, pp. 69-91.
4. For details on job assignments of undergraduates and master's degree holders at
Beijing University and Hangzhou University from 1983-1986, see Stanley Rosen, ed.,
"Profiles of Beijing University and Hangzhou University," Chinese Education, Vol. 21, No.
4, Winter, 1988-89.
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into business and becoming rich; and, only 5.5 percent sought Party
membership and a government position. 5
As the general overview presented above suggests, the Party's
youth and education policy in the reform decade had not been a clear
success. If opportunities for youth clearly improved over the ten year
period, youth confusion and dissatisfaction were arguably as high in
1988 as they were in 1978, albeit for different reasons. If students had
complained that studying was useless (dushu wuyong) during the Cultural Revolution, the same complaints could be heard in the late
1980s. In their solution to educational problems brought about by the
Cultural Revolution reforms, post-Mao reformers in tum created new
problems. In the broader area of youth policy, the regime had failed
in part because a divided leadership continued to pursue policies that
ultimately were mutually contradictory. Policy had oscillated in response to the waxing and waning of different leaders and philosophies.
Thus, trends in youth attitudes and behavior that had been accorded
praise or at least understanding at one point were reinterpreted and
condemned later.
In the aftermath of the military crackdown in and around
Tiananmen Square, it is striking how much of the Party's post-Mao
relationship to youth, which had been forged during the reform decade, has been rolled back. Whereas youth in the late 1970s sought a
return to the stability of the 1950s, it is now the Party leadership that
yearns for those halcyon days. Indeed, much of recent Party policy
appears to be based on the reconceptualization of a China that existed
prior to the Cultural Revolution. Revolutionary heroes of the early
1960s such as Lei Feng and Iron Man Wang Jinxi have been the subject of highly publicized emulation campaigns; political loyalty
("Red") has replaced expertise as the main criterion for Party membership and promotion; the already limited independence of mass organizations like the Communist Youth League (CYL) has been further
restricted by a Central Committee Circular calling for tighter Party
control over these transmission belts; another Central Committee
communique has resurrected the concept of the mass line to govern
relationships between the Party and the people; and, there has been a
renewed emphasis on working class leadership, central planning and
other familiar policies of an earlier China.
The attempts to restore social and ideological control through the
5. "An Investigation of the Ideology of a Portion of the Students at Four Nationally
Prominent Universities," Qingnian gongzuo yanjiu yu cankao, February 10, 1989, pp. 16-19
(no cited author).
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stress on the primacy of the Party have been accompanied by more
specific policies intended to punish those who show recalcitrance in
accepting the new rules of the game. Thus, the State Education Commission has threatened to cut enrollment at colleges and universities
that are found to have weak programs in ideological and political education; new regulations called for those working in government or
Party jobs at the national level who graduated in or after 1985 to be
transferred to low-level provincial or rural jobs, with their return dependent on their performance; and, in an increasingly tight job market, exacerbated by economic retrenchment policies, political
authorities have recentralized control over job allocations.
Despite these policies, the regime's own findings, as revealed in
survey data published in the Chinese press before and after June 4, as
well as interviews with students, professors and politi;al workers, suggest the almost certain failure of these measures beyond the short
term. Interviewees note the cynicism and despair among students in
China today. Even the small numbers of intellectual defenders of the
regime, like the widely disliked He Xin, base their defense on the importance of stability and the fear of chaos, not on a positive belief in
communism. Everyone seems to acknowledge the prevailing sentiment as koushi xinfei (saying one thing and meaning another). Thus,
the regime likely will be effective in preventing student unrest leading
to an Eastern European scenario during the series of upcoming anniversary days and the September 1990 Asian games, but for the long
term the policies are unrealistic, even anachronistic: the China that
has been conceptualized no longer exists.
The purpose of this article is to examine changing youth attitudes
and behavior, and the party's interpretation of these changes. It will
be argued that China's "liberal" reformers and conservative "ideologues" were in sharp disagreement in their assessment of Chinese
youth, that by 1988 the reformers had succeeded in gaining influence
over important socializing agents at the expense of their opponents,
and that the Tiananmen crackdown has reversed this process. Prior to
June 4, the role of youth in an ongoing, successful reform process had
been a common theme in such publications as Zhongguo qingnian
(Chinese Youth) and Zhongguo qingnian bao (Chinese Youth Daily).
After Tiananmen, the focus has shifted to the anti-state behavior of
youth and their role in the turmoil.
EXPLAINING CHINESE YOUTH PRIOR TO JUNE 4
The CPC's youth policy has long been a source of internal contention. Economic and ideo-political goals have coexisted uneasily
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through most of the post-1949 period, with the presence of Chairman
Mao as the ultimate arbiter contributing both to the periodic conflict
and its resolution. With the shift of the country's focus to rapid economic development in 1979, the previous emphasis on politics as class
struggle was repudiated as "sham Marxism," but this did not remove
the potential conflict. It was still necessary for the CPC to maintain
political and ideological control, a feat accomplished through the imposition of the Four Cardinal Principles (uphold the socialist road, the
dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party
and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought). Purposely vague,
they have been invoked as constraints on unorthodox behavior in
word or deed.
A more obvious contradiction was the dual admonition in postMao China to promote a Communist value system and to succeed
through competitive efforts. Indeed, the signals youth received
through the regime's socializing agents commonly were mixed and
contradictory, a major point in post-Tiananmen critiques of ideo-political work, varying directly with the forward, backward and sideways
thrust of various aspects of the reform program. If highly critical
views of the growing materialism of youth were often relegated to obscure and internal CYL journals while the influence of radical reformers waxed, these same views would appear in widely circulated
national journals and newspapers during less hospitable times for reform, for example, after the student demonstrations of December
1986. Recent policies that emphasized old methods of political indoctrination and ideological control represent a victory of those in the
Party who have been advocating such measures for years, but with
only intermittent and short-lived successes. 6
That China's recent history could be interpreted in vastly different ways is clear from an examination of the "reform decade's" influence on youth as presented in widely circulated and authoritative
youth magazines and newspapers published before and after the "turmoil." Before the 1989 demonstrations, the views of the ideological
hardliners had been eclipsed by those seeking to influence youth behavior more by carrots than by sticks. By 1988, the advocates of a
policy that acknowledged the futility of outdated, heavy-handed political indoctrination at a time when the CPC's ability to influence youth
behavior had drastically declined were featured prominently in the
6. Stanley Rosen, "Political Education and Student Response: Some Background
Factors Behind the 1989 Beijing Demonstrations," Issues and Studies, Vol. 25, No. 10,
October 1989, pp. 12-39.
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media. As the reform program was completing its first decade, these
advocates argued forcefully that a youth policy that tied the success of
young people to the nation's political and economic progress was far
more effective than mere political and moral exhortation.
These views received their widest currency throughout 1988 in a
six-part series of celebratory articles in the national journal of the
CYL. The series reflected on the positive changes for youth from
1978-1988. 7 Focusing on key issue areas, each article traced the increasing freedom and opportunity opened up to youth since the Third
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee (December 1978). Thus,
the transformation of the educational system had enabled youth to develop their talents fully. If the decade began with a struggle merely to
squeeze into a university (gaokao re), before too long students were
studying abroad in large numbers (chuguo re) (Part 1). The development of a commodity economy, the new system of agricultural contracts, and the growth of special economic zones, among other factors,
enabled enterprising youth with limited opportunities for educational
success to become wealthy, for which it was no longer necessary to
apologize (Part II).
In politics, the ten years were marked by the persistent pursuit of
democracy and popular participation. In this context, even the "Democracy Wall" of the late 1970s was seen in essentially positive terms,
and the student demonstrations of 1985 and 1986 were merely the
"high tuition cost" inevitable in the pursuit of democracy (Part III).
Perhaps the most crucial change was the "silent revolution" in youth
values, marked by increasing secularization (shisuhua) and the pursuit
of material benefits over spiritual concerns (Part IV). The transformation in male-female relationships, particularly love and sex, and
youths' lack of excessive concern with the morality of others was the
theme of Part V. The desirable male was no longer a "bookworm"
(shu daizz), but an entrepreneur who could compete successfully in the
marketplace. Indeed, in a passage that sounds almost eerie in the light
of June 4, the article noted that "ten years ago the only true men
(nanzihan) in the hearts of young women were soldiers, but today
beautiful women dare to ride easily on the back of a private entrepreneur's motorcycle." 8 Finally, reflecting a prevalent motif in intellectual circles throughout 1988-the contention over China's cultural
tradition and its proper place within a rapidly changing world-the
7. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 2-5; No.3, March 1988, pp. 6-9; No.
5, May 1988, pp. 4-7; No.7, July 1988, pp. 2-5; No.9, September 1988, pp. 2-5; No. 11,
November 1988, pp. 2-5.
8. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 9, September 1988, p. 2.
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series concluded by interweaving China's past and future prospects
with current conditions, noting how a feudal legacy continued to inhibit the country's development and prevent it from becoming integrated into the world outside (Part VI).
The "liberal" point of view taken in this series could, of course, be
found in other journals. It was the publication of these ideas in the
widely circulated, presumably orthodox and influential Chinese Youth
magazine that made the series significant and worthy of particular attention. The articles repeatedly brought forth negative images of
China's feudal past and leftist lurch during the Cultural Revolution.
For example, the piece on democracy began with a forceful poem that
had inspired the April 5, 1976, demonstrations in Tiananmen Square,
the beginnings of a movement which culminated in the political demise of the "Gang of Four" and the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping.
The authors did not hesitate to take sides on controversial issues.
The young economist Zhang W eiying's provocative essay, entitled
"Rehabilitate Money," which had been subjected to critical scrutiny
and debate in 1983, was vigorously affi.rmed. 9 Intellectual gurus such
as Y an Jiaqi and Su Xiaokang were quoted favorably. The concluding
piece offered solutions to China's backwardness that echoed Su's
themes from the highly controversial television series, "River Elegy."
Indeed, the co-author of the concluding article, Yuan Zhiming, had
collaborated on the "River Elegy" script and, like Su, is currently in
exile in America.
Chinese Youth continued to present the views of liberal thinkers
in 1989. In January, Su Shaozhi and Wang Yizhou "reminded" (tishl)
young people of the "triple anniversary" of the French Revolution, the
May Fourth Movement and the liberation of China, and the role of
youth in the forefront ofthese struggles. 10 In February, Yan Jiaqi was
interviewed on the relevance of "Mr. Democracy," "Mr. Science" and
"Mr. Law" to the current Chinese situation. 11
Far more controversial ideas than those expressed in Chinese
Youth could be found in Shekou tongxun bao in 1988 and early 1989.
In a series of articles on individualism and collectivism, this special
economic zone paper critically evaluated the regime's propaganda extolling the "moral spirit" of such official youth heroes as Lei Feng,
Zhang Haidi and Zhu Boru, arguing that these "moral supreme beings
9. For Zhang's essay and several responses, see Stanley Rosen, ed., "The Impact of
Modernization on the Socialization of Chinese Youth," Chinese Education, Vol. 18, No. 1,
Spring 1985, pp. 51-61.
10. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 1, January 1989, pp. 1-2.
11. Zhongguo qingnian, No.2, February 1989, pp. 2-4.
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of heaven" had become an "ideological burden" that had to be shed if
socialism with Chinese characteristics was to be constructed. 12 What
attracted the most attention, however, was the so-called "Shekou
Storm," which was a frontal assault on the old concepts of politics and
morality. 13
In January, 1988, invited by the local CYL branch, three wellknown "professors" of propaganda from the Research Center on Ideological Education for Chinese Youth addressed seventy young workers
in Shekou, in the Shenzhen special economic zone (SEZ). What made
the symposium newsworthy was the unexpected attack on the content
and form of traditional ideological work by members of the audience.
Two cultures had collided. Youth in Shekou had no patience with
what one called "empty sermons," preferring "a discussion of concrete
questions." The propagandists were used to neither dialogue nor discourtesy. They could not have expected to be challenged on positions
they considered unassailable. For example, one professor had earlier
criticized as "gold diggers" those who came to the SEZs to make
money; rather, they "should contribute a large portion of their income
to the state to be spent on public welfare." This smacked of "leftism"
to some youth, who pointed out that making money was fine and, in
fact, gold diggers had developed the American west.
Confronted with what they took to be the familiar sanctimonious,
self-righteous style of the propagandists, the youth seemed to enjoy
flaunting their freedom and Shekou's "foreignness." One reportedly
noted that "the central government is far away. Even if I swear at
you, no one will come to interfere, and my Hong Kong boss will not
fire me because ofthis." Another stated: "We find newspaper propaganda disgusting. It says Shenzhen takes the socialist road with Chinese characteristics. What Chinese characteristics are actually there?
The characteristics of Shenzhen are foreign characteristics!" One
propagandist, when challenged, asked whether the troublesome youth
dared to reveal his name. To great amusement, he presented his business card.
Although brief accounts of this encounter were published in
Shekou, the national press, for example, China Youth Daily, was for12. Shekou ton~xun. bao, .December 26, 1988, p. 3 and January 19, 1989, p. 3.
13. The followmg discussion draws from the Daily Report, September 21, 1988, pp. 5360 (Renmin Ribao, August 6 and 29, and September 14); the Daily Report, September 28,
1988, pp. 68-70 (Renmin Ribao, September 3), the Daily Report, October 26, 1988, pp. 1921 (Jingjixue Zhoubao, October 2); China News Analysis, No. 1374, December 15, 1988;
Chang Tianyu, ."Wh~t does the 'Shekou Storm' signify?", Guangjiaojing, September 1988,
pp. 94-95, and mterv1ew data.
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bidden to reprint information on the subject for many months. Then,
between August 15 and September 16, 1988, People's Daily published
35letter~ut of the thousands received-commenting on the Shekou
Storm. The propagandists were given a chance to reiterate and defend
their style and their views. They also noted their own personal health
and family difficulties, and lack of interest in financial remuneration.
In comments that could have been made by any political work cadre,
one noted that: "When ideological and political work is difficult, we
who work on the front line have given so much and yet have not been
properly assessed." Most poignantly, he ended with a plea, saying:
"We admit that we need to improve. However, even if there are weaknesses and mistakes in our work, shouldn't people help in a positive
way and as comrades?"
In fact, the level of confusion and dissatisfaction among youth
was a common theme in the late 1980s in specialized journals. One
writer compared Bei Dao's 1976 short poem "A Reply" (Huida), in
which he exclaimed "I Do Not Believe," thus articulating "the awakening, doubting, and reflecting of that generation" to Cui Jian's "I
Have Nothing," China's first rock-and-roll song a decade later, which
became the anthem of the "new-birth generation" (xin sheng daz). 14
Analyzing the youth culture in the aftermath of the failed student protest movement of December 1986-January 1987, one student compared the resulting loss of idealism to the experience of the Red
Guards in the 1960s, noting that "the majority of students have fallen
from the clouds to earth, and are now beginning to pay attention to
reality and practicality." 15 He also suggested the similarity between
the growing individualism and negative rebelliousness on university
campuses to a "fin-de-siecle" mood, in which students "cope with each
day and just seek to get by, having no sense of anything beyond just
making a living." Others spoke of three factions on the campustuopai, mapai, and xuanpai (TOEFL faction, mah jongg faction and
revolving or dancing faction).
Interest in officially-sanctioned student activities and general public service on the campuses had waned. In May 1987, when elections
for a new student union were conducted at Wuhan University, more
than 40 percent of the students did not bother to vote. Six months
earlier they had demanded the student union be reconstituted or abolished. In September, when the same student union conducted a survey, they found that 80 percent of the students did not have confidence
14. Dangdai qingnian yanjiu, No. 8, August 1988, pp. S-6.
15. Hainanjishi, No.5, May 1989, pp. 18-27.
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in the union and 90 percent felt that the union's work did not concern
them at all. In the second half of 1988, a class at Wuhan University
felt compelled to hire a student, at a compensation of 70 yuan a semester, to be social life commissioner; no one had been willing to serve.
At Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, it was discovered that nearly
half of the classes had not promoted any group activities over the past
year. These examples may be multiplied. 16
This was just part of the picture, however. The disillusion with
collective action common from 1986-1988 led to a "theory mania" on
the campuses. The most influential Western philosophers were Sartre,
Nietzsche, Maslow and Adler, with students intrigued by their ideas
about the infinite potential of man, individual freedom of choice and
ultimate self-actualization, to name a few.
Chinese authorities long had been concerned about the impact of
Western thought on the campuses and periodically had conducted
surveys to assess its influence. They were particularly sensitive to this
issue as the age and experience of new university students began to
drop by 1979-1980, when more and more students came directly from
secondary school. When Fudan University did a study of the 1978,
1979 and 1980 entering classes in the departments of philosophy and
computer science, they discovered that more recent entrants admitted
they did not understand theories of existentialism and "Western
Marxism" (70-85 percent), but the 1978 class felt much more comfortable commenting on these theories, assessing them in general as erroneous, but with some reasonable elements. 17
A survey at Beijing University was more extensive, and students
were asked for their views on a series of Western works and authors.
The least familiar book was a commentary on the Frankfurt School of
Social Research (76 percent did not know of the Frankfurt School).
Montesquieu and Rousseau were more familiar to the students, and a
book on the history of contemporary Western philosophy (probably by
Bertrand Russell) was rated highest. Although over 67 percent had
not had contact with this last work, over 20 percent thought it had
research value, and 11 percent felt its reference materials were
useful. 18
Table 1 is from a survey of students in the entering classes of 1980
and 1981 at Shanghai Normal Institute, which reports rather similar
results. It is important to realize, however, that by the early 1980s
16. Ibid.
17. Qingnian yanjiu, No.7, 1982.
18. Ibid.
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there was already a wave of interest in Western writings and an indifference to standard ideo-political works by the usual suspects. Table 2
gives some indication of this. It was perhaps only a matter of time
before Western philosophical writings would find a market on Chinese
campuses. Indeed, the incessant preaching against the dangers posed
by such "forbidden" authors as Freud, Sartre and Nietzsche by discredited political thought cadres, who may not even have read, much
less understood, these writings, merely made them more attractive to
the students.
The criticism against these authors had increased markedly by
1987, and continued thereafter unabated. Thus, a report in Beijing
Ribao (Beijing Daily) blamed a university student's suicide on his
reading of Sartre and Nietzsche. A more comprehensive series of
studies blamed these theorists for a variety of ills. One youth league
journal listed the following survey results, among others, to document
the pernicious influence of existentialism: (1) a study of 12 student
suicides from January-April 1987 at ten Shanghai universities; (2) a
study in parts of Jinshan, Songjiang and Chuansha districts which revealed that 65 percent of the youth were living together without the
benefit of marriage, and thought such cohabitation "normal" and "a
result of free choice;" (3) a study of 27 Shanghai universities and 95
scientific research institutes which showed a sharp decline in new candidates for master's degrees and lower exam scores for the applicants
they had. 19 Moreover, Sartre was blamed explicitly for the declining
authority of the Four Cardinal Principles. The following passage,
from an essay critical ofSartre and existentialist theory, reports results
from another survey of Shanghai universities and provides the flavor
of the critique:
Under the ideological impact of the proposition that "life is
nihilistic, and the world is ridiculous," some young people
have grown to have little confidence, or none at all, in Marxism-Leninism, in socialism, and in the leadership of the
Communist Party. According to some statistics, 52.86 percent of the young students have not given any thought to
joining the Chinese Communist Party or Party organizations; 14.36 percent expressed clearly that they simply will
not consider it, and 82 percent see communism as an illusion
that can be seen from afar but not actually approached. 20
19. Los Angeles Times, May 28, 1987; Tuande Shenghuo (Shanghai), No.2, February
1988, p. 33.
20. Dangdai qingnian yanjiu, No. 2, February 1989, p. 11.
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TABLE 1
DO YOU UNDERSTAND SARTRE AND HIS
THEORY?
Responses
Read Sartre's Works and Commentaries
Heard about it from Others
Haven't Heard about It
Other Responses
No Response

Number
120
196
547
14
192

N = 1,069
Percentage
11.2%
18.3%
51.2%
1.3%
18.0%

Source: Ye Jun, "Guanyu daxuesheng dushu qingkuangde diaocha" [An Investigation of
the Reading Preferences of University Students] in Gaodeng xuexiao deyu yanjiu wenji [A
Collection of Writings Reporting Research on Moral Education in Universities] (Beijing:
Moral Education Research Office, Institute of Youth Studies, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, February 1983), Table 7, p. 328.

POST-TIANANMEN ANALYSES OF CHINESE YOUTH
The open challenge to the Chinese leadership in the spring and
the brutal military crackdown of June 3-4 provided an opportunity for
more orthodox political work cadres to launch a counterattack, not
just on recent questionable writings, but on more general grounds. Individual articles by "elite" intellectuals who had "fled" China were of
course singled out. Su Shaozhi and Wang Yizhou were now accused
of "inciting" (shandong) youth to action, not merely reminding them
of the earlier actions of their predecessors. 21 Yan Jiaqi's Chinese
Youth interview, predictably, was interpreted as advocating a system
of Western capitalist democracy for China. 22 The Shekou Storm incident was revisited and now seen as a deliberate attempt to use the
media to negate the Party's ideo-political work. The three abused
political workers, along with many of their comrades, once again were
able to preach without refutation. 23 Indeed, seeking explanations for
the student unrest, these same authoritative newspapers and
magazines for youth reinterpreted the entire decade from 1978-1988,
seeing the trends in far less sanguine terms. 24
The key event to be explained is no longer the reform program
21. Personal communication with Su Shaozhi.
22. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 9, September 1989, p. 11.
23. Zhongguojiaoyu bao, August 8, 1989, p. 1; August 22, 1989, p. 4.
24. See, for example, the articles from Beijing qingnian bao and Sixiang jiaoyu yanjiu,
No. 3 and No.4, 1989, reprinted in Zhongguo qingnian bao, August 28, 1989, p. 3.
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TABLE2
WHAT KIND OF BOOKS DO YOU LIKE TO READ?
N = 1,815

Book Category
Foreign Novels and Stories
Books in Own Specialty
Books for the Self-Cultivation of Youth
Chinese Novels and Stories
Works in Psychology
Works in Philosophy
Marxism-Leninism
Political Theory
Works by Chairman Mao and Other
Revolutionaries of the Older
Generation

Number
469
350
348
342
115
77
48
44

Percentage
25.8%
19.3%
19.2%
18.8%
6.3%
4.2%
2.6%
2.4%

22

1.2%

Source: Ye Jun, "Guanyu daxuesheng dushu qingkuangde diaocha" [An Investigation of
the Reading Preferences of University Students] in Gaodeng xuexiao deyu yanjiu wenji [A
Collection of Writings Reporting Research on Moral Education in Universities] (Beijing:
Moral Education Research Office, Institute of Youth Studies, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, February 1983), p. 320.

and its success, but rather the "turmoil" and the anti-state behavior of
the students. Viewed from this perspective, the growing awareness
and increasing opportunity afforded young people by a steadily maturing reform program is replaced by a critique of ideo-political work and
a cyclical theory of youth behavior. University students in particular
are seen as wavering elements, lurching from one "hot topic" to another, beset by ideological contradictions. Moreover, their sense of
mission combined with a lack of responsibility to make them easily
mobilizable, whether by a leftist Jiang Qing in the Cultural Revolution
or "elite" intellectuals such as Yan Jiaqi in 1989.
Post-Tiananmen assessments commonly trace the changing outlook on life (rensheng guan) of university students through a series of
stages, noting that ideo-political workers at each stage were unable to
overcome the lack of appropriate ideals that have marked youth attitudes in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. 25 Students are seen
as alternating between private and public values. One author described students as initially concerned with social and politica1
problems (1979-1981), later turning inward and concentrating primar25. For example, Zhongguo qingnian bao, November 2, 1989, p. 3, which discusses six
stages since 1980.
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ily on their own futures (1982-1984). The next stage found them once
again oriented toward society and politics, bringing on the stude?t
demonstrations of 1985 and 1986. They also had become caught up m
the hot political, economic and cultural topics that dominated scholarly discussion in intellectual circles, including debates over Western
thought trends, democracy and the T.V. series "River Elegy." When
they lost confidence in developments in the larger society (the reform
process) and their own futures, their depression hit bottom. This current phase of the cycle, the author concluded, had yet to run its
course. 26
Despite their division of the reform decade into stages, post-"turmoil" accounts of youth attitudes and behavior are dominated by ideopolitical concerns and are essentially unilinear in showing how early
warning signs of youth malaise went unchecked, leading, step-by-step,
to an open challenge to the Communist Party. Moreover, in building
their case, such accounts focus almost solely on the key actors in the
turmoil-university students-at the expense of other youth. Earlier
positive accounts, although more balanced in their discussion of reform in a variety of issue areas, also tended to be unilinear. Both types
of accounts, marshalling evidence for unambiguous conclusions, likewise suffer from a familiar affiiction called "cutting with one knife"
(yidaoqie), in which youth too often are presented conveniently as an
undifferentiated group. Only occasionally does one find distinctions
made among youth, for example, in different geographical areas, from
families with different income levels, and in different types and at different levels of schooling. It would be useful, therefore, to attempt
some preliminary disaggregation. Are there significant differences in
the values and aspirations of youth in, for example, special economic
zones and the interior, in the urban and rural areas, at different levels
of schooling, and over time? Although there has been a significant
amount of survey research done by Chinese researchers on this subject, the questions are large and can be addressed only superficially
here. To give a flavor of some ofthe research in this field, we present a
few of the studies conducted by researchers in the city of Guangzhou.
Guangzhou researchers seem to have been the most active in
comparing youth attitudes and behavior in their city to cities elsewhere in China, at least in part to dispel some of the criticism of the
"open policy" and its negative effects on youth. The surveys often
seem to have an agenda, to demonstrate the benefits the open policy
can bring.
26. Zhongguo qingnian bao, August 28, 1989, p. 3.
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One imaginative study by a well-known young social scientist in
Guangzhou compared Guangzhou to Chengdu in terms of the impact
of outside forces on youth (age 35 and under). The author's starting
point was the widespread hypothesis that Guangzhou, a coastal city
presumably heavily influenced by Hong Kong and the West (nearly 70
percent of the city's residents have relatives either in Hong Kong, Macao or other countries), should be affected much more by negative factors associated with the open policy than Chengdu, an inland city
which is presumed to be relatively free of influences from the outside
world. Interestingly, the author shows that while Guangzhou youth
have been affected marginally by negative, nontraditional values (such
as somewhat greater willingness to accept cohabitation by lovers who
are unmarried), they also have been influenced more by positive values
from outside, such as a greater display of individual initiative. In addition, though Chengdu youth have had less exposure to foreign culture than Guangzhou youth, "the proportion of those who take an
affirmative attitude toward the propaganda of Western culture is 12
percent more than in the Guangzhou group." The author concludes,
therefore, that "contamination by foreign ideology and culture is not
necessarily in direct proportion to the amount of exposure one has to
it." Given the general perception of Guangzhou decadence in much of
the rest of China, there is a certain defensiveness in the study. Witness, for example, the following passage:
Some people hold that Guangzhou opened its door to the
outside world earlier than other places and Guangzhou people have more access to foreign ideology and culture, and
thus inevitably it must be the "hardest hit area" of spiritual
contamination. This viewpoint manifests a lack of national
pride and an absence of a realistic attitude. It is the symptom of neurasthenia and lacks logical reasoning. And it does
not tally with the actual situation in Guangzhou. 27
Another study, by a researcher at the Guangzhou Institute for
Educational Research, surveyed graduating junior and senior high
school students in Guangzhou and Xian concluding, among other
things, that Guangzhou students were not as desperate to enter key
schools and universities as their Xian counterparts. With the rapid
development of the economy, job possibilities had become quite good
in Guangzhou. 28
27. Guangzhou yanjiu, No. 4, August 1984, pp. 18-22.
28. See Zhongguojiaoyu xuehui tongxun, No.2, 1987, pp. 28-32; Guangzhou yanjiu,
No. 9, 1986, pp. 45-48.
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But praise for the positive changes in the areas open to foreign
influence came from publications outside Guangzhou as well. One
study published in Beijing described the change in the sense of values
held by Chinese youth over the course of the reform decade. One area
singled out for special consideration was the differential impact the
reforms had had on youth in different geographical areas. In open
areas, youth were seen as less conservative and inflexible. For example, the survey noted that 45.2 percent of young intellectuals agreed
that "it is more valuable to make contributions than to receive benefits," with another 16.7 percent treating giving and receiving as equal
values. By contrast, only 24 percent of young intellectuals outside the
open areas made such selfless choices. Similarly, while 19 percent of
those outside the open areas agreed that "as long as they did things
with a clear conscience, they didn't care about the results," only 6
percent of those in the open areas agreed with this statement. 29
The most recent example of such a survey was likewise conducted
by a researcher at the Guangzhou Educational Research Institute. 30
Questionnaires were distributed to 2,433 junior and senior high students from Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Xian and Chongqing
(representing special economic zones, coastal open cities, coastal open
districts and interior cities) to determine the differences in ideological
concepts in different types of geographical areas. Ten major changes
in concepts are discussed. Although it is unclear when the survey was
conducted, the results cast a very different light on the open areas.
Indeed, it is not difficult to see why selected findings were given wide
circulation in a national youth newspaper published after June 4. It
certainly suggests that survey results will continue to be used in pursuit of political agendas. For example, when it came to large societal
issues, 55 percent of the students were most concerned with "developing the economy and raising the standard of living." Only 4 percent
were concerned with "persisting in a socialist direction." Students in
open districts were considerably more concerned with an emphasis on
economics over politics. When it came to ideals, 57 percent of the
students felt the purpose of studying was to meet the practical needs of
the individual (to get promoted, find a job, learn more), while 26 percent felt that the purpose of studying was to benefit society or meet the
demands of the times (shidai xuqiu ). Again, individual interest was
significantly stronger in open districts than in the interior.
Other surveys of secondary school students show similar results,
29. Shidai (Beijing), No. 6, June 1988, pp. 13-14.
30. Zhongguo qingnian bao, October 30, 1989, p. 3.
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pointing up the failure to instill proper morality in young students.
For example, a study done in a county of Jiangsu province asked,
among other questions, who the students felt was the greatest individual, the one most worthy of respect. Of the 100 senior high students
queried, 38 percent chose themselves.Jl A survey in Shandong found
that only 43 percent of the students polled "believed" in Marxism; 55
percent believed in nothing; and 1.3 percent believed in religion. 32
These surveys appear to be part of a general trend, following the
victory of the hardline forces, to air discussions of social problems and
evidence of moral decline more openly. This fits in with the campaign
against the "six vices" (liu hal) and critiques of the unacceptable side
effects of the reform program. Thus, one commonly finds articles on
prostitution, pornography, unmarried couples living together, female
and child abduction and homosexuality, to name a few, in the widely
circulated press, particularly magazines for youth. Although such
prurient reading material not incidentally is also good for circulation-the market still rules in the highly competitive field of
magazines for teenagers-at least some of these stories in the past
would have been relegated to internally circulated and specialized
journals for scholars and political workers.
Despite the clear decline of serious work on Chinese public opinion, it is still possible to find studies of political attitudes and socialization of college students in open academic journals. Tables 3-8 are
drawn from a survey conducted by a Fudan University researcher
among 150 students (200 questionnaires were distributed), including
graduate students and undergraduates representing entering classes
from 1985 to 1988. Among the findings, one notes an indifference to
politics (Table 3) and a strong concern with material success (Table 8).
Interestingly, there is also a strong feeling that students should be engaged in politics (Table 5) and that the indifference noted may not
represent the true picture (Table 4). It is also striking that only 2.7
percent were "very confident" about the future of reform (Table 6)
and that a majority admitted that the strong desire to go abroad was
related to the slow pace of reform (Table 7). These results are quite
similar to what one hears from interviewees.
31. Zhongguo qingnian bao, December 11, 1989, p. 3.
32. China News Analysis, No. 1395, October 15, 1989, p. 8, from Renmin Ribao,Ju1y 1,
1989.
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TABLE3
WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING
EXPRESSION: "NOWADAYS UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ARE
INDIFFERENT TO POLmCS''?

Strongly Agree
Generally Agree
Agree Somewhat
Disagree
Firmly Oppose
Other

N = 150
22.4%
21.8%
25.9%
21.1%
5.4%
3.4%

Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang.
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions,
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989,
p. 53.

TABLE 4
FROM WHAT YOU'VE SEEN AND HEARD, WHAT IS YOUR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCERN UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS NOW HAVE TOWARD CURRENT EVENTS
(REFORM AND THE OPEN POLICY)?

Very Concerned
Superficially Unconcerned, But Deep Down Very
Concerned
Not Too Concerned
Very Unconcerned
Other

N = 150
11.3%
36.2%
40.4%
5.7%
6.4%

Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, ''Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang,
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions,
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989,
p. 53.
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TABLE 5
DO YOU FEEL THAT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS SHOULD
ACI'IVELY DISCUSS AND PARTICIPATE IN POLmCS?
N = 150

Definitely Should
Should
Should Not
Can't Say For Sure
Other

33.8%
41.4%
6.2%
14.5%
4.1%

Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang,
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions,
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989,
p. 53.

TABLE 6
DO YOU HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE
FUTURE OF REFORM?
N

Very Confident
Confident
Can't Say For Sure
No Confidence
Other

=

150
2.7%
37.4%
38.8%
14.9%
6.2%

Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang,
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions,
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989,
p. 53.
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TABLE 7
WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING
EXPRESSION: "THE CRAZE TO GO ABROAD THESE
DAYS IS A REACI'ION TO THE SLUGGISH
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE REFORMS"?

Agree
There's Some Truth In This
Disagree
Firmly Oppose
Other

N = 150
20.4%
36.8%
32.7%
6.1%
4.0%

Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang,
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions,
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989,
p. 53.

TABLE 8
THE THINGS OF MOST INTEREST TO STUDENTS
THESE DAYS
N = 150
31.0%
27.3%
25.7%
8.6%
1.6%

Finding A Good Job
Making Money
Going Abroad
Love and Romance
Doing Well In Studies

Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang.
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions,
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989,
p. 53.

CONCLUSION
Following the 1986-87 student demonstrations, Vice-director of
the State Education Commission, He Dongchang, could note blithely
that only 2 percent of China's college students had taken part. Thus,
publicly at least, they were viewed as unrepresentative of the mainstream of the student body. No such claim could be made in 1989.
Official accounts noted that 2. 8 million students from 600 institutions
of higher learning in 80 cities had taken to the streets. In the aftermath, many culprits had been found. The CYL was one of the first
organizations to be blamed, with the league and its media arms, such
as Chinese Youth Daily, scheduled for revamping even before the June
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4 denouement. 33 In a post-mortem, entitled "Ten Weaknesses of Ideological Work for Young People," Chinese Youth reported on a survey
of 86 CYL cadres. One finding was that 73 percent of the cadres saw
youth work as only human relations (renqing gongzuo). Thus, they
won over their charges by being "good old boys," and joining the
youth in such activities as playing mah jongg, gambling and drinking.
Another problem was that the cadres simply did what the higher levels
told them, reading out documents as needed. One survey found that
more than 43 percent did not bother to prepare when teaching CYL
courses (tuanke}, so there was little real discussion. 34
This was part of a larger problem of recruiting and retaining
young and capable political workers. Tang Shaoming, director of the
Education Bureau under the Propaganda Department of the CPC
Central Committee, told a reporter that it was virtually impossible to
find anyone to do ideo-political work in universities who is around 30
years old. Those of that age might be willing to work two or three
years in such a post, but would then transfer to academic work or
enroll as post-graduate students at universities, leading to high turnover rates. 35 Partly because political work is seen as temporary, political workers "have regarded their greatest achievements as when
students do not cause trouble. " 36 Perhaps such defensiveness is not
surprising. During the 1989 demonstrations, CYL cadres were "slandered as 'traitors to students,' and denounced by big-character
posters." 37
It is difficult to see how political work can improve under current
conditions. Liu Zhengwei, party secretary in Guizhou province, suggested CYL cadres and other youth need to "read more good
books. " 38 He Dongchang, to his credit, seemed to have suggested the
opposite, at least from the current Chinese viewpoint, when he argued
that political workers would need to read and understand Western
Marxism and other recent theories, if they wanted to have an influence
on the students. Li Ruihuan, a member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee responsible for ideological work, has likewise advocated an enhanced role for political education, while admitting that
the form and methods suitable for such work remain to be
33. Daily Report, May 2, 1989, pp. 25-26 (South China Morning Post, May 2).
34. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 8, August 1989, pp. 27-28; Zhongguo qingnian bao, November 6, 1989, p. 3.
35. Daily Report, August 25, 1989, pp. 13-15 (Liaowang, August 14).
36. Daily Report, August 30, 1989, p. 28 (Guangming Ribao, August 23).
37. Daily Report, August 4, 1989, p. 22 (Guangming Ribao, July 23).
38. Daily Report, July 24, 1989, p. 63 (Radio Guiyang, July 23).
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discovered. 39
In the meantime, more practical means for controlling student
behavior are being used. The plan to allow a growing number of college graduates to find their own jobs has been suspended. Party and
government organs at or above the provincial level have been told that
they cannot, except in special circumstances, directly employ graduates or postgraduate students from institutions of higher learning.
Marxist training on university campuses has been intensified, with
clear indications that some Party and academic leaders are seeking to
expand these measures and reimpose political tests as a criterion in
university admissions, faculty hiring and selection of candidates for
overseas study. Following the dramatic political changes in the Soviet
Union, Chinese authorities announced stiff new regulations to control
student activities, including the requirement that college graduates
must work for five years before studying overseas, or else pay steep
fines. 40
Interviewees report that student behavior is being controlled most
effectively by the recentralization of the job assignment system. They
describe a situation somewhat reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution
when youth and their parents sought to avoid a posting to the rural
areas. The enhanced role of political workers in making these assignment decisions has contributed to the creation of a more compliant
student body. Still, there are reports in the overseas press of the less
than friendly questioning Chinese leaders have received when they
have ventured on the campuses, with Yuan Mu's difficulties at Beijing
University and Jiang Zemin's problems at Qinghua University most
widely reported.
The "craze" to go abroad has never been greater, although arecent Chinese regulation makes such overseas study increasingly difficult. The regulation divides students into three categories, according
to family background. In category one are the children or direct relatives of "the six kinds of people" (liulei renyuan ). These include:
(1) Overseas Chinese who have returned to live in China; (2) Overseas
Chinese residing overseas; (3) Hong Kong compatriots; (4) Macao
compatriots; (5) Taiwan compatriots; and, (6) Chinese with foreign
citizenship. Category two includes "non-direct" relatives of the "six
kinds of people." Category three are those not related to the "six
kinds of people."
39. Daily Report, October 23, 1989, pp. 18-19 (Xinhua, October 21).
40. Chronicle of Higher Education, October 4, 1989; Los Angeles Times, February 10,
1990; New York Times, February 8, 1990; Far Eastern Economic Review, August 24, 1989,
p. 13; Daily Report, August 22, 1989, p. 13 (Hong Kong Wen weipo, August 22).
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Those in category three must work for five years after university
graduation before applying to study abroad. Category two students
can avoid this work requirement by paying an "education fee"
(peiyang fez) as follows: 2,500 renminbi (rmb) per year for college students; 4,000 rmb per year for master's students; and, 6,000 rmb a year
for doctoral students. For the fortunate category one students, there is
neither a five-year work requirement nor an education fee. Those who
return to China within eight years can get a full refund of their education fee. 41 Interviewees report the craze to go abroad is now accompanied by the craze to discover long-lost relatives.
While these measures surely have affected overt behavior, regaining a constituency among China's youth will not be easy. One recent
survey conducted among Beijing University students by the Chinese
Political Consultative Committee reportedly found that only 20 percent expressed ideological accord with the current leadership; 40 percent said they would not be won over; and, 40 percent did not
respond. 42 A recent State Education Commission delegation to the
United States was unsuccessful in winning many converts among students studying abroad. Reportedly, the group virtually abandoned its
efforts after an abortive meeting with Chinese students at the University of Illinois.
Indeed, the views of overseas students toward the current regime
have been studied. Table 9 reports an intriguing, albeit highly unscientific, survey in which students currently abroad (the fifth generation) were asked to evaluate well-known figures who studied abroad in
the first four generations. They were given 11 names and asked to rate
each person from one to ten. Not surprisingly, Li Peng brings up the
rear, the small standard deviation suggesting there was little ambiguity
regarding China's premier. Deng Xiaoping, a far more controversial
figure, elicited the largest standard deviation, with respondents varying from a minimum score of zero to a maximum score of nine. Sun
Yat-sen, in a category by himself, was seen as making the greatest
contributions to China, while T.D. Lee, Zhou Enlai and Qian Xuesen
join Deng as "middle characters," with both supporters and
detractors.
41. IFCSS Liaison Office News Release, No. 63, March 14, 1990.
42. Xingdao ribao, December 26, 1989.
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TABLE 9
EVALUATION OF ELEVEN INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD
STUDIED ABROAD

Name
Sun Yat-sen
Fang Lizhi
Cai Yuanpei
LuXun
Hu Shi
T.D. Lee
Zhou Enlai
Qian Xuesen
Deng Xiaoping
Jiang Zemin
Li Peng

Average Point
Total
8.9
7.6
7.5
6.9
6.8
5.7
5.1
4.5
3.8
2.2
0.4

Standard
Deviation
1.28
1.57
1.29
1.95
1.42
2.13
2.46
2.30
2.57
1.89
0.93

N = "more than 80"
Minimum Maximum
Score
Score
10
4
3
10
4
10
0
10
3
10
0
9
0
10
0
10
0
9
0
7
0
5

Source: Xinwen ziyou daobao [Press Freedom Herald], November 30, 1989, p. 4.

12. CHINA AND AMERICA: BEYOND THE BIG CHILL*
Winston Lord

The Big Chill has descended over China. Sino-American relations are suffering. While we assess the ramifications, we must also
look beyond the crisis and sketch blueprints for a warmer climate, for
the present season will not long endure.
For two decades, five American administrations, of both parties,
have pursued positive relations with Beijing. They have done so without illusions and with a firm grasp of the strategic and bilateral stakes.
Only a small minority of Americans has opposed cooperation and they
now point to recent events as vindication of their views. They have it
exactly wrong. Not only has the United States derived enormous benefits from this relationship, but in the process it has encouraged and
strengthened the very forces for greater openness and freedom in
China that shone so brightly last April and May.
The fabric of our ties has shown impressive sturdiness since we
first reopened the door in 1971. Both nations have weathered political
earthquakes and tremors. Successive leaders in China and America,
who have deeply disagreed among themselves on other issues, have all
agreed it is in the national interest to expand bilateral bonds.
Naturally there have been plateaus and detours during our journey. Now we are circling back as we confront the most treacherous
terrain yet. It is to President Bush's great credit that he has sought to
keep our longer-term interests in view even as we register our revulsion, as we must, at the sorry spectacle unfolding on the mainland.
II

Let me begin on a personal note of profound sadness, for the tragedy inflicted on the Chinese people, for the dimming of Deng Xiaoping's vision in the twilight of his remarkable odyssey, for the
necessity to address these issues. I do so with the anguish both of a
professional who has for 20 years promoted Sino-American relations
and as a friend of China's leaders.
I subscribe to the virtue of sticking by old friends, especially when
they are in difficulty, as the Chinese did, for example, with President
• Reprinted by permission of the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., dated
November 9, 1989, from Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No.4, Fall 1989, pp. 1-26.
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Nixon and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan. I have greatly
admired the courageous, historic achievements of Deng and his associates. While I consider the encouragement of human rights an important dimension of our foreign policy, I also weigh heavily the
geopolitical and economic factors. As a former ambassador and holding many professional and personal ties to the Chinese, my strong natural impulse is to refrain from commenting on China's internal
difficulties.
Nevertheless I have spoken out strongly against the actions of the
Chinese regime since the spring, as it proceeded from intransigence to
massacre, from roundups to executions and repression, all cloaked in a
most brazen display of the Big Lie. My condemnation has been harsh
because I am appalled at what the Chinese government has done and
continues to do--this is not merely scandal or corruption. I believe
that especially those of us who have worked for Sino-American relations need to speak to-- and for-the vast legions of the Chinese people, including not only those who are purged, vilified and silenced, but
also those in leading positions who once more must swallow their convictions and regurgitate the current Party line. Surely these "old
friends" deserve our loyalty more than the handful of those responsible for crushing Chinese spirits. I am persuaded that in the relatively
near future there will once again be a Chinese regime composed of
people with whom we can resume the forward march in our
relationship.
III
The most cold-blooded observer would have difficulty justifying
the Chinese government's policies since June. If the students and their
broad phalanx of supporters had used violence or set out to overthrow
the Party, one could have understood a firm response. But for weeks
the Chinese people displayed truly extraordinary moderation, discipline and goodwill.
In Beijing and other cities throughout the nation, huge numbers
demonstrated daily without causing a single death or committing an
act of violence. The authorities, whether by design or paralysis, also
showed great restraint. Those on the streets chose the only avenues of
expression open to them. They wished to work within the system,
seeking gradual reform in the context of communist rule, indeed promoting the very goals the Party had proclaimed. They petitioned for
rights set forth in the Chinese constitution. At the beginning no one
attacked the leadership or called for Western-style democracy. For
weeks the students' platform boiled down to two concrete requests: an
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acknowledgment that the demonstrators were patriotic and a dialogue
between genuine student leaders and the political leaders.
Meeting these two requests, as then Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang
and many other leading figures were willing to do, would have defused
the crisis. It would also have ushered in a new, hopeful chapter for
China. There could have followed serious attacks on corruption, a
freer press, the initiation of genuine exchanges between the authorities
and the intellectual elites who were prepared, as always in Chinese
history, to serve their nation. The inevitable transition pains of moving from one economic system to another could have been better understood and tolerated by the people. Possible solutions to complex
issues could have been better aired in the media and among the elites.
There could have evolved a greater sense of participation in decisions
by the urban population. And all could have felt a greater sense of
Party accountability.
Instead, a few elders-fearing chaos or at least a slippery slope
toward a Chinese "Solidarity" movement, defining stability as the suppression of dissent instead of gradual reform, clinging to power above
all - chose to squash the peaceful demonstration, to "kill chickens to
scare monkeys" and to haul China back 20 years to terror and Orwellian groupthink. There have been sickening replays of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution: wholesale fabrications;
exhortations to tum on one's fellow citizens; brainwashing in schools,
offices and factories; widespread fear of speaking one's mind; andsomewhat scaled down-the cult of personality, studying the chairman's thoughts and blaming troubles on outside influence.
In response to foreign condemnation, Beijing has started masking
its reprisals. Executions and arrests are no longer trumpeted; foreign
journalists are expelled; contacts for foreigners are frozen; the glare of
the world's attention is all but extinguished. The regime strives to
present a more benign face to the world through a controlled press,
endless reiteration of lies and distortions and seizing upon technical
errors in foreign reporting. Unfortunately, this has some effect in certain Western quarters. But for countless Chinese the nightmare of interrogations, harassment, arrests, disappearances and indoctrination
continues. The summer's events may not be as bloody as those in
early June, but their range is wider, their effect more insidious.
This is all the more tragic for having been unnecessary. Theregime could have maintained, indeed enhanced, its authority and legitimacy through rather modest conciliatory gestures. Instead, an ossified
leadership proved incapable of comprehending and adjusting to the
social and political changes its own economic reforms had generated.
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As a result, it has lost the "mandate of heaven" and radicalized some
of the opposition. Former President Nixon-architect of the opening
of China, a close friend of the Chinese leaders and no sentimentalistdescribed the crackdown as not only "shockingly cruel" but also "incredibly stupid."
As of this writing the regime's grip seems firm. But, as is seen so
often in China and recently in other totalitarian states, the surface
does not necessarily reflect reality. This spring [1989]'s movement
was spontaneous and sweeping in its scope. It will be recorded as a
major event in Chinese history. In cities throughout China not only
students, workers and ordinary citizens, but Party and government officials, leading journalists, top think-tankers and innovative entrepreneurs joined in. These forces are the political cutting edge of China
and precisely those sectors most crucial for reforms and the opening.
The Chinese leadership cannot round up and shut up these people and
at the same time hope to modernize the nation and obtain foreign
assistance. The urban population may be temporarily cowed, but people are angry, sullen and ready to tum to more enlightened leaders in
the future.
Furthermore, there are clear splits within the political leadership
itself. Not only those who have been purged but many still holding
official positions would have strongly preferred conciliation to crackdown. Important elements of the Chinese military also spoke out
against martial law and refused to move against the demonstrators.
Some fell into line only out of personal loyalty to Deng. Many officers
resented being dragged from their march toward professionalism back
into politics; many harbor shame over the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the June massacre.
Economic pressures on the regime will intensify. Before this
spring there were already serious problems: an overheated economy,
inflation, unemployment, bottlenecks in energy, raw materials and
transportation, and income disparities. Rampant nepotism and corruption were souring the populace. All of this has now been compounded by the dislocation of recent months and the prospect of a
more resentful, inefficient work force, spending long hours in sterile
political sessions. Subsidies will be needed to keep urban workers and
peasants quiet; in a nonproductive economy this will boost inflation
even higher. We will see the stifling of initiative and the increased
bucking of decisions to the top; normally cautious bureaucrats will be
even more fearful of making politically incorrect decisions. Dealing
with foreigners is riskier than ever. Key economic thinkers and actors
have fled or are intimidated.
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The crucial assistance provided by the outside world is being
erased in reaction to what the communique of the recent economic
summit in Paris referred to as China's "violent repression." Government actions by the United States, Europe, Japan and others are suspending military cooperation and slowing economic assistance,
technology transfers and investment. International financial institutions are postponing badly needed loans. There has been a severe impact on the psyches as well as the wallets of Hong Kong, Taiwan and
South Korea. Most important are the thousands of decisions by private individuals around the world-businessmen cancelling or stretching out trade and investment projects; intellectuals freezing scientific,
·cultural and academic exchanges; tourists staying away from China in
droves; and Chinese students, scientists and scholars refusing to return
to their homeland. China's balance-of-payments position will be extremely shaky as key sources of foreign exchange dwindle sharplyexports, foreign investment, tourism and loans.
In a few brief months the Chinese leaders have lost the respect,
confidence and credibility they had garnered during the past decade.
Their assurances on a whole range of issues will not be as readily accepted. They have squandered their special standing in world affairs.
They have shaken the view that China's entry into the international
economic, security and intellectual systems should be encouraged and
facilitated.
All these forces will build against the strange and fragile coalition
in Beijing, consisting of central actors whose age will soon sweep them
from the stage, elder gurus who resist both reforms and outside intluence, opportunistic figureheads and closet moderates.
IV

The best way to understand the reality in China today is to tum
the official line upside down. For "the situation is stable" read the
situation is precarious. For "broad consensus" substitute fierce disagreement. For "the people love the army" understand that the people
hate the army units engaged in the suppression. "A small band"
means massive numbers and "hooligans and ruffians" translates into
law-abiding citizens from all walks of life. When a handful of people
are shown on television turning in their neighbors to the authorities,
millions of others are refusing to do so or are helping the hunted escape. When Chinese are shown earnestly studying the chairman's
speeches, they are really numb with boredom and cynicism. The authorities vigorously proclaim the continuation of reforms and opening
to the outside world. The reality is that ten years of heartening pro-
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gress has been shattered in a few weeks, and China's drive for modernization has been dealt savage body blows that will take years to heal.
No one can predict how the Chinese panorama will unreel in the
near term. Much depends on the sequence in which key aging leaders
depart. The current discredited regime is clearly a transitional one. It
is not clear how fully it can extend its writ to all comers of China,
especially in the south near Hong Kong. There may be some interim
shuffling of the political deck among hard-line coalitions. There will
probably be future power struggles. It is at least possible that, echoing
Chinese history, central authority will disintegrate and some form of
regionalism will take hold.
But we can be confident that, however grim the interlude, a more
enlightened leadership will emerge within a few years. And we can be
absolutely sure that when that day comes, the official Chinese line will
manage to rewrite history once again. 1 Next time it will approximate
the truth. The true criminals and the true martyrs will then be recognized in party pronouncements-as they are already known by Chinese urban dwellers and people around the world.
In short, what we see in China today is not what we will see
within a few years. As the British historian R.H. Tawney noted in
1931: "Political forces in China recall Chinese rivers. The pressure on
the dam is enormous but unseen, and it is not till it bursts that the
strain is realized."
It may well tum out that the tragic events in China this year
[1989] have foreshortened that great nation's march toward democracy. The forecast had been for gradual, spasmodic progress toward a
freer society, impelled by the demands of a more market-oriented
economy and growing interaction with the world. Now, after experiencing the giddy liberating weeks of last spring that preceded the
great leap backward, the Chinese people may not settle for incremental advance.
Once the hard-liners leave, we may see a more determined move
toward pluralism and openness. To be sure, China will not become
like a Western democracy. Like the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
it will face a perilous transition from one system to another. But by
the end of the century the Chinese may well enjoy a freer press, a more
highly developed legal system and a more open political process than
would have been the case without the dark phase now being endured.
As the current leaders themselves have said, the agony of the Cull. In 1978 Deng himself insisted that the 1976 Tiananmen Square demonstrations
supporting him be redefined as a popular uprising rather than as a counterrevolution.
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tural Revolution made possible the decade of reform. It became clear
that pragmatism and international cooperation had to replace ideological frenzy and xenophobia. Chairman Deng, who together with his
family was a victim of that madness, boldly led his nation on a new
path. He himself repeatedly proclaimed the need for younger people
to take over for the next phase of China's Long March. Sadly, he did
not see this mission through. Had he succeeded, his historic legacy
would not have been sullied by recent events.
The current agony, like the Cultural Revolution, may well propel
China forward again. It is clear that political reform must accompany
economic reform. We now know that it is too much to expect the
octogenarians to lead the country to new frontiers. It will require the
fresh vision and flexibility of a younger generation.

v
What of the Big Chill's effect on relations with the United States?
Certainly we are experiencing the most serious setback since 1971.
American global diplomacy will be hampered, significantly in some
areas. Many bilateral edifices, painstakingly constructed, have been
tom down or left uncompleted. But since our mutual long-term interests remain and the bilateral foundations we have laid are broad, I
believe the relationship will weather the shocks.
Prudence, however, requires a careful assessment of the damage.
On the international front, Moscow has predictably sought to make
gains at Washington's expense by adopting a restrained attitude toward China's brutal repression. On the heels of the May Sino-Soviet
summit in Beijing, Mikhail Gorbachev has been deliberately currying
favor with Chinese leaders, encouraging them to compare his "understanding" with the attitudes of the moralistic, meddlesome West, in
particular the United States.
The Middle Kingdom's prickly leaders are calibrating the tone of
their relations with various countries according to their rhetorical and
policy stances. Some key Chinese figures remain more comfortable
with central planning than with market forces. Beijing may seek to
unnerve the West by suggesting further movement toward Moscow.
We will probably see more Sino-Soviet meetings, trade and exchanges,
additional progress on their border negotiations and increased consultation on regional conflicts.
Such developments are not cost free, but neither should they be
cause for undue concern. The same underlying limits to Sino-Soviet
rapprochement that existed before the Gorbachev-Deng meeting will
remain. The 4,500-mile Sino-Soviet border-the site of past clashes
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and restless, overlapping ethnic minorities-will not disappear. The
Pacific Ocean that reassuringly separates China and America will not
shrink.
Chinese authorities may be very adept at rewriting history but
they will not blot out tsarist territorial grabs or Soviet perfidies.
Under Gorbachev, direct threats and tensions have eased. But the
long-term geopolitical pressures of neighboring Soviet proxies and
friends in Vietnam, Afghanistan, India, Mongolia and North Korea
will persist. Finally, Beijing's overwhelming preoccupation well into
the next century will be economic development and modernization.
Only the United States, Europe and Japan can provide the capital,
technology, markets and managerial savvy that China urgently requires. The Soviet Union's disastrous economy, lagging technology
and limited barter trade provide no alternatives.
Chinese leaders, of whatever stripe on domestic issues, are united
in their basic world orientation. However intense their irritation with
Washington, they will continue to take the long-range view toward
security and development. The PLA is particularly suspicious of the
Soviet Union; it will look forward to resuming cooperation with the
United States and Western Europe. Beijing will not wish to further
jeopardize Western cash and computers by excessive flirtation with
Moscow.
It is to the carefully built process of consultation on international
issues that Washington's current estrangement from Beijing causes the
most serious political damage. In recent years both countries have
striven hard to broaden the scope of discussions, and both have reaped
substantial dividends. America and China kept each other posted on
their developing ties with the Soviet Union. Beijing provided constant
reassurance, and Washington reflected Chinese (as well as Japanese
and Korean) views in its final position on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Moscow, eliminating intermediate missiles in
Asia as well as Europe. Due to America's energetic representations,
China ceased sending Silkworm missiles to Iran and instilled confidence that it would not ship intermediate ballistic missiles to others
after its one-time deal with Saudi Arabia.
For several years China has been shifting toward a responsible
stance on nuclear nonproliferation. Despite significant commercial
complexities, the United States agreed to launch American satellites
on Chinese rockets. Both countries cooperated very closely on evicting Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The Chinese moved somewhat
toward the U.S. position that the Khmer Rouge be prevented from
regaining power in Cambodia. They facilitated direct dialogue be-
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tween the United States and North Korea in Beijing and forged commercial links with South Korea. For the first time in a century,
Tokyo, Beijing and Washington have all enjoyed cordial relations with
one another. At the United Nations, Chinese representatives were
more cooperative on issues ranging from the Gulf War to Namibia.
The Chinese showed restraint on Central America. They cultivated
ties with Israel.
Clearly Beijing made these various moves for its own reasons.
Just as clearly, our exchanges at all levels have paid off in greater mutual understanding and some adjustments in our respective positions.
While the chill in our relations continues, we will lose the benefits
of this process. Our direct influence on Chinese policies will shrivel.
The pursuit of some of our international objectives will be more arduous. Problems on which we already have differences could become
more acute and the tone of discourse could become nastier.
Nevertheless Beijing will, as always, conduct an independent foreign policy based on hardheaded calculations. It will not alter its approach on key issues to spite the United States. The degree of Chinese
warmth toward Moscow and Washington may shift- but not the fundamental geopolitical equations. History and geography will not
change.
Meanwhile, our two countries will continue to pursue compatible
policies on certain issues, but generally in parallel, not in concert.
They will result from independent assessments of respective national
interests, not from steady consultations and mutual education.
In the military sphere all sales, technology transfers, visits and
exchanges are halted in their tracks. While some economic, commercial and scientific exchanges continue, they decline sharply as trips and
programs are cancelled or postponed. The suspension of all high-level
government contacts aborts new official initiatives.
Moreover, the great bulk of these activities are conducted in the
private sector. Based on both practical and moral grounds, thousands
of individual decisions every week are wiping out or stretching out
trade deals, investment and scientific plans. In the cultural and academic areas, from ballet companies to art exhibits, from journalistic
exchanges to student exchanges, a host of promising projects are dying
or placed in cold storage.
VI

Such are the by-products-costly to both sides-of the Chinese
authorities' actions. The Bush Administration was given no choice
but to express national outrage and halt cooperation in various fields.
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American values and practical considerations dictated this response.
Public opinion was rightly incensed through television exposure, and
the views of key allies matched our own. It was also important-a
point not widely noticed-to paint a precedent to advise Moscow, as it
fashions its own responses to the Soviet internal stresses.
At the same time the administration has wisely chosen to suspend
rather than dismantle relationships. For a decade we have spun an
impressive web of legislation, umbrella agreements and consultative
mechanisms under which a broad range of visits and projects go forward. While many of these activities are frozen, the frameworks remain. Cabinet secretaries do not travel to Beijing but joint
commissions remain intact, pending resumption of efforts to increase
trade and investment. Specific scientific programs are temporarily
shelved but the basic protocols remain valid. Cultural and academic
exchanges are canceled but the broad bilateral agreements are preserved for a more auspicious climate. One day we will once again
learn from each other.
This is a difficult period for government and private decisionmakers alike. There is no clear road map as we feel our way
through an ambiguous passage. We cannot practice business as usual;
nor do we wish to destroy all the structures in place. We do not seek
to hurt the Chinese people, but we also do not want to hand the leaders photo-opportunities depicting normalcy.
In this context it is difficult to generalize; an ad hoc approach is
unavoidable. We face a period of sanctions, holding actions, carrots
and sticks and damage limitation. If a Stalinist-type regime persists
over time, we will have no choice but to hunker down and wait it out
as best we can. It is certainly appropriate to cease cooperation in areas
that carry strong symbolism, such as the military. This holds as well
for those commercial or scientific projects that benefit the Chinese
more than us or in cases where we have solid alternatives.
Many areas, however, pose complex choices. We cannot expect
American businesses to write off years of hard work and hard cash
when they are playing for the long run in any event. If, in principle,
the U.S. government forgoes extending special help to its private sector's efforts in China, what if foreign competitors were to exploit this
restraint to their advantage?
Moreover, it is not simply a matter of our policies but also the
practical results of Chinese policies. In general, I would like to see
academic and cultural ties maintained. But how can there be productive conferences with Chinese intellectuals when they are not free to
express their real views? If Washington seeks to continue bringing fu-
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ture Chinese leaders to the United States under auspices like the immensely successful International Visitors Program of the U.S.
Information Agency, will Beijing let them come? Should American
scholars, such as those in the Fulbright program, continue to go to
China, even if their access will be severely curtailed? Should cultural
groups convey American art to eager audiences when they will be exploited by the Chinese media?
The United States cannot fully restore ties with China until those
responsible for the June debacle and its aftermath are no longer at the
helm. In the meantime we face the practical question of how to conduct policy. The ingredients of U.S. policy should depend on the actions of the Beijing regime. It is impossible as well as unwise to draw
up rigid standards or precise calibrations between actions by China
and moves by the United States. Let me nevertheless sketch some criteria to guide U.S. policy. Here are some suggestions of steps by the
Chinese authorities that might invite positive responses:
-[the] lifting [of] martial law in Beijing and Tibet; 2
-cessation and rollback of the imprisonment, persecution
and execution of the peaceful demonstrators and their
supporters;
-conciliatory gestures, tolerance of debate and genuine dialogue with the disaffected;
-termination of the ideological campaigns against foreign
ideas;
-reopening of access to foreign media, including the Voice
of America;
-revival of foreign exchanges of students and others;
-resumption of the commitment to economic and political
reform;
-restoration of a climate in which Chinese and foreign professionals (journalists, businessmen, scholars and such)
can meet international standards in their dealings on Chinese soil;
-confidence that U.S. presence and access in China does not
endanger Chinese friends;
-serious efforts by the Chinese government to acknowledge
the damage it has done to its international credibility, for
example, by renegotiating aspects of the draft fundamental
law on Hong Kong's governance after 1997 now being
considered by the National People's Congress;
2. Martial law in Beijing and Tibet was lifted in early 1990.
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-evidence over a sustained time that China is honoring its
previous statements on such issues as missile sales, nuclear
nonproliferation, stability in Korea, progress toward a settlement in Cambodia and patience on the Taiwan issue. 3
While we must not condone what has happened and is happening
in China, we must not totally isolate the Chinese and rip out all the
roots that we have so carefully nurtured. We need to find a way to
balance our objectives of expressing near-term censure and holding
open long-term cooperation with an enlightened leadership. While
salvaging the framework, we must sustain indignation. In this process
we should maintain contact with those who don masks but share our
concerns. We should try to lighten the gloom for the Chinese people.
The impact of our policies may be modest, but it will be magnified if
we can preserve unity between Congress and the administration at
home and cohesion with our allies abroad.
To be sure, the revival of broad cooperation will not be automatic
or facile even with a moderate government in the future. Scars will
remain. Trust will have to be rebuilt. The assumption of long-term
political stability in China that has grown during the past decade has
been rudely shaken. Traders and investors will be more prone to
hedge their bets and to swerve to other markets. Cultural and academic leaders will harbor uneasiness about future winds of xenophobia. And China may have forfeited its special status in certain U.S.
government projects.
I believe nevertheless that there are grounds for longer-term optimism. A vast network of official, professional and personal contacts
has been created. The key Chinese interlocutors are precisely those
elements who supported-and will support-the aspirations for a
freer, more open society. They are shackled now from expressing their
views and dealing with foreigners, but they are eager to resume cooperation and will do so once a progressive regime takes hold.
History is on their side. Gone forever is the time when the Middle Kingdom could shut out the barbarians behind great walls of indifference or condescension. Too many doors have been opened. Even
hard-line leaders understand China's desperate need for foreign capital, technology and markets (indeed they have been avidly seeking to
regain lost ground by trying to project an image of business as usual).
No nation can prosper in the age of information and technology without opening up within and to the world outside. No government prop3. I am indebted to Professor Michel Oksenberg of the University of Michigan for his
thoughts on these criteria.
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aganda can erase years of images of relative progress elsewhere around
the globe--conveyed by television sets reaching over 800 million Chinese, by millions of tourists, including overseas Chinese, by tho?sands
of businessmen, scientists and scholars, and by the elite of China returning from more promising lands.
Americans in turn have every incentive to resume progress with
China when conditions allow. A more moderate government in Beijing will need-and deserve--outside cooperation. We should then
move vigorously to energize a wide range of contacts and programs
that are now on hold. This will not be a favor to China but rather to
ourselves.

VII
When this more hopeful time arrives, the fundamental challenges-and promises-that the United States and China faced in
their relationship until the spring of 1989 will resurface:
-to recast geopolitical cooperation in a more ambiguous
world;
-to expand economic links even while grappling with
transitions;
-to reap more fruit than friction from the mingling of two
cultures.
Let us look at the context and contours of a fully renewed relationship down the road, noting the transformation in the international
landscape since the 1970s.
After redressing the Soviet-American strategic balance in the
early 1980s, Washington is now moving energetically with Moscow to
reduce and stabilize arms across the spectrum. Facing immense
problems at home and confronted by firmness abroad, Gorbachev
seeks to cut the costs of Soviet foreign adventures. Both Washington
and Beijing have taken advantage of these conditions to improve relations with Moscow. Triangular diplomacy is thus blurred.
As the relative positions of the superpowers decline in the military sphere, new centers of wealth and stability emerge. China has
asserted itself forcefully on this new world stage: increasing trade,
selling arms, launching satellites and projecting power. Its domestic
trauma and the international reaction are cramping Beijing's diplomacy right now. But this is transitory. With a more benign regime,
China's full weight will once again be felt.
Other trends, mostly positive, have radically altered the international context of Sino-American relations. There has been movement

242

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

on several regional conflicts, Afghanistan and Cambodia, for instance.
On the Korean peninsula, economic contacts and tentative dialogues
have begun among the major outside powers and between North and
South Korea. Fragile cease-fires are in place in the Persian Gulf and
southwest Africa. In Central America and the Middle East, there is at
least more fluidity. Dramatic reforms unfold in Eastern Europe.
Finally, historic forces are shrinking the globe and loosening up
many of its societies. We ride a scientific and information revolution.
Countries receptive to new ideas and technologies forge ahead, while
closed, controlled societies fall behind. Democracy and the market
economy are gaining everywhere, while totalitarianism and Marxism
are fading fast. Most of these trends should continue into the next
century. They will inevitably affect how China and America relate
and react to one another.
Conventional wisdom holds that stra~egic factors in the SinoAmerican relationship are dwindling in importance. I strongly disagree. To be sure, this dimension will be more muted and nuanced than
it was in the 1970s. But references to "triangles" and "cards" were
misleading even then. While Beijing and Washington will seek further
improvement in ties with Moscow, both capitals will also continue to
share a stake in preserving global and regional balances. As Chairman
Deng made clear to President Bush last February, the history and geography of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Japanese relations will not change.
Nor will the traditional Chinese approach of balancing near powers
with far powers. Nor will America's convictions that no country, or
set of countries, should dominate Asia or the world, and that China's
integrity is essential for world equilibrium.
In this context, the United States and China should keep each
other informed once again on their respective dealings with the Soviet
Union, to prevent miscalculations and increase the prospects for international stability.
Indochina will remain an area of tension, if not conflict, for many
years. China and the United States share a strong interest in preventing Vietnamese domination of the region. Together with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and other interested countries, the
United States should ensure that the Vietnamese truly evacuate Cambodia and do not rule it by proxy. Washington will need to continue
encouraging Beijing to support the noncommunist factions led by
Prince Norodom Sihanouk and to exert its influence to control the
Khmer Rouge. This will entail an eventual halt of Chinese aid to the
Khmer Rouge; the Chinese might also provide exile to some of its
most murderous leaders.
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No easing of tensions in the Korean peninsula will be possible
without China's constructive role. Washington should seek Beijing's
ongoing contributions: restrain the North Koreans, increase ties with
the South Koreans and abet the U.S. embryonic dialogue with
Pyongyang.
The situation in the South Asian subcontinent is particularly
fluid. For years Washington worked intimately with Beijing to drive
Soviet forces from Afghanistan. China and the United States are modestly improving relations with India, while maintaining close links
with Pakistan. Nowhere is the risk of nuclear proliferation more acute
than in the interplay among India, Pakistan and China. This complex
terrain will require sustained Sino-American exchanges.
Tokyo, Beijing and Washington have been building positive ties
with each other. Japan will remain an important U.S. ally and most
important friend in Asia. Washington should consult closely with Tokyo about policy toward China so as to avoid shocks like those of the
early 1970s. At the same time, it should strive to reduce suspicion and
foster understanding among the three states. This process is crucial
for regional stability, easing the transition that is being caused by Japan's economic juggernaut, emerging political influence and growing
military clout.
Chinese influence outside Asia is less central. It will demand attention, however, given China's role in the United Nations, its more
expansive diplomacy and its arms sales. Nowhere is this clearer than
in the Middle East. China was moderately helpful in bringing about a
cease-fire in the Persian Gulf. It has delivered huge amounts of weapons, including ballistic missiles, to the area. It would play a part in a
U.N.-sponsored Middle East peace conference. Other regional issues
such as southern Africa and Central America would also benefit from
steadier Sino-American dialogue.
The most serious problem in bilateral relations during my tenure
as ambassador was the sale of Chinese missiles to Third World countries. Beijing had its reasons for resisting our representations: it
gained international influence from the sales; its profits helped finance
an impoverished PLA. No country willingly gives another a veto on
its arms policy; China charged us with double standards in our approach to various countries, and its global arms sales were very modest compared to ours, the Soviets' and the Europeans'. Yet, largely as
a result of our persistent demarches and discussions, the Chinese took
constructive actions. I regard these as prime examples of the tangible
benefits to be derived from serious exchanges with China on international topics.
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This issue is far from settled, however. Numerous questions remain about defining intermediate missiles, unstable regions and unsavory recipients. We face very real dangers that these destabilizing
weapons will find their way into volatile areas. The arms trade is emphatically a global problem; we must work with a host of potential
suppliers and recipients. China is crucial to any successful effort to
stem the tide of proliferation.
When conditions permit, the United States should search for new
areas of cooperation. We have been heartened by recent Chinese collaboration in halting the flow of drugs. Increasing these joint efforts
would not only help meet this problem but earn Beijing some sorely
needed goodwill in America where drugs are a rampant plague. So
too would Chinese efforts to help attack the scourge of international
terrorism. Still another potential new area for beneficial exchange
would be cleaning up the world's environment.

vm
On the international scene, therefore, China and the United
States have been friends but not allies. Both countries share parallel
interests and pursue compatible, if not collaborative, policies on many
issues, especially in Asia. On other questions they disagree, sometimes
fundamentally, sometimes on tactical approaches toward similar ends.
Against this backdrop the United States gradually developed military ties with China. This dimension is a natural component of a
relationship expanding across the board. Neither country threatens
the other, and both have been building friendly links in other sectors
of their societies. The United States and China share common perceptions on the necessity for Asian and global military balances. Washington has judged a secure, modernizing and humanely governed
China to be a force for stability. The Chinese have looked to the West
to help their defense modernization. To be sure, the United States
must be sensitive to the perceptions of others, whether in southeast
Asia or across the Taiwan Straits. Beijing and Washington have some
diverging national interests. Their domestic systems profoundly differ.
Thus the United States has measured its tread. Military cooperation has proceeded carefully on three tracks: high-level visits, functional exchanges and technology transfers. Trips by defense ministers,
chiefs of staffs and heads of services provide opportunities to discuss
the geopolitical scene, give impetus to ongoing programs and map out
future cooperation. Functional military exchanges implement agreements reached at higher levels. The United States has shared information in many fields ranging from strategy to tactics, from systems to
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equipment and from medicine to academic training. U.S. and Chinese
ships have visited each other's ports, and U.S. Thunderbirds have
soared in Chinese skies. These exchanges represent the most important aspect of defense cooperation between the United States and
China; they forge mutual understanding, personal ties and constituencies for a strong bilateral relationship.
The United States has not pushed arms on the Chinese. On the
contrary, it has considered their requests on a case-by-case basis and
has turned aside many inquiries because of concern over exporting advanced technology or projection capability. U.S. military sales are
strictly limited to defensive weapons, and to date they add up to about
$800 million in long-term programs.
In response to the events of June, President Bush correctly singled out the military relationship as the leading area in which to halt
Sino-U.S. cooperation. This action was appropriate symbolically, because of the PLA's role in suppressing the demonstrators. And it provides possible leverage for those Chinese, including those in the
military, who wish to follow a more moderate course--they can point
to the loss of U.S. cooperation in the modernization of the PLA as one
of the costs of a repressive policy.
Presumably, military ties will be one of the last parts of the SinoU.S. relationship to return to its previous course. But when the
United States again advances with China on a broad front, they will
clearly serve U.S. interests.

IX
High on the Chinese political agenda is the question of Taiwan.
The most senior American officials in successive administrations have
pledged to abide by the three joint Sino-American communiques of the
past two decades and adhere to the principle of one China.
For years Beijing has urged Washington to promote reconciliation between the mainland and Taiwan. The United States has demurred, stating that this is a process that must be worked out
peacefully by the two sides themselves. While the United States will
therefore not advocate specific avenues of reconciliation, neither will it
obstruct them; it has explicitly welcomed the remarkable surge in
trade and contacts that has occurred in the past two years across the
Taiwan Straits.
The soundness of the U.S. position has been evident. There has
recently been little tension between Beijing and Washington on this
question, although it remains a matter of fundamental principle to the
Chinese. Taiwan, feeling secure, has continued its astonishing eco-
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nomic progress and initiated political reforms. There has been almost
no debate in the United States. Meanwhile Taiwan and the mainland
have been reaching out peacefully toward each other through the exchange of goods and people.
It is still too early to assess the damage to Taiwan-mainland relations caused by the crackdown in China. Taipei has shown relative
restraint. Beijing has made only modest attempts to accuse Taiwan of
involvement in its turmoil. Nevertheless one could only expect the
people of Taiwan to recoil from the ugly scenes they have witnessed on
the mainland. It will be extremely difficult for future Chinese regimes
to make close association appear inviting to those living elsewhere.
The devastating impact on Hong Kong will cause further repercussions in Taiwan.
It would be a serious mistake to tamper with the balanced U.S.
approach, which has enjoyed broad bipartisan support and has worked
so well. For us to shift toward a two-China, or a one-China, oneTaiwan policy could wreck our relations with the People's Republic.
It could provide a dangerous situation in the Straits. It would undo
the solemn undertakings of five presidents of contrasting ideologies. It
would not find favor with the authorities in Taiwan who also subscribe
to a one-China policy. Whether conservative or moderate, whatever
their differences on other issues, the Chinese agree on one China-any
Beijing leader would be obligated to downgrade, perhaps sever, relations with Washington were there a fundamental U.S. shift on the Taiwan question. To anyone who grasps the long-term importance of
Sino-American relations the case for maintaining our successful posture on Taiwan is irrefutable.
The events since June, however, pose fresh dilemmas for U.S. policy. Substantial numbers of understandably angry Chinese intellectuals and students are at war with their own government, seeking
platforms in the United States, Europe, Hong Kong and elsewhere in
Asia from which to pursue their struggle. The United States was able
to reach a mutual accommodation with the Beijing government in the
1970s by promising, in effect, to disengage itself gradually and responsibly from the dispute between Taiwan and the mainland. In return
we expected the Chinese to pursue reconciliation by peaceful means
alone. That has been the thrust of American policy ever since.
In the months ahead, the United States faces a difficult balancing
act. On the one hand, we must offer refuge and moral support to the
Chinese who are threatened with political persecution due to their beliefs, and we must adhere to our obligations toward the people in Tai-
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wan. On the other hand, we should not inadvertently become deeply
engaged in Chinese domestic politics.
X

It is a melancholy irony that 1988, just before the Chinese great
leap backward, was the most positive year ever in Sino-American economic relations. Bilateral trade jumped forty percent to exceed $14
billion. Agricultural exports from the United States doubled to $1.2
billion. China was becoming our leading overseas market for wheat.
The P.R.C. became our thirteenth-largest trading partner; the United
States was China's second-largest export market. American investment leapt from 400 to 630 projects. With some $3.5 billion committed to China, the United States was the top outside investor after
Hong Kong.
Certainly there remained substantial obstacles to trade and investment, and Beijing's decisions in the summer of 1988 to cool the
economy and postpone reforms were casting shadows. Nevertheless, a
series of negotiations and agreements was laying the groundwork for
further expansion. After being stalled for years, the United States and
China broke through to a maritime agreement. Progress was made on
updating our civil aviation accord. With our allies in the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, we were steadily easing
controls over technology exports and were ready to extend a distribution licensing system to China. The Chinese were significantly improving their investment climate and were at last beginning to move
on protecting intellectual property rights. We were engaged in constructive talks concerning China's application for membership in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
This very promising advance in our economic relations has been
aborted for both practical and moral reasons. But as the United States
waits for a more benevolent climate, we can already identify our
longer-term objectives.
When China resumes its difficult transition from central planning
to market forces, we should encourage its reforms while recognizing
that their ultimate success depends on the Chinese themselves. Our
efforts in trade, technology and investment help China modernize and
become stronger.
Some question whether this bodes well for the United States. To
be sure, a more powerful China will present fresh challenges, especially for its neighbors. But it is decidedly in our interest to participate
in its development, and we should not leave the field to others. A
prosperous and stable China will be less subject to outside pressures
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and in a better position to help maintain a multipolar balance in Asia.
A China engaged in international markets and institutions will have
greater incentives to pursue a responsible foreign policy.
With these considerations in mind-and when the Chinese make
it possible--we will want to revive a broad economic relationship. For
our part this will include keeping open U.S. markets to Chinese goods,
transferring technology and encouraging China's participation in the
global economy.
For its part, a more enlightened Chinese regime will have to work
hard to attract foreign technology, capital and management skills.
The wounds of 1989 will not heal quickly. American companies will
be looking hard before leaping into investments. Beyond meeting the
necessary humane standards in their political system, Chinese authorities will need to resume the momentum toward a pluralistic market
economy and a trade and investment climate that is clear, fair and
sure. To these ends key moves will be: reducing high tariffs and import barriers; loosening controls over foreign exchange and import
licenses; allowing competition in the services sector; streamlining bureaucracy; ensuring consistent implementation of agreements.
The most difficult requirement for the Chinese, especially for its
elder leaders, may be to recognize that it cannot expect to attract and
exploit international science while excluding outside ideas. For much
of its recent history, China has attempted to gain foreign knowledge
without being contaminated by foreign culture. During the past 150
years this has proven to be very difficult. During the past decade of
reforms and opening to the world, the Chinese leaders have sought to
stamp out unsettling Western influences at three different times-the
tearing down of Democracy Wall in 1979, the attack on "spiritual pollution" in 1983 and the "anti-bourgeois liberalization" campaign of
1987. Now they are at it again-banning books, shutting out the
world media, hounding those "infected" by Western concepts, stepping up political "education" on campuses and in the work places.
Today, in the age of information and telecommunications, galloping technology and increasing interdependence, such an approach is
impossible. No country can prosper without opening up within its
borders and to the outside world. It is not a question of "Westernization" but rather the imperatives of modernization. China cannot simply import gadgets and boost productivity without applying modern
management techniques. Students and scientists returning from
abroad will carry back values as well as knowledge. The loosening
and opening up of Chinese society will be essential not only for economic progress but also for political stability. For as millions of Chi-
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nese so vividly demonstrated once again this past spring, men and
women do not live by rice alone.

XI
The events of 1989 painfully illustrate that the most profound
challenge in dealing with China will be in the cultural realm. For
most of our history, Americans and Chinese viewed each other
through veils of rhetoric and sentiment. During the past two decades
expanded contacts between our societies began to increase mutual
understanding.
Artists and experts, teachers and tourists were crisscrossing the
Pacific in increasing numbers. Thirty protocols on science and technology exchanges constituted the largest such program that either of
us had with any other country. There were over 40,000 Chinese students on American campuses by the end of 1988, more than half of all
those sent abroad. Hundreds of American scholars and students were
teaching and studying in China. Weekly Sino-American conferences
examined a wide range of topics, ranging from law to the stock market
to the U.S. Congress. We were rapidly increasing cultural exchanges,
our access to Chinese television and radio and the publication of
American books in Chinese. More than 300,000 American tourists
visited China yearly. After years of effort, and just two weeks before
leaving Beijing in April 1989, I signed an agreement with the Chinese
that would have sent Peace Corps volunteers for the first time ever to a
communist country. This project, like so many others, hangs in
suspense.
This extensive process, largely carried on by the private sector,
was fostering a more enlightened appreciation of each other's histories,
societies and systems. But it was highlighting some sharply different
values as well. Cultural and academic exchanges have mutually enriched both countries. At the same time, closer scrutiny was spawning
tensions and frictions well before Beijing's actions all but ruptured the
growing links.
Believers in freedom, Americans chafe at controls, whether on
Tibetan monks, prospective mothers or outspoken dissidents. As a nation of immigrants, our concern for human rights is natural and universal. We have never singled out China. Indeed there has been a
rising chorus of complaints in the United States about an alleged
double standard between our vigorous espousal of human rights in the
Soviet Union and our more muted approach toward China.
Presumably a more moderate government will allow intellectual
"flowers" to bloom, tolerate dissent, move toward a freer press and
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further develop a legal system to protect individual rights. Presumably its leaders will not create a major bilateral crisis when future visiting American officials invite dissidents to banquets. Even under a
more progressive regime, however, China will be very sensitive on
human rights. The world's oldest, richest civilization does not take
kindly to outside advice. Chinese leaders, who have always feared
chaos, will be wary of a rapid rush toward democracy. As communists, they will fear loss of Party control. Some see crime, homelessness and drugs as the costs of excessive freedom. The Chinese do not
raise human rights in their dealings with any country. Since they do
not seek to impose their concepts on the United States, they resent
what they perceive as our attempt to do so on them.
Human rights abuses and martial law in Tibet predated the Chinese crackdown in Beijing and elsewhere. Lacking access to the area
and without media coverage, we can only glumly imagine what has
been transpiring in that remote region. Until recently Beijing had
taken some positive steps to improve the religious and economic conditions in Tibet, but there was also continuing cultural arrogance,
harsh suppression of dissent and mistreatment of prisoners.
Whatever our anguish for Tibetans, the United States will need to
continue to recognize that Tibet is part of China. This is not only our
long-standing policy but that of all governments in the world. Encouraging Tibetan independence would be quixotic. There is a solid
consensus among Chinese that they cannot and will not grant it because of sovereignty, security and the implications for other nationalities in China. Fanning independence fever would also be a cruel
incitement to the Tibetan people, given China's overwhelming power
and control in the area. The Dalai Lama himself has stopped short of
demanding independence.
Thus adherence to the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over
Tibet is a prerequisite for engaging the Chinese constructively on the
broader issues. We must continue to press China for moderation in
Tibet and for access to outsiders. Our best route will be to support
negotiations between Beijing and the Dalai Lama. Progress toward
greater autonomy under Chinese authority will be required for the
Tibetans to enjoy a happier fate and for Sino-American tensions to
subside.
Beijing's population policy will be another continuing source of
friction. Americans need to comprehend that China confronts the
most dramatic Malthusian dilemma in world history: a young and
mushrooming population, already more than a billion people weak,
living on a land that is only one-tenth arable and three-quarters urban
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sprawl, mountains and sand. Unrestrained population growth would
doom China's future.
The Chinese in turn need to understand that, while Americans
disagree passionately on the subject of abortion, they find forced abortions and sterilization abhorrent in any country. While Beijing's official policy prohibits coercion, its infrequent punishment of abuses is
far from credible or effective. A concerted Chinese effort to root out
coercion will be necessary to regain American assistance. It will be
difficult, but it should not be impossible, to find a way to help China's
family-planning policy without either compromising our values or imposing them.
The United States should encourage progress in these various areas of human rights with a judicious mix of policies. We can provide
practical assistance through exchanges and conferences in certain areas, such as developing legal institutions and a more responsible press.
We should welcome advances as well as censure backsliding. We
should pursue policies, including quiet diplomacy, that promote real
progress rather than mere visceral satisfaction. We should recognize
that the Chinese face genuine problems of economic development, stability and balance of central control with local initiative. We should
not expect instant breakthroughs or American models. We should
gear our attitude to relative movement and not to snapshots that do
not measure up to our ideals. And we must continue to consider our
major geopolitical and economic interests with China in tandem with
our pursuit of human rights.
For their part, the Chinese must have surely learned this year
that the violation of human rights is costly not only in terms of world
opinion but also world cooperation.
XII
For the Chinese people above all, we must hope that the Big Chill
is soon lifted. In my view the question is when, not whether. Former
President Reagan put it· best: "You cannot massacre an idea." We
witnessed China's future not in those grim nights in June but rather in
the heady days of April and May.
When those days return, Americans should be prepared fully to
resume the journey with that great nation. It will not be easy to keep a
balanced perspective; it never has been for Americans. George Kenn~ once observed that "If we a~e .to regard ourselves as a grownup
natlon ... then we must, as the btbhcal phrase goes, put away childish
things; and . . . the first to go . . . should be self-idealization and the
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search for absolutes in world affairs: for absolute security, absolute
amity, absolute harmony."
That injunction captures the primary challenge in our China policy. The current course is full of ambiguities and tough decisions.
Our strategic imperative is to preserve a long-term relationship. Our
moral imperative is to project our principles as we survive this cold
season of suppression.
Even when a warmer climate returns, the journey will be complex. Our two nations will share important security concerns, but we
will not be allies, and we will differ on many international issues. We
will strengthen ties of amity. But we will face inevitable tensions as we
mesh two continental giants with vastly contrasting histories, cultures,
stages of development and values. We will cultivate cooperation. But
we can hardly hope for harmony.
This may seem an obvious precept for relations with almost any
country. It has not, however, been applied for most of America's past
history with China. American perspectives toward that nation have
swung between romance and hostility. We have held wildly fluctuating images-the evil Fu Manchu, the noble peasant of Pearl Buck.
During just the past half century, the Chinese have appeared, successively, as beleaguered allies and implacable foes, as yellow hordes, red
guards and blue ants, the angelic Maoist man and the diabolical Gang
of Four, budding capitalists adorning magazine covers and beastly
communists crushing students.
We need a steadier vision. Both in our attitudes and in our policies, we must incorporate the Chinese yin and yang of opposites forming a whole.
In recent years, thanks to expanding links, we have traveled far.
Americans were becoming more clear-eyed toward China, discarding
both red herrings and rose-colored glasses. In recent months, thanks
to television images, we have traveled farther. Americans have seen
the two faces of China. Beyond the Big Chill, our challenge will be
formidable. So will the stakes- for Chinese, for Americans, and for
this planet's prospects in the 21st century.

13. THE IMPACI OF TIANANMEN ON
THE CHINESE ECONOMY
Chu-yuan Cheng

Economic conditions in the People's Republic of China (PRC)
since the June 4, 1989, bloodshed in and around Tiananmen Square
have rapidly deteriorated. Although the rampant inflation showed
signs of subsiding, industrial output and the GNP slipped into stagnation in the fourth quarter of 1989 and fell sharply in January 1990.
The economic crisis is partly the result of the austerity policies pursued by the hardliners since September 1988, but the events in
Tiananmen Square exert profound impact on every aspect of economic
life in China.
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE
TIANANMEN INCIDENT
China's economy was in a shambles even before the pro-democracy movement. China's economic problems, among others, contributed to the 1989 student uprising. Inflation rates kept rising in the
latter part of 1988 and accelerated in the first half of 1989. The annual
inflation rate of 1988 was officially reported at 18.5 percent. For food
prices, the rate exceeded 50 percent. In September, 1988, the Beijing
authorities adopted a retrenchment program, deciding to cut investment and the money supply in the hope that the inflation rate could be
contained below 10 percent in 1989. However, in the first half of 1989,
the rate soared another 25.5 percent over the preceding period. For
major cities, the inflation rate exceeded 40 percent. Fixed income urban residents suffered the most from inflation. In 1988, 34 percent of
urban dwellers found their real income declining.
One pivotal barometer is the rising share of consumer expenditure on food in recent years. In most advanced countries, food occupies about 25 percent of consumer spending. In 1978, prior to the
adoption of economic reforms, expenditure on food amounted to 60
percent of the workers' total expenditure in China. Between 1979 and
1985, as people's income rose while food prices remained stable, the
share for food declined steadily to only 42 percent. Since 1985, the
situation began to reverse with food prices climbing rapidly and real
income falling. By 1987, the food share rose to 55 percent and by 1988
to 60 percent again. This indicates that the benefits of the reform in
(253)
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the earlier years have been completely negated. The return to the prereform level of expenditure has frustrated most urban dwellers. 1
Unemployment is another intractable problem. For years, the
Chinese government used the term "awaiting employment" (dai ye) to
refer to unemployed people. In recent years, official statistics began to
report an unemployment rate which was so low (1.5 to 2 percent) that
no one believed its reliability. In 1988, the official news media began
publishing a series of surveys which showed that 30 million workers
and employees were "latently unemployed." This refers to those people who are officially employed but lacking job assignments. As
China's new labor force increases at a rate of 20 million people per
year, those who cannot get into the state enterprises can only be hired
as temporary workers at low pay. Unemployed people travel from one
city to another seeking job opportunities and creating a 50 million
strong "fluid population," who possess neither job nor home. They
generally sleep in railway stations, parks and urban slums, causing
problems for public traffic and social order.
In contrast to the misery of ordinary people, those with official
connections can easily locate high-paying jobs. Once a person occupies such a position, his family members and relatives will slip in and
form a net of personnel who protect each other and engage in unchecked corruption. This kind of corruption was facilitated by the
economic reform which delegated control power from the central government to local authorities and set up a dual-price system. The country's privileged class took advantage of the relaxation of controls and
the dual-price system to engage in illegal activities. Many Party, government and military institutions and cadres and their children
swarmed forward to do business. In 1988 alone, some 180,000 speculating companies were set up by government officials and their relatives. These companies engaged in all sorts of criminal activities, such
as speculation, smuggling and offering or taking bribes. One of these
companies, the Kang-Hua Company, was managed by Deng Pufang,
son of Deng Xiaoping.
Moreover, under the dual-price system, people with special connections can buy one ton of steel at the official price of 700 yuan and
immediately resell it at the market price of 2, 100 yuan. The price system created many instant millionaires. The prevalence of guan dao
(official speculation) has significantly raised the price of raw materials
1. Wu Hanzhi, "An Analysis of the Cause of Inflation and Its Control," Jingji yu
Guan/i Yanjiu (Study on Economics and Management) (Beijing), No. 2, 1989, pp. 1-4.
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and thereby injected an element of "cost-push" into the rampant
inflation.
As part of the reform, the government encouraged a segment of
the population to enrich themselves, hoping that their affiuence might
stimulate others to emulate them. The new policy led to the emergence of many 10,000-yuan farm families (annual income exceeds
10,000 yuan). The rise of an affiuent peasant class and the expansion
of u new privileged class markedly widened the income disparities
among various segments of the population and caused mounting social
conflicts. 2
The root of these social and economic problems lies in the oneparty authoritarian system. The popular demand for democratization,
for curtailing the special privileges of the new class, was so strong that
when the students in the Beijing area raised the banner of "Down with
corruption," "Down with guandao," and called for freedom and democracy, they won the hearts of the people and formed a formidable
united front confronting the regime.
INITIAL IMPACT OF THE BLOODSHED
When the Li Peng administration ordered the PLA to suppress
the unarmed protesters, the reaction of the civilized countries was unprecedented. The initial impact of the crackdown on the Chinese
economy involved four major aspects: the suspension of foreign loans;
the canceling of foreign direct investment; the loss of tourist revenue
and the sharp rise of the budget deficit.
The first major consequence was world-wide economic sanctions.
Angered by the violence, Western governments and aid agencies
delayed or restricted loans. The World Bank, China's major source of
interest-free and low-interest loans since 1980, announced on June 27
the suspension of $780 million in new loans to China. During the past
9 years, the World Bank provided loans totalling $8.5 billion of which
$3.44 billion was interest-free. One-third of these loans were used for
agricultural and industrial development. The government of Japan
also decided in mid-June to postpone a 7-year, $5.8 billion new loan to
China. For a country starved for technical know-how and basic infrastructure, the suspension of foreign loans has been a severe blow.
Direct investment has also been suspended or canceled. Immediately after the crackdown, most American, European, and Japanese
businessmen in Beijing and Shanghai opted to evacuate. By the end of
2. For details see Chu-yuan Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre: Social, Political
and Economic Ferment in China, (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), Chapter 2.
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September, more than 50 percent of them had not returned. As a result, many new investment plans either were delayed or outright abandoned. For instance, Peugeot SA and Pepsi Co., Inc., postponed
expanding their separate joint-venture factories in southern China.
According to one Western trade official, five Fortune-500 companies
had had plans to invest a total of $650 million in China operations, but
because of the worsening economic and political outlook, only one of
the five still plans to proceed. A Japanese trade official estimates that
Japanese companies will invest less than half the $200 million they had
committed in 1988. 3
The impact of Tiananmen on China's burgeoning tourist industry
has been devastating. Before the massacre, China derived about $2.2
billion a year from tourism. As a million Taiwanese and several million Hong Kong and overseas Chinese visited their hometowns in recent years, tourism became a crucial source of foreign exchange. The
bloodshed in Beijing took a clear toll on travel-related business. Between July 1 and December 31, China had been expecting over a million overseas tourists, but the violence frightened off foreign visitors.
Figures released by the Chinese National Tourism Administration in
early September, 1989, report an 81 percent decline in visitors. 4 It was
officially reported that the revenue of tourist business in 1989 was $1.8
billion, $400 million less than the previous year and $1.2 billion below
the original target for 1989.
The massacre also increased government expenditures and raised
the budget deficit. As the government now relies on the Army's support, military expenditures began to rise. Since 1979, the growth rate
of the defense budget for each year has been below the expenditure for
that year. The share of the defense budget in total government spending declined sharply from 26.1 percent in 1968 to 17.5 percent in 1979
to only 8.6 percent in 1986. The yearly drops have incensed military
leaders. Now as the army has resumed the critical role of king-maker,
they have begun to demand a larger share of the budget be devoted to
defense. In 1989, the share rose to 13.9 percent of total expenditure,
up 11.2 percent. The defense budget showed another 15 percent increase in 1990, reversing the decade-long decline. This will undoubtedly widen the budget deficit. 5
Moreover, as the controlling of inflation is not as effective as
promised, in order to calm the popular discontent, the government
3. New York Times, July 3, 1989, p. 21.
4. Anne T. Thurston, "Back to Square One?", China Business Review, Sept.-Oct.
1989, pp. 36-41.
5. China Times (Taipei), January 24, 1990, p. 9.
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may have to raise food subsidies that now run at 40 billion yuan a year
and constitute the biggest burden on the government budget.

mE LONGER-TERM IMPACf ON mE ECONOMY
The longer-term consequences are more profound. The farreaching effect is the destruction of the reform leadership. The purge
of reform leader Zhao Ziyang and the entire group of his intellectual
advisers signals the scrapping of most programs Zhao and his followers have pursued in the past several years. In the middle of August,
the three influential "think tanks" of the reformers-the Rural Development Research Center of the State Council; the Economic Structural Reform Research Institute of the State Council; and the
Economic, Technical and Social Development Center of the State
Council are all slated for abolition. Of the 130 members of the Economic Structural Reform Research Institute, more than 20 went into
exile, eight high-ranking officers were arrested, the remainder were
either reassigned to other jobs or sent to labor camps. As Lee Kuan
Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore observed:
It took Zhao Ziyang ten years to build a team of economists
who understood how the Western economies work and now
that team is part in exile, part being rusticated and part missing. Rebuilding that team will take another 10 years. That's
very sad for China and for Asia. 6
Not only is the brain-trust of the reform camp lost, the entire
reform program is halted. Although the leadership repeatedly stressed
that there would be no change in the policies of reform, many reform
programs were either suspended or preparing to be dismantled. In the
second half of 1989 and early 1990, major changes could be discerned
in four areas:
(1) Price reform-In the October 1984 Decisions on Economic
Reform, the reform of the irrational price system was touted as the
key to institutional transformation. In May 1988, with Deng's endorsement, Zhao proposed the bold solution of decontrolling prices.
The populace responded with panic buying, which forced the government to rescind the policy. Since then, economic decision-making
power has fallen into the hands of Premier Li Peng and Vice Premier
Yao Yilin, two conservative leaders. Steps were taken to reimpose
price controls for steel, copper, aluminum, and other basic materials.
After the June 4 bloodshed, government officials reasserted centralized
6. Wall Street Journal, November 1, 1989, p. A15.
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control over major segments of the Chinese economy. Fan Weizhong,
Deputy Director of the State Planning Commission, indicated that the
important role of central planning would be restored in the process of
retrenchment. 7
(2) Stock Ownership-In fall 1988, the reformers tried to keep
the reform program alive by proposing the sale of state enterprise
stock to workers and employees. The plan was condemned by the
hardliners as a betrayal of socialism. In fall 1989, Party newspapers
even blamed proponents of the stock ownership idea for fueling the
student unrest. The plan is likely to remain in abeyance.
(3) Private Business-During the 1978-1988 period, the number
of private businesses had grown rapidly, rising from 100,000 to 14.5
million, employing 23 million people. It was one of the most dynamic
sectors of the Chinese economy. After the conservatives took the
helm, individual businesses began to dwindle. In the first half of 1989,
they fell by 2.4 million. After the June 4 crackdown, the new leadership has initiated an inspection program to regulate individual business. The fate of the individual business is once again at stake.
(4) Income Distribution-Under Mao's rule, the PRC adopted
an egalitarian system of income distribution, which dampened individual incentive and motivation. When Deng launched the economic reform program, he initiated a policy that would allow some people to
become affluent before others. The new policy was responsible for the
emergence of many of 10,000-yuan families in the rural areas and tens
of thousands of well-to-do businessmen in the cities. The rise of the
new wealthy class inevitably increased disparities in income distribution. After Shanghai CPC Secretary Jiang Zemin replaced, in June,
1989, Zhao Ziyang as CPC General Secretary, he vowed to remedy
this situation. Not only did he avoid mentioning Deng's policy of encouraging enrichment of a few first, but he also identified self-employed traders and peddlers as the source of rising income disparities. 8
From these new measures, it is quite clear that the reform policy,
while continuously being upheld in official statements, bas lost its vitality. In contrast, Deng's open-door policy has received support from
the hardliners as the means to solve the country's capital shortage. Li
Peng bas on many occasions emphasized the importance of the open
7. Japan External Trade Organization China Newsletter, No. 84, Jan.-Feb. 1990, pp.

S-6.
8. Jiang Zemin, "Seriously Eliminating the Inequitable Distribution of Income," Qiu
shi (Seeking Truth), No. 12, 1989, pp. 5-9.
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door. However, the June 4 bloodshed dealt a severe blow to China's
economic cooperation with foreign countries.
One clear indication is the deterioration of relations with Hong
Kong. In recent years, Hong Kong has been China's number one
trade partner and the chief supplier of foreign exchange. In 1988,
Hong Kong's trade with China exceeded $30 billion, surpassing
China's trade with Japan ($19 billion) and with Western Europe
($21.8 billion). More importantly, under China's new open-door policy, Hong Kong has in the past couple years invested $7 billion in
Guangdong province, creating job opportunities for 1.5 million workers. Prior to the unrest, Hong Kong businessmen had conceived several major investment plans in South China, including electrical power
plants, a super highway, and a new airport. The bloodshed near
Tiananmen Square shattered these plans. Since the imposition of martial law in Beijing, the prices of stock and real estate in Hong Kong
have dropped by more than 20 percent. The loss of confidence in Beijing's "one country, two systems" formula for Hong Kong after its
return to China in 1997 has accelerated the flight of capital and professional manpower. When businesses in Hong Kong lost their zeal, the
injection of capital into South China was substantially reduced.
The Tiananmen Incident also signalled an end to the boom in
Western and Japanese direct investment in China that began in 1988
and continued into the first half of 1989. Foreign direct investment
interest was fueled by Zhao Ziyang's coastal development strategy and
the decisions to raise Hainan to the status of a province and designate
it a special economic zone. In 1988, foreign investors committed $5.3
billion in direct investment to a total of 5,924 projects in China. These
figures were 42.9 percent and 166.2 percent higher than the previous
year. The June 4 massacre halted this advance. In the 3 months
(July-September) following the Tiananmen Incident, there was a 20
percent decline in direct investment. The halting of fresh foreign capital inflow reflects apprehension about China's debt situation and its
economic health as well as fears of political instability. 9
FUTURE PROSPECfS
In view of these developments, the June 4 massacre has aggravated those economic maladies existing before the turmoil and added
other new ones. The new leadership is confronted with several thorny
problems.
9. "Direct Investment in China Losing Momentum," China Newsletter, No. 84, Jan.Feb. 1990, pp. 17-21.

260

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

First, the loss of foreign loans and revenue from tourism have
drained the meager foreign exchange reserves. By the end of 1989,
China had incurred foreign debts totalling $44 billion. About 50 percent of the debt was financed by Japan and denominated in Japanese
yen. As China's foreign trade is calculated in U.S. dollars, the 50 percent appreciation of the yen against the dollar in the past four years
has substantially increased the debt burden, which must be repaid in
1992 and 1993. It is officially estimated that by 1993, the repayment
of principal and interest on foreign debt will account for 25 percent of
China's total exports, surpassing the 20 percent warning level set up
by the International Monetary Fund. This will further limit China's
capacity to invest in infrastructure.
Second, since 1979, China's Central Government budget has suffered deficits for almost every year, with an accumulated deficit of 160
billion yuan. One of the major sources of deficit has been the increasing state subsidies to prices and enterprises operating at a loss. In
1989, these two items reached a record high of 106 billion yuan ($28
billion), accounting for 32.6 percent of the total budget. 10 Increase of
defense spending and price subsidies will further enlarge the deficit.
The result will be the expansion of the money supply, making the control of inflation extremely difficult.
Third, the repayment of foreign debts and the rising burden in
subsidies will diminish the country's capacity to remove the bottleneck
in the energy supply and transportation facilities, two limiting factors
on the Chinese economy. Due to the critical shortage of electricity,
many state enterprises presently operate only three or four days a
week. 11 A recent official report indicates that the shortfall of electricity now stands at 60 billion to 70 billion KWH per year, affecting onethird of industrial capacity. The loss of industrial output value is estimated at 200 billion yuan. 12 Power shortages also become a major
detriment to foreign investors. In Shenzhen, the showcase of special
economic zones, power failures have shut down factories as often as
four times a week.
Finally, the purge of hundreds of social scientists, particularly
economists, has deprived the country of the service of its best brains.
In the wake of the bloodshed, most of the measures announced by the
new general secretary simply replay threadbare policies implemented
in the 1950s and 1960s. Old slogans like "Learning from Lei Feng,"
10. International Daily News (Los Angeles), July 29, 1989, p. 13.
II. China Daily News (New York), July 25, 1989, p. 6.
12. Renmin Ribao, January 18, 1990, p. 3.
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and "Industry learning from Daqing," which have been out of fashion
for a decade, all returned to prominence again. Since September 1989,
a new nationwide campaign to "learn from Lei Feng" has been in full
swing. Lei Feng, an obscure soldier who died in an accident in 1962,
was sanctified by Mao as a paragon of communist virtues in a campaign to emulate him. After the economic reform, instead of praising
hardship and suffering, the new Party policy was to promote competition and innovation, to let some people become rich first; pure selfsacrifice like that of Lei Feng was no longer considered a virtue. However, after the pro-democracy movement, the old hardliners quickly
restarted the "Learning from Lei Feng" campaign. All these factors
indicate that, instead of carrying the reform program forward, the new
leadership in Beijing is in fact trying to tum the clock back.
If China's contradictory economic program is not untangled and
if the people's incentive and productivity are not revived, stagnation,
inflation and shortages will grow worse. The rising popular discontent
may precipitate the downfall of the hardline government.

14. TIANANMEN AND ITS IMPACf
Winston L. Y. Yang
Seton Hall University

China's struggle for democracy had begun long before the 1989
student movement. In December, 1978, a Beijing zoo electrician
named Wei Jingsheng, a native of Anhui Province born in 1950, began
an underground publication, Exploration (Tan Shuo). 1 Originally a
single sheet posted on Xidan Wall, known as "Democracy Wall" to
the Chinese and later abolished by the Chinese authorities, Exploration urged the Chinese Communist leadership to expand China's "four
modernization" program to include "political modernization"
designed to achieve democratization. 2 The mimeographed magazine
published many articles that exposed serious and extensive human
rights violations in China and advocated fundamental political reforms. Wei's activities, though well received by Chinese students and
intellectuals, soon attracted the attention of the government, which
arrested him on March 29, 1979. After a brief trial at a Beijing court,
he was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for his alleged crimes of
providing a foreigner with Chinese military intelligence and carrying
out "counterrevolutionary agitation. " 3
Even though his conviction brought an end to this early democracy movement, Wei's democracy drive had stimulated the Chinese
people, especially students and intellectuals, and helped them develop
a better understanding of China's need for political liberalization.
After Wei's sentencing, however, China began a series of sweeping economic reforms, including an "open-door" policy, which helped
the Chinese, especially those in the rural areas, improve their standard
of living.
l. See Fox Butterfield, "Imprisoned Chinese Dissident Leader, Wei Jingsheng," The
New York Times, October 20, 1979, p. 9. In preparing this article, I have consulted many
Chinese sources even though few of them will be cited. Chinese sources published outside
China seem too numerous to cite. My bibliographical review of Chinese sources will be
completed and published soon.
2. Ibid. Part of an article by Wei entitled "The Fifth Modernization-Democracy
and Others," is translated in "China Clamps Down on Dissidents," The Asian Wall Street
Journal Weekly, December 3, 1979, p. 10. See also Melinda Liu, "Wei and the Fifth Modernization," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 2, 1979, pp. 22-23.
3. "Wei Jingsheng Sentenced," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 43 (October 26, 1976),
pp. 6-7.
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China's expanding economic reforms led to growing cultural,
educational, and economic exchanges and cooperation with the West.
Despite extensive restrictions, Western political ideas and concepts
rapidly found their way to Chinese students and intellectuals. Calls
for political reform were voiced loudly by the educated Chinese, but
the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) made little or no effort to develop programs for democratization to parallel the extensive economic changes.
The growing unrest of Chinese students had become quite obvious by the mid-1980s. The first extensive Chinese student demonstrations for democratization and other reforms took place in December,
1986. The growing movement eventually led to the dismissal of CPC
General Secretary Hu Yaobang in January, 1987. Hu was dismissed
for his liberal political views and sympathetic attitudes toward student
demands and for his failure to halt student demonstrations. 4
Subsequent to Hu's removal, Premier Zhao Ziyang, an advocate
of extensive economic reforms and limited political changes, was appointed Acting CPC General Secretary. Zhao was confirmed as General Secretary and First Vice Chairman of the CPC Military
Commission at the 13th CPC Congress held in October, 1987. The
Congress also adopted limited political changes, which were essentially administrative reforms rather than genuine political liberalization. The only significant change approved by the Congress was the
adoption of the separation of different functions of the CPC and the
PRC government. s
The failure of the Congress to adopt sweeping political reforms
and the CPC's failure to implement even limited political changes further disappointed and angered Chinese students and intellectuals.
Since the beginning of 1988, the growing corruption, inefficiency, economic difficulties, especially the worsening inflation, contributed further to popular unrest and resentment. Leading intellectuals, such as
Fang Lizhi, a physicist dismissed as Vice President of the University
of Science and Technology, and Liu Binyan, a well-known writer who
4. For background information on the events of 1986-1987, see Victor C. Falkenheim,
"The Limits of Political Reform," Cu"ent History, September, 1987, pp. 261-265, 279-281;
Stanley Rosen, "China in 1987: The Year of the Thirteenth Party Congress," Asian Survey,
vol. 28, no. 1 (January, 1988), pp. 35-50.
5. For more details on the Congress, see Michael Oksenberg, "China's 13th Party
Congress," Problems of Communism, November-December, 1987, pp. l-17. For a review
of the 13th Central Committee, see Li Cheng and Lynn White, ''The Thirteenth Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," Asian Survey, vol. 28, no. 4 (April, 1988),
pp. 24-34. Zhao Ziyang's key-note speech is published in Beijing Review, November 9-15,
1987, pp. 23-49.
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energetically exposed the dark side of China's political and economic
worlds, began to speak out more loudly against the Communist authorities, forcefully demanding genuine political change. 6 The democracy movement was thus given a powerful push forward by these
intellectuals as well as by the worsening conflicts between the Communist authorities and Chinese students. By early 1989, relations between the CPC authorities and Chinese students and intellectuals had
become fairly tense, and confrontations seemed inevitable. 7
On April 15, 1989, Hu Yaobang, the deposed leader well known
for his sympathy toward the young people and their call for democratic reforms, died of a seizure. His death soon set off a series of
student demonstrations in the capital and other cities, including
Shanghai, Chengdu, and Wuhan. The students were clearly angered
by the CPC's failure to positively address Hu's support for democratic
reform. 8 Thus, the demonstrations snowballed in the weeks that followed. The momentum of the movement was soon accelerated by the
support of the citizens of Beijing and the negative official reactions. 9
As a prelude to China's 1989 student uprising, Hu's death on
April 15 triggered weeks of massive protests in April and May when
throngs of over one million people filled the streets of Beijing to protest the growing official corruption and to demand democratization, a
course with which Hu had been identified. The CPC refused to accept
the original demands, put forth by representatives of the student
protesters 10, and imposed martial law in Beijing on May 20, 1989. After seven escalating weeks, the protests came to a sudden end. In the
early hours of June 4, the tanks of the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) moved toward Tiananmen, Beijing's central square, and fired
on the crowds, killing hundreds and wounding thousands to suppress
the democracy movement. A shocking massacre had taken place in
6. On Fang Lizhi, see Orville Schell, "China's Andrei Sakharov," The Atlantic
Monthly, May, 1988, pp. 35-52, and "An Act of Defiance," New York Times, April 16,
1989, pp. 27-30, 43. For a biography of Liu Binyan, see Winston L.Y. Yang, "Liu
Binyan," Encyclopaedia Britannica 1987 Book of the Year, Chicago, 1987, p. 89.
7. For a discussion of the revolt of Chinese intellectuals against the CPC, see Perry
Link, "The Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolt," New York Review of Books, June 29,
1989, pp. 38-41.
8. For a biography ofHu Yaobang, see Winston L.Y. Yang, "Hu Yaobang," Encyclopaedia Britannica 1982 Book of the Year, Chicago, 1982, pp. 78-79.
9. For information on Hu's life and the unrest stirred by his death, see Sheryl
WuDunn, "Hu's Death is Stirring Unrest"; and Nicholas D. Kristof, "Hu Yaobang, ExParty Chief in China, Dies at 73", New York Times, April 16, 1989, p. 38.
10. Robert Pear, "Diplomats Say China Is In Crisis it Could Have Been Averted," New
York Times, May 21, 1989, p. 6.
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Beijing. 11
The reasons for the crackdown are quite obvious. The aging Chinese leaders, especially hardliners like Deng Xiaoping, despite their
open-door policy and economic reform programs, did not intend to
make fundamental political changes and rejected the Western democratic system as unsuitable for China. The growing student protests
had posed serious challenges and threats to the CPC authorities.
China's political stability, in the opinion of conservative elders, had
been threatened by the democracy movement. 12 The crackdown was
probably ordered by Deng with the support of his hardline colleagues,
who had remained hopelessly out of touch with the democratic ideals
of Chinese students and with the evident global trends toward greater
democracy.
The precise numbers of dead, wounded, those arrested, and those
executed after June 4 remain unknown even today because the Chinese
authorities have never released name lists and because official Chinese
accounts have not been accepted at face value. Most Western reporters and sources stationed in Beijing estimate that several hundred were
killed by the PLA troops, thousands were wounded, and many were
arrested or executed. 13 Whatever the numbers may be 14, the global
reaction was uniformly negative. It is now time to examine
Tiananmen's impact, especially the consequences of the brutal
suppression.
THE POLITICAL IMPACT
One of the greatest casualties of the crackdown is, of course, the
11. Since three articles on the student protests and the CPC's subsequent crackdown
are included in this book, details of these events will not be discussed in this article.
12. Richard Bernstein, "Why the Crackdown?," New York Times, June 27, 1989, p.
A6.
13. Estimates of the death toll range from 300 to as high as 5,000. See, for instance,
Nicholas D. Kristof, "Artillery Firing in suburbs .. .,"New York Times, June 7, 1989, p.
AS.
14. The Western media has begun to review some of their reports, attempting to correct unsubstantiated rumors. See David M. Lampton, China and U.S.-China Relations in
the Wake ofTiananmen, New York: National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 1989,
p. 9. It is now believed that many were killed or injured on the streets far away from
Tiananmen, especially in and around Muxidi, where government tanks opened fire on the
crowds of people who had attempted to block the movement of troops toward Tiananmen
Square. Nicholas D. Kristof points out, for instance, that there was no massacre in
Tiananmen Square although there were many killings elsewhere. See his article "How the
Hardliners Won," New York Times Magazine, November 12, 1989, p. 71. Hence, the term
"Tiananmen Massacre" is quite misleading. A more accurate term should be, therefore,
"Beijing Massacre.''
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fall of Zhao Ziyang, the refonn-minded CPC General Secretary who
showed an unusual understanding of and sympathy for the student
democracy movement, even though most of Zhao's supporters, such as
Vice Premier Tian Jiyun, remain in power. During the intense debate
and power struggle prior to the May 19 announcement of martial law
(announced at a meeting at 10 pm May 19 and broadcast and implemented May 20), Zhao had suffered a serious defeat because Deng
Xiaoping, China's paramount leader, had thrown his support to the
hardliners headed by Premier Li Peng and President Yang
Shangkun. 15 Zhao was officially purged at the end of the Fourth Plenum of the 13th CPC Congress. A communique released on June 24,
1989, announced the dismissal of Zhao from all his posts in the CPC
"for supporting the tunnoil and splitting the Party" 16, even though he
was allowed to retain his CPC membership.
Zhao's downfall meant not only the loss of a top leader of the
refonn-minded faction in China but also the setback of China's refonn
and modernization programs. 17 The hardliners, such as Li Peng and
Yang Shangkun, clearly gained the upper hand. Li retained his premiership and membership in the all-powerful Standing Committee of the
CPC Politburo. Yang was promoted to First Vice Chairman of the
CPC Military Commission and his half-brother, Yang Baibing, was
elevated to the job of the Commission's Secretary-General and appointed to the CPC Secretariat. 18
As a result, even the limited political refonns advocated by Zhao
at the 13th CPC Congress in 1987 have failed to be implemented and
received no mention at both the Fourth Plenum (in June, 1989) and
the Fifth Plenum (in November, 1989) of the 13th CPC Congress.
Zhao's fall has brought an effective end, at least for the foreseeable
future, to China's political refonns, which was one of the fundamental
demands of the student protesters. The economic development program, adopted at the Fifth Plenum, stresses retrenchment, reorganization, central planning, and the economic power of the Central
Government. It makes no mention of new or old refonn programs
15. Nicholas D. Kristof provides a vivid, though not well substantiated, account of
how Zhao was defeated by the hardline leaders in his article, "How the Hardliners Won,"
New York Times Magazine, Nov. 12, 1989, pp. 39-41, 66-71.
16. "Communique of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee," Beijing Review, vol. 32, no. 27, July 3-9, 1989, pp. 13-14.
17. For a discussion of Zhao's fall as a loss to China, see John Fincher, "Zhao's Fall,
China's Loss," Foreign Policy, 16 (Fall, 1989), pp. 3-25.
18. Adi Ignatius, "China's Deng Quits His Last Post, Names Jiang Zemin as His Successor," Wall Street Journal, Nov. 10, 1989, p. A5.
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even though it repeatedly renders lip service to the slogan, "deepening
of reforms," with little practical significance. 19 There is little doubt
that economic reforms suffered serious setbacks.
As for China's open-door policy, Chinese leaders have time and
again stressed that it will continue, but cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation with the West have been noticeably curtailed20 because of the Chinese policy of opposing Western "bourgeois
liberalization." Yet, despite this, China's economic open-door policy
continues because of its need for Western technology, equipment, and
investment.
Western economic sanctions, Chinese internal power struggle and
turmoil, the decline of foreign loans and technology to and investment
in China, and other relevant developments have also affected China's
modernization drive.
It is quite obvious that a decade of reform, initiated by Deng and
implemented by Zhao and others, is now in shambles. The fall of
Zhao Ziyang and the setbacks suffered by his reform programs led, in
June, 1989, to the rise of Jiang Zemin, a technocrat and formerly the
Shanghai CPC Secretary. Jiang apparently became Deng's chosen
successor. He was first named CPC General Secretary to replace Zhao
at the June, 1989 CPC meeting 21 and then Chairman of the CPC
Military Commission at the Fifth Plenum to succeed Deng in November, 1989.22 Even though he now enjoys not only the full support of
Deng but also holds two of the three most important posts (the third
one being the Premiership currently held by Li Peng), Jiang remains
very weak within the leadership for several reasons. First, as a technocrat, Jiang has no power base of his own and lacks strong factional
support. Second, he has had neither military experience nor wide connections within the PLA. Third, his two competitors, Premier Li
Peng and President Yang Shangkun, enjoy the respective support of
such conservative elders as Chen Yun and the military. Therefore, as
long as Deng remains alive and healthy, Jiang will be secure in his
position. After Deng passes from the scene, the real power struggle,
19. For a summary of the economic retrenchment program, see "Communique of the
Fifth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee," Beijing Review, vol. 32, no. 45,
November 11-17, 1989, pp. 6-9. For comments on "deepening" of reforms and other questions, see Nicholas D. Kristof, "Beijing Hopes to Stamp Out the 6 'Evils'," New York
Times, Nov. 26, 1989, p. A9.
20. Sheryl WuDunn, "China Weighs New Restrictions on Study Abroad," New York
Times, Oct. 19, 1989, p. A13. In early 1990, however, China relaxed somewhat its restraint
on cultural and educational exchanges with the West.
21. See supra note 16.
22. See supra note 19.
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leadership split, and political crisis will inevitably begin. 23 The gradual fall of Mao Zedong's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, whose political situation in the late 1970s is similar to Jiang's today, is a painful
reminder vis-a-vis Jiang's political future and problems.
What is even more worrisome is the potential impact of the military, whose guns were employed to suppress the democracy movement. After the deaths of Deng, now 86, and Yang Shangkun, now
82, no one will have sufficient power and authority to command the
PLA, which has been plagued by factionalism. 24 The regional military
commanders, along with provincial party and government leaders,
may come to dominate China's political scene. Disunity and factional
struggles, which Jiang, with his limited power base, will not be able to
handle, may emerge. A divided China, tom by civilian or military
factionalism, may come into existence after strongmen like Deng are
gone. 2 s
Long before the 1989 democracy movement, Deng had apparently chosen Zhao as his successor. The crackdown led to the fall of
Zhao and destroyed the possibility of an orderly succession.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACI'
Before the 1989 disturbance, China, in a period of slightly over
ten years, had propelled itself from the bland egalitarian poverty of
Maoism to the new-found consumerism of refrigerators, washing machines, and color television sets, much envied by many Soviets and
Eastern Europeans. During the past ten years, the average Chinese
income has more than doubled. After a decade of impressive growth
induced by Deng Xiaoping's market-oriented reforms, however, China
found itself, in early 1988, confronted with such serious problems as
an acute credit shortage, growing inflation, declining industrial pro23. The author is now working on an article on China's factionalism since 1977, which
will be completed and published in early 1991.
24. For a discussion of the role of the PLA, see Nicholas D. Kristof, "Now the People's Army Has Few Friends, More Power,'' New York Times, Oct. 29, 1989, p. D2. See
also China in Crisis: the Role of the Military, Surrey, England: Jane's Information Group,
1989.
25. Deng has made conflicting statements on his role after his resignation from the
CPC Military Commission Chairmanship in November, 1989. See Sheryl WuDunn,
"Deng Hints at Keeping a Large Role in China,'' New York Times, Nov. 11, 1989, p. 5; and
Nicholas D. Kristof, "Deng, Retiring, Says He Won't Meddle in Politics," New York
Times, Nov. 14, 1989, p. AS. It is unlikely that Deng will not wield his powerful influence
while he remains healthy and clear-minded. See Nicholas D. Kristof, "Deng is Ex-Chairman But not Ex-Leader," New York Times, Nov. 12, 1989, p. D3; and Sheryl WuDunn,
"Deng Warns Against Own Senility," New York Times, Nov. 12, 1989, p. A3.
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ductivity and farm output, bottlenecks in transportation and energy,
and severe inefficiency and corruption. The economic expectations of
the Chinese, despite economic stagnation and official corruption, had
risen substantially. All these factors contributed much to popular
discontent. 26
Even though most of these economic problems had existed before
the repression of the student democracy movement, the brutal crackdown made China's economic difficulties much worse for several
reasons.
First, the disruptions caused by the protests, demonstrations, and
suppressions had a negative impact on China's orderly economic development. Second, the Chinese leadership was preoccupied with factional infighting and power struggles and failed to focus on the
growing economic problems. Third, the cost of mobilizing troops and
tanks and bringing them to Beijing added much to China's budget
problems. Fourth, the economic sanctions imposed by Western nations deprived China of some of the much-needed foreign exchange
and loans, as well as Western technology. Fifth, the growing inflation,
inefficiency, corruption, poor economic planning, and overheated
economy all contributed, in large measure, to China's economic difficulties. Finally, foreign investments in China plummeted because of
the declining international confidence in China's political stability.
China's economic difficulties are reflected on many fronts. First,
China's industrial output after the crackdown registered a much
slower growth rate and even a decline. 27 In fact, the September, 1989
drop was the first decline since China began economic reforms a decade ago. This is a clear sign of China's growing economic difficulties
because as recently as early 1989, monthly output was rising at rates of
10 to 15 percent above the previous year. 28 Such an industrial slowdown was caused, in part, by the retrenchment and austerity programs, the unrest of industrial workers, unusually tight credit, project
cancellations, and restrictions on domestic investment, all of which
have rendered industrial expansion and modernization extremely difficult, if not impossible.
26. Fox Butterfield, "China's Economy: Pushed and Pulled Toward the Edge," New
York Times, June 25, 1989, pp. D1, DB.
27. Adi Ignatius, "New China Statistics Signal Long Period of Recession," Asian Wall
Street Journal Weekly, Oct. 23, 1989, p. 2; and Sheryl WuDunn, "China's Industrial Output Declined 2.1% in October,'' New York Times, Nov. 20, 1989, p. DlO. China's economic difficulties continued into mid-1990. See Sheryl WuDunn, "Debt is Squeezing
Hotels in China," New York Times, May 28, 1990, p. 29.
28. Ibid.
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Second, with the disruption of the April-June period of 1989,
China's exports fell, which created balance of payment problems. In
the first five months of 1989 alone, for instance, China's trade deficit
reached $4.6 billion, more than five times the unbalance in the same
period of 1988. 29
Third, the greatly reduced number of foreign tourists, as a result
of the crackdown, has compounded China's foreign exchange shortage
problems. 30 Western economic sanctions (most of which remain intact even today even though the Bush Administration has renewed
China's most favored nation status and allowed the World Bank to
approve a $300 million loan to China) and their delayed consideration
of new loans, including those adopted by the United States, Japan, the
World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, have created even
more foreign exchange shortage problems for China. 31 On November
9, 1989, Moody's Investors Service, Inc. downgraded China's longterm credit rating from the favorable A3 to the medium grade Baa. 32
This rating has had a very negative impact on China's foreign borrowing and foreign investments in China. Foreign bankers have become
much more cautious in lending to China. It will also cost much more
for China to borrow from foreign banks. China is about to begin repaying larger amounts of its $43 billion foreign debt, and the higher
interest rates brought about by a downgraded credit rating will undoubtedly increase the difficulties of refinancing China's foreign
loans. 33 Several international bank syndicates, such as the Schroderled syndicate, have already cancelled loans, agreed upon earlier, to
China. 34
Fourth, local and provincial economic autonomy, especially in
the southeastern coastal region, has enabled some provinces, cities and
special economic zones to invest money abroad, which has created a
large capital flight and intensified the credit shortage. 35
Fifth, China's cash and credit shortage worsened in late 1989.
29. See supra note 26.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. For the World Bank loan, see Clyde H. Farnsworth, "China Gets One Loan,
but Another is Put Off," New fork Times, May 30, 1990, pp. D1, DS. For Bush's decision
to renew China's most favored nation status, see R. W. Apple, "Bush Withholding Normal
Trade Ties From the Soviets," New York Times, May 25, 1990, pp. A1, A12.
32. Sheryl WuDunn, "China's Credit Rating Downgraded by Moody's," New York
Time, Nov. 10, 1989, p. D2.
33. Ibid.
34. Julia Leung and Adi Ignatius, "Schroders-Led Syndicate Cancels Loan to Shanghai
Property Project," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, Oct. 23, 1989, p. 2.
35. See supra note 26.
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Many workers were told by their employers that their take-home pay
would be slashed by as much as two thirds for the coming one to four
months, and they would be paid a new kind of three-year interestpaying bond in place of the deductions. 36 This unprecedented move,
which affects virtually the entire urban labor force, has revealed the
seriousness of China's cash and credit shortage problems and will lead
to more unrest of industrial workers, which, in turn, will likely cause
more declines in industrial output. The central government also has
cash problems in paying farmers for their crops and in paying off holders of a large number of treasury bonds that will become due in the
coming months. Although the forced sale of bonds may provide temporary relief for China's cash shortage, there seems to be no long-term
solution, however, to the mounting crisis among state-owned factories
and enterprises. 37
Sixth, the rising unemployment rate, estimated to range from 2
percent of the labor force to 8 percent, 38 has created more difficulties
for China. Unemployed youths are believed to have played a major
role in the spring, 1989 uprising, and there are few jobs available for
them. 39
Finally, such existing problems as an inadequate transportation
system, energy shortages, and poor quality controls have all compounded China's economic development problems. 40
In coping with its economic difficulties, the Chinese government
has adopted extensive austerity and retrenchment programs. 41 The
November 1989 CPC Central Committee meeting adopted a lis~ of 39
economic measures as part of the retrenchment program, most of
which will likely be implemented. 42 It is obvious that the CPC's emphasis has been placed on political repression, central planning and
central economic authority and power. These approaches are unlikely
36. Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Fears Strife During Hard Times," New York Times,
October 8, 1989, p. AI.
37. Ibid., p. A22.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. For a summary of these programs, see "Communique of the Fifth Plenary session
of the 13th CPC Central Committee," Beijing Review, vol. 32, no. 45, Nov. 11-17, 1989, pp.
6-9. See also Nicholas D. Kristof, "Beijing Hopes to Stamp out the 6 'Evils'," New York
Times, Nov. 26, 1989, p. A9.
42. Sheryl WuDunn, "Deng Warns Against Own Senility," New York Times, Nov. 19,
1989, p. A3.
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to solve China's present economic problems. 43
While the long-term effectiveness of the austerity and retrenchment programs, which began in 1988 with emphasis on consolidation
rather than economic change or reform, and which will be maintained
for at least two to three more years, remains to be seen, new statistics
seem to signal a long period of recession. Despite the recent ease of
inflation and a better 1989 grain harvest, 44 China registered the
slowest growth rate in a decade according to an unusually frank report
released by the official Statistical Bureau in September, 1989. 45 The
official statistics also indicate that retail sales were plummeting while
consumer prices were still rising. 46 Some of these trends were also
confirmed by later statistics. 47 These disturbing developments
prompted Chinese and foreign economists to predict a prolonged period of stagnation characterized by low growth with continuing and
even increased inflation. They are also concerned that a recession may
be around the corner. 48 The year 1990 may be characterized by flat or
negative industrial growth, a widening budget deficit caused by further
drains on the state treasury, severe hardships for urban workers, and
growing unemployment. 49 All these may enhance the potential for urban unrest, thus creating more political problems for the CPC.
Even though not all these difficulties were caused by the 1989
student democracy movement or its subsequent suppression by the
CPC authorities, the major political events of 1989 certainly have rendered China's economic problems much worse. The present health
and immediate future prospects of China's economy are grim indeed.
SETBACKS ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT
The PRC has suffered serious setbacks on the international front
as a result of the massacre in Beijing. Its relations with the West have
been severely damaged and its pre-eminent position as the "sole legal
43. Nicholas D. Kristof, "The People's Republic at 40, at Odds with the People," New
York Times, October 1, 1989, p. D7.
44. See supra note 36, p. A22. The 1989 grain crop may not be as good as originally
expected. The latest official estimate is 400 million rather than 410 million metric tons. See
Sheryl WuDunn, "In a Dry China, a Huge Grain Crop Is Not Enough," New York Times,
Nov. 26, 1989, p. AS.
45. Adi Ignatius, "New China Statistics Signal Long Period of Recession", Asian Wall
Street Journal Weekly, October 23, 1989, p. 2.
46. Ibid.
47. Sheryl WuDunn, "China's Industrial Output Declined 2.1% in October," New
York Times, Nov. 20, 1989, p. D10.
48. See supra note 27.
49. Ibid.
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government of China" has been repeatedly challenged with some success by the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. 50
Within hours after the June 4th crackdown, the Bush Administration began to ponder steps against China to demonstrate American
criticism of China's use of force to end the student democracy movement and the U.S. outrage over the killing of student protesters in
Beijing. 51 On June 4, 1989, the United States, Britain, France, West
Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands all issued statements deploring China's use of force. 52 One day later, President
George Bush, spurning a total break in relations and other drastic actions, announced the following sanctions against China:
1. Suspension of all government-to-government sales
and commercial export of weapons;
2. Suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese military leaders;
3. Sympathetic review of requests by Chinese students
in the United States to extend their stay;
4. Offers of humanitarian and medical assistance,
through the Red Cross, to those injured during the assault;
and
5. A review of other aspects of bilateral relationship as
events in China continue to unfold. 53
The European Commission, the executive body of the European
Community, cancelled high-level talks with Chinese leaders, deploring
the "brutal repression in Beijing." 54 At the United Nations, Secretary
General Javier Perez de Cuellar expressed his sadness over China's
action even though the Charter requires the United Nations to refrain
from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of member nations. ss Other Western nations, such as Belgium
and Australia, also adopted some sanctions against China.
50. Taipei has been planning offensives to achieve breakthroughs on the diplomatic
front since early 1988, soon after President Chiang Ching-kuo's death. Taiwan's recent
diplomatic victories are not, of course, the direct result of China's military crackdown, but
Taipei has taken full advantage of Beijing's troubles on the international front to hasten its
diplomatic breakthroughs.
51. Thomas L. Friedman, "Administration Ponders Steps on China," New York Times,
June 5, 1989, p. Al2.
52. Ibid.
53. Bernard Weinraub, "President Spurns Other Sanctions," New York Times, June 6,
1989, pp. AI, Al5.
54. Ibid., p. Al5.
55. Ibid.
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Japan, China's main foreign benefactor, though slow in its response to the crackdown and unwilling to take immediate sanctions,
finally took steps that cast doubt on the future of billions of dollars in
aid projects generally deemed crucial to China's economic development. The Japanese government announced, on June 7, 1989, the suspension of economic development and cultural missions to Beijing in
the coming weeks and case-by-case reviews of aid projects already underway, especially those that might be affected by the upheaval. 56
On June 27, 1989, leaders of the 12-nation European Economic
Community, after a two-day summit, condemned "the brutal repression" taking place in China, called for an embargo on arms sales to
China and other sanctions, and urged the World Bank to postpone
new loans to Beijing to protest the crackdown. 57 At the 15th annual
economic summit meeting in Paris in mid-July, leaders of the world's
most powerful democracies also condemned China for bloodily crushing student-led protests with tanks and troops. 58
Even though most Asian countries have been generally restrained
in their condemnations of China, Southeast Asian allies of the United
States expressed, on July 7, 1989, their strong support for the China
policy of the United States at the 1989 annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 5 9
.On August 31, 1989, a United Nations panel, a subcommission of
the United Nations Human Rights Commission, voted 15 to 9, by secret ballot, to have the full commission examine the charge that China
brutally suppressed the student pro-democracy movement in violation
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, China was
placed on a list of countries accused of seriously violating their citizens' human rights. The full commission will consider the charges at
its annual meeting in 1990. 60 Amnesty International, based in
London, also issued a preliminary report to detail and criticize China's
human rights violations since June 3, 1989. 61
As summarized above, foreign and international reaction to the
56. Steven R. Weisman, "Japan, China's Main Foreign Benefactor, Puts Billions in Aid
in Doubt," New York Times, June 7, 1989, p. AlO.
57. "Beijing Refuses to be Intimidated by West," Hong Kong Standard, June 30, 1989,
p. 10.
58. R.W. Apple, "Leaders in Paris Argue Over China," New York Times, July 14,
1989, p. A6.
59. Steven Erlanger, "Asian Allies Back U.S. China Policy," New York Times, July 8,
1989, p. 3.
60. Paul Lewis, "UN Panel Puts China on List of Human Rights Defendants," New
York Times, Sept. 1, 1989, p. AS.
61. Amnesty International, "People's Republic of China: Preliminary Findings on
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Beijing crackdown has been fairly strong. Even though different countries have adopted different responses, nearly all Western nations,
some developing countries, and even a few communist nations, such as
Hungary, have criticized or condemned China in one way or another.
Some of the sanctions adopted by Western nations remain intact even
today. China has indeed suffered serious setbacks on the international
front.
It is obvious that the Chinese leadership decided to ignore the
international outcry at the time of the crackdown in order to consolidate its internal political position. China, of course, has refused to be
intimidated by the West and has insisted that as a sovereign nation, it
has "the right to handle its internal aft'airs," 62 thus ignoring the fact
that human rights are a universal concern and that China has signed
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nevertheless, Beijing, concerned with its diplomatic difficulties, has made
great efforts to improve its international standing since July, 1989.
Some changes have taken place. Japan, for instance, which has not
been very consistent in its dealings with China, has gradually relaxed
its restrictions on contact and exchanges with the PRC. The Foreign
Ministers of Japan, the United States, France, and Great Britain did
meet and talk with their Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, in Paris at
the end of July, 1989, and again in late September when they gathered
to discuss the Cambodian and other issues at the United Nations annual meeting in New York. No changes in their respective policies
toward China were made, however. China has also attempted to improve its relations with Communist countries63 and developing nations
by high-level contacts or aid programs. Premier Li Peng's 1989 state
visits to Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh were designed to break Beijing's diplomatic isolation. 64
The United States, for its part, has also made some efforts to improve its relations with China. Washington, for instance, repeatedly
attempted to negotiate with Beijing to find a solution to the question of
Fang Lizhi, an astrophysicist and China's best-known dissident who,
along with his wife Li Shuxian, took refuge in the United States EmKillings of Unarmed Civilians, Arbitrary Arrests and Summary Executions Since June 3,
1989," London, 1989.
62. See supra note 57.
63. China's relations with the Soviet Union and North Korea have significantly improved. Growing protests and reforms in Eastern Europe have made it impossible for Beijing to improve its relations with East European countries.
64. Li Peng's state visits to the three Asian nations were prominently reported in
China's official organ, People's Daily (Overseas edition), Nov. 15, 1989, p. 1.
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bassy in Beijing after China labelled Fang a "traitor." On June 25,
1990, China allowed Fang and his wife to leave the American Embassy in Beijing for London for "medical treatment," apparently after
an agreement was reached by Fang, China and the United States. 65
Despite Congressional criticism, the United States Government
granted, in July, 1989, a waiver to Boeing to deliver four jetliners to
China. 66 President Bush sent his National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft to Beijing, in July and again in December, 1989, to improve
U.S.-Chinese relations. More recently he renewed China's most favored nation status against wide congressional opposition. Besides
lifting martial law in Beijing and Tibet and the release of some dissidents from jail, China has done very little to ease its policy of
repression. 67
In late October and early November, 1989, former President
Richard Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, respectively, visited Beijing with the blessing of the Bush Administration.
Apparently neither made breakthroughs in the rebuilding of ChineseAmerican relations. Beijing obviously expected Washington to take
the initiative, 68 and Washington was not yet ready to make a major
change in its policy toward China. 69 Kissinger, noting that both countries had an interest in stability and peace, urged both Washington and
Beijing to "take steps together to put relations onto a smooth path. " 70
While the Bush Administration has been reaffirming the wisdom
of a "measured response" to China by insisting on the importance of
"maintaining open lines of communication" despite the Beijing crack65. The Fang Lizhi question is summarized in Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Names a
Culprit Behind Student Unrest," New York Times, June 10, 1989, p. 5. See also Thomas L.
Friedman, "U.S. and Chinese Seek to Resolve Rift on Dissident," New York Times, July 8,
1989, pp. 1, 22. For a discussion of Fang's release, see Sheila Rule, "Chinese Dissident to
Study in U.S. and to Speak Out," New York Times, July 14, 1990, p.5.
66. For a summary of the U.S. response to China's crackdown on the democracy
movement, see James D. Seymour, The International Reaction to the 1989 Crackdown in
China, New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute, 1990, pp. 11-14.
67. For China's release of 211 dissidents, see Nicholas Kristof, "China Announces Release From Jail of 211 Dissidents," New York Times, May 11, 1990, pp. AI, A7. For
Bush's decision to renew China's most favored nation status see R. W. Apple, "Bush Holding Normal Trade Ties From the Soviets," New York Times, May 25, 1990, pp. AI, All.
68. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Better Relations Depend on the U.S., Deng Tells Nixon,"
New York Times, Nov. 1, 1989, p. AS.
69. Andrew Rosenthal, "Nixon Talks of China at White House Dinner," New York
Times, Nov. 7, 1989, p. A13.
70. Sheryl WuDunn, "Kissinger, in Beijing, Seeks to Mend Fences," New York Times,
Nov. 9, 1989, p. A19.
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down, 71 Congress has moved to impose more sanctions on China than
those President Bush is willing to accept. In late November, 1989,
Congress approved a package that imposes two years of sanctions, including a suspension of trade assistance and an end to insurance for
American companies doing business in China. It also freezes the export of satellites, helicopters and certain nuclear materials and components72. President Bush did not sign the proposed bill into law.
Congress wants more sanctions written into law in view of China's
massive human rights violations, whereas the Administration does not
want to jeopardize the common U.S.-Chinese strategic interests. 73
Despite a slight improvement in China's international standing,
Beijing's foreign relations remain in considerable trouble. The only
bright spot is China's greatly improved relations with the Soviet Union
as a result of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's summit meeting
with Chinese leaders in Beijing on May 15-17, 1989 and Premier Li
Peng's visit to Moscow in May, 1990. The summit meetings led to the
normalization and strengthening of Sino-Soviet relations after a 30year rift. 74 The normalization has strengthened Beijing's position in
the triangular relationship among China, the Soviet Union, and the
United States.
In the face of Western sanctions, moving closer to Moscow is now
an official option for China but it is not a very realistic one. Conflicting national interests still divide the two nations, and China is still
very suspicious of the Soviet Union. The two Communist giants do
not share similar views on political and economic reforms nor on how
to respond to political unrest. Moreover, Moscow cannot provide Beijing with the kind of investment funds and advanced technology that
China needs for its modernization drive and that can be made available to China only by Japan, the United States and other Western
countries. Moving closer to Moscow, therefore, is not a realistic option, and there are no indications that China has been moving in that
direction. 75 In its modernization efforts, China still needs Western,
71. Steven Erlanger, "Asian Allies Back U.S. China Policy," New York Times, July 8,
1989, p. 3.
72. Sheryl WuDunn, "China at Congress Sanctions," New York Times, Nov. 10, 1989,
p. A6.
73. Former U.S. Ambassador to China Winston Lord has suggested steps by China
that might invite positive responses from Washington, including the lifting of martial law,
termination of the ideological campaigns against foreign ideas, and better human rights
protection. See his article, "China and America: Beyond the Big Chill," in this volume.
74. For a discussion of the 1989 Sino-Soviet summit, see Henry A. Kissinger, "Seeking
a New Balance in Asia," Newsweek, May 22, 1989, p. 51.
75. For a discussion ofU.S.-China and China-U.S.S.R. relations, see Nicholas D. Kris-
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especially American, technology and investments very much despite
better relations with the Soviets. After the crackdown, however, such
Western technology and investment funds have become much less
available to China.
Besides setbacks in its relations with the West, China has also
suffered setbacks in its competition with Taiwan on the diplomatic
front. 76
Pursuing a policy of "sole recognition" until recently, Taiwan began a campaign, in late 1988, to overcome its diplomatic isolation by
getting countries to switch their diplomatic recognition from Beijing
to Taipei or to recognize both governments at the same time. Taipei's
offensives have succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations, since
July, 1989, with such developing countries as Grenada, Liberia, and
Belize, all of which had recognized Beijing as the "sole legal government of China." Taipei has apparently taken full advantage of China's
diplomatic difficulties created by the crackdown to strengthen Taiwan's international standing.
With its huge foreign trade surplus, enormous foreign exchange
reserves, and acknowledged expertise in economic development based
on the "Taiwan model," Taipei has been in a good position to offer
economic aid to developing countries and replace China as a powerful
champion for the causes of the Third World.
Taiwan's recent moves have led China to conclude that Taipei
has adopted a "more flexible policy" that would allow dual recognition of both Beijing and Taipei, thus creating a "two-China" or "one
China and one Taiwan" situation. Such a strategy is designed to allow
Taiwan to remain separate forever from the Mainland in the view of
Beijing.
China's sense of urgency is not merely due to its recent defeats on
the diplomatic front but also to its fear of Taiwan's true intention on
the question of re-unification. In unequivocal terms, Beijing has stated
that "there is no flexibility to speak of" on the question of "one
China" and the "unification of the motherland. " 77
Besides verbal attacks on Taipei, Beijing has suspended its relatof, "Relations with U.S. Seem Badly Hurt by Crushing Democracy Protests," New York
Times, June 11, 1989, p. 16.
76. For a discussion of the recent confrontations between Beijing and Taipei on the
diplomatic front, see Winston L.Y. Yang, "Diplomatic Dilemma May Prompt Drastic
Move," Hong Kong Standard, Nov. 4, 1989, p. 8.
77. Sheryl WuDunn, "China Says Taiwan is 'Buying Hearts' Abroad", New York
Times, Oct. 15, 1989, p. 10.
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tions with Grenada, Liberia, and Belize to demonstrate its firm rejection of "dual recognition" by third countries.
But the question remains: What else can or will Beijing do to
punish Taipei besides the fierce verbal attacks? The following are
thought to be steps likely to be taken by China against Taiwan:
• Intensified actions to frustrate Taiwan's efforts to
participate in certain international and regional organizations;
• Greater pressure on countries with which China has
maintained diplomatic ties not to improve their relations or
establish formal ties with Taipei;
• Increased economic aid to Third World countries;
and
• Creating problems or difficulties in the people-topeople exchanges between the two sides. 78
None of the above, however, are easy or effective options for
China except efforts to prevent Taiwan from joining or returning to
certain regional or world organizations, which has already been
China's official policy. China's recent successful move to block
Taipei's membership at the International Management Society and its
decision not to consider Taiwan's membership application at the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) until its acceptance of
China as a member, are clear signs of Beijing's determination to further isolate Taiwan internationally.
China's recent economic difficulties and limited foreign exchange
reserves have made it impossible for Beijing to offer more aid to developing countries. Pressure on countries with which China has maintained official relations will not be effective without extensive aid to
match Taipei's substantial economic assistance plan.
Moves designed to create difficulties in unofficial exchanges with
Taiwan will greatly harm the improved relations between the two sides
and damage prospects for more contacts and eventual re-unification.
Thus, such moves clearly run counter to China's long-term interests.
The only other option would be to create a. disturbance on the
Taiwan Straits, which has enjoyed considerable peace and stability for
many years. Such an action would create psychological pressure on
Taiwan without the use of force. Taiwan's prosperity and growing
economic strength have been maintained by many factors, including
its people's confidence in the future of Taiwan. If such confidence
78. See supra note 76.
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were shaken by Beijing, more citizens would flee to foreign countries
and investment in Taiwan would inevitably decline. Ultimately, Taiwan's foreign trade and prosperity would be affected.
Such actions, if taken by Beijing, would force the United States,
Japan, and other Western countries to condemn China, thus creating
more diplomatic problems for Beijing. Such moves would also increase Taiwan's determination to resist China's pressure and effort to
move toward eventual re-unification with China. All these would, no
doubt, harm China's long-term interests.
Beijing's recent diplomatic setbacks in its confrontations with
Taipei have thus placed China in a dilemma. Under Taipei's aggressive diplomatic offensive, combined with huge aid projects, more developing countries may abandon China and establish formal ties with
Taipei. Taipei, therefore, expects more diplomatic victories. There is
not much China can do to effectively frustrate Taipei's diplomatic
offensives.
Beijing's diplomatic defeats by Taipei are not the direct result, of
course, of the Chinese crackdown, but Taipei has taken full advantage
of Beijing's weakened international position to hasten its diplomatic
successes.
Since late November, 1989, China has made some progress in improving its foreign relations. Beijing has established diplomatic ties
with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Singapore. There are no indications
that Western countries, especially the United States, will be ready to
lift all their sanctions against China soon. The brutal suppression has
had, indeed, a great impact on China's foreign relations. Beijing paid
a heavy price in terms of foreign relations for the crackdown, even
though it remains to be seen how enduring the negative effects will be.
IMPACI' ON HONG KONG, TAIWAN, AND
OVERSEAS CHINESE
The impact of the massacre in Beijing in June, 1989, on Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese has been so great that it is probably beyond the comprehension of the CPC leadership. The reaction of
Chinese residing outside the Chinese mainland to the massacre was
unusually strong. In Hong Kong, for instance, well over 10,000 people gathered in Victoria Park on May 20, 1989, to support the Chinese
student democracy movement.'9 On June 4, the residents of Hong
Kong demonstrated in huge numbers to protest the massive killings in
79. Barbara Basler, "Hong Kong Turns Out in Protest Against Its Once and Future
Ruler," New York Times, May 21, 1989, p. A18.
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Beijing while revealing their deep shock and distress over the violent
crackdown. 80 On one occasion in May, approximately one million
people, roughly a sixth of the entire population of Hong Kong, participated in demonstrations to support the democracy movement in
China. 81 Some Hong Kong protesters even called for the postponement of the British-Chinese negotiations on the details of the return of
Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty.
But on June 7, 1989, plans for a series of rallies to mourn the
victims of Beijing's military suppression of June 4 were cancelled after
a violent confrontation between the police force and a group believed
to be provocateurs from China. The organizers of the pro-democracy
movement, however, continued their call for a token strike, and many
Hong Kong residents observed a moment of silence for the Beijing
protesters killed on June 4. 82 After the student democracy movement
began in China in April, 1989, Hong Kong residents, 98 percent of
whom are ethnically Chinese, held rallies at first to express their hope
and support for the democratic aspirations of Chinese students and
then to show their anger and sorrow after the crackdown. They were
afraid that the Chinese government, after the return of the British colony to Chinese control in 1997, would, as in Beijing in 1989, suppress
political and economic freedoms in Hong Kong.
Thus, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, upon his
arrival in Hong Kong on July 2, 1989, to restore the island's confidence in its future but without concrete plans, was jeered by angry
crowds. 83 The Hong Kong residents' fear of the approaching 1997
reversion of the territory to China was quite obvious.
All these reveal the profound concern of Hong Kong residents
over the future of the island as a result of China's brutal killings in
Beijing. A deep fear of China and a sense of distrust, uncertainty, and
desperation soon emerged in Hong Kong. China's confidence crisis
has become more serious than ever in Hong Kong and a smooth transition from British rule to Chinese sovereignty seems unlikely.
Fear about the 1997 reversion led 46,000 people, mostly professionals, to emigrate in 1988, and the number intending to leave has
skyrocketed since the massacre in Beijing. In 1990, residents are emi80. Richard Bernstein, "Vast Hong Kong Crowd Protests Beijing's Action,'' New York
Times, June 5, 1989, p. A12.
81. Ibid.
82. Barbara Basler, "Hong Kong Cancels Mourning Rallies," New York Times, June 8,
1989, p. A14.
83. Fox Butterfield, "British Foreign Secretary is Booed by Angry Crowds in Hong
Kong,'' New York Times, July 3, 1989, p. A6.
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grating at the rate of over 1,000 a week, and the capital outflow soared
in 1989 to nearly $5 billion. 84
·
For those who are unable to leave, the CPC crackdown and
China's confidence crisis sparked a new political :consciousness.
Shaken and betrayed, Hong Kong residents demanded more guarantees before 1997 and would like to speed up the timetable for Hong
Kong's first direct elections, designed to insure some form of local democracy before 1997. 85 A stronger democratic system is needed, it is
widely believed in Hong Kong, to protect the territory after the 1997
reversion to China. 86
There is not much Hong Kong can do, of course, to insure its
own future, even though Chinese leaders, such as CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin, have repeatedly pledged, since the June 4 crackdown, that the Chinese policy towards Hong Kong remains
unchanged. 87 Chinese pressure on the Hong Kong government not to
allow the territory to be used as a base for "subverting" Chinese has
grown in recent months. 88 Officials of the New China News Agency
(NCNA) cited some of the measures that the Hong Kong government
had taken to "restrain the anti-PRC subversive activities." 89 Soon afterwards, the Hong Kong government indeed took the necessary steps,
such as its refusal to allow certain members of the Chinese student
democracy movement organizations to enter Hong Kong90 and to restrain anti-Chinese activities. All these steps have painfully revealed
Hong Kong's sense of hopelessness and helplessness in the face of
China's growing pressure and the approaching reversion to Chinese
controP 1 Hong Kong has indeed become, since the June 4 massacre
in Beijing, a city frightened of its future and obsessed with one dateJuly 1, 1997- and tom between those who can leave and the 60 per84. Ibid. See also Nicholas Kristof, "Foreign Passports Tell of a Desperate Hong
Kong," New York Times, May 16, 1990, p. Al2.
85. Fox Butterfield, "Hong Kong Fears China's Hard Line,'· New York Times, June
18, 1989, p. A12.
86. Barbara Basler, "In Hong Kong, Black Signs to Denote Horror," New York Times,
June 11, 1989, p. A17.
87. Tammy Tam, "Hong Kong Policy Stays Same, Says Jiang," Hong Kong Standard,
June 29, 1989, p. 1.
88. Barbara Basler, "China Says Hong Kong Apologized in Dispute," New York
Times, Oct. 25, 1989, p. AS.
89. Ibid.
90. See, for instance, a report published in the Chinese language newspaper World
Journal (New York), Nov. 10, 1989, p. 3.
91. Many reports on the tense relations between China and Hong Kong have been
published. See, for instance, a report which appeared in the international edition of one of
Taiwan's Chinese language newspapers, Central Daily News, October 27, 1989, p. 1.
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cent or so who cannot afford to leave. 92 The mood of grim desperation, as pointed out by Margaret Scott, a long-time Hong Kong
resident and observer, is a far cry from the euphoria that engulfed
Hong Kong before June 4, when crowds of close to a million jammed
the streets in support of China's democracy movement. 93 Hong Kong
is thus trapped between a looming Chinese motherland which the
Hong Kong residents cannot change or democraticize and the departing British colonial rulers who they feel are betraying them by refusing
to allow most of the local Chinese to emigrate to Britain. 94 The choice
for those unable to leave seems to be either to beg London for protection or to participate in movements designed to change the Chinese
motherland. Both are impossible and unrealistic choices.
The enormous erosion of confidence is very apparent in Hong
Kong. London has been under added pressure to negotiate stronger
safeguards for Hong Kong before the 1997 reversion and to allow
more Hong Kong residents to enter Britain. Both are impossible tasks
for Britain to accomplish. 9 s The future of Hong Kong has thus become much grimmer after the 1989 massacre in Beijing.
As for the impact of Tiananmen on Taiwan, it is equally profound
but less dramatic. Like the Chinese in Hong Kong, the Taiwan Chinese also participated in massive demonstrations after the June 4
events in support of China's democracy movement, even though
Taipei's official pronouncements remained very cautious. This caution
is probably due to Beijing's allegation that Taiwan was involved in the
democracy movement on the mainland. But there is very little that
the Chinese in Taiwan, like those in the British colony, can do to influence developments on the mainland.
In the immediate wake of the violent crackdown in Beijing, however, Taiwan established direct telecommunication links with the
mainland96 in order to meet the growing demands of the people. People-to-people contacts and exchanges dropped sharply after June 4,
1989 and the number of Taiwan's tourists and those who visited the
mainland for family reunions also decreased considerably. Taiwan's
investment in China and the two-way trade declined as well, even
92. Margaret Scott, "Hong Kong on Borrowed Time," New York Times Magazine,
October 22, 1989, p. 31. See also David Sanger, "As Hong Kong Elite Are Leaving, Japanese Investors Are Moving In," New York Times, May 29, 1990, pp. AI, D6.
93. Ibid
94. Scott, "Hong Kong on Borrowed Time," supra note 92, p. 32.
95. David M. Lampton, supra note 14, p. 9. The author points out that Hong Kong's
project investment in China was immediately slowed by the 1989 massacre.
96. Ibid.
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though no official statistical reports have been released. A gradual increase in various economic fields has been registered, however, since
late 1989.
Those in Taiwan who advocated an eventual re-unification with
China were of course shocked by the brutal killings in Beijing. Their
aspirations and hopes were inevitably dashed by the CPC action.
China's attempts to woo Taiwan back to "the fold of the motherland"
have been significantly damaged by the Chinese crackdown,97 even
though considerable progress had been made in contacts and exchanges since 1987. The "mainland fever" on Taiwan largely disappeared after June 4, 1989.
Beijing's violent actions have also made Taiwan more determined
than ever to resist Chinese pressures to move toward re-unification. 98
The independence movement in Taiwan seems to have been strengthened by China's violent action.
As discussed earlier, Taiwan has also taken advantage of China's
weakened international position (created by the Chinese crackdown)
by launching diplomatic offensives, which led to the establishment of
official ties between Taipei and several developing countries, including
Grenada, Liberia, and Belize. Beijing, in tum, suspended its relations
with them in order to avoid the "dual recognition" situation and denounced Taiwan for its "two China" or "one China and one Taiwan"
policy. Rejecting Beijing's charges, Taiwan has since stepped up its
efforts designed to expand its foreign relations. Thus, renewed tension
on the diplomatic front has appeared in Beijing-Taipei relations since
late 1989. 99
There have been some casualties of the worsening relations
caused by the massacre in Beijing and by the Taipei-Beijing diplomatic
rivalry. Plans for allowing ships to travel directly between Taiwan
and the mainland have been put aside, and direct transport is likely to
be delayed. 100
Whatever the impact of the 1989 Chinese massacre on Taiwan
may be, Beijing's goal of an eventual re-unification with Taiwan has
now become more remote than ever. The brutal killings have also reinforced a growing sense of self-confidence in Taiwan in its own political and economic system. 101 The widening gaps in various fields
97. Ibid.
98. Winston L.Y. Yang, supra note 76, p. 9..
99. Ibid.
100. Nicholas D. Kristof, ''Taiwan Pulls in a Hand Extended to the Mainland," New
York Times, August 20, 1989, p. D2.
101. Ibid.
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between the two sides have made many in Taiwan more skeptical
about reunification. They have become more distrustful of the CPC
and skeptical of the prospects for political links. 102 The violent Chinese actions in 1989 have widened considerably the differences and
gaps between the two sides.
As for the overseas Chinese, they were equally disturbed and angered by Beijing's military crackdown. Shortly after June 4, 1989,
overseas Chinese in many countries, especially those in the United
States and Western Europe, organized huge rallies in support of the
Chinese student democracy movement and to protest the violent actions of the government. For the first time since Deng Xiaoping began
his modernization and reform drives in the late 1970's, overseas Chi- .
nese were united in their condemnation of China's brutal killings. On
May 20, 1989, for instance, thousands of Chinese marched on the Chinese Embassy in Washington to support Beijing's student democracy
movement.l 03 Rallies were also held on June 10, 1989 in a number of
American cities to support the pro-democracy movement and to protest the brutal killings in Beijing. 104 In addition, overseas Chinese
have contributed financially to funds established to assist the pro-democracy movement.
Overseas Chinese have also strongly supported organizations
formed by leaders of the democracy movement who fled to the West
soon after the crackdown. Yan Jiaqi, Wuer Kaixi, Wan Runnan,
Chen Yizhi and others formed, in Paris on September 24, 1989, the
Federation for a Democratic China (FDC), which is dedicated to the
promotion of democracy in China. The FDC aims at "safeguarding
basic human rights, upholding social justice, promoting a private
economy, and terminating the one-party dictatorship in China." 105
Large numbers of overseas Chinese in Europe, the United States, and
elsewhere, have shown their support for the FDC and other pro-democracy organizations. Overseas Chinese residents and Chinese students and intellectuals abroad seem to have formed a unified front in
their struggle for democracy in China. 106 Support for the CPC regime
has decreased drastically in the wake of the massacre in Beijing.
After the oppression, the democracy movement has been carried
102. Ibid.
103. "Students March on Embassy in Washington," Star-Ledger, May 21, 1989, p. A32.
104. "Rallies Are Held Across U.S. to Back Protesters in China," New York Times,
June 10, 1989, p. 7. Other reports appear on p. 5.
105. "The Federation for a Democratic China," Paris, 1989, p. 3.
106. For a brief report on the resistance movement after the crackdown, see Russell
Watson and others, "Underground in China,'· Newsweek, July 10, 1989, p. 26.
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on by underground leaders in China and by overseas Chinese and exiled Chinese intellectuals and students abroad. "The seeds of democracy and freedom," as pointed out by Yan Jiaqi, Chairman of the
FDC, "have been planted, and as long as there is an underground, the
government will not be able to stamp all of them out." 107
FUTURE PROSPECTS

As discussed above, the impact of the 1989 student democracy
movement and the subsequent crackdown by the CPC authorities has
been profound. China's political stability and orderly succession plans
have been disrupted. The reform faction, headed by the purged former CPC General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, has suffered a serious setback, if not a complete defeat. The new, divided leadership headed by
Jiang Zemin is confronted with crises on many fronts and can hardly
deal with them in any effective way despite Deng Xiaoping's personal
support of Jiang, a newly emerged technocrat who has no power base
of his own within either the CPC or the PLA. After the death of
Deng, now 86, an inescapable crisis will begin. Deng's passing may
lead to a party split and an intense power struggle. Today's policies,
programs, and power alignments may very well wither. China's future
has become more uncertain than ever.
In fact, long before the 1989 student uprising, the CPC's power
and authority had been eroding. The CPC has been further weakened
by the brutal killings because public support for the CPC has significantly declined. In fact, the CPC has become extremely unpopular
with the masses.
As a result of Tiananmen, China's economic reforms and modernization drive have suffered serious setbacks and political reforms
have come to a virtual end. Today China still attempts to carry on
normal cooperation with the West, but has greatly reduced its cultural
and educational exchanges with Western nations. The scale of the
open-door policy has obviously been significantly reduced.
China's economic problems have escalated due to the democracy
movement, the CPC's military suppression, and Western economic
sanctions imposed after the crackdown. Beijing is now confronted
with mounting economic difficulties on many fronts.
On the international front, Beijing's setbacks are starkly apparent. Western economic and diplomatic sanctions have driven China to
an inevitable isolation. International support for China has declined
sharply; it now comes mainly from small developing countries.
107. Ibid.
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The crackdown has also reinforced China's confidence cnsts
among the overseas Chinese and the Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The reaction of overseas Chinese and those in Hong Kong and
Taiwan to China's brutal killings was uniformly negative. Overseas
Chinese support for the CPC and PRC has declined sharply; large
numbers of them have organized to oppose the CPC. China's
problems in Hong Kong, especially its confidence crisis, have become
even more serious as Hong Kong moves toward the 1997 reversion.
The violent PLA actions in Beijing have greatly weakened the reunification movement in Taiwan and reinforced Taiwan's resistance to
more cooperation with Beijing. The prospects for the re-unification of
China have now become more remote than ever.
Even though the CPC authorities have successfully suppressed
the student movement, the democracy drive is now being carried on by
underground organizations. The effectiveness of this underground
resistance movement can be gauged by its ability to help hundreds of
the leaders of the democracy movement, such as Chai Ling in April,
1990, escape arrest or flee to the West. Thousands of Chinese students
and intellectuals abroad have formed organizations to carry on the
unfinished task of the 1989 student democracy movement. In due
time, these underground and overseas movements could present a serious political challenge to the CPC and openly renew the democracy
movement in China.
Our discussion of Tiananmen's aftermath has shown its great impact on many fronts. Having celebrated the 40th anniversary of the
founding of the PRC on October 1, 1989, China is now confronted
with grave political, economic, and other problems and crises. Even
though martial law has been lifted, and a sense of stability has returned, at least on the surface, the People's Republic, approaching 41,
remains at great odds with the people. A decade of reform is now in
shambles.
Hundreds of Beijing University students marched, defying a huge
display of police and security forces, around the campus, in the predawn hours of June 4, 1990, to mourn the student democracy protesters killed precisely one year earlier. About 2000 students and faculty
members roamed the campus from 11 p.m. to 2 a.m. Elsewhere Beijing was generally peaceful, as the government displayed huge security
forces in many parts of the capital. The police set up many roadblocks
throughout the city and sealed off the entire university district to pre-
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vent demonstrations and protests. 108 Chinese authorities obviously
tightened security and closed Tiananmen Square in an effort to head
off any commemoration of last year's June 4th army attack on student
protesters. 109
In Hong Kong, more than 100,000 people, most of them dressed
in the mourning colors of white and black, participated on June 3,
1990 in a march to honor the pro-democracy protestors who were
killed in the military crackdown in Beijing last June 4th. The huge
crowd proves beyond doubt that the Chinese policy of trying to intimidate Hong Kong has failed. While China has made many promises to
Hong Kong in view of the approaching 1997 transfer of the territory
to Chinese control, few have faith in those pledges anymore. More
than 1,000 educated, talented entrepreneurs and professionals are leaving Hong Kong each week, and more local firms have moved their
bases to foreign countries and are looking for investments outside
Hong Kong. 110 The confidence crisis in Hong Kong has worsened one
year after the military crackdown in Beijing.
In New York, Washington, Boston, and many other cities in the
world, demonstrations commemorating the first anniversary of the
suppression of the democracy movement in China were held on June
3, 1990. 111 President Bush and Congressional leaders also criticized
China. 112
On the economic front, business is in a deep slump for most foreign firms with offices in China on the first anniversary of the 1989
bloody suppression of the democracy movement. The hard times stem
from China's austerity and economic retrenchment programs, curbs
on imports and credits, and uncertainties in China's economic reforms
and policies. The foreign business community in China has been filled
with pessimism on China's trade.
On the political front, the Chinese political system is widely regarded today as in a deadlock. Mixed signals show that the rival factions have only succeeded in blocking each other instead of initiating
new policies. There is no clear sign of China's direction. All policy
108. Nicholas Kristof, "Hundreds March in a Protest at Beijing University," New York
Times, June 4, 1990, p. A7.
109. "China Beefs up Security on Tiananmen Eve," (AP dispatch), Sunday Star-Ledger,
June 3, 1990, Section 1, p. 2.
110. Barbara Basler, "Hong Kong Honors Beijing's Victims," New York Times, June 4,
1990, p. A7.
111. Ibid.
112. Susan F. Rasky, "Bush Nudges China on Anniversary of Crackdown," New York
Times, June 5, 1990, p. A9.
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and personnel changes seem to have been postponed to avoid the impression of instability as China is still being remotely controlled by a
"gang of elders." China's future is on hold with elders like Deng
Xiaoping in power. 113 China's political uncertainty is clear.
As for the Chinese people, a bitter memory has turned into disillusionment and indifference. Passive resistance from a sullen population has been apparent. 114 As widely reported, people do not seem to
have any confidence in the CPC or the PRC government. us Nor do
people believe in anything. The sense of emptiness and purposelessness has become particularly acute since the 1989 crackdown. 116 As
of mid-1990, China's future prospects remain grim indeed. 117

113. Sheryl WuDunn, "Pessimism on Chinese Trade," New York Times, June 4, 1990,
pp. Dl, D6.
114. Nicholas Kristof, "China's Future on Hold With a 'Gang of Elders'," New York
Times, June 3, 1990, p. 20.
115. Ibid.
116. Nicholas Kristof, "Marxism Died and Left a Big Hole in Their Lives," New York
Times, May 18, 1990, p. A4.
117. Even though China announced the release of 211 of those arrested after the 1989
crackdown, China continued to make new arrests in May-June, 1990. At least two democracy advocates, including Liu Qing, a leader of the Democracy Wall movement in 1978-79
who spent a decade of his life in prison for his political beliefs, were arrested on May 25,
1990. See Sheryl WuDunn, "2 China Dissidents Detained in May," New York Times, May
31, 1990, p. AS. Also, three prominent dissidents vanished on May 31, 1990 and were
probably detained. See Nicholas Kristof, "Mystery in Beijing: the Vanishing Dissidents,"
New York Times, June 1, 1990, p. A5. All three reappeared later. For a very recent report
on the ugly images of China's crackdown, see "The Death of Democracy," Newsweek, June
4, 1990, pp. 28-29.

NOTES ON THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS
Winston L.Y. Yang, a Chinese-American scholar who received
his Ph.D. in Chinese Studies from Stanford University, is Professor
and Chairman of the Department of Asian Studies, Seton Hall University, South Orange, N.J. An expert on contemporary China, Dr. Yang
has published extensively on Chinese (mainland and Taiwan) affairs.
His articles and reviews have appeared in China Quarterly, Journal of
Asian Studies, Asian Affairs, Encyclopaedia Britannica, etc. His recent
books include China's Reunification: Problems and Obstacles (Washington: HeldrefPublications, 1987) and The 1989 Chinese Democracy
Movement (Hong Kong: Pai Shing Publishing Co., 1990).
Marsha Wagner, who received her Ph.D. from the University of
California at Berkeley in 1975, is on the East Asian Studies faculty of
Columbia University and also serves as Director of Columbia's C.V.
Starr East Asian Library. Her books include Wang Wei (Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981) and Locus Boat: The Origins of Chinese
Tz'u Poetry in T'ang Popular Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). In the mid-1980s she was Vice President of China
Institute in America.
Hungdah Chiu, who received his S.J.D. degree from the Harvard
Law School, is Professor of Law at the School of Law of the University of Maryland. His many books include People's China and International Law, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1974), China: 70 Year After the 1911 Hsinhai Revolution (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1984), Criminal Justice in PostMao China (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985)
and The Future of Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1987).
Orville Schell is a journalist and freelance writer who has published extensively on Chinese affairs and other topics in Atlantic
Monthly, The New York Times Magazine, and other publications. His
recent books include To Get Rich is Glorious-China in the Eighties
(New York: Patheon, 1985) and Discos and Democracy-China in the
Throes of Reform (New York: Patheon, 1988).
Nicholas D. Kristof, Beijing Bureau Chief of The New York
Times, has published many reports on China in the Times and The
New York Times Magazine. He and his wife Sheryl WuDunn, also a
New York Times correspondent in Beijing, won the 1989 Pulitzer Prize
(291)

292

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

in International Reporting for their extensive, timely, and in-depth reports on Tiananmen.
David Aikman is a former chief of Time's Beijing Bureau. He
joined the magazine as a correspondent in 1971 and is currently based
in Washington. A specialist in Soviet and Chinese affairs and in Communism generally, he has also been the magazine's bureau chief in
Moscow, Jerusalem and Eastern Europe. Educated at Oxford University and the University of Washington, where he received a Ph.D. in
Russian and Chinese history, he is the author of Pacific Rim: Area of
Change, Area of Opportunity (Little, Brown, 1986) and the editor of
Love China Today (Tyndale House, 1978).
Russell Watson is a Senior Editor of Newsweek, specializing in
foreign news. He has written many articles on China for Newsweek
from reporting by Newsweek correspondents in Beijing and elsewhere.
Sandra Burton is Time's Beijing Bureau Chief and former Hong
Kong Bureau Chief. A graduate of Middlebury College, she joined
Time as a secretary in 1964 and became a correspondent in 1970. She
was awarded the Edward R. Murrow Fellowship of the Council on
Foreign Relations in 1986. She is the author of Impossible Dream: the
Marcoses, the Aquinos and the Unfinished Revolution (Warner Books,
1989).
Harrison Salisbury, who received the 1955 Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting for his in-depth reports on the Soviet Union, was a
New York Times correspondent in Moscow and later became Time's
foreign editor. He has published many books on China and the Soviet
Union.
John Fincher, who received his Ph.D. in Modem Chinese History
from Harvard University, is on the East Asian Studies faculty of the
Australian National University. Currently on Harvard's visiting
faculty, he has published many books and articles on modem China.
Stanley Rosen, who received his Ph.D. in Political Science from
the University of California at Los Angeles, teaches political science at
the University of Southern California. He is the author of Red Guard
Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Westview,
1982), the co-author of Survey Research in the People's Republic of
China (USIA, 1987), and has co-edited On Socialist Democracy and
the Chinese Legal System (Sharpe, 1985) and Policy Conflicts in PostMao China (Sharpe, 1986). He edits the journal Chinese Education.
His current projects include the study of youth, public opinion and
social change in China.
Winston Lord, who received his education from the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, was a former Am-

EDITORS AND CoNTRIBUTORS

293

bassador to China. He played an important role in assisting Richard
Nixon and Henry Kissinger in their 1972 historic opening of China.
Chu-yuan Cheng, who received his Ph.D. in Economics from Georgetown University, is President of Sun Yat-sen Institute in America
and Professor of Economics at Ball State University. He has published many books on China's economy, including China's Petroleum
Industry (Praeger, 1976), China's Economic Development (Westview,
1981), Sun Yat-sun's Doctrine in the Modern World (Westview, 1989)
and Behind the Tiananmen Massacre (Westview, 1990).

INDEX

A

Adie, Kate, 97, 105, 108
Afghanistan, 236, 241, 242
Africa, 241, 243
Agence France Presse, 132
Aikman, David, 4, 81
All China Women's Federation, 68
American Broadcasting Corp. (ABC), 30, 82, 140
Amnesty International, 9f, 275, 275f
Anderson, Donna, 134, 135
Andropov, Yuri, 148
Anhui, China, 7, 263
Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign, 49, 248, 268
Anti-Rightist Campaign, 231
Anti-spiritual Pollution Campaign (1983), 128
Apple, R. W., 271, 275f, 277f
Arrest and Detention Act, (1979), 11f
Asia, 243, 244, 257, 275
Asia Television Corp., Hong Kong, 107
Asian Development Bank, 189, 195, 271
Asian Olympic Games (1990), 151, 207
Associated Press (AP), 99
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 242, 275
Australia, 26, 275
Australian National University, 4
Autonomous Students' Union of Beijing Universities, 82
B

Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery, Beijing, 116
Baker, James III, 125
Ball State University, 5
Bangladesh, 276
Bao Tong, 175, 176, 181, 183
Baoding, China, 93
Baotu, 143
Barnett, Doak, If
(295)

296

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Bamsley, Pamela, 13
Basler, Barbara, 281f, 282f, 283f, 289f
Bei Dao, 27, 47, 212
Beidaihe, China, 91, 163, 164, 165
Beijing, China, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 18, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, 42,
45, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 61, 64, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 79, 81,
83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 102, 103,
105, 106, 107, 108, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 122, 125, 127, 128,
129, 135, 136, 137, 140, 144, 145, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153,
154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 166, 171, 172, 175, 176,
179, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 192, 194, 195, 197, 200, 201, 205,
219, 230, 231, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243,
244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 253, 255, 256, 259, 265, 266, 270,
273, 274f,275, 276, 276f, 277, 278, 279, 279f, 280, 281, 282, 283,
284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289
Beijing Aeronautics Institute, 51
Beijing Astronomical Obervatory, 23
Beijing City Revolutionary Committee, 11
Beijing Communist Party Committee, 11, 46
Beijing Daily, 50, 214
Beijing Hospital, 172
Beijing Hotel, 83, 97, 101, 108, 112, 115, 117, 142, 166
Beijing Military Region, 92
Beijing Municipal Government, 49
Beijing Municipal Higher People's Court, 9, 11
Beijing Municipal Intermediate People's Court, 8, 11, 18
Beijing Normal University 45, 54f, 73, 82, 86, 113
Beijing Radio, 141
Beijing Railroad Station, 81
Beijing Spring, 156, 187, 192
Beijing Students' Federation, 52f, 56, 60, 61f, 69, 71
Beijing University, 4, 26, 42, 43, 43f, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 48f 49, 50, 5lf,
52, 52f, 54f, 55, 56, 57, 59, 59f, 62, 62f, 63, 64, 66, 70, 73, 74, 86,
118, 128, 133, 174, 205, 205f, 213, 225, 226, 288,
Bejing University Hunger Strikers' Group, 66, 70
Beijing University Students' Solidarity Committee, 51
Beijing World Trade Center, 151
Beijing Zoo, 3, 7, 263
Beijingzhan Street, Beijing, 100
Beixinhua Street, Beijing, 116
Belize, 279, 280, 285
Berstein, Richard, 266f, 282f

INDEX

297

Birch, Cyril, 64f
Bo Yi, 64, 64f
Boeing Aircraft Co., 277
Bolivia, 35
Boston, Mass., 289
Brazil, 41
Britain, 10, 274, 276, 284
British Broadcasting Corp (BBC), 78, 97, 105, 108, 158
Brookings Institution (Washington), 41
Burton, Sandra, 5, 59f
Bush, George, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 122, 125, 133, 181, 229, 237,
245, 271, 271f, 274, 277, 277f, 278, 289
Butterfield, Fox, 3, 7f, 10f, 263f, 270f, 282f, 283f

c
Cable News Network (CNN), 117
Caccamo, Paul, 105
Cai Yuanpei, 227
Cambodia, 239, 241, 242, 276
Canada, 25
Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), 10
Canton, See Guangzhou
Cao Siyuan, 180
Carter, Jimmy, 193
CCP, see The Communist Party of China(CPC)
Centerville, Va., 118
Central America, 237, 241, 243
Central Art Academy, 72
Central Communist Party School, 68
Chai Ling, 64, 68, 71, 72, 73, 82, 84, 113, 288
Chairman Mao's Memorial Hall, 104
Chang, David Wen-Wei, 1f
Chang Taiyu, 211f
ChanganAvenue,Beijing, 83, 86,87, 88 89,90,94,95,96,97,98,99,
100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117,
118
Changchun, China, 105, 144
Changsha, China, 41
Chen Di, 72
Chen Pingyuan, 47
Chen Xitong, 47f, 84, 127, 152, 173, 176, 181
Chen Yizhi, 286

298

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Chen, Yun, 124, 147, 172, 181, 193
Cheng, Chu-yuan, 5, 253, 255
Cheng, Joseph Y.S., 37
Cheng Ming, 146
Cheng, Peter P., 1f
Chengdu, China, 93, 218, 265
Chi, Haotian, 92, 93, 94, 137
Chiang Ching-kuo, 274f
Children's Hospital, Beijing, 108
China, Republic of, See Taiwan, Republic of China
China Central Television (CCTV), 50, 67, 83,130,134,140,141
China Daily, 149
China International Trust & Investment Corp. (CITIC), 131
China 1989 Democracy Movement Archives, 47, 50, 54f, 57f, 62f
Chinese Academy of Sciences, 23, 48
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 131
Chinese National Tourism Administaration, 256
Chinese Political Consultative Committee, 226
Chinese Red Cross, 118
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 37
Chinese Youth, 207, 210, 216, 224
Chinese Youth Daily, 207, 211, 223
Chinese Communist Youth League, see Chinese Youth League(CYL)
Chinese Youth League (CYL), 206, 208, 209, 211, 223, 224
Chiu, Hungdah, 3, 7, Sf, 47f
Chongqing, China, 219
Clough, Ralph N., lf
Columbia Broadcasting Corp. (CBS), 30
Columbia University, 4
Committee for Scholarly Exchange with the People's Republic of
China, 43f
Commune System, 40, 42, 190, 198
Communist Party of China (CPC), 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 19, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47f, 49, 51, 52, 54f, 55,
56, 58, 59, 59f, 65, 66, 68, 73, 77, 80, 81, 82, 86, 90, 138, 140, 147,
148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 159, 163, 166, 167, 168, 174, 175, 180,
184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196, 199, 200,
203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 215, 216, 217, 225, 230, 232, 249,
254, 258, 264, 265, 265f, 266, 266f, 267, 268, 272, 273, 281, 283,
285, 286, 287' 288, 290
Communist Party of China, Central Committee, 14, 42, 90, 123, 129,
139, 148, 153, 206, 272

INDEX

299

Communist Party of China, Central Committee, Politbureau, 78, 92,
137, 171, 178, 179, 192, 194
Communist Party of China, Central Committee, Politbureau, Standing Committee, 43, 55, 149, 159, 173, 180, 181, 189, 192, 196,
224, 267
Communist Party of China, Central Military Commission, 92, 137,
146, 160, 161, 162, 167, 176, 191, 192, 193, 194, 264, 268, 269f
Communist Party of China, Propaganda Dept., 90, 191, 194, 224
Communist Party of China, 13th Congress, 2f,193, 194, 264, 267
Connecticut, 4, 157
Coordinting Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, 247
Counter-Revolutionary Act (1951), 8, 10, llf
Cui Sian, 44
Cultural Revolution, 4, 7, 39, 41, 49, 52, 64f, 81, 145, 146, 159, 161,
168, 173, 176, 185, 192, 194, 199, 203, 204, 206, 216, 225, 231,
234, 235
D

Da Sha La Street, Beijing, 89
Dadi(Great Earth), 11
Dalai Lama, 250
Dalian, China, 141
Dallas Morning News, 103
Daqing, China, 48f, 260
Datong, China, 93
Datsun, 24
De-Maoization, 191
"Democracy Salons,", 44, 45, 46, 47, 47f, 59
Democracy University, 72, 98
Democracy Wall, 3, 7, 18, 27, 47, 187, 209, 248, 263
Democratic Party (U.S.), 39
Deng Liqun, 191
Deng Xiaoping, 1, 12, 14, 15, 16, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 35, 39, 40, 41,
46, 47, 51, 55, 56, 68, 76, 91, 93, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 136, 137,
138, 139, 140, 144, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 159, 160,
161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176,
177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192,
193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 201, 202, 210, 226, 227, 229, 230,
232, 234, 235, 242, 254, 257, 258, 266, 267, 268, 269, 269f, 286,
287, 287, 289
Dictatorship of the Proletariat,9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 54
Dongdan Street, Beijing, 100

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

300

Dongzhimen, Beijing, 95
Dongzhimenwai Street, Beijing, 94
Duke, Michael S., 58f

E
East Asia, 188, 190, 201
Eastern Europe, 79, 186, 188, 202, 207, 234, 241, 276f
Economic Structural Reform Research Institute, China, 257
Econimic, Technical and Social Development Center, China, 257
8341 Pegiment, 158
Elliott, Dorinda, 60f
Emperor Hirohito, 28
Enlightenment Daily, SO
Erlanger, Steven, 275f, 278f
Eurocommunism, 21
Europe, 10, 233, 236, 246, 286
European Commission, 274
European Economic Community, 274, 275
Exploration (Tan-Shuo), 3, 7, 13, 18, 21, 263

F
Faison, Seth, 54f
Falkenheim, Victor C., 264f
Fan Weizhong, 258
Fang Lizhi, 3, 23, 23f, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 46, 47, 47f, 48, 133,
141, 152, 227, 264, 265f, 276, 277, 277f
Far Eastern Economic Review, 118
Farnsworth, Clyde H., 271
Fathers, Michael, 111
Federation for a Democratic China (FDC), 2, 156, 286, 287
Federation of Autonomous Students Unions of Beijing Universities
and Colleges, 51, 52, 60,
Feringer, Alexis, 117
Feuchtwang, Stephen, 1f
Fiat, 149
15th Airborne Division, China 94
"Fifth Modernization", 18, 20, 47
Fifth of April Forum, 18
Fincher, John, 4, 185, 267f
Fitzwater, Marlin, 31
Florcruz, Jaime A., 59f
Forbidden City, Beijing, 105, 110, 115, 159, 168

INDEX

301

Four Cardinal Principles, 19, 54, 54f, 76, 147, 208, 215
Four Modernizations, 20, 27,263
40th Army, China, 93
France, 10, 131, 274, 276
French Revolation, 47, 210
Friedman, Milton, 152
Friedman, Thomas L., 274f, 277f
Fu Manchu, 252
Furlan University, 213, 220
Fulbright Program, 239
Fuxingmen, Beijing, 105
Fuyou Street, Beijing, 87, 105

G
Gang of Elders, 80, 138, 148, 289
Gang of Four, 16, 20, 22, 49, 159, 160, 163, 185, 192, 210, 252
Gao Wenyu, 18
Gao Xin, 73, 86
Garden City, New York, 105
Gate of Heavenly Peace, See Tiananmen
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 247, 280
Germany, Federal Republic of, 274
Glasnost, 42, 188, 200
Goddess of Democracy Statue, 72, 82, 97, 110, 121, 188
Gorbachev, Mikhails, 28, 41, 42, 62, 64, 79, 160, 161, 163, 176, 177,
188, 189, 190, 192, 202, 235, 236, 241, 278
Great Hall ofthe People, 29, 50, 51, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 92, 95, 96, 107,
111, 112, 113, 114
Great Wall, 39, 149, 168, 169
Great Wall Sheraton Hotel, 23, 24, 30
Grenada, 279, 280, 285
Griffin, Nick, 107, 111
Guandao, 43
Guangdong, China, 259
Guangzhou, 35, 204, 213, 217, 218, 219
Guangzhou Institute for Educational Research, 218, 219
Gulf War, 237
H
Haidian District, Beijing, 54
Han Minzhu, 44f, 45f, 47f, 48f, 49f, 51f, 52f, 53f, 55f, 56f, 58f, 61f, 62f,
63f, 69f, 70f, 74f

302

CONTEMPORARY

AsiAN

STUDIES SERIES

Hangzhou, China, 219
Hangzhou University, 205
Harding, Harry, 41
Harpers and Queen, 13
Harvard University, 4
He Dongchang, 223
He Xin, 207
Hebei, China 92
Helms, Jesse, 125
Heshang, see River Elegy
Hong Kong, 2, 9, 26, 37, 45, 48, 79, 82, 84, 86, 104, 107, 111, 130, 136,
139, 143, 146, 149, 151, 152, 155, 185, 186, 195, 197, 201, 211,
218, 225, 233, 234, 239, 246, 247, 256, 259, 281, 282, 283, 284,
287' 288, 289
Hong Xuezhi, 137
Horley, David, 25, 30
Hou Dejian, 73, 74f, 85, 86, 112, 114
Howe, Geoffrey, 282
Hu Qiaomu, 191
HuQili, 147,175,178
Hu Shi, 227
Hu Yaobang, 1, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 75, 78, 157, 158, 159, 164, 171,
172, 187' 192, 193, 194, 264, 265, 265f
Hua Guofeng, 10, 16, 168, 269
Hua Sheng, 44f, 45f, 47f, 48f, 49f, 5lf, 52f, 53f, 55f, 56f, 58f, 61f, 62f,
63t 66t 69t 70f, 74f
Huang Ziping, 47
Hukou, 144
Hukoubu, 143
Hunan, China, 168
Hunan Teachers' College, Changsha, 64f
Hungary, 187
"Hunger Strike Manifesto," 73, 74, 74f
Hurel, Pierre, 100, 101
I

LF. Stone's Weekly, 196
Ignatius, Adi, 267, 270f, 27lf, 273f
Illinois, University of, 226
Independent, 111
India, 236, 243
Indochina, 242

INDEX

303

Inner Mongolia, China, 93
Institute of Population Research, Beijing University, 35
International Management Society, 280
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 260
International Visitors Program (U.S.), 238
Internationale, 41, 113, 188
Iran, 236
Israel, 237
Italy, 274
J
Japan, 186, 233, 236, 243, 255, 259, 271, 275, 276
Jiang Qing, 160, 216
Jiang Zemin, 2, 129, 148, 151, 155, 167, 168, 181, 189, 225, 227, 258,
268, 269, 283, 287
Jiangsu, China, 220
Jianguo Hotel, Beijing, 102
Jianguomenwai, Beijing, 96, 102, 131, 134
Jingxi Hotel, Beijing, 180
K

Kahn, Joe, 103
Kang-Hua Co., 254
Kautskyism, 21
Kenan, George, 251
Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant, Beijing, 101, 106, 112
K.G.B., 148
Khmer Rouge, 236, 242
Khrushchev, Nikita, 190
Kissinger, Henry, 5, 277, 278f
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, 236, 239, 241, 242, 276
Korea, Republic of, 31, 40, 41, 55, 158, 195, 233, 236, 239, 241, 242
Korean War, 37
Kristof, Nicholas D., 2f, 3, 4, 33, 58f, 59, 59f, 71, 72, 171, 265f, 266f,
267t 268t 269t 273t 277t 278t 283t 285t 288t 290f
Kunlun Hotel, Baijing, 24, 25
Kuo, Shirley, 189, 201
L

Lampton, David M., 266f, 284f
Landy, John, 100
Laurie, James, 140

304

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Law, Willy Wo-Lap, 58f
Lee Feigon, 52f, 64f
Lee Kuan Yew, 257
Lee, T.D., 226, 227
Lee Teng-hui, 125, 201
Lee Tze-chung, 152
Lei Feng, 206, 210, 260, 261
Lei Xiding, 34
Leng, Shao-chuan, Sf
Leninism, 21
Leung, Julia, 271f
Lewis, Paul, 275f
Leyton, Stuart, 64f
Li Cheng, 264f
Li Peng, 26, 29, 33, 35, SO, 55, 63, 68, 70, 77, 77f, 78, 81, 82, 89, 97,
103, 112, 122, 124, 125, 127, 134, 138, 146, 147, 148, 162, 164,
165, 167, 168, 173, 178, 179, 180, 181, 188, 193, 194, 195, 196,
197, 198, 200, 201, 226, 227, 255, 257, 258, 267, 268, 276, 276f,
278
Li Ruihuan, 189, 224
Li Shuxian, 23, 47, 133, 141, 277
Li Xiannian, 148, 173, 176, 181, 193
Li Zhibo, 139
Liberia, 279, 280, 285
Lin Biao, 185
Lin Jianhong, 221, 222, 223
Link, Perry, 24, 25, 30, 31, 133, 265f
"Little Red Book", 52
Liu Binyan, 155, 156, 157, 264, 265f
Liu, Melinda, 3, 7f
Liu Qing, 27, 290f
Liu, Shaoqi, 161
Liu Xiaobo, 73, 74, 86, 113
Liu, Zhengwei, 224
Liubukou, Beijing, 87
Lo, Carlos Wing-hung, llf, 12f
London, 23f, 108, 275, 277, 284
Long March, 138, 154, 157, 161, 189, 192, 235
Lord Acton, 39
Lord, Bette Bao, 29
Lord, Winston, 5, 29, 229, 278f
Lu Xun, 184, 227

INDEX

305

M
Macao, 130, 195, 225
"Mandate of Heaven", 39
Mao Xiangdong, 103
Mao Zedong, 1, 14, 15, 16, 21, 38, 39, 49, 52, 54, 64, 64f, 81, 82, 88,
91, 121, 160, 163, 164, 165, 167, 190, 192, 195, 197, 204, 206, 208,
215, 258, 261, 269
Maoism, 34, 38, 44, 202, 269
Mapai ("Mahjong Faction"), 44
Martial Law, 1, 33, 40, 63, 68, 70, 71, 77, 78, 81, 82, 84, 91, 92, 94, 95,
96, 109, 112, 123, 124, 128, 129, 135, 146, 150, 162, 180, 181, 183,
188, 190, 194, 201, 232, 239, 265, 267, 277
Marxism, 21, 39, 208, 213, 215, 224, 242
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, 18, 19, 20, 54f, 130, 208
Maryland, University of, 3 .
May Fourth Movement, 26, 27, 44, 45, 47, 52, 60, 61, 210
Middle East, 241, 243
Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution, 90
Ming Pao, 136
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, 132, 180, 193
Ministry of Justice, China, 28
Ministry of National Defense, China, 87, 159
Ministry of Public Security, China, 87, 112
Ministry of Radio, Film & Television, China, 90
Ministry of State Security, China, 99
Minzu Hotel, Beijing, 99, 117
Mongolia, 79, 236
Monument to the People's Heroes, 47, 64, 82, 85, 97, 101
Moody's Investors Service, 271
Moscow, USSR, 148, 235, 236, 237, 238, 241, 242, 278
Mueller, Michael, 108
Museum of the Chinese Revolution, 104
Muxidi, Beijing, China, 83, 100, 266f
Muxidi Bridge, Beijing, 98, 101

N
Nambia, 237
Nanjing, China, 55
Nanyuan Military Airfield, Beijing, 93, 94, 101
Nathan, Andrew J., 76f, 77f
National Broadcasting Corp. (NBC), 30

306

CONTEMPORARY

AsiAN

STUDIES SERIES

National People's Congress(NPC), 11, 27, 47, 47f, 49, 64f, 72, 82, 139,
152, 180, 187, 188, 195, 239
Nepal, 276
Netherlands, 274
New China News Agency (NCNA), 108, 154, 283
New Delhi, India, 100
"New May Fourth Manifesto", 43
New York, New York, 38, 140, 289
New York Times, 3, 4
Newsweek, 4
Nexus, 106
The Nineties, 132
Nixon, Bob, 70f, 74f
Nixon, Richard, 5, 230, 231, 277
Nobel Prize in Peace, 156
Northern Ireland, 67
0
Oksenberg, Michael, 126, 264f
Oregon, U.S.A., 99
p

The Pacific, 39, 249
Pakistan, 243, 276
Palace Hotel, 105
Paris, 2, 275, 286
Paris-Match, 100
Peace Corps, 249
Pear, Robert, 265f
Peking, see Beijing
Peking University, See Beijing University
Pell, Claiborne, 126
Peng, Zhen, 124, 139
Peopel's Armed Police, 24, 87, 88, 90
People's Daily, 35, 41, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 65, 69, 76, 78, 138, 141,
144, 151, 157, 159, 160, 174, 175, 176, 177, 187, 194, 195, 196,
212
People's Liberation Army (PLA).7,33, 58, 70, 77,81, 83, 84, 85. 86, 87,
89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 105, 106, 109, 110, 111,
112, 116, 117, 121, 122, 132, 138, 149, 151, 158, 160, 166, 167,
168, 171, 173, 179, 183, 185, 188, 191, 194, 196, 198, 200, 232,
233, 236, 243, 245, 255, 256, 265, 266, 268, 269, 269f, 287, 288

INDEX

307

People's University, 45, 49, 49f, 51, 52f, 53f, 56
People's University Students' Autonomous Union, 62f
Perestroika 42
Perez de Cuellar, Jauier, 274
Persian Gulf, 241, 243
Peugeot SA, 256
The Philippines, 188
Poland, 140, 173
"Polish Syndrome," 186, 187
Political Science and Law College of China, see University of Political
Science and Law
Political Science Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 97
Pomfret, John, 99
Presnick, Mitch, 118
Protect Tiananmen Headquarters, 71, 72
Provisional Students' Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges,
51, 53, 53f, 58, 58f, 60
Public Security Bureau, Beijing, 11, 24, 30, 57, 85, 132, 141, 142, 158
Pyongyang, Korea, 173, 194, 242
Q
Qian Linzhao, 48f
Qian Qichen, 276
Qian Xuesen, 226, 227
Qianmen, Beijing, 96, 106
Qianmen Road, Beijing, 96, 116
Qiao Guanhua, 38
Qiao Shi, 122, 148, 174, 178, 180
Qijiayuan Foreign Compounds, Beijing, 102
Qin Jiwei, 125, 137
Qin Shi Huang Di, 38, 39
Qincheng No. 1 Prison, 7
Qing Dynasty, 37, 39
Qinghua University, 45, 51, 53, 56, 59, 64f, 142, 205, 225
Qinghua University Students Union, 56
Qu Yuan, 64
Queen Elizabeth, 168
R

Radio Beijing, 118
Rasky, Susan F., 289f
Reagan, Ronald, 28, 251

308

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Red Guards, 7, 81, 212
River Elegy, 43, 169, 210, 217
Rosen, Stanley, 4, 203, 204f, 205f, 210f, 264f
Rosenthal, Andrew, 277f
Rui Xingwen, 175
Rule, Sheila, 23f, 277f
Rural Development Research Center, China, 257
Russell, Bertrand, 213

s
Salisbury, Harrison, 4, 157
Saudi Arabia, 236
Schell, Orville, 2, 23f, 47f, 265f
Schweisberg, David, 113, 118
Scott, John, 13
Scott, Margaret, 284, 284f
Scowcroft, Brent, 277
Seoul, Korea, 201
Seton Hall University, 5
17th Army, China, 94
70th Army, China, 93
Seymour, James, 277f
Shanghai, China, 29, 35, 36, 41, 55, 56, 139, 144, 148, 181, 189, 196,
215, 255, 265, 268
Shanghai Normal Institute, 213
Shangri-La Hotel, 30
Shekou, 211
Shekou Storm, 212, 216
Shen Tong, 62
Shenyang, China, 72, 93, 103
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 211, 219, 260
Shijiazhung, China 92
Shouyang Mountain, 64f
Shu Qi, 64, 64f
Sichuan, China, 41, 93
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 242
Simmie, Scott, 70f, 74f
Singapore, 195, 257
Sino-British Joint Agreement on Hong Kong, 152
Sino-Soviet Summit Meeting (1989), 141, 176, 235
Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 10, 18, 19
16th Army China, 94

INDEX

309

65th Army, China, 93, 94
67th Army, China, 89
69th Army, China, 94
Solarz, Stephen, 125
South Africa, 67
South Asia, 242
Southeast Asia, 275
Southerland, Daniel, 62f
Southern California, University of, 4
Soviet Republic of Georgia, 173
Soviet Union, 21, 28, 31, 41, 42, 62, 187, 225, 234, 236, 241, 242, 249,
276f, 278, 279
Spain, 274
Special Economic Zones(SEZ), 130, 148, 210, 217, 219
"Spiritual Pollution", 49
Stalin Automobile Factory(Moscow), 148
Stalin, Joseph, 160
Stalinism, 21
State Council, China, 129, 153, 187, 192, 193, 257
State Education Commission, China, 207, 223, 226
State Family Planning Commission, China, 35
State Planning Commission, China, 258
State Statistical Bureau, China, 273
Statue of Liberty, New York, 188
Stone Computer Corp., 73
Students' Dialogue Delegation of Beijing Universities, 62, 62f, 63
Su Shaozhi, 130, 216, 216f
Su Wei, 48f
Su Xiaokang, 43, 210
Sun Jiaming, 221, 222, 223
Sun Yat-sen, 226, 227
Sun Yong, 33
Supreme People's Court, China, 9
Supreme People's Procuratorate, China, 145
Sweden, 274
T

Taipei, Taiwan,201, 274f, 279, 279f, 280, 281, 284
Taiwan, Republic of China, 2, 5, 9, 36, 37, 40, 73, 85, 125, 136, 185,
189, 195, 197, 201, 225, 233, 239, 245, 246, 274, 274f, 279, 279f,
280, 281, 284, 285, 287, 288
Taiwan Straits, 36, 244, 245

310

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Tam, Tammy, 283f
Tan Zuenling, 11
Tanaka Kakuei, 230
Tang Shaoming, 224
Tang Yijie, 47
Tan-shuo, see Exploration (Tan-shuo)
Tawney, R. H., 234
Temple of Heaven, Beijing, 101
Temple of Heaven Park, Beijing, 94
Texas, 25
Third World, 279, 280
38th Army, China, 56, 93, 94
39th Army, China, 103
Thompson, Mark V., 47f, 50f, 56f, 63f, 70f, 77f
Thurston, Anne T., 256f
Tian Jiyun, 267
Tiananmen Square, 1, 2, 5, 33, 44f, 49, 50, 52, 52f, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62,
64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91,
92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,
108, 109, 110, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,
112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128,
130, 131, 135, 140, 146, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167,
168, 169, 171, 174, 177, 119, 182, 183, 186, 187, 189, 191, 199,
200, 202, 206, 207, 208, 210, 216, 253, 256, 259, 265, 266, 266f,
284, 287, 288
Tiananmen Incident (1976), 13, 16, 49, 50
Tianjin, 189
Tibet, 29, 239, 249, 240, 277
Time, 4
TOPEL, 212
Tokyo, Japan, 28, 140, 236, 243
Tongxian County, Hebei, China, 83
Tufts University, 117
27th Army, 90, 94, 97, 98, 101, 106, 107, 109, 110, Ill, 128, 131, 135,
136, 191
28th Army, 93, 94

u
Uerkesh Daolet, See Wuer Kaixi
Underdeveloped Countries, 36
Union Medical College, 90, 107, 108
United Nations, 38, 237, 243, 274, 275, 276

INDEX

311

United Nations Human Rights Commission, 275
United Press International (UPI), 100, 113, 118
United States, 1, 5, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 38, 41, 44, 64, 91, 145,
180, 201, 237, 238, 240
United States Ambassador to China, 5, 25, 29, 31
United States Congress, 125, 240, 249, 278, 289
United States Department of State, 128, 134
United States Embassy (Beijing), 23, 23f, 25, 133, 134, 141, 277
United States Information Agency, 238
United States Laison Office, (Beijing), 28
United States Senate, 126
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10, 12, 275, 276
University of Political Science and Law, 60, 62, 118, 128
University of Science and Technology, 23, 264

v
Vadivostok, USSR, 201
Victoria Park, Hong Kong, 281
Vietnam, 18, 21, 94, 236, 242
Voice of America, 78, 153, 158, 239

w
Wagner, Marsha, 4, 43
Walesas, Lech, 140
Wan Li, 180, 181
Wan Runnan, 286
Wang Bingqian, 151
Wang Chaohua, 69, 73
Wang Dan, 43, 44, 45, 59, 61, 63, 64, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77f, 85
Wang Fang, 153
Wang Hai, 94
Wang Jinxi, 206
Wang, Xiaoyi, 11
Wang Xizhe, 27
Wang, Yizhou, 210, 216
Wang, Zhen, 43, 139
Wangfujing Street, Beijing, 115, 117
Washington, D.C., 4, 29, 31, 96, 235, 236, 237, 238, 241, 242, 243,
244, 245, 246, 276, 277, 278f, 289
Watson, Burton, 64f
Watson, Russell, 4
Watson, Sandra, 4

312

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Wei Jingsheng, 3, 7, 7f, 9, 10, 11, llf, 12, 13, 18, 19, 27, 47, 47f, 187,
263
Wei Wei Po, 152
Weinraub, Bernard, 274
Weisman, Steven, 275f
Western Europe, 259, 286
Western Hills, Beijing, 92, 97, 116
White, Lynn, 264f
White House, 30
Wong, Jean, 24
World Bank, 255, 271, 271f, 275
World Economic Herald, 196
Wu Hanzhi, 254f
Wu Jialang, 40
Wu Muran, 52f
Wu, Yuan-Li, 3
Wu Zuxiang, 47
WuDunn, Sheryl, 265f, 268f, 269f, 270f, 271f, 273f, 277f, 278f, 279f,
290f
Wuer Kaixi, 43, 44f, 59, 60, 61, 64, 69, 70, 71, 73, 77, 142, 156, 286
Wuhan, China, 55, 91, 162, 181, 265
Wuhan Military Region, China, 94
Wuhan University, 212, 213
X
Xian China, 41, 55, 218, 219
Xiang Xiaoji, 62, 73
Xiao Yang, 124
Xidan, Beijing, 88, 90, 106
Xidan Wall, Beijing, 263
Xie Hua, 9f
Xing Zhong, 9f
Xinhua News Agency, See New China News Agency
Xinhuamen, Beijing, 49
Xinjiang, China, 36
Xu Wenli, 27
Xu, Xin, 137

y
Yan Jiaqi, 35, 97, 102, 156, 177, 210, 216, 286, 287
Yan Mingfu, 69, 174, 177, 179,
Yanan, China, 161

INDEX

313

Yang Baibing, 92, 137
Yang Guohua, 204f
Yang Jiahua, 94
Yang Shangkun, 25, 26, 29, 55, 70, 96, 94, 124, 136, 137, 146, 149,
155, 160, 161, 163, 164, 167, 173, 179, 180, 189, 192, 193, 194,
195, 200, 267, 268, 269
Yang, Winston L.Y., 1, 5, 263, 265f, 279f, 285f
Yangtze River, 42
Yanjing Hotel, 83
Yao Yilin, 148, 178, 181, 257
Yao Yongzhan, 139
Ye Jun, 214, 215
Yellow River, 168, 169
Yellow Sea, 91
Yi Mu, 47f, 50f, 56f, 63f, 70f, 77f
Yongdingmen Bridge, Beijing, 83
Yongdingmen Street, Beijing, 94, 97
Yuan Mu, 60, 134, 153, 225
Yuan Zhiming, 210
Yue Daiyun, 47
Yuyuantan Park, Beijing, 98

z
Zhang Dainian, 47
Zhang Gong, 116
Zhang Haidi,. 210
Zhang Hanzhi, 37, 38
Zhang Jianzhong, 145
Zhang Weiying, 210, 21 Of
Zhao Ziyang, 2, 4, 29, 43, 55, 61, 92, 98, 122, 124, 125, 127, 129, 137,
138, 139, 146, 147, 152, 153, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165,
172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 187,
189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202,
231, 257, 259, 264, 267, 267f, 268, 269, 287
Zheng Ming, see Cheng Ming,
Zheng Tuobin, 149
Zhongnanhai, 23
Zhongnanhai, 49, 84, 87, 88, 90, 95, 105, 123, 137, 155, 158, 159, 169,
171, 173, 174, 176, 178, 180
Zhongshan University 213
Zhou Duo 173
Zhou Dynasty, 64f

314

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Zhou Enlai, 49, 161, 168, 174, 196, 226, 227
ZhouFengsuo, 142
Zhou Tuo, 86
Zhou Yongjun, 60
Zhou Yongyun, 73
Zhu Born, 210
Zhu Ziqing, 64f

